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AN  INQUIRY  INTO  THE  NATURE  OF  PEACE 
AND 

THE  TERMS  OF  ITS  PERPETUATION 


BOOKS  BY  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN 

THE  THEORY  OF  THE  LEISURE  CLASS 
THE  THEORY  OF  BUSINESS  ENTERPRISE 
THE  INSTINCT  OF  WORKMANSHIP 

IMPERIAL  GERMANY 

AND  THE  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTION 

THE  NATURE  OF  PEACE 

AND  THE  TERMS  OF  ITS  PERPETUATION 

THE  HIGHER  LEARNING  IN  AMERICA 


AN  INQUIRY  INTO 

l\ 

THE  NATURE  OF  PEACE 

AND 

THE  TERMS  OF  ITS  PERPETUATION 


BY 

THORSTEIN  VEBLEN 


fndt 

B.  W.  HUEBSCH 
1919 


All  rishts  reserved 


/72  . i 
)/3‘=)S  T- 


Copyright,  1917, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 
Published  April,  1917  : 
Reprinted  August,  1917. 

New  edition  published  by 
B.  W.  HUEBSCH, 

January,  1919. 


1 


PREFACE 


It  is  now  some  122  years  since  Kant  wrote  the  essay, 
Zum  ewigen  Frieden.  Many  things  have  happened  since 
then,  although  the  Peace  to  which  he  looked  forward 
with  a doubtful  hope  has  not  been  among  them.  But 
many  things  have  happened  which  the  great  critical  phil- 
osopher, and  no  less  critical  spectator  of  human  events, 
would  have  seen  with  interest.  To  Kant  the  quest  of  an 
enduring  peace  presented  itself  as  an  intrinsic  human 
duty,  rather  than  as  a promising  enterprise.  Yet  through 
all  his  analysis  of  its  premises  and  of  the  terms  on  which 
it  may  be  realised  there  runs  a tenacious  persuasion  that, 
in  the  end,  the  regime  of  peace  at  large  will  be  installed. 
Not  as  a deliberate  achievement  of  human  wisdom,  so 
much  as  a work  of  Nature  the  Designer  of  things — Na- 
tura  daedala  rerum. 

To  any  attentive  reader  of  Kant’s  memorable  essay  it 
will  be  apparent  that  the  title  of  the  following  inquiry — 
On  the  nature  of  peace  and  the  terms  of  its  perpetua- 
tion— is  a descriptive  translation  of  the  caption  under 
which  he  wrote.  That  such  should  be  the  case  will  not, 
it  is  hoped,  be  accounted  either  an  unseemly  presumption 
or  an  undue  inclination  to  work  under  a borrowed  light. 
The  aim  and  compass  of  any  disinterested  inquiry  in 
these  premises  is  still  the  same  as  it  was  in  Kant’s  time ; 
such,  indeed,  as  he  in  great  part  made  it, — ^viz.,  a sys- 
tematic knowledge  of  things  as  they  are.  Nor  is  the 
light  of  Kant’s  leading  to  be  dispensed  with  as  touches 

vii 


VI 11 


Preface 


the  ways  and  means  of  systematic  knowledge,  wherever 
the  human  realities  are  in  question. 

Meantime,  many  things  have  also  changed  since  the 
date  of  Kant’s  essay.  Among  other  changes  are  those 
that  affect  the  direction  of  inquiry  and  the  terms  of  sys- 
tematic formulation.  Natura  daedala  rerum  is  no  longer 
allowed  to  go  on  her  own  recognizances,  without  divulg- 
ing the  ways  and  means  of  her  workmanship.  And  it  is 
such  a line  of  extension  that  is  here  attempted,  into  a 
field  of  inquiry  which  in  Kant’s  time  still  lay  over  the 
horizon  of  the  future. 

The  quest  of  perpetual  peace  at  large  is  no  less  a para- 
mount and  intrinsic  human  duty  today  than  it  was,  nor 
is  it  at  all  certain  that  its  final  accomplishment  is  nearer. 
But  the  question  of  its  pursuit  and  of  the  conditions  to 
be  met  in  seeking  this  goal  lies  in  a different  shape  today ; 
and  it  is  this  question  that  concerns  the  inquiry  which  is 
here  undertaken, — What  are  the  terms  on  which  peace 
at  large  may  hopefully  be  installed  and  maintained? 
What,  if  anything,  is  there  in  the  present  situation  that 
visibly  makes  for  a realisation  of  these  necessary  terms 
within  the  calculable  future?  And  what  are  the  conse- 
quences presumably  due  to  follow  in  the  nearer  future 
from  the  installation  of  such  a peace  at  large?  And  the 
answer  to  these  questions  is  here  sought  not  in  terms  of 
what  ought  dutifully  to  be  done  toward  the  desired  con- 
summation, but  rather  in  terms  of  those  known  factors 
of  human  behaviour  that  can  be  shown  by  analysis  of  ex- 
perience to  control  the  conduct  of  nations  in  conjunctures 
of  this  kind. 


February  1917 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

Introductory:  On  the  State  and  Its  Relation 
TO  War  and  Peace 

The  inquiry  is  not  concerned  with  the  intrinsic  merits 
ef  peace  or  war,  2 ; — But  with  the  nature,  causes  and 
consequences  of  the  preconceptions  favoring  peace  or 
war,  3;  — A breach  of  the  peace  is  an  act  of  the  govern- 
ment, or  State,  3 : — Patriotism  is  indispensable  to  fur- 
therance of  warlike  enterprise,  4;  — All  the  peoples  of 
Christendom  are  sufficiently  patriotic,  6;  — Peace  es- 
tablished by  the  State,  an  armstice  — the  State  is  an 
instrumentality  for  making  peace,  not  for  perpetuating 
it,  7;  — The  governmental  establishments  and  their 
powers  in  all  the  Christian  nations  are  derived  from 
the  feudal  establishments  of  the  Middle  Ages,  9 ; — Still 
retain  the  right  of  coercively  controlling  the  actions  of 
their  citizens,  ii; — Contrast  of  Icelandic  Commonwealth, 
12; — The  statecraft  of  the  past  half  century  has  been 
one  of  competitive  preparedness,  14;  — Prussianised  Ger- 
many has  forced  the  pace  in  this  competitive  prepared- 
ness, 20 ; — An  avowedly  predatory  enterprise  no  longer 
meets  with  approval,  21;  — When  a warlike  enterprise 
has  been  entered  upon,  it  will  have  the  support  of  popu- 
lar sentiment  even  if  it  is  an  aggressive  war,  22; — The 
moral  indignation  of  both  parties  to  the  quarrel  is  to 
be  taken  for  granted,  23 ; — The  spiritual  forces  of  any 
Christian  nation  may  be  mobilised  for  war  by  either  of 
two  pleas:  (i)  The  preservation  or  furtherance  of  the 
community’s  material  interests,  real  or  fancied,  and  (2) 
vindication  of  the  National  Honour;  as  perhaps  also  per- 
petuation of  the  national  “Culture,”  23. 

CHAPTER  II 

On  The  Nature  and  Uses  Of  Patriotism 

The  nature  of  Patriotism,  31 ; — Is  a spirit  of  Emu- 
lation, 33;  — Must  seem  moral,  if  only  to  a biased  popu- 
ix 


X 


Contents 


lace,  33 ; — The  cemmon  man  is  lufEciently  patriotic 
but  is  hampered  with  a sense  of  right  and  honest  dealing, 

38 ; — Patriotism  is  at  cross  purposes  with  modern  life, 

38;  — Is  an  hereditary  trait?  41;  — Variety  of  racial 
stocks  in  Europe,  43 ; — Patriotism  a ubiquitous  trait,  43 ; 

— Patriotism  disserviceable,  yet  men  hold  to  it,  46 ; — 
Cultural  evolution  of  Europeans,  48;  — Growth  of  a 
sense  of  group  soliditary,  49 ; — Material  interests  of 
group  falling  into  abeyance  as  class  divisions  have  grown 
up,  until  prestige  remains  virtually  the  sole  community 
interest,  51 ; — Based  upon  warlike  prowess,  physical 
magnitude  and  pecuniary  traffic  of  country,  54;  — Inter- 
ests of  the  master  class  are  at  cross  purposes  with  the 
fortunes  of  the  common  man,  57;  — Value  of  superiors 
is  a “prestige  value,”  ^7 ; — The  material  benefits  which 
this  ruling  class  contribute  are:  defense  against  aggres- 
sion, and  promotion  of  the  community’s  material  gain, 

60;  — The  common  defense  is  a remedy  for  evils  due 
to  the  patriotic  spirit,  61;  — The  common  defense  the 
usual  blind  behind  which  events  are  put  in  train  for 
eventual  hostilities,  62 ; — All  the  nations  of  warring 
Europe  convinced  that  they  are  fighting  a defensive 
war,  62;  — Which  usually  takes  the  form  of  a defense 
of  the  National  Honour,  63;  — Material  welfare  is  of 
interest  to  the  Dynastic  statesman  only  as  it  conduces 
to  political  success,  64; — The  policy  of  national  eco- 
nomic self-sufficiency,  67 ; — The  chief  material  use  of 
patriotism  is  its  use  to  a limited  number  of  persons  in 
their  quest  of  private  gain,  67;  — And  has  the  effect  of 
dividing  the  nations  on  lines  of  rivalry,  76. 

CHAPTER  III 

On  The  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  77 

The  patriotic  spirit  of  modern  peoples  is  the  abiding 
source  of  contention  among  nations,  77;  — Hence  any 
calculus  of  the  Chances  of  Peace  will  be  a reckoning 
of  forces  which  may  be  counted  on  to  keep  a patriotic 
nation  in  an  unstable  equilibrium  of  peace,  78 ; — The 
question  of  peace  and  war  at  large  is  a question  of  peace 
and  war  among  the  Powers,  which  are  of  two  contrasted 
kinds : those  which  may  safely  be  counted  on  spontane- 
ously to  take  the  offensive  and  those  which  wdll  fight 
on  provocation,  79;  — War  not  a question  of  equity 
but  of  opportunity,  81 ; — The  Imperial  designs  of  Ger- 
many and  Japan  as  the  prospective  cause  of  war,  82; 

— Peace  can  be  maintained  in  two  ways : submission  to 
their  dominion,  or  elimination  of  these  two  Powers; 

No  middle  course  open,  84;  — Frame  of  mind  of  states; 


Contents 


XI 


saen  and  popular  sentiment  in  a Dynastic  State,  84 ; — 
Information,  persuasion  and  reflection  will  not  subdue 
national  animosities  and  jealousies;  Peoples  of  Europe 
are  racially  homogeneous  along  lines  of  climatic  lati- 
tude, 88;  — But  loyalty  is  a matter  of  habituation,  89;  — 
Derivation  and  current  state  of  German  nationalism  94; 

— Contrasted  with  the  animus  of  the  citizens  of  a com- 

S monwealth,  103 ; — A neutral  peace-compact  may  be  prac- 
ticable in  the  absence  of  Germany  and  Japan,  but  it  has 
no  chance  in  their  presence,  106; — The  national  life  of 
Germany : the  Intellectuals,  108 ; — Summary  of  chapter, 

I id 

CHAPTER  IV 

Peace  Without  Honour  . . . , 118 

Submission  to  the  Imperial  Power  one  of  the  conditions 
precedent  to  a peaceful  settlement,  1 18 ; — Character 
of  the  projected  tutelage,  118; — Life  under  the  Pax 
Germanica  contrasted  with  the  Ottoman  and  Russian 
rule,  124 ; — China  and  biological  and  cultural  success, 

130- — Difficulty  of  non-resistant  subjection  is  of  a psy- 
chological order,  131 ; — Patriotism  of  the  bellicose  kind 
is  of  the  nature  of  habit,  134; — And  men  may  divest 
themselves  of  it,  140 ; — A decay  of  the  bellicose  nation- 
al spirit  must  be  of  the  negative  order,  the  disuse  of  the 
discipline  out  of  which  it  has  arisen,  142 ; — Submission 
to  Imperial  authorities  necessitates  abeyance  of  national 
pride  among  the  other  peoples,  144;  — Pecuniary  merits 
of  the  projected  Imperial  dominion,  145;  — Pecuniary 
class  distinctions  in  the  commonwealths  and  the  pe- 
cuniary burden  on  the  common  man,  150;  — Material 
conditions  of  life  for  the  common  man  under  the  modern 
rule  of  big  business,  156;  — The  competitive  regime, 
“what  the  traffic  will  bear,”  and  the  life  and  labor  of  the 
common  man,  158;  — Industrial  sabotage  by  business- 
men, 165 ; — Contrasted  with  the  Imperial  usufruct  and 
its  material  advantages  to  the  common  man,  174. 

CHAPTER  V 

Peace  and  Neutrality  . . , . 178 

Personal  liberty,  not  creature  comforts,  the  ulterior 
springs  of  action  of  the  common  man  of  the  democratic 
nations,  178;  — No  change  of  spiritual  state  to  be  looked 
for  in  the  life-time  of  the  oncoming  generation,  185; 

— The  Dynastic  spirit  among  the  peoples  of  the  Empire 


Contents 


xii 


will,  under  the  discipline  of  modern  economic  conditions, 
fall  into  decay,  187;  — Contrast  of  class  divisions  in 
Germany  and  England,  192;  — National  establishments 
are  dependent  for  their  continuance  upon  preparation 
for  hostilities,  196;  — The  time  required  for  the  people 
of  the  Djmastic  States  to  unlearn  their  preconceptions 
will  be  longer  than  the  interval  required  for  a new  on- 
set,i97;  — There  can  be  no  neutral  course  between  peace 
by  unconditional  surrender  and  submission  or  peace  by 
the  elimination  of  Imperial  Germany  and  Japan,  202 ; — 
Peace  by  submission  not  practicable  for  the  modern 
nations,  203;  — Neutralisation  of  citizenship,  205;  — 
Spontaneous  move  in  that  direction  not  to  be  looked  for, 
213;  — Its  chances  of  success,  219;  — The  course  of 
events  in  America,  221. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Elimination  of  the  Unfit  ... 

A league  of  neutrals,  its  outline,  233;  — Need  of  security 
from  aggression  of  Imperial  Germany,  234;  — Inclusion 
of  the  Imperial  States  in  the  league,  237;  — Necessity  of 
elimination  of  Imperial  military  clique,  239;  — Necessity 
of  intermeddling  in  internal  affairs  of  Germany  even 
if  not  acceptable  to  the  German  people,  240;  — Proba- 
bility of  pacific  nations  taking  measures  to  insure  peace, 
244-298; — The  British  gentleman  and  his  control  of 
the  English  government,  244; — The  shifting  of  control 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  gentleman  into  those  of  the 
underbred  common  man,  251; — The  war  situation  and 
its  probable  effect  on  popular  habits  of  thought  in  Eng- 
land, 252 ; — The  course  of  such  events  and  their  bear- 
ing on  the  chances  of  a workable  pacific  league,  255 ; 
— Conditions  precedent  to  a successful  pacific  league 
of  neutrals,  258;  — Colonial  possessions,  259;  — Neu- 
tralisation of  trade  relations,  263;  — Futility  of  economic 
boycott,  266 ; — The  terms  of  settlement,  269 ; — The  ef- 
fect of  the  war  and  the  chances  of  the  British  people 
being  able  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  peace,  273 ; — Sum- 
mary of  the  terms  of  settlement,  280;  — Constitutional 
monarchies  and  the  British  gentlemanly  government, 
281 ; — The  American  national  establishment,  a gov- 
ernment by  businessmen,  and  its  economic  policy,  292; 
— America  and  the  league,  294. 


233 


Contents 


Kiii 


CHAPTER  VII 

Peace  and  the  Price  System  . . . 299 

The  different  conceptions  of  peace,  299 ; — Psychological 
effects  of  the  war,  303 ; — The  handicraft  system  and 
the  machine  industry,  and  their  psychological  effect  ©n  po- 
litical preconceptions,  206 ; — The  machine  technology 
and  the  decay  of  patriotic  loyalty,  310;  — Summary, 

313;  — Ownership  and  the  right  of  contract,  315;  — 
Standardised  under  handicraft  system,  319;  — Owner- 
ship and  the  machine  industry,  320 ; — Business  control 
and  sabotage,  322 ; — Governments  of  pacific  nations 
controlled  by  privileged  classes,  326 ; — Effect  of  peace 
on  the  economic  situation,  328 ; — Economic  aspects  of 
a regime  of  peace,  especially  as  related  to  the  develop- 
ment of  classes,  330; — The  analog  of  the  Victorian 
Peace,  344 ; — The  case  of  the  American  Farmer,  3/^8 ; — 

The  leisure  class,  350; — The  rising  standard  of  living, 

354;  — Culture,  3S5; — The  eventual  cleavage  of  classes, 
those  who  own  ana  those  who  do  not,  360 ; — Condition- 
ed by  peace  at  large,  366;  — Necessary  conditions  of  a 
lasting  peace,  367, 


AN  INQUIRY  INTO  THE  NATURE  OF  PEACE 
AND 

THE  TERMS  OF  ITS  PERPETUATION 


ON  THE  NATURE  OF  PEACE  AND  THE 
TERMS  OF  ITS  PERPETUATION 


CHAPTER  I 

Introductory:  On  the  State  and  its  Relation  tc 
War  and  Peace 

To  many  thoughtful  men  ripe  in  worldly  wisdom  it  is 
known  of  a verity  that  war  belongs  indefeasibly  in  the 
Order  of  Nature.  Contention,  with  manslaughter,  is  in- 
dispensable in  human  intercourse,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  conduces  to  the  increase  and  diffusion  of  the  manly 
virtues.  So  likewise,  the  unspoiled  youth  of  the  race,  in 
the  period  of  adolescence  and  aspiring  manhood,  also  com- 
monly share  this  gift  of  insight  and  back  it  with  a gen- 
erous commendation  of  all  the  martial  qualities ; and 
women  of  nubile  age  and  no  undue  maturity  gladly  meet 
them  half  way. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  mothers  of  the  people  are  com- 
monly unable  to  see  the  use  of  it  all.  It  seems  a waste 
of  dear-bought  human  life,  with  a large  sum  of  nothing 
to  show  for  it.  So  also  many  men  of  an  elderly  turn, 
prematurely  or  otherwise,  are  ready  to  lend  their  coun- 
tenance to  the  like  disparaging  appraisal ; it  may  be  that 
the  spirit  of  prowess  in  them  runs  at  too  low  a tension,  or 
they  may  have  outlived  the  more  vivid  appreciation  of 
the  spiritual  values  involved.  There  are  many,  also,  with 

1 


2 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


a turn  for  exhortation,  who  find  employment  for  their 
best  faculties  in  attesting  the  well-known  atrocities  and 
futility  of  war. 

Indeed,  not  infrequently  such  advocates  of  peace  will 
devote  their  otherwise  idle  powers  to  this  work  of  ex- 
hortation without  stipend  or  subsidy.  And  they  uniformly 
make  good  their  contention  that  the  currently  accepted 
conception  of  the  nature  of  war — General  Sherman’s  for- 
mula— is  substantially  correct.  All  the  while  it  is  to  be 
admitted  that  all  this  axiomatic  exhortation  has  no  visible 
effect  on  the  course  of  events  or  on  the  popular  temper 
touching  warlike  enterprise.  Indeed,  no  equal  volume  of 
speech  can  be  more  incontrovertible  or  less  convincing 
than  the  utterances  of  the  peace  advocates,  whether  sub- 
sidised or  not.  “War  is  Bloodier  than  Peace.”  This 
would  doubtless  be  conceded  without  argument,  but  also 
without  prejudice.  Hitherto  the  pacifists’  quest  of  a 
basis  for  enduring  peace,  it  must  be  admitted,  has  brought 
home  nothing  tangible — with  the  qualification,  of  course, 
that  the  subsidised  pacifists  have  come  in  for  the  subsidy. 
So  that,  after  searching  the  recesses  of  their  imagination, 
able-bodied  pacifists  whose  loquacity  has  never  been  at 
fault  hitherto  have  been  brought  to  ask:  “What  Shall 
We  Say?” 

Under  these  circumstances  it  will  not  be  out  of  place 
to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  this  peace  about  which  swings 
this  wide  orbit  of  opinion  and  argument.  At  the  most, 
such  an  inquiry  can  be  no  more  gratuitous  and  no  more 
nugatory  than  the  controversies  that  provoke  it.  The 
intrinsic  merits  of  peace  at  large,  as  against  those  of  war- 
like enterprise,  it  should  be  said,  do  not  here  come  in 
question.  That  question  lies  in  the  domain  of  precon- 


Introductory 


ceived  opinion,  so  that  for  the  purposes  of  this  inquiry  it 
will  have  no  significance  except  as  a matter  to  be  in- 
quired into ; the  main  point  of  the  inquiry  being  the  na- 
ture, causes  and  consequences  of  such  a preconception 
favoring  peace,  and  the  circumstances  that  make  for  a 
contrary  preconception  in  favor  of  war. 

By  and  large,  any  breach  of  the  peace  in  modern  times 
is  an  official  act  and  can  be  taken  only  on  initiative  of  the 
governmental  establishment,  the  State.  The  national  au- 
thorities may,  of  course,  be  driven  to  take  such  a step  by 
pressure  of  warlike  popular  sentiment.  Such,  e.  g.,  is 
presumed  to  have  been  the  case  in  the  United  States’ 
attack  on  Spain  during  the  McKinley  administration ; 
but  the  more  that  comes  to  light  of  the  intimate  history 
of  that  episode,  the  more  evident  does  it  become  that  the 
popular  war  sentiment  to  which  the  administration  yielded 
had  been  somewhat  sedulously  “mobilised”  with  a view 
to  such  yielding  and  such  a breach.  So  also  in  the  case 
of  the  Boer  war,  the  move  was  made  under  sanction  of 
a popular  war  spirit,  which,  again,  did  not  come  to  a head 
without  shrewd  surveillance  and  direction.  And  so  again 
in  the  current  European  war,  in  the  case,  e.  g.,  of  Ger- 
many, where  the  initiative  was  taken,  the  State  plainly 
had  the  full  support  of  popular  sentiment,  and  may  even 
be  said  to  have  precipitated  the  war  in  response  to  this 
urgent  popular  aspiration;  and  here  again  it  is  a matter 
of  notoriety  that  the  popular  sentiment  had  long  been 
sedulously  nursed  and  “mobilised”  to  that  effect,  so  that 
the  populace  was  assiduously  kept  in  spiritual  readiness 
for  such  an  event.  The  like  is  less  evident  as  regards  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  perhaps  also  as  regards  the  other 
Allies. 


4 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


And  such  appears  to  have  been  the  common  run  of  the 
facts  as  regards  all  the  greater  wars  of  the  last  one  hun- 
dred years, — what  may  be  called  the  “public’’  wars  of  this 
modern  era,  as  contrasted  with  the  “private”  or  adminis- 
trative wars  which  have  been  carried  on  in  a corner  by 
one  and  another  of  the  Great  Powers  against  hapless  bar- 
barians, from  time  to  time,  in  the  course  of  administra- 
tive routine. 

It  is  also  evident  from  the  run  of  the  facts  as  exempli- 
fied in  these  modern  wars  that  while  any  breach  of  the 
peace  takes  place  only  on  the  initiative  and  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  government,  or  State, ^ it  is  always  requisite 
in  furtherance  of  such  warlike  enterprise  to  cherish  and 
eventually  to  mobilise  popular  sentiment  in  support  of 
any  warlike  move.  Due  fomentation  of  a warlike  animus 
is  indispensable  to  the  procuring  and  maintenance  of  a 
suitable  equipment  with  which  eventually  to  break  the 
peace,  as  well  as  to  ensure  a diligent  prosecution  of  such 
enterprise  when  once  it  has  been  undertaken.  Such  a 
spirit  of  militant  patriotism  as  may  serviceably  be  mobil- 
ised in  support  of  warlike  enterprise  has  accordingly  been 
a condition  precedent  to  any  people’s  entry  into  the  mod- 
ern Concert  of  Nations.  This  Concert  of  Nations  is  a 
Concert  of  Powers,  and  it  is  only  as  a Power  that  any 
nation  plays  its  part  in  the  concert,  all  the  while  that  “pow- 
er” here  means  eventual  warlike  force. 

Such  a people  as  the  Chinese,  e.  g.,  not  perv'adcd  with 
an  adequate  patriotic  spirit,  comes  into  the  Concert  of 
Nations  not  as  a Power  but  as  a bone  of  contention.  Not 
that  the  Chinese  fall  short  in  any  of  the  qualities  that  con- 

modern  nation  constitutes  a State  only  in  respect  of  or  with 
ulterior  bearing  on  the  question  of  international  peace  or  war. 


Introductory 


5 


duce  to  efficiency  and  welfare  in  time  of  peace,  but  they 
appear,  in  effect,  to  lack  that  certain  “solidarity  of  prow- 
ess” by  virtue  of  which  they  should  choose  to  be  (collec- 
tively) formidable  rather  than  (individually)  fortunate 
and  upright ; and  the  modern  civilised  nations  arc  not  in  a 
position,  nor  in  a frame  of  mind,  to  tolerate  a neighbor 
whose  only  claim  on  their  consideration  falls  under  the 
category  of  peace  on  earth  and  good-will  among  men. 
China  appears  hitherto  not  to  have  been  a serviceable 
people  for  warlike  ends,  except  in  so  far  as  the  resources 
of  that  country  have  been  taken  over  and  converted  to 
warlike  uses  by  some  alien  power  working  to  its  own 
ends.  Such  have  been  the  several  alien  dynasties  that 
have  seized  upon  that  country  from  time  to  time  and 
have  achieved  dominion  by  usufruct  of  its  unwarlike 
forces.  Such  has  been  the  nature  of  the  Manchu  empire 
of  the  recent  past,  and  such  is  the  evident  purpose  of  the 
prospective  Japanese  usufruct  of  the  same  country  and 
its  populace.  Meantime  the  Chinese  people  appear  to 
be  incorrigibly  peaceable,  being  scarcely  willing  to  fight 
in  any  concerted  fashion  even  when  driven  into  a corner 
by  unprovoked  aggression,  as  in  the  present  juncture. 
Such  a people  is  very  exceptional.  Among  civilised  na- 
tions there  are,  broadly  speaking,  none  of  that  temper, 
with  the  sole  exception  of  the  Chinese, — if  the  Chinese 
are  properly  to  be  spoken  of  as  a nation, 
r”  Modem  warfare  makes  such  large  and  direct  use  of 
the  industrial  arts,  and  depends  for  its  successful  prose- 
cution so  largely  on  a voluminous  and  unremitting  supply 
of  civilian  services  and  wrought  goods,  that  any  inoffen- 
“^ve  and  industrious  people,  such  as  the  Chinese,  could 
doubtless  now  be  turned  to  good  account  by  any  war- 
like power  that  might  have  the  disposal  of  their  working 


6 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


forces.  To  make  their  industrial  efficiency  count  in  this 
^ way  toward  warlike  enterprise  and  imperial  dominion,  the 
usufruct  of  any  such  inoffensive  and  unpatriotic  populace 
, would  have  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  an  alien  govern- 
mental establishment.  And  no  alien  government  resting 
on  the  support  of  a home  population  trained  in  the  habits 
of  democrafy  or  given  over  to  ideals  of  common  honesty 
in  national  concerns  could  hopefully  undertake  the  en- 
terprise. This  work  of  empire-building  out  of  unwarlike 
materials  could  apparently  be  carried  out  only  by  some 
alien  power  hampered  by  no  reserve  of  scruple,  and 
backed  by  a servile  populace  of  its  own,  inbued  with  an 
impeccable  loyalty  to  its  masters  and  with  a suitably  belli- 
cose temper,  as,  e.  g..  Imperial  Japan  or  Imperial  Ger- 
many. 

However,  for  the  commonplace  national  enterprise  the 
common  run  will  do  very  well.  Any  populace  imbued 
with  a reasonable  measure  of  patriotism  will  serve  as 
ways  and  means  to  warlike  enterprise  under  competent 
management,  even  if  it  is  not  habitually  prone  to  a belli- 
cose temper.  Rightly  managed,  ordinary  patriotic  sen- 
timent may  readily  be  mobilised  for  warlike  adventure 
by  any  reasonably  adroit  and  single-minded  body  of  states- 
men,— of  which  there  is  abundant  illustration.  All  the 
peoples  of  Christendom  are  possessed  of  a sufficiently  alert 
sense  of  nationality,  and  by  tradition  and  current  usage 
all  the  national  governments  of  Christendom  are  warlike 
establishments,  at  least  in  the  defensive  sense;  and  the 
distinction  between  the  defensive  and  the  offensive  in 
international  intrigue  is  a technical  matter  that  offers  no 
great  difficulty.  None  of  the^  nations  is  of  such  an 
incorrigibly -peaeeable  temper  that  they  can  be  counted  on 
to  keep  the  peace  consistently  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
events. 


Introductory 


I 


Peace  established  by  the  State,  or  resting  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  State,  is  necessarily  of  the  nature  of  an  armis- 
tice, in  effect  terminable  at  will  and  on  short  notice.  It  is 
maintained  only  on  conditions,  stipulated  by  express  con- 
vention or  established  by  custom,  and  there  is  always  the 
reservation,  tacit  or  explicit,  that  recourse  will  be  had  to 
arms  in  case  the  “national  interests”  or  the  punctilios  of 
international  etiquette  are  traversed  by  the  act  or  defec- 
tion of  any  rival  government  or  its  subjects.  The  more 
nationally-minded  the  government  or  its  subject  populace, 
the  readier  the  response  to  the  call  of  any  such  oppor- 
tunity for  an  unfolding  of  prowess.  The  most  peaceable 
governmental  policy  of  which  Christendom  has  experience 
is  a policy  of  “watchful  waiting,”  with  a jealous  eye  to 
the  emergence  of  any  occasion  for  national  resentment; 
and  the  most  irretrievably  shameful  dereliction  of  duty 
on  the  part  of  any  civilised  government  would  be  its 
eventual  insensibility  to  the  appeal  of  a “just  war.”  Un-  \ 
der  any  governmental  auspices,  as  the  modem  world 
knows  governments,  the  keeping  of  the  peace  comes  at 
its  best  under  the  precept,  “Speak  softly  and  carry  a big 
stick.”  But  the  case  for  peace  is  more  precarious  than 
the  wording  of  the  aphorism  v/ould  indicate,  in  as  much 
as  in  practical  fact  the  “big  stick”  is  an  obstacle  to  soft 
speech.  Evidently,  in  the  light  of  recent  history,  if  the 
peace  is  to  be  kept  it  will  have  to  come  about  irrespec- 
tive of  governmental  management, — in  spite  of  the  State 
rather  than  by  its  good  offices.  At  the  best,  the  State,  or  ) 
the  government,  is  an  instrumentality  for  making  peace,  \ 
not  for  perpetuating  it. 

Anyone  who  is  interested  in  the  nature  and  derivation 
of  governmental  institutions  and  establishments  in  Eu- 


8 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


rope,  In  any  but  the  formal  respect,  should  be  able  to  sat- 
isfy his  curiosity  by  looking  over  the  shoulders  of  the 
professed  students  of  Political  Science.  Quite  properly 
and  profitably  that  branch  of  scholarship  is  occupied  with 
the  authentic  pedigree  of  these  institutions,  and  with  the 
documentary  instruments  in  the  case;  since  Political  Sci- 
ence is,  after  all,  a branch  of  theoretical  jurisprudence  and 
is  concerned  about  a formally  competent  analysis  of  the 
recorded  legal  powers.  The  material  circumstances  from 
which  these  institutions  once  took  their  beginning,  and 
the  exigencies  which  have  governed  the  rate  and  direc- 
tion of  their  later  growth  and  mutation,  as  well  as  the 
de  facto  bearing  of  the  institutional  scheme  on  the  ma- 
terial welfare  or  the  cultural  fortunes  of  the  given  com- 
munity,— while  all  these  matters  of  fact  may  be  germane 
to  the  speculations  of  Political  Theory,  they  are  not  in- 
trinsic to  its  premises,  to  the  logical  sequence  of  its  in- 
quiry, or  to  its  theoretical  findings.  The  like  is  also  true, 
of  course,  as  regards  that  system  of  habits  of  thought, 
that  current  frame  of  mind,  in  which  any  given  institu- 
tional scheme  necessarily  is  grounded,  and  without  the 
continued  support  of  which  any  given  scheme  of  govern- 
mental institutions  or  policy  would  become  nugatory  and 
so  would  pass  into  the  province  of  legal  fiction.  All  these 
are  not  idle  matters  in  the  purview  of  the  student  of 
Political  Science,  but  they  remain  after  all  substantially 
extraneous  to  the  structure  of  political  theory' ; and  in 
so  far  as  matters  of  this  class  are  to  be  brought  into  the 
case  at  all,  the  specialists  in  the  field  can  not  fairly  be 
expected  to  contribute  anything  beyond  an  occasional 
obiter  dictum.  There  can  be  no  discourteous  presump- 
tion, therefore,  in  accepting  the  general  theorems  of  cur- 
rent political  theory  without  prejudice,  and  looking  past 


Introductory 


9 


the  received  theoretical  formulations  for  a view  of  the 
substantial  grounds  on  which  the  governmental  establish- 
ments have  grown  into  shape,  and  the  circumstances, 
material  and  spiritual,  that  surround  their  continued  work- 
ing and  effect. 

By  lineal  descent  the  governmental  establishments  and 
the  powers  with  which  they  are  vested,  in  all  the  Chris- 
tian nations,  are  derived  from  the  feudal  establishments 
of  the  Middle  Ages;  which,  in  turn,  are  of  a predatory 
origin  and  of  an  irresponsible  character.^  In  nearly  all 
instances,  but  more  particularly  among  the  nations  that 
are  accounted  characteristically  modern,  the  existing  es- 
tablishments have  been  greatly  altered  from  the  mediaeval 
pattern,  by  concessive  adaptation  to  later  exigencies  or  by 
a more  or  less  revolutionary  innovation.  The  degree  of 
their  modernity  is  (conventionally)  measured,  roughly, 
by  the  degree  in  which  they  have  departed  from  the  me- 
diaeval pattern.  Wherever  the  unavoidable  concessions 
have  been  shrewdly  made  with  a view  to  conserving 
the  autonomy  and  irresponsibility  of  the  governmental 
establishment,  or  the  “State,”  and  where  the  state  of 
national  sentiment  has  been  led  to  favor  this  work  of 
conservation,  as,  e.  g.,  in  the  case  of  Austria,  Spain  or 
Prussia,  there  the  modern  outcome  has  been  what  may 
be  called  a Dynastic  State.  Where,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  run  of  national  sentiment  has  departed  notably  from 
the  ancient  holding-ground  of  loyal  abnegation,  and  has 
enforced  a measure  of  revolutionary  innovation,  as  in  the 
case  of  France  or  of  the  English-speaking  peoples,  there 
the  modern  outcome  has  been  an  (ostensibly)  democratic 

iThe  partial  and  dubious  exception  of  the  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries or  of  Switzerland  need  raise  no  question  on  this  head. 


10 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


commonwealth  of  ungraded  citizens.  But  the  contrast 
so  indicated  is  a contrast  of  divergent  variants  rather  than 
of  opposites.  These  two  type-forms  may  be  taken  as  the 
extreme  and  inclusive  limits  of  variation  among  the  gov- 
ernmental establishments  with  which  the  modern  world 
,s  furnished.^ 

The  effectual  difference  between  these  two  theoretically 
contrasted  types  of  governmental  establishments  is  doubt- 
less grave  enough,  and  for  many  purposes  it  is  consequen- 
tial, but  it  is  after  all  not  of  such  a nature  as  need  greatly 
detain  the  argument  at  this  point.  The  two  differ  less, 
in  effect,  in  that  range  of  their  functioning  which  comes 
in  question  here  than  in  their  bearing  on  the  community’s 
fortunes  apart  from  questions  of  war  and  peace.  In  all 
cases  there  stand  over  in  this  bearing  certain  primary 
characteristics  of  the  ancient  regime,  which  all  these 
modern  establishments  have  in  common,  though  not  all 
in  an  equal  degree  of  preservation  and  effectiveness. 
They  are,  e.  g.,  all  vested  with  certain  attributes  of  “sov- 
ereignty.” In  all  cases  the  citizen  still  proves  on  closer 
attention  to  be  in  some  measure  a “subject”  of  the  State, 
in  that  he  is  invariably  conceived  to  owe  a “duty”  to  the 
constituted  authorities  in  one  respect  and  another.  All 
civilised  governments  take  cognizance  of  Treason,  Sedi- 
tion, and  the  like;  and  all  good  citizens  are  not  only 
content  but  profoundly  insistent  on  the  clear  duty  of  the 
citizen  on  this  head.  The  bias  of  loyalty  is  not  a matter 
on  which  argument  is  tolerated.  By  virtue  of  this  bias 
of  loyalty,  or  “civic  duty” — which  still  has  much  of  the 
color  of  feudal  allegiance — the  governmental  establish- 

^Cf.,  e.  g.,  Eduard  Meyer,  England:  its  political  organisation 
and  development,  ch.  ii. 


Introductory 


11 


merit  is  within  its  rights  in  coercively  controlling  and 
directing  the  actions  of  the  citizen,  or  subject,  in  those 
respects  that  so  lie  within  his  duty;  as  also  in  authorita- 
tively turning  his  abilities  to  account  for  the  purposes 
that  so  lie  within  the  governmental  discretion,  as,  e.  g., 
the  Common  Defense. 

These  rights  and  powers  still  remain  to  the  govern- 
mental establishment  even  at  the  widest  democratic  de- 
parture from  that  ancient  pattern  of  masterful  tutelage 
and  usufruct  that  marked  the  old-fashioned  patrimonial 
State, — and  that  still  marks  the  better  preserved  ones 
among  its  modern  derivitives.  And  so  intrinsic  to  these 
governmental  establishments  are  these  discretionary  pow- 
ers, and  by  so  unfailing  a popular  bias  are  they  still 
accounted  a matter  of  course  and  of  axiomatic  necessity, 
that  they  have  invariably  been  retained  also  among  the 
attributes  of  those  democratic  governments  that  trace 
their  origin  to  a revolutionary  break  with  the  old  order. 

To  many,  all  this  will  seem  a pedantic  taking  note  of 
commonplaces, — as  if  it  were  worth  while  remarking 
that  the  existing  governments  are  vested  with  the  indis- 
pensable attributes  of  government.  Yet  history  records 
an  instance  at  variance  with  this  axiomatic  rule,  a rule 
which  is  held  to  be  an  unavoidable  deliverance  of  com- 
mon sense.  And  it  is  by  no  means  an  altogether  unique 
instance.  It  may  serve  to  show  that  these  characteristic 
and  unimpeachable  powers  that  invest  all  current  govern- 
mental establishments  are,  after  all,  to  be  rated  as  the 
marks  of  a particular  species  of  governments,  and  not 
characteristics  of  the  genus  of  governmental  establish- 
ments at  large.  These  powers  answer  to  an  acquired  bias, 
not  to  an  underlying  trait  of  human  nature;  a matter  of 
habit,  not  of  heredity. 


12 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


Such  an  historical  instance  is  the  so-called  Republic,  or 
Commonwealth,  of  Iceland — tenth  to  thirteenth  centu- 
ries. Its  case  is  looked  on  by  students  of  history  as  a 
spectacular  anomaly,  because  it  admitted  none  of  these 
primary  powers  of  government  in  its  constituted  authori- 
ties. And  yet,  for  contrast  with  these  matter-of-course 
preconceptions  of  these  students  of  history,  it  is  well  to 
note  that  in  the  deliberations  of  those  ancients  who  in- 
stalled the  Republic  for  the  management  of  their  joint 
concerns,  any  inclusion  of  such  powers  in  its  competency 
appears  never  to  have  been  contemplated,  not  even  to  the 
extent  of  its  being  rejected.  This  singularity — as  it  would 
be  rated  by  modern  statesmen  and  students — was  in  no 
degree  a new  departure  in  state-making  on  the  part  of 
the  founders  of  the  Republic.  They  had  no  knowledge 
of  such  powers,  duties  and  accountabilities,  except  as 
unwholesome  features  of  a novel  and  alien  scheme  of 
irresponsible  oppression  that  was  sought  to  be  imposed  on 
them  by  Harald  Fairhair,  and  which  they  incontinently 
made  it  their  chief  and  immediate  business  to  evade. 
They  also  set  up  no  joint  or  collective  establishment  with 
powers  for  the  Common  Defense,  nor  does  it  appear  that 
such  a notion  had  occurred  to  them. 

In  the  history  of  its  installation  there  is  no  hint  that 
the  men  who  set  up  this  Icelandic  Commonwealth  had 
any  sense  of  the  need,  or  even  of  the  feasibility,  of  such 
a coercive  government  as  would  be  involved  in  concerted 
preparation  for  the  common  defense.  Subjection  to  per- 
sonal rule,  or  to  official  rule  in  any  degree  of  attenuation, 
was  not  comprised  in  their  traditional  experience  of  citi- 
zenship ; and  it  was  necessarily  out  of  the  elements  com- 
prised in  this  traditional  experience  that  the  new  struc- 
ture would  have  to  be  built  up.  The  new  commonwealth 


Introductory 


13 


was  necessarily  erected  on  the  premises  afforded  by  the 
received  scheme  of  use  and  wont;  and  this  received 
scheme  had  come  down  out  of  pre-feudal  conditions, 
without  having  passed  under  the  discipline  of  that  regime 
of  coercion  which  the  feudal  system  had  imposed  on  the 
rest  of  Europe,  and  so  had  established  as  an  “immemo- 
rial usage”  and  a “second  nature”  among  the  popula- 
tions of  Christendom.  The  resulting  character  of  the 
Icelandic  Commonwealth  is  sufficiently  striking  when  con- 
trasted with  the  case  of  the  English  commonwealth  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  or  the  later  French  and  Amer- 
ican republics.  These,  all  and  several,  came  out  of  a 
protracted  experience  in  feudalistic  state-making  and 
State  policy;  and  the  common  defense — frequently  on 
the  offensive — with  its  necessary  coercive  machinery  and 
its  submissive  loyalty,  consequently  would  take  the  cen- 
tral place  in  the  resulting  civic  structure. 

To  close  the  tale  of  the  Icelandic  commonwealth  it  may 
be  added  that  their  republic  of  insubordinate  citizens  pres- 
ently fell  into  default,  systematic  misuse,  under  the  dis- 
orders brought  on  by  an  accumulation  of  wealth,  and 
that  it  died  of  legal  fiction  and  constitutional  formalities 
after  some  experience  at  the  hands  of  able  and  ambitious 
statesmen  in  contact  with  an  alien  government  drawn  on 
the  coercive  plan.  The  clay  vessel  failed  to  make  good 
among  the  iron  pots,  and  so  proved  its  unfitness  to  sur- 
vive in  the  world  of  Christian  nations, — very  much  as 
the  Chinese  are  today  at  the  mercy  of  the  defensive  ra- 
pacity of  the  Powers. 

And  the  mercy  that  we  gave  them 
Was  to  sink  them  in  the  sea, 

Down  on  the  coast  of  High  Barbaric. 


14 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace  ’ 


No  doubt,  it  will  be  accepted  as  an  axiomatic  certainty 
that  the  establishment  of  a commonwealth  after  the  fash- 
ion of  the  Icelandic  Republic,  without  coercive  authority 
or  provision  for  the  common  defense,  and  without  a sense 
of  subordination  or  collective  responsibility  among  its 
citizens,  would  be  out  of  all  question  under  existing  cir- 
cumstances of  politics  and  international  trade.  Nor 
would  such  a commonwealth  be  workable  on  the  scale 
and  at  the  pace  imposed  by  modern  industrial  and  com- 
mercial conditions,  even  apart  from  international  jealousy 
and  ambitions,  provided  the  sacred  rights  of  ownership 
were  to  be  maintained  in  something  like  their  current 
shape.  And  yet  something  of  a drift  of  popular  senti- 
ment, and  indeed  something  of  deliberate  endeavour,  set- 
ting in  the  direction  of  such  a harmless  and  helpless 
national  organisation  is  always  visible  in  Western  Europe, 
throughout  modern  times ; particularly  trough  the  eigh- 
teenth and  the  early  half  of  the  nineteenth  centuries; 
and  more  particularly  among  the  English-speaking  peo- 
ples and,  with  a difference,  among  the  French.  The 
Dutch  and  the  Scandinavian  countries  answer  more  doubt- 
fully to  the  same  characterisation. 

The  movement  in  question  is  known  to  history  as  the 
Liberal,  Rationalistic,  Humanitarian,  w Individualistic 
departure.  Its  ideal,  when  formulated,  is  spc^cn  of  as 
the  System  of  Natural  Rights;  and  its  goal  in  the  way 
of  a national  establishment  has  been  well  characterised 
by  its  critics  as  the  Police  State,  or  the  Night-Watchman 
State.  The  gains  made  in  this  direction,  or  perhaps  bet- 
ter the  inroads  of  this  animus  in  national  ideals,  are 
plainly  to  be  set  down  as  a shift  in  the  direction  of  peace 
and  amity;  but  it  is  also  plain  that  the  shift  of  ground 
so  initiated  by  this  strain  of  sentiment  has  never  reached 


Introductory 


15 


a conclusion  and  never  has  taken  effect  in  anything  like 
an  effectual  working  arrangement.  Its  practical  con- 
sequences have  been  of  the  nature  of  abatement  and  de- 
fection in  the  pursuit  of  national  ambitions  and  dynastic 
enterprise,  rather  than  a creative  work  of  installing  any 
institutional  furniture  suitable  to  its  own  ends.  It  has 
in  effect  gone  no  farther  than  what  would  be  called  an 
incipient  correction  of  abuses.  The  highest  rise,  as  well 
as  the  decline,  of  this  movement  lie  within  the  nineteenth 
century. 

In  point  of  time,  the  decay  of  this  amiable  conceit  of 
laissez-faire  in  national  policy  coincides  with  the  period 
of  great  advance  in  the  technology  of  transport  and  com- 
munication in  the  nineteenth  century.  Perhaps,  on  a larger 
outlook,  it  should  rather  be  said  that  the  run  of  national 
ambitions  and  animosities  had,  in  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries,  suffered  a degree  of  decay  through 
the  diffusion  of  this  sentimental  predilection  for  Natural 
Liberty,  and  that  this  decline  of  the  manlier  aspirations 
was  then  arrested  and  corrected  by  help  of  these  improve- 
ments in  the  technological  situation;  which  enabled  * 
closer  and  more  coercive  control  to  be  exercised  over 
larger  areas,  and  at  the  same  time  enabled  a more  mas- 
sive aggregate  of  warlike  force  to  strike  more  effectively 
at  a greater  distance.  This  whole  episode  of  the  rise  and 
decline  of  laissez-faire  in  modem  history  is  perhaps  best;, 
to  be  conceived  as  a transient  weakening  of  nationalism, 
by  neglect rather  than  anything  like  the  growth  of  a 
new  and  more  humane  ideal  of  national  intercourse.  Such 
would  be  the  appraisal  to  be  had  at  the  hands  of  those 
who  speak  for  a strenuous  national  life  and  for  the  ar- 
bitram«it  of  sportsmanlike  contention  in  human  affairs. 
And  the  latterday  growth  of  more  militant  aspirations. 


16 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


together  with  the  more  settled  and  sedulous  attention  to 
a development  of  control  and  of  formidable  armaments, 
such  as  followed  on  through  the  latter  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  would  then  be  rated  as  a resumption  of 
those  older  aims  and  ideals  that  had  been  falling  some- 
what into  abeyance  in  the  slack-water  days  of  Liberalism. 

There  is  much  to  be  said  for  this  latter  view ; and, 
indeed,  much  has  been  said  for  it,  particularly  by  the 
spokesmen  of  imperialist  politics.  This  bias  of  Natural 
Liberty  has  been  associated  in  history  with  the  English- 
speaking  peoples,  more  intimately  and  more  extensively 
than  with  any  other.  Not  that  this  amiable  conceit  is  in 
any  peculiar  degree  a race  characteristic  of  this  group 
of  peoples ; nor  even  that  the  history  of  its  rise  and  de- 
cline runs  wholly  within  the  linguistic  frontiers  indicated 
by  this  characterisation.  The  French  and  the  Dutch  have 
borne  their  share,  and  at  an  earlier  day  Italian  sentiment 
and  speculation  lent  its  impulsion  to  the  same  genial  drift 
of  faith  and  aspiration.  But,  by  historical  accident,  its 
center  of  gravity  and  of  diffusion  has  lain  with  the  Eng- 
lish-speaking communities  during  the  period  when  this 
bias  made  history  and  left  its  impress  on  the  institu- 
tional scheme  of  the  Western  civilisation.  By  grace  of 
what  may,  for  the  present  purpose,  be  called  historical 
accident,  it  happens  that  the  interv^al  of  history  during 
which  the  bias  of  Natural  Liberty  made  visible  headway 
was  also  a period  during  which  these  English-speaking 
peoples,  among  whom  its  effects  are  chiefly  visible,  were 
relatively  secure  from  international  disturbance,  by  force 
of  inaccessibility.  Little  strain  was  put  upon  their  sense 
of  national  solidarity  or  national  prowess ; so  little,  in- 
deed, that  there  was  some  danger  of  their  patriotic  ani- 
mosity falling  into  decay  by  disuse;  and  then  they  were 


Introductory 


17 


also  busy  with  other  things.  Peaceable  intercourse,  it  is 
true,  was  relatively  easy,  active  and  far-reaching — eigh- 
teenth and  nineteenth  centuries — as  compared  with  what 
had  been  the  case  before  that  time;  but  warlike  inter- 
course on  such  a scale  as  would  constitute  a substantial 
menace  to  any  large  nation  was  nearly  out  of  the  ques- 
tion, so  far  as  regards  the  English-speaking  peoples.  The 
available  means  of  aggression,  as  touches  the  case  of 
these  particular  communities,  were  visibly  and  consciously 
inadequate  as  compared  with  the  means  of  defense.  The 
means  of  internal  or  intra-national  control  or  coercion 
were  also  less  well  provided  by  the  state  of  the  arts  cur- 
rent at  that  time  than  the  means  of  peaceable  intercourse. 
These  means  of  transport  and  communication  were,  at 
that  stage  of  their  development,  less  well  suited  for  the 
purposes  of  far-reaching  warlike  strategy  and  the  exercise 
of  surveillance  and  coercion  over  large  spaces  than  for 
the  purposes  of  peaceable  traffic. 

But  the  continued  improvement  in  the  means  of  com- 
munication during  the  nineteenth  century  presently  up- 
set that  situation,  and  so  presently  began  to  neutralise 
the  geographical  quarantine  which  had  hedged  about  these 
communities  that  were  inclined  to  let  well  enough  alone. 
The  increasing  speed  and  accuracy  of  movement  in  ship- 
ping, due  to  the  successful  introduction  of  steam,  as  well 
as  the  concomitant  increasing  size  of  the  units  of  equip- 
ment, all  runs  to  this  effect  and  presently  sets  at  naught 
the  peace  barriers  of  sea  and  weather.  So  also  the  de- 
velopment of  railways  and  their  increasing  availability  for 
strategic  uses,  together  with  the  far-reaching  coordination 
of  movement  made  possible  by  their  means  and  by  the 
telegraph;  all  of  which  is  further  facilitated  by  the  in- 
creasing mass  and  density  of  population.  Improvements 
2 


18 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


in  the  technology  of  arms  and  armament  worked  to  the 
like  effect,  of  setting  the  peace  of  any  community  on  an 
increasingly  precarious  footing,  through  the  advantage 
which  this  new  technology  gave  to  a ready  equipment  and 
^a  rapid  mobilisation.  The  new  state  of  the  industrial 
arts  serviceable  for  warlike  enterprise  put  an  increasingly 
heavy  premium  on  readiness  for  offense  or  defense,  but 
more  particularly  it  all  worked  increasingly  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  offensive.  It  put  the  Fabian  strategy  out 
of  date,  and  led  to  the  doctrine  of  a defensive  offense. 

Gradually  it  came  true,  with  the  continued  advance  in 
those  industrial  arts  that  lend  themselves  to  strategic 
uses,  and  it  came  also  to  be  realised,  that  no  corner  of 
the  earth  was  any  longer  secure  by  mere  favor  of  dis- 
tance and  natural  difficulty,  from  eventual  aggression  at 
the  hands  of  any  provident  and  adventurous  assailant, — 
even  by  help  of  a modicum  of  defensive  precaution.  The 
fear  of  aggression  then  came  definitively  to  take  the  place 
of  international  good-will  and  became  the  chief  motive 
in  public  policy,  so  fast  and  so  far  as  the  state  of  the 
industrial  arts  continued  to  incline  the  balance  of  advan- 
tage to  the  side  of  the  aggressor.  All  of  which  served 
gjeatly  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  those  statesmen  who, 
by  interest  or  temperament,  were  inclined  to  imperialistic 
enterprise.  Since  that  period  all  armament  has  conven- 
tionally been  accounted  defensive,  and  all  statesmen  have 
professed  that  the  common  defense  is  their  chief  con- 
cern. Professedly  all  armament  has  been  designed  to 
keep  the  peace;  so  much  of  a shadow  of  the  peaceable 
bias  there  still  stands  over. 

Throughout  this  latest  phase  of  modem  civilisation  the 
avowed  fear  of  aggression  has  served  as  apology,  pos- 
sibly as  provocation  in  fact,  to  national  armaments ; and 


Introductory 


19 


throughout  the  same  period  any  analysis  of  the  situation 
will  finally  run  the  chain  of  fear  back  to  Prussia  as  the, 
putative  or  actual,  center  of  disturbance  and  apprehension. 
No  doubt,  Prussian  armament  has  taken  the  lead  and 
forced  the  pace  among  the  nations  of  Christendom;  but 
the  Prussian  policy,  too,  has  been  diligently  covered  with 
the  same  decorous  plea  of  needful  provision  for  the  com- 
mon defense  and  an  unremitting  solicitude  for  interna- 
tional peace, — to  which  has  been  added  the  canny  after- 
thought of  the  “defensive  offense.” 

It  is  characteristic  of  this  era  of  armed  peace  that  in 
all  these  extensive  preparations  for  breaking  the  peace 
any  formal  avowal  of  other  than  a defensive  purpose 
has  at  all  times  been  avoided  as  an  insufferable  breach  of 
diplomatic  decorum.  It  is  likewise  characteristic  of  the 
same  era  that  armaments  have  unremittingly  been  in- 
creased, beyond  anything  previously  known ; and  that  all 
men  have  known  all  the  while  that  the  inevitable  out- 
come of  this  avowedly  defensive  armament  must  eventu- 
ally be  war  on  an  unprecedented  scale  and  of  unexampled 
ferocity.  It  would  be  neither  charitable  nor  otherwise 
to  the  point  to  call  attention  to  the  reflection  which  this 
state  of  the  case  throws  on  the  collective  sagacity  or  the 
good  faith  of  the  statesmen  who  have  had  the  management 
of  affairs.  It  is  not  practicable  to  imagine  how  such  an 
outcome  as  the  present  could  have  been  brought  about 
by  any  degree  of  stupidity  or  incapacity  alone,  nor  is  it 
easier  to  find  evidence  that  the  utmost  sagacity  of  the 
statecraft  engaged  has  had  the  slightest  mitigating  effect 
on  the  evil  consummation  to  which  the  whole  case  has 
been  brought.  It  has  long  been  a commonplace  among 
observers  of  public  events  that  these  professedly  defen- 
sive warlike  preparations  have  in  effect  been  preparations 


20 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


for  breaking  the  peace ; against  wbich,  at  least  ostensibly, 
a remedy  had  been  sought  in  the  preparation  of  still 
heavier  armaments,  with  full  realisation  that  more  arma- 
ment would  unfailingly  entail  a more  unsparing  and  more 
^disastrous  war, — which  sums  up  the  statecraft  of  the 
past  half  century. 

Prussia,  and  afterwards  Prussianised  Germany,  has 
come  in  for  the  distinction  of  taking  the  lead  and  forcing 
the  pace  in  this  competitive  preparation — or  “prepared- 
ness”— for  war  in  time  of  peace.  That  such  has  been 
the  case  appears  in  good  part  to  be  something  of  a for- 
tuitous circumstance.  The  season  of  enterprising  force 
and  fraud  to  which  that  country  owes  its  induction  into 
the  concert  of  nations  is  an  episode  of  recent  history ; 
so  recent,  indeed,  that  the  German  nation  has  not  yet  had 
time  to  live  it  down  and  let  it  be  forgotten ; and  the 
Imperial  State  is  consequently  burdened  with  an  irri- 
tably uneasy  sense  of  odium  and  an  established  reputation 
for  unduly  bad  faith.  From  which  it  has  followed, 
among  other  things,  that  the  statesmen  of  the  Empire 
have  lived  in  the  expectation  of  having  their  unforgotten 
derelictions  brought  home,  and  so  have,  on  the  one  hand, 
found  themselves  unable  to  credit  any  pacific  intentions 
professed  by  the  neighboring  Powers,  while  on  the  other 
hand  they  have  been  unable  to  gain  credence  for  their 
own  voluble  professions  of  peace  and  amity.  So  it  has 
come  about  that,  by  a fortuitous  conjuncture  of  scarcely 
relevant  circumstances,  Prussia  and  the  Empire  have 
been  thrown  into  the  lead  in  the  race  of  “preparedness” 
and  have  been  led  assiduously  to  hasten  a breach  which 
they  could  ill  aflford.  It  is,  to  say  the  least,  extremely 
doubtful  if  the  event  would  have  been  substantially  dif- 
ferent in  the  absence  of  that  special  provocation  to  com- 


Introductory 


21 


petitive  preparedness  that  has  been  injected  into  the  sit- 
uation by  this  German  attitude ; but  the  rate  of  approach 
to  a warlike  climax  has  doubtless  been  hastened  by  the 
anticipatory  policy  of  preparedness  which  the  Prussian 
dynasty  has  seen  itself  constrained  to  pursue.  Eventu- 
ally, the  peculiar  circumstances  of  its  case — embarrass- 
ment at  home  and  distaste  and  discredit  abroad — have 
induced  the  Imperial  State  to  take  the  line  of  a defensive 
offense,  to  take  war  by  the  forelock  and  retaliate  on  pre- 
sumptive enemies  for  prospective  grievances.  But  in  any 
case,  the  progressive  improvement  in  transport  and  com- 
munication, as  well  as  in  the  special  technology  of  war- 
fare, backed  by  greatly  enhanced  facilities  for  indoctrinat- 
ing the  populace  with  militant  nationalism, — these  ways 
and  means,  working  under  the  hand  of  patriotic  states- 
men must  in  course  of  the  past  century  have  brought  the 
peace  of  Europe  to  so  precarious  a footing  as  would  have 
provoked  a material  increase  in  the  equipment  for  na- 
tional defense;  which  would  unavoidably  have  led  to 
competitive  armament  and  an  enhanced  international  dis- 
trust and  animosity,  eventually  culminating  in  hostilities. 

It  may  well  be  that  the  plea  of  defensive  preparation 
advanced  by  the  statesmen,  Prussian  and  others,  in  apol- 
ogy for  competitive  armaments  is  a diplomatic  subter- 
fuge,— there  are  indications  that  such  has  commonly 
been  the  case ; but  even  if  it  commonly  is  visibly  disin- 
genuous, the  need  of  making  such  a plea  to  cover  more 
sinister  designs  is  itself  an  evidence  that  an  avowedly 
predatory  enterprise  no  longer  meets  with  the  requisite 
popular  approval.  Even  if  an  exception  to  this  rule  be 
admitted  in  the  recent  attitude  of  the  German  people, 
it  is  to  be  recalled  that  the  exception  was  allowed  to  stand 


22 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


only  transiently,  and  that  presently  the  avowal  of  a pred- 
atory design  in  this  case  was  urgently  disclaimed  in  the 
face  of  adversity.  Even  those  who  speak  most  fluently 
for  the  necessity  of  war,  and  for  its  merits  as  a needed 
discipline  in  the  manly  virtues,  are  constrained  by  the 
prevailing  sentiment  to  deprecate  its  necessity. 

Yet  it  is  equally  evident  that  when  once  a warlike 
enterprise  has  been  entered  upon  so  far  as  to  commit  the 
nation  to  hostilities,  it  will  have  the  cordial  support  of 
popular  sentiment  even  if  it  is  patently  an  aggressive  war. 
Indeed,  it  is  quite  a safe  generalisation  that  when  hostil- 
ities have  once  been  got  fairly  under  way  by  the  inter- 
ested statesmen,  the  patriotic  sentiment  of  the  nation 
may  confidently  be  counted  on  to  back  the  enterprise 
irrespective  of  the  merits  of  the  quarrel.  But  even  if  the 
national  sentiment  is  in  this  way  to  be  counted  in  as  an 
incidental  matter  of  course,  it  is  also  to  be  kept  in  mind 
in  this  connection  that  any  quarrel  so  entered  upon  by  any 
nation  will  forthwith  come  to  have  the  moral  approval 
of  the  community.  Dissenters  will  of  course  be  found, 
sporadically,  who  do  not  readily  fall  in  with  the  pre- 
vailing animus;  but  as  a general  proposition  it  will  still 
hold  true  that  any  such  quarrel  forthwith  becomes  a just 
quarrel  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  have  so  been  com- 
mitted to  it 

A corollary  following  from  this  general  theorem  may 
be  worth  noting  in  the  same  connection.  Any  politician 
who  succeeds  in  embroiling  his  country  in  a war,  how- 
ever nefarious,  becomes  a popular  hero  and  is  reputed  a 
wise  and  righteous  statesman,  at  least  for  the  time  being. 
Illustrative  instances  need  perhaps  not,  and  indeed  can 
not  gracefully,  be  named;  most  popular  heroes  and  re- 
puted statesmen  belong  in  this  class. 


'Introductory 


23 


Another  corollary,  which  bears  more  immediately  on 
the  question  in  hand,  follows  also  from  the  same  general 
proposition:  Since  the  ethical  values  involved  in  any 
given  international  contest  are  substantially  of  the  nature 
of  after-thought  or  accessory,  they  may  safely  be  left  on 
one  side  in  any  endeavour  to  understand  or  account  for 
any  given  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  moral  indignation 
of  both  parties  to  the  quarrel  is  to  be  taken  for  granted, 
as  being  the  statesman’s  chief  and  necessary  ways  and 
means  of  bringing  any  warlike  enterprise  to  a head  and 
floating  it  to  a creditable  finish.  It  is  a precipitate  of 
the  partisan  animosity  that  inspires  both  parties  and  holds 
them  to  their  duty  of  self-sacrifice  and  devastation,  and 
at  its  best  it  will  chiefly  serve  as  a cloak  of  self-righteous- 
ness to  extenuate  any  exceptionally  profligate  excursions 
in  the  conduct  of  hostilities. 

Any  warlike  enterprise  that  is  hopefully  to  be  entered 
on  must  have  the  moral  sanction  of  the  community,  or 
of  an  effective  majority  in  the  community.  It  conse- 
quently becomes  the  first  concern  of  the  warlike  states- 
man to  put  this  moral  force  in  train  for  the  adventure 
on  which  he  is  bent.  And  there  are  two  main  lines  of 
motivation  by  which  the  spiritual  forces  of  any  Christian 
nation  may  so  be  mobilised  for  warlike  adventure:  (1) 
The  preservation  or  furtherance  of  the  community’s  ma- 
terial interests,  real  or  fancied,  and  (2)  vindication  of 
the  national  honour.  To  these  should  perhaps  be  added 
as  a third,  the  advancement  and  perpetuation  of  the  na- 
tion’s “Culture that  is  to  say,  of  its  habitual  scheme  of 
use  and  wont.  It  is  a nice  question  whether,  in  practical 
effect,  the  aspiration  to  perpetuate  the  national  Culture  is 
consistently  to  be  distinguished  from  the  vindication  of 
the  national  honour.  There  is  perhaps  the  distinction  to 


24 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


be  made  that  “the  perpetuation  of  the  national  Culture” 
lends  a readier  countenance  to  gratuitous  aggression  and 
affords  a broader  cover  for  incidental  atrocities,  since  the 
enemies  of  the  national  Culture  will  necessarily  be  con- 
ceived as  an  inferior  and  obstructive  people,  falling  be- 
neath the  rules  of  commonplace  decorum. 

Those  material  interests  for  which  modem  nations 
are  in  the  habit  of  taking  to  arms  are  commonly  of  a 
fanciful  character,  in  that  they  commonly  have  none  but 
an  imaginary  net  value  to  the  community  at  large.  Such 
are,  e.  g.,  the  national  trade  or  the  increase  of  the  na- 
tional territory.  These  and  the  like  may  serve  the  war- 
like or  d}-Tiastic  ambitions  of  the  nation’s  masters;  they 
may  also  further  the  interests  of  office-holders,  and  more 
particularly  of  certain  business  houses  or  businessmen 
who  stand  to  gain  some  small  advantage  by  help  of  the 
powers  in  control ; but  it  ah  signifies  nothing  more  to 
the  common  man  than  an  increased  bill  of  governmental 
expense  and  a probable  increase  in  the  cost  of  living. 

That  a nation’s  trade  should  be  carried  in  vessels  owned 
by  its  citizens  or  registered  in  its  ports  will  doubtless 
have  some  sentimental  value  to  the  common  mn  of  its 
citizens,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  disingenuous  poli- 
■>ticians  always  find  it  worth  their  while  to  appeal  to  this 
chauvinistic  predilection.  But  it  patently  is  all  a com- 
pletely idle  question,  in  point  of  material  advantage,  to 
anyone  but  the  owners  of  the  vessels ; and  to  these  own- 
ers it  is  also  of  no  material  consequence  under  what  flag 
their  investments  sail,  except  so  far  as  the  government 
in  question  may  afford  them  some  preferential  oppor- 
tunity for  gain, — -always  at  the  cost  of  their  fellow  citi- 
zens. The  like  is  equally  true  as  regards  the  domicile 
and  the  national  allegiance  of  the  businessmen  who  buy 


Introductory 


25 


and  sell  the  country’s  imports  and  exports.  The  common 
man  plainly  has  no  slightest  material  interest  in  the  na- 
tionality or  the  place  of  residence  of  those  who  conduct 
this  traffic ; though  all  the  facts  go  to  say  that  in  some 
puzzle-headed  way  the  common  man  commonly  persuades 
himself  that  it  does  make  some  occult  sort  of  difference 
to  him ; so  that  h.e  is  commonly  willing  to  pay  something 
substantial  toward  subsidising  businessmen  of  his  own 
nationality,  in  the  way  of  a protective  tariff  and  the  like. 

The  only  material  advantage  to  be  derived  from  such 
a preferential  trade  policy  arises  in  the  case  of  interna- 
tional hostilities,  in  which  case  the  home-owned  vessels 
and  merchants  may  on  occasion  count  toward  military 
readiness ; although  even  in  that  connection  their  value 
is  contingent  and  doubtful.  But  in  this  way  they  may 
contribute  in  their  degree  to  a readiness  to  break  off 
peaceable  relations  with  other  countries.  It  is  only  for 
warlike  purposes,  that  is  to  say  for  the  dynastic  ambi- 
tions of  warlike  statesmen,  that  these  preferential  con- 
trivances in  economic  policy  have  any  substantial  value; 
and  even  in  that  connection  their  expediency  is  always 
doubtful.  They  are  a source  of  national  jealousy,  and 
they  may  on  occasion  become  a help  to  military  strategy 
when  this  national  jealousy  eventuates  in  hostilities. 

The  run  of  the  facts  touching  this  matter  of  national 
trade  policy  is  something  as  follows : At  the  instance  of 
businessmen  who  stand  to  gain  by  it,  and  with  the  cordial 
support  of  popular  sentiment,  the  constituted  authorities 
sedulously  further  the  increase  of  shipping  and  com- 
merce under  protection  of  the  national  power.  At  the 
same  time  they  spend  substance  and  diplomatic  energy 
in  an  endeavor  to  extend  the  international  market  fa- 
cilities open  to  the  country’s  businessmen,  with  a view 


26 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


always  to  a preferential  advantage  in  favor  of  these 
businessmen,  also  with  the  sentimental  support  of  the 
common  man  and  at  his  cost.  To  safeguard  these  com- 
mercial interests,  as  well  as  property-holdings  of  the 
nation’s  citizens  in  foreign  parts,  the  nation  maintains 
naval,  military,  consular  and  diplomatic  establishments, 
at  the  common  expense.  The  total  gains  derivable  from 
these  commercial  and  investment  interests  abroad,  under 
favorable  circumstances,  will  never  by  any  chance  equal 
the  cost  of  the  governmental  apparatus  installed  to  fur- 
ther and  safeguard  them.  These  gains,  such  as  they  are, 
go  to  the  investors  and  businessmen  engaged  in  these 
enterprises;  while  the  costs  incident  to  the  adventure 
are  borne  almost  wholly  by  the  common  man,  who  gets 
no  gain  from  it  all.  Commonly,  as  in  the  case  of  a pro- 
tective tariff  or  a preferential  navigation  law,  the  cost  to 
the  common  man  is  altogether  out  of  proportion  to  the 
gain  which  accrues  to  the  businessmen  for  whose  benefit 
he  carries  the  burden.  The  only  other  class,  besides  the 
preferentially  favored  businessmen,  who  derive  any  ma- 
terial benefit  from  this  arrangement  is  that  of  the  office- 
holders who  take  care  of  this  governmental  traffic  and 
draw  something  in  the  way  of  salaries  and  perquisites; 
and  whose  cost  is  defrayed  by  the  common  man,  who 
remains  an  outsider  in  all  but  the  payment  of  the  bills. 
The  common  man  is  proud  and  glad  to  bear  this  burden 
for  the  benefit  of  his  wealthier  neighbors,  and  he  does 
so  with  the  singular  conviction  that  in  some  occult  man- 
ner he  profits  by  it.  All  this  is  incredible,  but  it  is  every- 
day fact. 

In  case  it  should  happen  that  these  business  interests 
of  the  nation’s  businessmen  interested  in  trade  or  invest- 
ments abroad  are  jeopardised  by  a disturbance  of  any 


Introductory 


27 


kind  in  these  foreign  parts  in  which  these  business  inter- 
ests lie,  then  it  immediately  becomes  the  urgent  concern 
of  the  national  authorities  to  use  all  means  at  hand  for 
maintaining  the  gainful  traffic  of  these  businessmen  un- 
diminished, and  the  common  man  pays  the  cost.  Should 
such  an  untoward  situation  go  to  such  sinister  lengths  as 
to  involve  actual  loss  to  these  business  interests  or  other- 
wise give  rise  to'  a tangible  grievance,  it  becomes  an  af- 
fair of  the  national  honour ; whereupon  no  sense  of  pro- 
portion as  between  the  material  gains  at  stake  and  the 
cost  of  remedy  or  retaliation  need  longer  be  observed, 
since  the  national  honour  is  beyond  price.  The  motiva- 
tion in  the  case  shifts  from  the  ground  of  material  inter- 
est to  the  spiritual  ground  of  the  moral  sentiments. 

In  this  connection  “honour”  is  of  course  to  be  taken 
in  the  euphemistic  sense  which  the  term  has  under  the 
code  duello  governing  “affairs  of  honour.”  It  carries  no 
connotation  of  honesty,  veracity,  equity,  liberality,  or  un- 
selfishness. This  national  honour  is  of  the  nature  of  an 
intangible  or  immaterial  asset,  of  course;  it  is  a matter 
of  prestige,  a sportsmanlike  conception;  but  that  fact 
must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  it  is  of  any  the  less  sub- 
stantial effect  for  purposes  of  a casus  belli  than  the  ma- 
terial assets  of  the  community.  Quite  the  contrary: 
“Who  steals  my  purse,  steals  trash,”  etc.  In  point  of  fact, 
it  will  commonly  happen  that  any  material  grievance  must 
first  be  converted  into  terms  of  this  spiritual  capital,  be- 
fore it  is  effectually  turned  to  account  as  a stimulus  to 
warlike  enterprise. 

Even  among  a people  with  so  single  an  eye  to  the  main 
chance  as  the  American  community  it  will  be  found  true, 
on  experiment  or  on  review  of  the  historical  evidence, 
that  an  offense  against  the  national  honour  commands  a 


28 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


profounder  and  more  unreser^^ed  resentment  than  any 
infraction  of  the  rights  of  person  or  property  simply. 
This  has  latterly  been  well  shown  in  connection  with  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  several  European  belligerents,  de- 
signed to  bend  American  neutrality  to  the  service  of  one 
iside  or  the  other.  Both  parties  have  aimed  to  intimidate 
and  cajole;  but  while  the  one  party  has  taken  recourse 
to  effrontery  and  has  made  much  and  ostentatious  use 
of  threats  and  acts  of  violence  against  person  and  prop- 
erty, the  other  has  constantly  observed  a deferential  atti- 
tude toward  American  national  self-esteem,  even  while 
engaged  on  a persistent  infraction  of  American  com- 
mercial rights.  The  first  named  line  of  diplomacy  has 
convicted  itself  of  miscarriage  and  has  lost  the  strategic 
advantage,  as  against  the  none  too  adroit  finesse  of  the 
other  side.  The  statesmen  of  this  European  war  power 
were  so  ill  advised  as  to  enter  on  a course  of  tentatively 
cumulative  intimidation,  by  threats  and  experimentally 
graduated  crimes  against  the  property  and  persons  of 
American  citizens,  with  a view  to  coerce  American  cu- 
pidity and  yet  to  avoid  carrying  these  manoeuvres  of  ter- 
rorism far  enough  to  arouse  an  unmanageable  sense  of 
outrage.  The  experiment  has  served  to  show  that  the 
breaking  point  in  popular  indignation  will  be  reached  be- 
fore the  terrorism  has  gone  far  enough  to  raise  a serious 

question  of  pecuniary  caution. 

This  national  honour,  which  so  is  rated  a necessar}^  of 
life,  is  an  immaterial  substance  in  a peculiarly  high- 
wrought  degree,  being  not  only  not  physically  tangible 
but  also  not  even  capable  of  adequate  statement  in  pe- 
cuniary terms, — as  would  be  the  case  with  ordinary  imma- 
terial assets.  It  is  true,  where  the  point  of  grievance  out 
of  which  a question  of  the  national  honour  arises  is  a pe- 


Introductory 


29 


cuniary  discrepancy,  the  national  honour  can  not  be  satis- 
fied without  a pecuniary  accounting;  but  it  needs  no 
argument  to  convince  all  right-minded  persons  that  even 
at  such  a juncture  the  nationalhonourthat  has  been  com- 
promised is  indefinitely  and  indefinably  more  than  what 
can  be  made  to  appear  on  an  accountant’s  page.  It  is  a 
highly  valued  asset,  or  at  least  a valued  possession,  but 
it  is  of  a metaphysical,  not  of  a physical  nature,  and 
it  is  not  known  to  serve  any  material  or  otherwise  useful 
end  apart  from  affording  a practicable  grievance  conse- 
quent upon  its  infraction. 

This  national  honour  is  subject  to  injury  in  divers  ways, 
and  so  may  yield  a fruitful  grievance  even  apart  from  of- 
fences against  the  person  or  property  of  the  nation’s  busi- 
nessmen; as,  e.  g.,  through  neglect  or  disregard  of  the 
conventional  punctilios  governing  diplomatic  intercourse, 
or  by  disrespect  or  contumelious  speech  touching  the  Flag, 
or  the  persons  of  national  officials,  particularly  of  such 
officials  as  have  only  a decorative  use,  or  the  costumes 
worn  by  such  officials,  or,  again,  by  failure  to  observe 
the  ritual  prescribed  for  parading  the  national  honour  on 
stated  occasions.  When  duly  violated  the  national  honour 
may  duly  be  made  whole  again  by  similarly  immaterial 
instrumentalities ; as,  e.  g.,  by  recital  of  an  appropriate 
formula  of  words,  by  formal  consumption  of  a stated 
quantity  of  ammunition  in  the  way  of  a salute,  by  ‘‘dip- 
ping” an  ensign,  and  the  like, — procedure  which  can,  of 
course,  have  none  but  a magical  efficacy.  The  national 
honour,  in  short,  moves  in  the  realm  of  magic,  and  touch- 
es the  frontiers  of  religion. 

Throughout  this  range  of  duties  incumbent  on  the  na- 
tional defense,  it  will  be  noted,  the  offenses  or  discrepan- 
cies to  be  guarded  against  or  corrected  by  recourse  to 


30 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


arms  have  much  of  a ceremonial  character.  Whatever 
may  be  the  material  accidents  that  surround  any  given 
concrete  grievance  that  comes  up  for  appraisal  and  re- 
dress, in  bringing  the  case  into  the  arena  for  trial  by  com- 
bat it  is  the  spiritual  value  of  the  offense  that  is  played 
up  and  made  the  decisive  ground  of  action,  particularly 
in  so  far  as  appeal  is  made  to  the  sensibilities  of  the  com- 
mon man,  who  will  have  to  bear  the  cost  of  the  adven- 
ture. And  in  such  a case  it  will  commonly  happen  that 
the  common  man  is  unable,  without  advice,  to  see  that 
any  given  hostile  act  embodies  a sacrilegious  infraction  of 
the  national  honour.  He  will  at  any  such  conjuncture 
scarcely  rise  to  the  pitch  of  moral  indignation  necessary 
to  float  a warlike  reprisal,  until  the  expert  keepers  of  the 
Code  come  in  to  expound  and  certify  the  nature  of  the 
transgression.  But  when  once  the  lesion  to  the  national 
honour  has  been  ascertained,  appraised  and  duly  exhibitca 
by  those  persons  whose  place  in  the  national  economy  it 
is  to  look  after  all  that  sort  of  thing,  the  common  man 
will  be  found  nowise  behindhand  about  resenting  the  evil 
usage  of  which  he  so,  by  force  of  interpretation,  has  been 
a victim. 


CHAPTER  II 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism 

Patriotism  may  be  defined  as  a sense  of  partisan  soli- 
darity in  respect  of  prestige.  What  the  expert  psycholo- 
gists, and  perhaps  the  experts  in  Political  Science,  might 
find  it  necessary  to  say  in  the  course  of  an  exhaustive 
analysis  and  definition  of  this  human  faculty  would  pre- 
sumably be  something  more  precise  and  more  extensive. 
There  is  no  inclination  here  to  forestall  definition,  but 
only  to  identify  and  describe  the  concept  that  loosely  un- 
derlies the  colloquial  use  of  this  term,  so  far  as  seems 
necessary  to  an  inquiry  into  the  part  played  by  the  patri- 
otic animus  in  the  life  of  modem  peoples,  particularly 
as  it  bears  on  questions  of  war  and  peace. 

On  any  attempt  to  divest  this  concept  of  all  extrane- 
ous or  adventitious  elements  it  will  be  found  that  such 
a sense  of  an  undivided  joint  interest  in  a collective  body 
of  prestige  will  always  remain  as  an  irreducible  minimum. 
This  is  the  substantial  core  about  which  many  and  divers 
subsidiary  interests  cluster,  but  without  which  these  other 
clustering  interests  and  aspirations  will  not,  jointly  or 
severally,  make  up  a working  palladium  of  the  patri- 
otic spirit. 

It  is  true,  seen  in  some  other  light  or  rated  in  some 
other  bearing  or  connection,  one  and  another  of  these 
other  interests,  ideals,  aspirations,  beatitudes,  may  well 
be  adjudged  nobler,  wiser,  possibly  more  urgent  than  the 

31 


32 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


national  prestige ; but  in  the  forum  of  patriotism  all  these 
other  necessaries  of  human  life — the  glory  of  God  and 
the  good  of  man — rise  by  comparison  only  to  the  rank 
of  subsidiaries,  auxiliaries,  amenities.  He  is  an  indiffer- 
ent patriot  who  will  let  “life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness”  cloud  the  issue  and  get  in  the  way  of  the 
main  business  in  hand. 

There  once  were,  we  are  told,  many  hardy  and  enter- 
prising spirits  banded  together  along  the  Spanish  Main 
for  such  like  ends,  just  as  there  are  in  our  day  an  even 
greater  number  of  no  less  single-minded  spirits  bent  on 
their  own  “life,  liberty  and  pursuit  of  happiness,”  ac- 
cording to  their  light,  in  the  money-markets  of  the  mod- 
ern world ; but  for  all  their  admirable  qualities  and 
splendid  achievements,  their  passionate  quest  of  these 
amenities  has  not  entitled  these  Gentlemen  Adventurers 
to  claim  rank  as  patriots.  The  poet  says : 

“Strike  for  your  altars  and  your  fires! 

Strike  for  the  green  graves  of  your  sires ! 

God  and  your  native  land  1” 

But,  again,  a temperate  scrutiny  of  the  list  of  desiderata 
so  enumerated  in  the  poet’s  flight,  will  quickly  bring  out 
the  fact  that  any  or  all  of  them  might  drop  out  of  the 
situation  without  prejudice  to  the  plain  call  of  patriotic 
duty.  In  the  last  resort,  when  the  patriotic  spirit  falls 
back  on  its  naked  self  alone,  it  is  not  reflection  on  the 
merits  of  these  good  and  beautiful  things  in  Nature  that 
gives  him  his  cue  and  enforces  the  ultimate  sacrifice. 
Indeed  it  is  something  infinitely  more  futile  and  infinitely 
more  urgent, — provided  only  that  the  man  is  imbued  with 
the  due  modicum  of  patriotic  devotion ; as,  indeed,  men 
commonly  are.  It  is  not  faith,  hope  or  charity  that  abide 
as  the  irreducible  minimum  of  virtue  in  the  patriot’s 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  33 

scheme  of  things;  particularly  not  that  charity  that  has 
once  been  highly  spoken  of  as  being  the  greatest  of  these. 
It  may  be  that,  viewed  in  the  light  of  reason,  as  Doctor 
Katzenberger  would  say,  patriotic  devotion  is  the  most 
futile  thing  in  the  world;  but,  for  good  or  ill,  the  light 
of  reason  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  case, — no  more 
than  “The  flowers  that  bloom  in  the  spring.” 

The  patriotic  spirit  is  a spirit  of  emulation,  evidently, 
at  the  same  time  that  it  is  emulation  shot  through  with  a 
sense  of  solidarity.  It  belongs  under  the  general  cap- 
tion of  sportsmanship,  rather  than  of  workmanship. 
Now,  any  enterprise  in  sportsmanship  is  bent  on  an  in- 
vidious success,  which  must  involve  as  its  major  purpose 
the  defeat  and  humiliation  of  some  competitor,  whatever 
else  may  be  comprised  in  its  aim.  Its  aim  is  a differential 
gain,  as  against  a rival ; and  the  emulative  spirit  that 
comes  under  the  head  of  patriotism  commonly,  if  not 
invariably,  seeks  this  differential  advantage  by  injury  of 
the  rival  rather  than  by  an  increase  of  home-bred  well- 
being. 

Indeed,  well-being  is  altogether  out  of  the  perspective, 
except  as  underpinning  for  an  edifice  of  national  prestige. 
It  is,  at  least,  a safe  generalisation  that  the  patriotic  sen- 
timent never  has  been  known  to  rise  to  the  consummate 
pitch  of  enthusiastic  abandon  except  when  bent  on  some 
work  of  concerted  malevolence.  Patriotism  is  of  a con- 
tentious complexion,  and  finds  its  full  expression  in  no 
other  outlet  than  warlike  enterprise ; its  highest  and  final 
appeal  is  for  the  death,  damage,  discomfort  and  destruc- 
tion of  the  party  of  the  second  part. 

It  is  not  that  the  spirit  of  patriotism  will  tolerate  no 
other  sentiments  bearing  on  matters  of  public  interest, 
but  only  that  it  will  tolerate  none  that  traverse  the  call 
3 


34 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace, 


of  the  national  prestige.  Like  other  men,  the  patriot  may 
be  moved  by  many  and  divers  other  considerations,  be- 
sides that  of  the  national  prestige;  and  these  other  con- 
siderations may  be  of  the  most  genial  and  reasonable 
kind,  or  they  may  also  be  as  foolish  and  mischievous  as 
any  comprised  in  the  range  of  human  infirmities.  He 
may  be  a humanitarian  given  over  to  the  kindliest  solici- 
tude for  the  common  good,  or  a religious  devotee  hedged 
about  in  all  his  motions  by  the  ever  present  fear  of  God, 
or  taken  up  with  artistic,  scholarly  or  scientific  pursuits ; 
or,  again,  he  may  be  a spendthrift  devotee  of  profane  dis- 
sipation, whether  in  the  slums  or  on  the  higher  levels  of 
gentility,  or  he  may  be  engaged  on  a rapacious  quest 
of  gain,  as  a businessman  within  the  law  or  as  a criminal 
without  its  benefit,  or  he  may  spend  his  best  endeavors 
in  advancing  the  interests  of  his  class  at  the  cost  of  the 
nation  at  large.  All  that  is  understood  as  a matter  of 
course  and  is  beside  the  point.  In  so  far  as  he  is  a com- 
plete patriot  these  other  interests  will  fall  away  from 
him  when  the  one  clear  call  of  patriotic  duty  comes  to 
enlist  him  in  the  cause  of  the  national  prestige.  There 
is,  indeed,  nothing  to  hinder  a bad  citizen  being  a good 
patriot;  nor  does  it  follow  that  a good  citizen — in  other 
respects — may  not  be  a very  indifferent  patriot. 

Many  and  various  other  preferences  and  considera- 
tions may  coincide  with  the  promptings  of  the  patriotic 
spirit,  and  so  may  come  in  to  coalesce  with  and  fortify 
its  driving  force;  and  it  is  usual  for  patriotic  men  to 
seek  support  for  their  patriotic  impulses  in  some  rea- 
soned purpose  of  this  extraneous  kind  that  is  believed  to 
be  served  by  following  the  call  of  the  national  prestige, — 
it  may  be  a presumptive  increase  and  diffusion  of  culture 
at  large,  or  the  spread  and  enhancement  of  a presump- 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  35 

tively  estimable  religious  faith,  or  a prospective  libera- 
tion of  mankind  from  servitude  to  obnoxious  masters  and 
outworn  institutions ; or,  again,  it  may  be  the  increase 
of  peace  and  material  well-being  among  men,  within  the 
national  frontiers  or  impartially  throughout  the  civilised 
world.  There  are,  substantially,  none  of  the  desirable 
things  in  this  world  that  are  not  so  counted  on  by  some 
considerable  body  of  patriots  to  be  accomplished  by  the 
success  of  their  own  particular  patriotic  aspirations. 
What  they  will  not  come  to  an  understanding  about  is 
the  particular  national  ascendency  with  which  the  attain- 
ment of  these  admirable  ends  is  conceived  to  be  bound  up. 

The  ideals,  needs  and  aims  that  so  are  brought  into 
the  patriotic  argument  to  lend  a color  of  rationality  to 
the  patriotic  aspiration  in  any  given  case  will  of  course 
be  such  ideals,  needs  and  aims  as  are  currently  accepted 
and  felt  to  be  authentic  and  self-legitimating  among  the 
people  in  whose  eyes  the  given  patriotic  enterprise  is  to 
find  favor.  So  one  finds  that,  e.  g.,  among  the  follow- 
ers of  Islam,  devout  and  resolute,  the  patriotic  statesman 
(that  is  to  say  the  politician  who  designs  to  make  use  of 
the  popular  patriotic  fervor)  will  in  the  last  resort  ap- 
peal to  the  claims  and  injunctions  of  the  faith.  In  a 
similar  way  the  Prussian  statesman  bent  on  dynastic  en- 
terprise will  conjure  in  the  name  of  the  dynasty  and  of 
culture  and  efficiency;  or,  if  worse  comes  to  worst,  an 
outbreak  will  be  decently  covered  with  a plea  of  mortal 
peril  and  self-defense.  Among  English-speaking  peoples 
much  is  to  be  gained  by  showing  that  the  path  of  patri- 
otic glory  is  at  the  same  time  the  way  of  equal-handed 
justice  under  the  rule  of  free  institutions ; at  the  same 
time,  in  a fully  commercialised  community,  such  as  the 
English-speaking  commonly  are,  material  benefits  in  the 


36 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


way  of  trade  will  go  far  to  sketch  in  s background  of 
decency  for  any  enterprise  that  looks  to  the  enhance- 
ment of  the  national  prestige. 

But  any  promise  of  gain,  whether  in  the  nation’s  ma- 
terial or  immaterial  assets,  will  not  of  itself  carry  full 
conviction  to  the  commonplace  modern  citizen ; or  even 
to  such  modern  citizens  as  are  best  endowed  with  a na- 
tional spirit.  By  and  large,  and  overlooking  that  appre- 
ciable contingent  of  morally  defective  citizens  that  is  to 
be  counted  on  in  any  hybrid  population,  it  will  hold  true 
that  no  contemplated  enterprise  or  line  of  policy  will  fully 
commend  itself  to  the  popular  sense  of  merit  and  expe- 
diency until  it  is  given  a moral  turn,  so  as  to  bring  it  to 
square  with  the  dictates  of  right  and  honest  dealing. 
On  no  terms  short  of  this  will  it  effectually  coalesce  with 
the  patriotic  aspiration.  To  give  the  fullest  practical 
effect  to  the  patriotic  fervor  that  animates  any  modern 
nation,  and  so  turn  it  to  use  in  the  most  effective  way, 
it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the  demands  of  equity  are 
involved  in  the  case.  Any  cursory  survey  of  modern 
historical  events  bearing  on  this  point,  among  the  civilised 
peoples,  will  bring  out  the  fact  that  no  concerted  and  sus- 
tained movement  of  the  national  spirit  can  be  had  without 
enlisting  the  community’s  moral  convictions.  The  com- 
mon man  must  be  persuaded  that  right  is  on  his  side. 
“Thrice  is  he  armed  who  knows  his  quarrel  just.’’  The 
grounds  of  this  conviction  may  often  be  tawdry  enough, 
but  the  conviction  is  a necessary  factor  in  the  case. 

The  requisite  moral  sanction  may  be  had  on  various 
grounds,  and,  on  the  whole,  it  is  not  an  extremely  difficult 
matter  to  arrange.  In  the  simplest  and  not  infrequent 
case  it  may  turn  on  a question  of  equity  in  respect  of  trade 
or  investment  as  between  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  tlie 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  37 

several  rival  nations ; the  Chinese  “Open  Door”  aflfords 
as  sordid  an  example  as  may  be  desired.  Or  it  may  be 
only  an  envious  demand  for  a share  in  the  world’s  ma- 
terial resources — “A  Place  in  the  Sun,”  as  a picturesque 
phrase  describes  it;  or  “The  Freedom  of  the  Seas,”  as 
another  equally  vague  and  equally  invidious  demand  for 
international  equity  phrases  it.  These  demands  are  put 
forward  with  a color  of  demanding  something  in  the 
way  of  equitable  opportunity  for  the  commonplace  peace- 
able citizen ; but  quite  plainly  they  have  none  but  a fan- 
ciful bearing  on  the  fortunes  of  the  common  man  in 
time  of  peace,  and  they  have  a meaning  to  the  nation  only 
as  a fighting  unit ; apart  from  their  prestige  value,  these 
things  are  worth  fighting  for  only  as  prospective  means  of 
fighting.  The  like  appeal  to  the  moral  sensibilities  may, 
again,  be  made  in  the  way  of  a call  to  self-defense,  under 
the  rule  of  Live  and  let  live;  or  it  may  also  rest  on  the 
more  tenuous  obligation  to  safeguard  the  national  integ- 
rity of  a weaker  neighbor,  under  a broader  interpreta- 
tion of  the  same  equitable  rule  of  Live  and  let  live.  But 
in  one  way  or  another  it  is  necessary  to  set  up  the  con- 
viction that  the  promptings  of  patriotic  ambition  have 
the  sanction  of  moral  necessity. 

It  is  not  that  the  line  of  national  policy  or  patriotic 
enterprise  so  entered  upon  with  the  support  of  popular 
sentiment  need  be  right  and  equitable  as  seen  in  dis- 
passionate perspective  from  the  outside,  but  only  that  it 
should  be  capable  of  being  made  to  seem  right  and  eq- 
uitable to  the  biased  populace  whose  moral  convictions 
are  requisite  to  its  prosecution ; which  is  quite  another 
matter.  Nor  is  it  that  any  such  patriotic  enterprise  is, 
in  fact,  entered  on  simply  or  mainly  on  these  moral 
grounds  that  so  are  alleged  in  its  justification,  but  only 


38 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  some  such  colorable  ground  of  justification  or  exten- 
uation is  necessary  to  be  alleged,  and  to  be  credited  by 
popular  belief. 

It  is  not  that  the  common  man  is  not  sufficiently  patri- 
otic, but  only  that  he  is  a patriot  hampered  with  a plod- 
ding and  uneasy  sense  of  right  and  honest  dealing,  and 
that  one  must  make  up  one’s  account  with  this  moral  bias 
in  looking  to  any  sustained  and  concerted  action  that 
draws  on  the  sentiment  of  the  common  man  for  its  car- 
rying on.  But  the  moral  sense  in  the  case  may  be  some- 
what easily  satisfied  with  a modicum  of  equity,  in  case 
the  patriotic  bias  of  the  people  is  well  pronounced,  or  in 
case  it  is  re-enforced  with  a sufficient  appeal  to  self- 
interest.  In  those  cases  where  the  national  fervor  rises 
to  an  excited  pitch,  even  very  attenuated  considerations 
of  right  and  justice,  such  as  would  under  ordinary  con- 
ditions doubtfully  bear  scrutiny  as  extenuating  circum- 
stances, may  come  to  serve  as  moral  authentication  for 
any  extravagant  course  of  action  to  which  the  craving 
for  national  prestige  may  incite.  The  higher  the  pitch 
of  patriotic  fervor,  the  more  tenuous  and  more  thread- 
bare may  be  the  requisite  moral  sanction.  By  cumulative 
excitation  some  very  remarkable  results  have  latterly 
been  attained  along  this  line. 

Patriotism  is  evidently  a spirit  of  particularism,  of 
aliency  and  animosity  between  contrasted  groups  of  per- 
sons ; it  lives  on  invidious  comparison,  and  works  out 
in  mutual  hindrance  and  jealousy  between  nations.  It 
commonly  goes  the  length  of  hindering  intercourse  and 
obstructing  traffic  that  would  patently  serve  the  material 
and  cultural  well-being  of  both  nationalities;  and  not 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  39 

infrequently,  indeed  normally,  it  eventuates  in  competi- 
tive damage  to  both. 

All  this  holds  true  in  the  world  of  modern  civilisation, 
at  the  same  time  that  the  modern  civilised  scheme  of  life 
is,  notoriously,  of  a cosmopolitan  character,  both  in  its 
cultural  requirements  and  in  its  economic  structure. 
Modern  culture  is  drawn  on  too  large  a scale,  is  of  too 
complex  and  multiform  a character,  requires  the  coopera- 
tion of  too  many  and  various  lines  of  inquiry,  experience 
and  insight,  to  admit  of  its  being  confined  within  na- 
tional frontiers,  except  at  the  cost  of  insufferable  crip- 
pling and  retardation.  The  science  and  scholarship  that 
is  the  peculiar  pride  of  civilised  Christendom  is  not  only 
international,  but  rather  it  is  homogeneously  cosmopoli- 
tan ; so  that  in  this  bearing  there  are,  in  effect,  no  national 
frontiers ; with  the  exception,  of  course,  that  in  a season 
of  patriotic  intoxication,  such  as  the  current  war  has 
induced,  even  the  scholars  and  scientists  will  be  tempo- 
rarily overset  by  their  patriotic  fervour.  Indeed,  with 
the  best  efforts  of  obscurantism  and  national  jealousy  to 
the  contrary,  it  remains  patently  true  that  modern  culture 
is  the  culture  of  Christendom  at  large,  not  the  culture 
of  one  and  another  nation  in  severalty  within  the  confines 
of  Christendom.  It  is  only  as  and  in  so  far  as  they 
partake  in  and  contribute  to  the  general  run  of  Western 
civilisation  at  large  that  the  people  of  any  one  of  these 
nations  of  Christendom  can  claim  standing  as  a cultured 
nation;  and  even  any  distinctive  variation  from  this 
general  run  of  civilised  life,  such  as  may  give  a “local 
colour”  of  ideals,  tastes  and  conventions,  will,  in  point 
of  cultural  value,  have  to  be  rated  as  an  idle  detail,  a 
species  of  lost  motion,  that  serves  no  better  purpose  than 
a transient  estrangement. 


40 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


So  also,  the  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts  is  of  a 
like  cosmopolitan  character,  in  point  of  scale,  specialisa- 
tion, and  the  necessary  use  of  diversified  resources,  of 
climate  and  raw  materials.  None  of  the  countries  of 
Europe,  e.  g.,  is  competent  to  carry  on  its  industry  by 
modern  technological  methods  without  constantly  draw- 
ing on  resources  outside  of  its  national  boundaries.  Iso- 
lation in  this  industrial  respect,  exclusion  from  the  world 
market,  would  mean  intolerable  loss  of  efficiency,  more 
pronounced  the  more  fully  the  given  country  has  taken 
over  this  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts.  Exclusion 
from  the  general  body  of  outlying  resources  would  seri- 
ously cripple  any  one  or  all  of  them,  and  effectually  de- 
prive them  of  the  usufruct  of  this  technology;  and  par- 
tial exclusion,  by  prohibitive  or  protective  tariffs  and  the 
like,  unavoidably  results  in  a partial  lowering  of  the  ef- 
ficiency of  each,  and  therefore  a reduction  of  the  current 
well-being  among  them  all  together. 

Into  this  cultural  and  technological  system  of  the  mod- 
ern world  the  patriotic  spirit  fits  like  dust  in  the  eyes 
and  sand  in  the  bearings.  Its  net  contribution  to  the 
outcome  is  obscuration,  distrust,  and  retardation  at 
every  point  where  it  touches  the  fortunes  of  modem  man- 
kind. Yet  it  is  forever  present  in  the  counsels  of  the 
statesmen  and  in  the  affections  of  the  common  man,  and 
it  never  ceases  to  command  the  regard  of  all  men  as  the 
prime  artribute  of  manhood  and  the  final  test  of  the 
desirable  citizen.  It  is  scarcely  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  no  other  consideration  is  allowed  in  abatement  of  the 
claims  of  patriotic  loyalty,  and  that  such  loyalty  will  be 
allowed  to  cover  any  multitude  of  sins.  When  the  an- 
cient philosopher  described  IMan  as  a “political  animal,” 
this,  in  effect,  was  what  he  affirmed;  and  today  the 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  41 

ancient  maxim  is  as  good  as  new.  The  patriotic  spirit 
is  at  cross  purposes  with  modern  life,  but  in  any  test 
case  it  is  found  that  the  claims  of  life  yield  before  those 
of  patriotism ; and  any  voice  that  dissents  from  this 
, order  of  things  is  as  a voice  crying  in  the  wilderness. 

To  anyone  who  is  inclined  to  moralise  on  the  singular 
discrepancies  of  human  life  this  state  of  the  case  will  be 
fruitful  of  much  profound  speculation.  The  patriotic 
animus  appears  to  be  an  enduring  trait  of  human  nature, 
an  ancient  heritage  that  has  stood  over  unshorn  from  time 
immemorial,  under  the  Mendelian  rule  of  the  stability  of 
racial  types.  It  is  archaic,  not  amenable  to  elimination  or 
enduring  suppression,  and  apparently  not  appreciably 
to  be  mitigated  by  reflection,  education,  experience  or 
selective  breeding. 

Throughout  the  historical  period,  and  presumably 
through  an  incalculable  period  of  the  unrecorded  past, 
patriotic  manslaughter  has  consistently  been  weeding  out 
of  each  successive  generation  of  men  the  most  patriotic 
among  them ; with  the  net  result  that  the  level  of  pa- 
triotic ardor  today  appears  to  be  no  lower  than  it  ever 
was.  At  the  same  time,  with  the  advance  of  population, 
of  culture  and  of  the  industrial  arts,  patriotism  has  grown 
increasingly  disserviceable ; and  it  is  to  all  appearance 
as  ubiquitous  and  as  powerful  as  ever,  and  is  held  in  as 
high  esteem. 

The  continued  prevalence  of  this  archaic  animus  among 
the  modern  peoples,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  it  is  universal- 
ly placed  high  among  the  virtues,  must  be  taken  to  argue 
that  it  is,  in  its  elements,  an  hereditary  trait,  of  the  nature 
of  an  inborn  impulsive  propensity,  rather  than  a pro- 
duct of  habituation.  It  is,  in  substance,  not  something 


42 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  can  be  learned  and  unlearned.  From  one  generation 
to  another,  the  allegiance  may  shift  from  one  nationality 
to  another,  but  the  fact  of  unreflecting  allegiance  at  large 
remains.  And  it  all  argues  also  that  no  sensible  change 
has  taken  effect  in  the  hereditary  endowment  of  the  race, 
at  least  in  this  respect,  during  the  period  known  by  rec- 
ord or  by  secure  inference, — say,  since  the  early  Neolithic 
in  Europe ; and  this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  there  has  all 
this  while  been  opportunity  for  radical  changes  in  the 
European  population  by  cross-breeding,  infiltration  and 
displacement  of  the  several  racial  stocks  that  go  to  make 
up  this  population.  Hence,  on  slight  reflection  the  infer- 
ence has  suggested  itself  and  has  gained  acceptance  that 
this  trait  of  human  nature  must  presumably  have  been 
serviceable  to  the  peoples  of  the  earlier  time,  on  those 
levels  of  savagery  or  of  the  lower  barbarism  on  which 
the  ancestral  stocks  of  the  European  population  first  made 
good  their  survival  and  proved  their  fitness  to  people  that 
quarter  of  the  earth.  Such,  indeed,  is  the  common  view ; 
so  common  as  to  pass  for  matter-of-course,  and  therefore 
habitually  to  escape  scrutiny. 

Still  it  need  not  follow,  as  more  patient  reflection  will 
show.  All  the  European  peoples  show  much  the  same 
animus  in  this  respect;  whatever  their  past  history  may 
have  been,  and  whatever  the  difference  in  past  experience 
that  might  be  conceived  to  have  shaped  their  tempera- 
ment. Any  difference  in  the  pitch  of  patriotic  conceit 
and  animosity,  between  the  several  nationalities  or  the 
several  localities,  is  by  no  means  wide,  even  in  cases 
where  the  racial  composition  of  the  population  is  held  to 
be  very  different,  as,  e.  g.,  between  the  peoples  on  the 
Baltic  seaboard  and  those  on  the  Mediterranean.  In  point 
of  fact,  in  this  matter  of  patriotic  animus  there  appears 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  43 

to  be  a wider  divergence,  temperamentally,  between  in- 
dividuals within  any  one  of  these  communities  than  be- 
tween the  common  run  in  any  one  community  and  the 
corresponding  common  run  in  any  other.  But  even  such 
divergence  of  individual  temper  in  respect  of  patriotism 
as  is  to  be  met  with,  first  and  last,  is  after  all  surprisingly 
small  in  view  of  the  scope  for  individual  variation  which 
this  European  population  would  seem  to  offer. 

These  peoples  of  Europe,  all  and  several,  are  hybrids 
compounded  out  of  the  same  run  of  racial  elements,  but 
mixed  in  varying  proportions.  On  any  parallel  of  lati- 
tude— taken  in  the  climatic  rather  than  in  the  geometric 
sense — the  racial  composition  of  the  west-European  pop- 
ulation will  be  much  the  same,  virtually  identical  in  ef- 
fect, although  always  of  a hybrid  complexion;  whereas 
on  any  parallel  of  longitude — also  in  the  climatic  sense — 
the  racial  composition  will  vary  progressively,  but  always 
within  the  limits  of  the  same  general  scheme  of  hybridisa- 
tion,— the  variation  being  a variation  in  the  proportion  in 
which  the  several  racial  elements  are  present  in  any  given 
case.  But  in  no  case  does  a notable  difference  in  racial 
composition  coincide  with  a linguistic  or  national  frontier. 
But  in  point  of  patriotic  animus  these  European  peoples 
are  one  as  good  as  another,  whether  the  comparison  be 
traced  on  parallels  of  latitude  or  of  longitude.  And  the 
inhabitants  of  each  national  territory,  or  of  each  detail 
locality,  appear  also  to  run  surprisingly  uniform  in  re- 
spect of  their  patriotic  spirit. 

Heredity  in  any  such  community  of  hybrids  will,  su- 
perficially, appear  to  run  somewhat  haphazard.  There 
will,  of  course,  be  no  traceable  difference  between  social 
or  economic  classes,  in  point  of  heredity, — as  is  visibly 


44 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  case  in  Christendom.  But  variation — of  an  appar- 
ently haphazard  description — will  be  large  and  ubiquitous 
among  the  individuals  of  such  a populace.  Indeed,  it  is 
a matter  of  course  and  of  easy  verification  that  individual 
variation  within  such  a hybrid  stock  will  greatly  exceed 
the  extreme  differences  that  may  subsist  between  the  sev- 
eral racial  types  that  have  gone  to  produce  the  hybrid 
stock.  Such  is  the  case  of  the  European  peoples.  The 
inhabitants  vary  greatly  among  themselves,  both  in  phys- 
ical and  in  mental  traits,  as  would  be  expected;  and  the 
variation  between  individuals  in  point  of  patriotic  ani- 
mus should  accordingly  also  be  expected  to  be  extremely 
wide, — should,  in  effect,  greatly  exceed  the  difference,  if 
any,  in  this  respect  between  the  several  racial  elements 
engaged  in  the  European  population.  Some  appreciable 
difference  in  this  respect  there  appears  to  be,  between 
individuals;  but  individual  divergence  from  the  normal 
or  average  appears  always  to  be  of  a sporadic  sort, — it 
does  not  run  on  class  lines,  whether  of  occupation,  status 
or  property,  nor  does  it  run  at  all  consistently  from 
parent  to  child.  When  all  is  told  the  argument  returns  to 
the  safe  ground  that  these  variations  in  point  of  patriotic 
animus  are  sporadic  and  inconsequential,  and  do  not 
touch  the  general  proposition  that,  one  with  another,  the 
inhabitants  of  Europe  and  the  European  Colonies  are 
sufficiently  patriotic,  and  that  the  average  endowment  in 
this  respect  runs  with  consistent  uniformity  across  all 
differences  of  time,  place  and  circumstance.  It  would,  in 
fact,  be  extremely  hazardous  to  affirm  that  there  is  a 
sensible  difference  in  the  ordinary  pitch  of  patriotic  sen- 
timent as  between  any  two  widely  diverse  samples  of  these 
hybrid  populations,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  diversity 
in  visible  physical  traits  may  be  quite  pronounced. 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  45 

In  short,  the  conclusion  seems  safe,  on  the  whole,  that 
in  this  respect  the  several  racial  stocks  that  have  gone  to 
produce  the  existing  populations  of  Christendom  have 
all  been  endowed  about  as  richly  one  as  another.  Patri- 
otism appears  to  be  a ubiquitous  trait,  at  least  among  the 
races  and  peoples  of  Christendom.  From  which  it  should 
follow,  that  since  there  is,  and  has  from  the  beginning 
been,  no  differential  advantage  favoring  one  racial  stock 
or  one  fashion  of  hybrid  as  against  another,  in  this  mat- 
ter of  patriotic  animus,  there  should  also  be  no  ground 
of  selective  survival  or  selective  elimination  on  this  ac- 
count as  between  these  several  races  and  peoples.  So 
that  the  undisturbed  and  undiminished  prevalence  of  this 
trait  among  the  European  population,  early  or  late,  argues 
nothing  as  to  its  net  serviceability  or  disserviceability 
under  any  of  the  varying  conditions  of  culture  and  tech- 
nology to  v>?hich  these  Europeans  have  been  subjected, 
first  and  last ; except  that  it  has,  in  any  case,  not  proved 
so  disserviceable  under  the  conditions  prevailing  hitherto 
as  to  result  in  the  extinction  of  these  Europeans,  one 
with  another.^ 

The  patriotic  frame  of  mind  has  been  spoken  of  above 
as  if  it  were  an  hereditary  trait,  something  after  the 
fashion  of  a Mendelian  unit  character.  Doubtless  this 
is  not  a competent  account  of  the  matter ; but  the  present 
argument  scarcely  needs  a closer  analysis.  Still,  in  a 
measure  to  quiet  title  and  avoid  annoyance,  it  may  be 
noted  that  this  patriotic  animus  is  of  the  nature  of  a 
“frame  of  mind”  rather  than  a Mendelian  unit  character ; 

ipor  a more  extended  discussion  of  this  matter,  cf.  Imperial 
Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,  ch.  i.  and  Supplementary- 
Notes  i.  and  ii. 


46 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  it  so  involves  a concatenation  of  several  impulsive 
propensities  (presumably  hereditary)  ; and  that  both  the 
concatenation  and  the  special  mode  and  amplitude  of  the 
response  are  a product  of  habituation,  very  largely  of  the 
nature  of  conventionalised  use  and  wont.  What  is  said 
above,  therefore,  goes  little  farther  than  saying  that  the 
underlying  aptitudes  requisite  to  this  patriotic  frame  of 
mind  are  heritable,  and  that  use  and  wont  as  bearing  on 
this  point  run  with  sufficient  uniformity  to  bring  a pass- 
ably uniform  result.  It  may  be  added  that  in  this  con- 
catenation spoken  of  there  seems  to  be  comprised,  ordi- 
narily, that  sentimental  attachment  to  habitat  and  custom 
that  is  called  love  of  home,  or  in  its  accentuated  expres- 
sion, home-sickness ; so  also  an  invidious  self-compla- 
cency, coupled  with  a gregarious  bent  which  gives  the 
invidious  comparison  a group  content ; and  further,  com- 
monly if  not  invariably,  a bent  of  abnegation,  self-abase- 
ment, subservience,  or  whatever  it  may  best  be  called,  that 
inclines  the  bearer  unreasoningly  and  unquestioningly  to 
accept  and  serve  a prescriptive  ideal  given  by  custom  or 
by  customary  authority. 

The  conclusion  would  therefore  provisionally  run  to 
the  effect  that  under  modem  conditions  the  patriotic  ani- 
mus is  wholly  a disserviceable  trait  in  the  spiritual  en- 
dowment of  these  peoples, — in  so  far  as  bears  on  the 
material  conditions  of  life  unequivocally,  and  as  regards 
the  cultural  interests  more  at  large  presumptively ; where- 
as there  is  no  assured  ground  for  a discriminating  opin- 
ion as  touches  its  possible  utility  or  disutility  at  any  re- 
mote period  in  the  past.  There  is,  of  course,  always  room 
for  the  conservative  estimate  that,  as  the  possession  of 
this  spiritual  trait  has  not  hitherto  resulted  in  the  extinc- 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  47 

tion  of  the  race,  so  it  may  also  in  the  calculable  future 
continue  to  bring  no  more  grievous  results  than  a degree 
of  mischief,  without  even  stopping  or  greatly  retarding 
the  increase  of  population. 

All  this,  of  course,  is  intended  to  apply  only  so  far  as 
it  goes.  It  must  not  be  taken  as  intending  to  say  any 
least  word  in  derogation  of  those  high  qualities  that  in- 
spire the  patriotic  citizen.  In  its  economic,  biological  and 
cultural  incidence  patriotism  appears  to  be  an  untoward 
trait  of  human  nature ; which  has,  of  course,  nothing  to 
say  as  to  its  moral  excellence,  its  aesthetic  value,  or  its  in- 
dispensability to  a worthy  life.  No  doubt,  it  is  in  all  these 
respects  deserving  of  all  the  esteem  and  encomiums  that 
fall  to  its  share.  Indeed,  its  well-known  moral  and  aes- 
thetic value,  as  well  as  the  reprobation  that  is  visited  on 
any  shortcomings  in  this  respect,  signify,  for  the  purposes 
of  the  present  argument,  nothing  more  than  that  the  pa- 
triotic animus  meets  the  unqualified  approval  of  men  be- 
cause they  are,  all  and  several,  infected  with  it.  It  is  evi- 
dence of  the  ubiquitous,  intimate  and  ineradicable  pres- 
ence of  this  quality  in  human  nature ; all  the  more  since  it 
continues  untiringly  to  be  held  in  the  highest  esteem  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  a modicum  of  reflection  should  make 
its  disserviceability  plain  to  the  meanest  understanding. 
No  higher  praise  of  moral  excellence,  and  no  profounder 
test  of  loyalty,  can  be  asked  than  this  current  unreserved 
commendation  of  a virtue  that  makes  invariably  for  dam- 
age and  discomfort.  The  virtuous  impulse  must  be  deep- 
seated  and  indefeasible  that  drives  men  incontinently  to  do 
good  that  evil  may  come  of  it.  “Jliough  He  slay  me,  yet 
will  I trust  in  Him,” 


48 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


In  the  light — and  it  is  a dim  and  wavering  light — of  the 
archaeological  evidence,  helped  out  by  circumstantial  evi- 
dence from  such  parallel  or  analogous  instances  as  are 
afforded  by  existing  communities  on  a comparable  level 
of  culture,  one  may  venture  more  or  less  confidently  on 
a reconstruction  of  the  manner  of  life  among  the  early 
Europeans,  of  early  neolithic  times  and  laterd  And  so 
one  may  form  some  conception  of  the  part  played  by  this 
patriotic  animus  among  those  beginnings,  when,  if  not 
the  race,  at  least  its  institutions  were  young;  and  when 
the  native  temperament  of  these  peoples  was  tried  out  and 
found  fit  to  survive  through  the  age-long  and  slow-moving 
eras  of  stone  and  bronze.  In  this  connection,  it  appears 
safe  to  assume  that  since  early  neolithic  times  no  sensible 
change  has  taken  effect  in  the  racial  complexion  of  the 
European  peoples ; and  therefore  no  sensible  change  in 
their  spiritual  and  mental  make-up.  So  that  in  respect  of 
the  spiritual  elements  that  go  to  make  up  this  patriotic 
animus  the  Europeans  of  today  will  be  substantially  iden- 
tical with  the  Europeans  of  that  early  time.  The  like  is 
true  as  regards  those  other  traits  of  temperament  that 
come  in  question  here,  as  being  included  among  the  stable 
characteristics  that  still  condition  the  life  of  these  peoples 
under  the  altered  circumstances  of  the  modern  age. 

The  difference  between  prehistoric  Europe  and  the 
present  state  of  these  peoples  resolves  itself  on  analysis 
into  a difference  in  the  state  of  the  industrial  arts,  to- 
gether with  such  institutional  changes  as  have  come  on 
in  the  course  of  working  out  this  advance  in  the  indus- 
trial arts.  The  habits  and  the  exigencies  of  life  among 
these  peoples  have  greatly  changed;  whereas  in  temper- 

^Cf.  Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,  as  above. 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism 


49 


ament  and  capacities  the  peoples  that  now  live  by  and 
under  the  rule  of  this  altered  state  of  the  industrial  arts 
are  the  same  as  they  were.  It  is  to  be  noted,  therefore, 
that  the  fact  of  their  having  successfully  come  through- 
the  long  ages  of  prehistory  by  the  use  of  this  mental  and 
spiritual  endowment  can  not  be  taken  to  argue  that  these 
peoples  are  thereby  fit  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  this 
later  and  gravely  altered  age;  nor  will  it  do  to  assume 
that  because  these  peoples  have  themselves  worked  out 
this  modern  culture  and  its  technology,  therefore  it  must 
all  be  suitable  for  their  use  and  conducive  to  their  bio- 
logical success.  The  single  object  lesson  of  the  modern 
urban  community,  with  its  endless  requirements  in  the 
way  of  sanitation,  police,  compulsory  education,  chari- 
ties,— all  this  and  many  other  discrepancies  in  modern 
life  should  enjoin  caution  on  anyone  who  is  inclined  off- 
hand to  hold  that  because  modern  men  have  created  these 
conditions,  therefore  these  must  be  the  most  suitable  con- 
ditions of  life  for  modern  mankind. 

In  the  beginning,  that  is  to  say  in  the  European  begin- 
ning, men  lived  in  small  and  close  groups.  Control  was 
close  within  the  group,  and  the  necessity  of  subordinating 
individual  gains  and  preferences  to  the  common  good 
was  enjoined  on  the  group  by  the  exigencies  of  the  case, 
on  pain  of  common  extinction.  The  situation  and  usages 
of  existing  Eskimo  villages  may  serve  to  illustrate  and 
enforce  the  argument  on  this  head.  The  solidarity  of 
sentiment  necessary  to  support  the  requisite  solidarity  of 
action  in  the  case  would  be  a prime  condition  of  survival 
in  any  racial  stock  exposed  to  the  conditions  which  sur- 
rounded these  early  Europeans.  This  needful  sense  of 
solidarity  would  touch  not  simply  or  most  imperatively 
the  joint  prestige  of  the  group,  but  rather  the  joint  ma- 
4 


50  On  the  Nature  of  Peace 

terlal  interests;  and  would  enforce  a spirit  of  mutual 
support  and  dependence.  Which  would  be  rather  helped 
than  hindered  by  a jealous  attitude  of  joint  prestige;  so 
long  as  no  divergent  interests  of  members  within  the 
group  were  in  a position  to  turn  this  state  of  the  common 
sentiment  to  their  own  particular  advantage. 

This  state  of  the  case  will  have  lasted  for  a relatively 
long  time ; long  enough  to  have  tested  the  fitness  of  these 
peoples  for  that  manner  of  life, — longer,  no  doubt,  than 
the  interval  that  has  elapsed  since  history  began.  Special 
interests — e.  g.,  personal  and  family  interests — will  have 
been  present  and  active  in  these  days  of  the  beginning; 
but  so  long  as  the  group  at  large  was  small  enough  to 
admit  of  a close  neighborly  contact  throughout  its  extent 
and  throughout  the  workday  routine  of  life,  at  the  same 
time  that  it  was  too  small  and  feeble  to  allow  any  appre- 
ciable dissipation  of  its  joint  energies  in  such  pursuit  of 
selfish  gains  as  would  run  counter  to  the  paramount  busi- 
ness of  the  common  livelihood,  so  long  the  sense  of  a 
common  livelihood  and  a joint  fortune  would  continue 
to  hold  any  particularist  ambitions  effectually  in  check. 
Had  it  fallen  out  otherwise,  the  story  of  the  group  in 
question  would  have  been  ended,  and  another  and  more 
suitably  endowed  type  of  men  would  have  taken  the  place 
vacated  by  its  extinction. 

With  a sensible  advance  in  the  industrial  arts  the  scale 
of  operations  would  grow  larger,  and  the  group  more 
numerous  and  extensive.  The  margin  between  produc- 
tion and  subsistence  would  also  widen  and  admit  addi- 
tional scope  for  individual  ambitions  and  personal  gains. 
And  as  this  process  of  growth  and  increasing  productive 
efficiency  went  on,  the  control  exercised  by  neighborly 
surveillance,  through  the  sentiment  of  the  common  good 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  51 

as  against  the  self-seeking  pursuits  of  individuals  and 
sub-groups,  would  gradually  slacken ; until  by  progres- 
sive disuse  it  would  fall  into  a degree  of  abeyance ; to 
be  called  into  exercise  and  incite  to  concerted  action  only 
in  the  face  of  unusual  exigencies  touching  the  common 
fortunes  of  the  group  at  large,  or  on  persuasion  that  the 
collective  interest  of  the  group  at  large  was  placed  in 
jeopardy  in  the  molestation  of  one  and  another  of  its 
members  from  without.  The  group’s  prestige  at  least 
would  be  felt  to  suffer  in  the  defeat  or  discourtesy  suf- 
fered by  any  of  its  members  at  the  hands  of  any  alien ; 
and,  under  compulsion  of  the  ancient  sense  of  group  soli- 
darity, whatever  material  hardship  or  material  gain  might 
so  fall  to  individual  members  in  their  dealings  with  the 
alien  would  pass  easy  scrutiny  as  material  detriment  or 
gain  inuring  to  the  group  at  large, — in  the  apprehension 
of  men  whose  sense  of  community  interest  is  inflamed 
with  a jealous  disposition  to  safeguard  their  joint  prestige. 

With  continued  advance  in  the  industrial  arts  the  cir- 
cumstances conditioning  life  will  undergo  a progressive 
change  of  such  a character  that  the  joint  interest  of  the 
group  at  large,  in  the  material  respect,  will  progressively 
be  less  closely  bound  up  with  the  material  fortunes  of  any 
particular  member  or  members ; until  in  the  course  of 
time  and  change  there  will,  in  effect,  in  ordinary  times  be 
no  general  and  inclusive  community  of  material  interest 
binding  the  members  together  in  a common  fortune  and 
working  for  a common  livelihood.  As  the  rights  of  own- 
ership begin  to  take  effect,  so  that  the  ownership  of  prop- 
erty and  the  pursuit  of  a livelihood  under  the  rules  of 
ownership  come  to  govern  men’s  economic  relations,  these 
material  concerns  will  cease  to  be  a matter  of  undivided 
joint  interest,  and  will  fall  into  the  shape  of  interest  in 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


52  , 

severalty.  So  soon  and  so  far  as  this  institution  of  own- 
ership or  property  takes  effect,  men’s  material  interests 
cease  to  run  on  lines  of  group  solidarity.  Solely,  or  al- 
most solely,  in  the  exceptional  case  of  defense  against 
a predatory  incursion  from  outside,  do  the  members  of 
the  group  have  a common  interest  of  a material  kind. 
Progressively  as  the  state  of  the  arts  advances,  the  in- 
dustrial organisation  advances  to  a larger  scale  and  a 
more  extensive  specialisation,  with  increasing  divergence 
among  individual  interests  and  individual  fortunes ; and 
intercourse  over  larger  distances  grows  easier  and  makes 
a larger  grouping  practicable ; which  enables  a larger, 
prompter  and  more  effective  mobilisation  of  forces  with 
which  to  defend  or  assert  any  joint  claims.  But  by  the 
same  move  it  also  follows,  or  at  least  it  appears  uni- 
formly to  have  followed  in  the  European  case,  that  the 
accumulation  of  property  and  the  rights  of  ownership 
have  progressively  come  into  the  first  place  among  the 
material  interests  of  these  peoples ; while  anything  like 
a community  of  usufruct  has  imperceptibly  fallen  into  the 
background,  and  has  presently  gone  virtually  into  abey- 
ance, except  as  an  eventual  recourse  in  extremis  for  the 
common  defense.  Property  rights  have  displaced  com- 
munity of  usufruct ; and  invidious  distinctions  as  between 
persons,  sub-groups,  and  classes  have  displaced  commu- 
nity of  prestige  in  the  workday  routine  of  these  peoples ; 
and  the  distinctions  between  contrasted  persons  or  classes 
have  come  to  rest,  in  an  ever  increasing  degree,  directly 
or  indirectly,  on  invidious  comparisons  in  respect  of  pe- 
cuniary standing  rather  than  on  personal  affiliation  with 
the  group  at  large. 

So,  with  the  advance  of  the  industrial  arts  a differentia- 
tion of  a new  character  sets  in  and  presently  grows  pro- 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism 


53 


gressively  more  pronounced  and  more  effectual,  giving 
rise  to  a regrouping  on  lines  that  run  regardless  of  those 
frontiers  that  divide  one  community  from  another  for 
purposes  of  patriotic  emtdation.  So  far  as  it  comes 
chiefly  and  typically  in  question  here,  this  regrouping 
takes  place  on  two  distinct  but  somewhat  related  princi- 
ples of  contrast;  that  of  wealth  and  poverty,  and  that 
of  master  and  servant,  or  authority  and  obedience.  The 
material  interests  of  the  population  in  this  way  come  to 
be  divided  between  the  group  of  those  who  own  and  those 
who  command,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  those  who  work 
and  who  obey,  on  the  other  hand. 

Neither  of  these  two  contrasted  categories  of  persons 
have  any  direct  material  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
patriotic  community;  or  at  any  rate  no  such  interest  as 
should  reasonably  induce  them  to  spend  their  own  time 
and  substance  in  support  of  the  political  (patriotic)  or- 
ganisation within  which  they  live.  It  is  only  in  so  far 
as  one  or  another  of  these  interests  looks  for  a more  than 
proportionate  share  in  any  prospective  gain  from  the 
joint  enterprise,  that  the  group  or  class  in  question  can 
reasonably  be  counted  on  to  bear  its  share  in  the  joint 
venture.  And  it  is  only  when  and  in  so  far  as  their  par- 
ticular material  or  self-regarding  interest  is  reenforced 
by  patriotic  conceit,  that  they  can  be  counted  on  to  spend 
themselves  in  furtherance  of  the  patriotic  enterprise,  with- 
out the  assurance  of  a more  than  proportionate  share  in 
any  gains  that  may  be  held  in  prospect  from  any  such 
joint  enterprise;  and  it  is  only  in  its  patriotic  bearing 
that  the  political  community  continues  to  be  a joint  ven- 
ture. That  is  to  say,  in  more  generalised  terms,  through 
the  development  of  the  rights  of  property,  and  of  such 
like  prescriptive  claims  of  privilege  and  prerogative,  it 


54 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


has  come  about  that  other  community  interests  have  fallen 
away,  until  the  collective  prestige  remains  as  virtually 
the  sole  community  interest  which  can  hold  the  sentiment 
of  the  group  in  a bond  of  solidarity. 

To  one  or  another  of  these  several  interested  groups 
or  classes  within  the  community  the  political  organisation 
may  work  a benefit;  but  only  to  one  or  another,  not  to 
each  and  several,  jointly  or  collectively.  Since  by  no 
chance  will  the  benefit  derived  from  such  joint  enterprise 
on  the  part  of  the  community  at  large  equal  the  joint  cost ; 
in  as  much  as  all  joint  enterprise  of  the  kind  that  looks  to 
material  advantage  works  by  one  or  another  method  of 
inhibition  and  takes  effect,  if  at  all,  by  lowering  the  ag- 
gregate efficiency  of  the  several  countries  concerned,  with 
a view  to  the  differential  gain  of  one  at  the  cost  of  another. 
So.  e.  g.,  a protective  tariff  is  plainly  a conspiracy  in  re- 
straint of  trade,  with  a view  to  benefit  the  conspirators  by 
hindering  their  competitors.  The  aggregate  cost  to  the 
community  at  large  of  such  an  enterprise  in  retardation  is 
always  more  than  the  gains  it  brings  to  those  who  may 
benefit  by  it. 

In  so  speaking  of  the  uses  to  which  the  common  man’s 
patriotic  devotion  may  be  turned,  there  is  no  intention 
to  underrate  its  intrinsic  value  as  a genial  and  generous 
trait  of  human  nature.  Doubtless  it  is  best  and  chiefly  to 
be  appreciated  as  a spiritual  quality  that  beautifies  and  en- 
nobles its  bearer,  and  that  endows  him  with  the  full 
stature  of  manhood,  quite  irrespective  of  ulterior  con- 
siderations. So  it  is  to  be  conceded  without  argument 
that  this  patriotic  animus  is  a highly  meritorious  frame 
of  mind,  and  that  it  has  an  aesthetic  value  scarcely  to  be 
overstated  in  the  farthest  stretch  of  poetic  license.  But 
the  question  of  its  serviceability  to  the  modern  commu- 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  55 

nity,  in  any  other  than  this  decorative  respect,  and  par- 
ticularly its  serviceability  to  the  current  needs  of  the  com- 
mon man  in  such  a modern  community,  is  not  touched 
by  such  an  admission ; nor  does  this  recognition  of  its 
generous  spiritual  nature  afford  any  help  toward  answer- 
ing a further  question  as  to  how  and  with  what  effect  this 
animus  may  be  turned  to  account  by  anyone  who  is  in 
position  to  make  use  of  the  forces  which  it  sets  free. 

Among  Christian  nations  there  still  is,  on  the  whole,  a 
decided  predilection  for  that  ancient  and  authentic  line  of 
national  repute  that  springs  from  warlike  prowess.  This 
repute  for  warlike  prowess  is  what  first  comes  to  mind 
among  civilised  peoples  when  speaking  of  national  great- 
ness. And  among  those  who  have  best  preserved  this 
warlike  ideal  of  worth,  the  patriotic  ambition  is  likely  to 
converge  on  the  prestige  of  their  sovereign ; so  that  it 
takes  the  concrete  form  of  personal  loyalty  to  a master, 
and  so  combines  or  coalesces  with  a servile  habit  of  mind. 

But  peace  hath  its  victories  no  less  renowned  than  war, 
it  is  said;  and  peaceable  folk  of  a patriotic  temper  have 
learned  to  make  the  best  of  their  meager  case  and  have 
found  self-complacency  in  these  victories  of  the  peace- 
able order.  So  it  may  broadly  be  affirmed  that  all  nations 
look  with  complacency  on  their  own  peculiar  Culture — 
the  organised  complex  of  habits  of  thought  and  of  con- 
duct by  which  their  own  routine  of  life  is  regulated — as 
being  in  some  way  worthier  than  the  corresponding  hab- 
its of  their  neighbors.  The  case  of  the  German  Culture 
has  latterly  come  under  a strong  light  in  this  way.  But 
while  it  may  be  that  no  other  nation  has  been  so  naive 
as  to  make  a concerted  profession  of  faith  to  the  effect 
that  their  own  particular  way  of  life  is  altogether  com- 
mendable and  is  the  only  fashion  of  civilisation  that  is 


56 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


fit  to  survive;  yet  it  will  scarcely  be  an  extravagance  to 
assert  that  in  their  own  secret  mind  these  others,  too,  are 
blest  with  much  the  same  consciousness  of  unique  worth. 
Conscious  virtue  of  this  kind  is  a good  and  sufficient 
ground  for  patriotic  inflation,  so  far  as  it  goes.  It  com- 
monly does  not  go  beyond  a defensive  attitude,  however. 
Now  and  again,  as  in  the  latterday  German  animation  on 
this  head,  these  phenomena  of  national  use  and  wont  may 
come  to  command  such  a degree  of  popular  admiration  as 
will  incite  to  an  aggressive  or  proselyting  campaign. 

In  all  this  there  is  nothing  of  a self-seeking  or  covetous 
kind.  The  common  man  who  so  lends  himself  to  the 
aggressive  enhancement  of  the  national  Culture  and  its 
prestige  has  nothing  of  a material  kind  to  gain  from  the 
increase  of  renown  that  so  comes  to  his  sovereign,  his 
language,  his  countrymen’s  art  or  science,  his  dietary,  or 
his  God.  There  are  no  sordid  motives  in  all  this.  These 
spiritual  assets  of  self-complacency  are,  indeed,  to  be 
rated  as  grounds  of  high-minded  patriotism  without  after- 
thought. These  aspirations  and  enthusiasms  would  per- 
haps be  rated  as  Quixotic  by  men  whose  horizon  is  bound- 
ed by  the  main  chance;  but  they  make  up  that  substance 
of  things  hoped  for  that  inflates  those  headlong  patriotic 
animosities  that  stir  universal  admiration. 

So  also,  men  find  an  invidious  distinction  in  such  mat- 
ters of  physical  magnitude  as  their  country’s  area,  the 
number  of  its  population,  the  size  of  its  cities,  the  ex- 
tent of  its  natural  resources,  its  aggregate  wealth  and  its 
wealth  per  capita,  its  merchant  marine  and  its  foreign 
trade.  As  a ground  of  invidious  complacency  these  phe- 
nomena of  physical  magnitude  and  pecuniary  traffic  are 
no  better  and  no  worse  than  such  immaterial  assets  as 
the  majesty  of  the  sovereign  or  the  perfections  of  tlie 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotmn 


57 


language.  They  are  matters  in  which  the  common  man 
is  concerned  only  by  the  accident  of  domicile,  and  his  only 
connection  with  these  things  is  an  imaginary  joint  interest 
in  their  impressiveness.  To  these  things  he  has  contrib- 
uted substantially  nothing,  and  from  them  he  derives  no 
other  merit  or  advantage  than  a patriotic  inflation.  He 
takes  pride  in  these  things  in  an  invidious  way,  and  there 
is  no  good  reason  why  he  should  not ; just  as  there  is  also 
no  good  reason  why  he  should,  apart  from  the  fact  that 
the  common  man  is  so  constituted  that  he,  mysteriously, 
takes  pride  in  these  things  that  concern  him  not. 

Of  the  several  groups  or  classes  of  persons  within  the 
political  frontiers,  whose  particular  interests  run  system- 
atically at  cross  purposes  with  those  of  the  community 
at  large  under  modern  conditions,  the  class  of  masters, 
rulers,  authorities, — or  whatever  term  may  seem  most 
suitable  to  designate  that  category  of  persons  whose  char- 
acteristic occupation  is  to  give  orders  and  command  def- 
erence,— of  the  several  orders  and  conditions  of  men 
these  are,  in  point  of  substantial  motive  and  interest,  most 
patently  at  variance  with  all  the  rest,  or  with  the  fortunes 
of  the  common  man.  The  class  will  include  civil  and 
military  authorities  and  whatever  nobility  there  is  of  a 
prescriptive  and  privileged  kind.  The  substantial  inter- 
est of  these  classes  in  the  common  welfare  is  of  the  same 
kind  as  the  interest  which  a parasite  has  in  the  well-being 
of  his  host;  a sufficiently  substantial  interest,  no  doubt, 
but  there  is  in  this  relation  nothing  like  a community  of 
interest.  Any  gain  on  the  part  of  the  community  at  large 
will  materially  serve  the  needs  of  this  group  of  per- 
sonages, only  in  so  far  as  it  may  afford  them  a larger 
volume  or  a wider  scope  for  what  has  in  latterday  col- 


58 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


loquial  phrase  been  called  “graft.”  These  personages 
are,  of  course,  not  to  be  spoken  of  with  disrespect  or 
with  the  slightest  inflection  of  discourtesy.  They  are  all 
honorable  men.  Indeed  they  afford  the  conventional  pat- 
tern of  human  dignity  and  meritorious  achievement,  and 
the  “Fountain  of  Honor”  is  found  among  them.  The 
point  of  the  argument  is  only  that  their  material  or  other 
self-regarding  interests  are  of  such  a nature  as  to  be  fur- 
thered by  the  material  wealth  of  the  community,  and 
more  particularly  by  the  increasing  volume  of  the  body 
politic ; but  only  with  the  proviso  that  this  material 
wealth  and  this  increment  of  power  must  accrue  without 
anything  like  a corresponding  cost  to  this  class.  At  the 
same  time,  since  this  class  of  the  superiors  is  in  some 
degree  a specialised  organ  of  prestige,  so  that  their  value, 
and  therefore  their  tenure,  both  in  the  eyes  of  the  commu- 
nity and  in  their  own  eyes,  is  in  the  main  a “prestige 
value”  and  a tenure  by  prestige ; and  since  the  prestige 
that  invests  their  persons  is  a shadow  cast  by  the  putative 
worth  of  the  community  at  large,  it  follows  that  their 
particular  interest  in  the  joint  prestige  is  peculiarly  alert 
and  insistent.  But  it  follows  also  that  these  personages 
cannot  of  their  own  substance  or  of  their  own  motion 
contribute  to  this  collective  prestige  in  the  same  propor- 
tion in  which  it  is  necessary  for  them  to  draw  on  it  in 
support  of  their  own  prestige  value.  It  would,  in  other 
words,  be  a patent  absurdity  to  call  on  any  of  the  cur- 
rent ruling  classes,  dynasties,  nobility,  military  and  diplo- 
matic corps,  in  any  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  e.  g.,  to  pre- 
serve their  current  dignity  and  command  the  deference 
that  is  currently  accorded  them,  by  recourse  to  their  own 
powers  and  expenditure  of  their  own  substance,  without 
the  usufruct  of  the  commonalty  whose  organ  of  dignity 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  59 

they  are.  The  current  prestige  value  which  they  enjoy  is 
beyond  their  unaided  powers  to  create  or  maintain,  with- 
out the  usufruct  of  the  community.  Such  an  enterprise 
does  not  lie  within  the  premises  of  the  case. 

In  this  bearing,  therefore,  the  first  concern  with  which 
these  personages  are  necessarily  occupied  is  the  procure- 
ment and  retention  of  a suitable  usufruct  in  the  material 
resources  and  good-will  of  a sufficiently  large  and  indus- 
trious population.  The  requisite  good-will  in  these  prem- 
ises is  called  loyalty,  and  its  retention  by  the  line  of  per- 
sonages that  so  trade  on  prestige  rests  on  a superinduced 
association  of  ideas,  whereby  the  national  honour  comes  to 
be  confounded  in  popular  apprehension  with  the  prestige 
of  these  personages  who  have  the  keeping  of  it.  But  the 
potentates  and  the  establishments,  civil  and  military,  on 
whom  this  prestige  value  rests  will  unavoidably  come  into 
invidious  comparison  with  others  of  their  kind;  and,  as 
invariably  happens  in  matters  of  invidious  comparison, 
the  emulative  needs  of  all  the  competitors  for  prestige  are 
“indefinitely  extensible,”  as  the  phrase  of  the  economists 
has  it.  Each  and  several  of  them  incontinently  needs  a 
further  increment  of  prestige,  and  therefore  also  a fur- 
ther increment  of  the  material  assets  in  men  and  re- 
sources that  are  needful  as  ways  and  means  to  assert  and 
augment  the  national  honor. 

It  is  true,  the  notion  that  their  prestige  value  is  in  any 
degree  conditioned  by  the  material  circumstances  and  the 
popular  imagination  of  the  underlying  nation  is  distaste- 
ful to  many  of  these  vicars  of  the  national  honour.  They 
will  incline  rather  to  the  persuasion  that  this  prestige 
value  is  a distinctive  attribute,  of  a unique  order,  in- 
trinsic to  their  own  persons.  But,  plainly,  any  such  de- 
tached line  of  magnates,  notables,  kings  and  mandarins. 


60 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


resting  their  notability  on  nothing  more  substantial  than 
a slightly  sub-normal  intelligence  and  a moderately  scrof- 
ulous habit  of  body  could  not  long  continue  to  command 
that  eager  deference  that  is  accounted  their  due.  Such 
a picture  of  majesty  would  be  sadly  out  of  drawing. 
There  is  little  conviction  and  no  great  dignity  to  be  drawn 
from  the  unaided  pronouncement; 

“We’re  here  because, 

“We’re  here  because, 

“We’re  here  because 
“We’re  here,” 

even  when  the  doggerel  is  duly  given  the  rhetorical  bene- 
fit of  a “Tenure  by  the  Grace  of  God.”  The  personages 
that  carry  this  dignity  require  the  backing  of  a deter- 
mined and  patriotic  populace  in  support  of  their  prestige 
value,  and  they  commonly  have  no  great  difficulty  in  pro- 
curing it.  And  their  prestige  value  is,  in  effect,  propor- 
tioned to  the  volume  of  material  resources  and  patriotic 
credulity  that  can  be  drawn  on  for  its  assertion.  It  is 
true,  their  draught  on  the  requisite  sentimental  and  pe- 
cuniary support  is  fortified  with  large  claims  of  service- 
ability to  the  common  good,  and  these  claims  are  some- 
what easily,  indeed  eagerly,  conceded  and  acted  upon; 
although  the  alleged  benefit  to  the  common  good  will 
scarcely  be  visible  except  in  the  light  of  glory  shed  by  the 
blazing  torch  of  patriotism. 

In  so  far  as  it  is  of  a material  nature  the  benefit  which 
the  constituted  authorities  so  engage  to  contribute  to  the 
common  good,  or  in  other  words  to  confer  on  the  com- 
mon man,  falls  under  two  heads ; defense  against  aggres- 
sion from  without;  and  promotion  of  the  community’s 
material  gain.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  constituted 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  61 

authorities  commonly  believe  more  or  less  implicitly  in 
their  own  professions  in  so  professing  to  serve  the  needs 
of  the  common  man  in  these  respects.  The  common  de- 
fense is  a sufficiently  grave  matter,  and  doubtless  it  claims 
the  best  affections  and  endeavour  of  the  citizen ; but  it  is 
not  a matter  that  should  claim  much  attention  at  this 
point  in  the  argument,  as  bearing  on  the  service  rendered 
the  common  man  by  the  constituted  authorities,  taken  one 
with  another.  Any  given  governmental  establishment 
at  home  is  useful  in  this  respect  only  as  against  another 
governmental  establishment  elsewhere.  So  that  on  the 
slightest  examination  it  resolves  itself  into  a matter  of 
competitive  patriotic  enterprise,  as  between  the  patriotic 
aspirations  of  different  nationalities  led  by  different  gov- 
ernmental establishments;  and  the  service  so  rendered 
by  the  constituted  authorities  in  the  aggregate  takes  on 
the  character  of  a remedy  for  evils  of  their  own  creation. 
It  is  invariably  a defense  against  the  concerted  aggres- 
sions of  other  patriots.  Taken  in  the  large,  the  com- 
mon defense  of  any  given  nation  becomes  a detail  of  the 
competitive  struggle  between  rival  nationalities  animated 
with  a common  spirit  of  patriotic  enterprise  and  led  by 
authorities  constituted  for  this  competitive  purpose. 

Except  on  a broad  basis  of  patriotic  devotion,  and  ex- 
cept under  the  direction  of  an  ambitious  governmental 
establishment,  no  serious  international  aggression  is  to 
be  had.  The  common  defense,  therefore,  is  to  be  taken 
as  a remedy  for  evils  arising  out  of  the  working  of  the 
patriotic  spirit  that  animates  mankind,  as  brought  to  bear 
under'  a discretionary  authority ; and  in  any  balance  to  be 
struck  between  the  utility  and  disutility  of  this  patriotic 
spirit  and  of  its  service  in  the  hands  of  the  constituted 
authorities,  it  will  have  to  be  cancelled  out  as  being  at 


62 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  best  a mitigation  of  some  of  the  disorders  brought  on 
by  the  presence  of  national  governments  resting  on  patri- 
otic loyalty  at  large. 

But  this  common  defense  is  by  no  means  a vacant  ru- 
bric in  any  attempted  account  of  modem  national  enter- 
prise. It  is  the  commonplace  and  conclusive  plea  of  the 
dynastic  statesmen  and  the  aspiring  -warlords,  and  it  is 
the  usual  blind  behind  which  events  are  put  in  train  for 
eventual  hostilities.  Preparation  for  the  common  de- 
fense also  appears  unfailingly  to  eventuate  in  hostilities. 
With  more  or  less  hona  tides  the  statesmen  and  warriors 
plead  the  cause  of  the  common  defense,  and  with  patri- 
otic alacrity  the  common  man  lends  himself  to  the  enter- 
prise aimed  at  under  that  cover.  In  proportion  as  the 
resulting  equipment  for  defense  grows  great  and  becomes 
formidable,  the  range  of  items  which  a patriotically  biased 
nation  are  ready  to  include  among  the  claims  to  be  de- 
fended grows  incontinently  larger,  until  by  the  overlap- 
ping of  defensive  claims  between  rival  nationalities  the 
distinction  between  defense  and  aggression  disappears, 
except  in  the  biased  fancy  of  the  rival  patriots. 

Of  course,  no  reflections  are  called  for  here  on  the 
current  American  campaign  of  “Preparedness.”  Except 
for  the  degree  of  hysteria  it  appears  to  differ  in  no  sub- 
stantial respect  from  the  analogous  course  of  auto-intox- 
ication among  the  nationalities  of  Europe,  which  came 
to  a head  in  the  current  European  situation.  It  should 
conclusively  serve  the  turn  for  any  self-possessed  ob- 
server to  call  to  mind  that  all  the  civilised  nations  of 
warring  Europe  are,  each  and  several,  convinced  that 
they  are  fighting  a defensive  war. 

The  aspiration  of  all  right-minded  citizens  is  presumed 
to  be  “Peace  with  Honour.”  So  that  first,  as  well  as  last, 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  63 

among  those  national  interests  that  are  to  be  defended, 
and  in  the  service  of  "which  the  substance  and  affections 
of  the  common  man  are  enlisted  under  the  aegis  of  the 
national  prowess,  comes  the  national  prestige,  as  a matter 
of  course.  And  the  constituted  authorities  are  doubt- 
less sincere  and  single-minded  in  their  endeavors  to  ad- 
vance and  defend  the  national  honour,  particularly  those 
constituted  authorities  that  hold  their  place  of  authority 
on  grounds  of  fealty ; since  the  national  prestige  in  such 
a case  coalesces  with  the  prestige  of  the  nation’s  ruler  in 
much  the  same  degree  in  which  the  national  sovereignty 
devolves  upon  the  person  of  its  ruler.  In  so  defending 
or  advancing  the  national  prestige,  such  a dynastic  or 
autocratic  overlord,  together  with  the  other  privileged 
elements  assisting  and  dependent  on  him,  is  occupied 
with  his  own  interest ; his  own  tenure  is  a tenure  by  pres- 
tige, and  the  security  of  his  tenure  lies  in  the  continued 
maintenance  of  that  popular  fancy  that  invests  his  person 
with  this  national  prestige  and  so  constitutes  him  and 
his  retinue  of  notables  and  personages  its  keeper. 

But  it  is  uniformly  insisted  by  the  statesmen — poten- 
tates, notables,  kings  and  mandarins — that  this  aegis  of 
the  national  prowess  in  their  hands  covers  also  many 
interests  of  a more  substantial  and  more  tangible  kind. 
These  other,  more  tangible  interests  of  the  community 
have  also  a value  of  a direct  and  personal  sort  to  the 
dynasty  and  its  hierarchy  of  privileged  subalterns,  in 
that  it  is  only  by  use  of  the  material  forces  of  the  nation 
that  the  dynastic  prestige  can  be  advanced  and  maintained. 
The  interest  of  such  constituted  authorities  in  the  material 
welfare  of  the  nation  is  consequently  grave  and  insistent; 
but  it  is  evidently  an  interest  of  a special  kind  and  is  sub- 
ject to  strict  and  peculiar  limitations.  The  common  good, 


64 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


in  the  material  respect,  interests  the  dynastic  statesman 
only  as  a means  to  dynastic  ends ; that  is  to  say,  only  in  so 
far  as  it  can  be  turned  to  account  in  the  achievement  of 
dynastic  aims.  These  aims  are  ‘‘The  Kingdom,  the  Power 
and  the  Glory,”  as  the  sacred  formula  phrases  the  same 
conception  in  another  bearing. 

That  is  to  say,  the  material  welfare  of  the  nation  is 
a means  to  the  unfolding  of  the  dynastic  power ; provided 
always  that  this  material  welfare  is  not  allowed  to  run  in- 
to such  ramifications  as  will  make  the  commonwealth  an 
unwieldy  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  dynastic  states- 
men. National  welfare  is  to  the  purpose  only  in  so  far 
as  it  conduces  to  political  success,  which  is  always  a ques- 
tion of  warlike  success  in  the  last  resort.  The  limitation 
which  this  consideration  imposes  on  the  government’s 
economic  policy  are  such  as  will  make  the  nation  a self- 
sufficient  or  self-balanced  economic  commonwealth.  It 
must  be  a self-balanced  commonwealth  at  least  in  such 
measure  as  will  make  it  self-sustaining  in  case  of  need, 
in  all  those  matters  that  bear  directly  on  warlike  efficiency. 

Of  course,  no  community  can  become  fully  self-sustain- 
ing under  modern  conditions,  by  use  of  the  modem  state 
of  the  industrial  arts,  except  by  recourse  to  such  drastic 
measures  of  repression  as  would  reduce  its  total  efficiency 
in  an  altogether  intolerable  degree.  This  will  hold  true 
even  of  those  nations  who,  like  Russia  or  the  United 
States,  are  possessed  of  extremely  extensive  territories 
and  extremely  large  and  varied  resources;  but  it  applies 
with  greatly  accentuated  force  to  smaller  and  more  scan- 
tily furnished  territorial  units.  Peoples  living  under  mod- 
ern conditions  and  by  use  of  the  modem  state  of  the  in- 
dustrial arts  necessarily  draw  on  all  quarters  of  the  habit- 
able globe  for  materials  and  products  which  they  can  pro- 


65 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism 

cure  to  the  best  advantage  from  outside  their  own  special 
field  so  long  as  they  are  allowed  access  to  these  outlying 
sources  of  supply;  and  any  arbitrary  limitation  on  this 
freedom  of  traffic  makes  the  conditions  of  life  that  much 
harder,  and  lowers  the  aggregate  efficiency  of  the  com- 
munity by  that  much.  National  self-sufficiency  is  to  be 
achieved  only  by  a degree  of  economic  isolation;  and 
such  a policy  of  economic  isolation  involves  a degree  of 
impoverishment  and  lowered  efficiency,  but  it  will  also 
leave  the  nation  readier  for  warlike  enterprise  on  such 
a scale  as  its  reduced  efficiency  will  compass. 

So  that  the  best  that  can  be  accomplished  along  this 
line  by  the  dynastic  statesmen  is  a shrewd  compromise, 
embodying  such  a degree  of  isolation  and  inhibition  as 
will  leave  the  country  passably  self-sufficient  in  case  of 
need,  without  lowering  the  national  efficiency  to  such  a 
point  as  to  cripple  its  productive  forces  beyond  what  will 
be  offset  by  the  greater  warlike  readiness  that  is  so  at- 
tained. The  point  to  which  such  a policy  of  isolation  and 
sufficiency  will  necessarily  be  directed  is  that  measure  of 
inhibition  that  will  yield  the  most  facile  and  effective  ways 
and  means  of  warlike  enterprise,  the  largest  product  of 
warlike  effectiveness  to  be  had  on  multiplying  the  nation’s 
net  efficiency  into  its  readiness  to  take  the  field. 

Into  any  consideration  of  this  tactical  problem  a cer- 
tain subsidiary  factor  enters,  in  that  the  patriotic  temper 
of  the  nation  is  always  more  or  less  affected  by  such  an 
economic  policy.  The  greater  the  degree  of  effectual 
isolation  and  discrimination  embodied  in  the  national 
policy,  the  greater  will  commonly  be  its  effect  on  popu- 
lar sentiment  in  the  way  of  national  animosity  and  spirit- 
ual self-sufficiency;  which  may  be  an  asset  of  great  value 
for  the  purposes  of  warlike  enterprise. 

5 


66 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


Plainly,  any  dynastic  statesman  who  should  undertake 
to  further  the  common  welfare  regardless  of  its  service- 
ability for  warlike  enterprise  would  be  defeating  his  own 
purpose.  He  would,  in  effect,  go  near  to  living  up  to 
his  habitual  professions  touching  inteniational  peace,  in- 
stead of  professing  to  live  up  to  them,  as  the  exigencies 
of  his  national  enterprise  now  conventionally  require  him 
to  do.  In  effect,  he  would  be  functus  officio. 

There  are  two  great  administrative  instruments  avail- 
able for  this  work  of  repression  and  national  self-suffi- 
ciency at  the  hands  of  the  imperialistic  statesman ; the  pro- 
tective tariff,  and  commercial  subvention.  The  two  are 
not  consistently  to  be  distinguished  from  one  another  at 
all  points,  and  each  runs  out  into  a multifarious  convolu- 
tion of  variegated  details ; but  the  principles  involved  are, 
after  all,  fairly  neat  and  consistent.  The  former  is  of  the 
nature  of  a conspiracy  in  restraint  of  trade  by  repression ; 
the  latter,  a consipiracy  to  the  like  effect  by  subsidised 
monopoly;  both  alike  act  to  check  the  pursuit  of  industry 
in  given  lines  by  artificially  increasing  the  cost  of  pro- 
duction for  given  individuals  or  classes  of  producers,  and 
both  alike  impose  a more  than  proportionate  cost  on  the 
community  within  which  they  take  effect.  Incidentally, 
both  of  these  methods  of  inhibition  bring  a degree,  though 
a less  degree,  of  hardship,  to  the  rest  of  the  industrial 
world. 

All  this  is  matter  of  course  to  all  economic  students,  and 
it  should,  reasonably,  be  plain  to  all  intelligent  persons ; 
but  its  voluble  denial  by  interested  parties,  as  well  as 
the  easy  credulity  with  which  patriotic  citizens  allow 
themselves  to  accept  the  sophistries  offered  in  defense  of 
these  measures  of  inhibition,  has  made  it  seem  worth 
while  here  to  recall  these  commonplaces  of  economic 
science. 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  67 

The  ground  of  this  easy  credulity  is  not  so  much  in- 
firmity of  intellect  as  it  is  an  exuberance  of  sentiment, 
although  it  may  reasonably  be  believed  that  its  more  pro- 
nounced manifestations — as,  e.  g.,  the  high  protective 
tariff — can  be  had  only  by  force  of  a formidable  coopera- 
tion of  the  two.  The  patriotic  animus  is  an  invidious  sen- 
timent of  joint  prestige;  and  it  needs  no  argument  or 
documentation  to  bear  out  the  affirmation  that  its  bias  will 
lend  a color  of  merit  and  expediency  to  any  proposed 
measure  that  can,  however  speciously,  promise  an  in- 
crease of  national  power  or  prestige.  So  that  when  the 
statesmen  propose  a policy  of  inhibition  and  mitigated 
isolation  on  the  professed  ground  that  such  a policy  will 
strengthen  the  nation  economically  by  making  it  econo- 
mically self-supporting,  as  well  as  ready  for  any  warlike 
adventure,  the  patriotic  citizen  views  the  proposed  meas- 
ures through  the  rosy  haze  of  national  aspirations  and 
lets  the  will  to  believe  persuade  him  that  whatever  con- 
duces to  a formidable  national  battle-front  will  also  con- 
tribute to  the  common  good.  At  the  same  time  all  these 
national  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade  are  claimed, 
with  more  or  less  reason,  to  inflict  more  or  less  harm  on 
rival  nationalities  with  whom  economic  relations  are 
curtailed;  and  patriotism  being  an  invidious  sentiment, 
the  patriotic  citizen  finds  comfort  in  the  promise  of  mis- 
chief to  these  others,  and  is  all  the  more  prone  to  find 
all  kinds  of  merit  in  proposals  that  look  to  such  an  invid- 
ious outcome.  In  any  community  imbued  with  an  alert 
patriotic  spirit,  the  fact  that  any  given  circumstance,  oc- 
curence or  transaction  can  be  turned  to  account  as  a 
means  of  invidious  distinction  or  invidious  discrimination 
against  humanity  beyond  the  national  pale,  will  always 
go  far  to  procure  acceptance  of  it  as  being  also  an  article 


68 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  substantial  profit  to  the  community  at  large,  even 
though  the  slightest  unbiased  scrutiny  would  find  it  of  no 
ascertainable  use  in  any  other  bearing  than  that  of  invid- 
ious mischief.  And  whatever  will  bear  interpretation  as 
an  increment  of  the  nation’s  power  or  prowess,  in  com- 
parison with  rival  nationalities,  will  always  be  securely 
counted  as  an  item  of  joint  credit,  and  will  be  made  to 
serve  the  collective  conceit  as  an  invidious  distinction; 
and  patriotic  credulity  will  find  it  meritorious  also  in  other 
respects 

So,  e.  g.,  it  is  past  conception  that  such  a patent  im- 
becility as  a protective  tariff  should  enlist  the  support  of 
any  ordinarily  intelligent  community  except  by  the  help 
of  some  such  chauvinistic  sophistry.  So  also,  the  various 
royal  establishments  of  Europe,  e.  g.,  afford  an  extreme 
but  therefore  all  the  more  convincing  illustration  of  the 
same  logical  fallacy.  These  establishments  and  person- 
ages are  great  and  authentic  repositories  of  national  pres- 
tige, and  they  are  therefore  unreflectingly  presumed  by 
their  several  aggregations  of  subjects  to  be  of  some  sub- 
stantial use  also  in  some  other  bearing ; but  it  would  be  a 
highly  diverting  exhibition  of  credulity  for  any  outsider  to 
fall  into  that  amazing  misconception.  But  the  like  is  mani- 
festly true  of  commercial  turnover  and  export  trade 
among  modern  peoples;  although  on  this  head  the  in- 
fatuation is  so  ingrained  and  dogmatic  that  even  a rank 
outsider  is  expected  to  accept  the  fallacy  without  reflec- 
tion, on  pain  of  being  rated  as  unsafe  or  unsound.  Such 
matters  again,  as  the  dimensions  of  the  national  territory, 
or  the  number  of  the  population  and  the  magnitude  of  the 
national  resources,  are  still  and  have  perhaps  always  been 
material  for  patriotic  exultation,  and  are  fatuously  believ- 
ed to  have  some  great  significance  for  the  material  for- 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  69 

tunes  of  the  common  man ; although  it  should  be  plain  on 
slight  reflection  that  under  modern  conditions  of  owner- 
ship, these  things,  one  and  all,  are  of  no  consequence  to 
the  common  man  except  as  articles  of  prestige  to  stimulate 
his  civic  pride.  The  only  conjuncture  under  which  these 
and  the  like  national  holdings  can  come  to  have  a mean- 
ing as  joint  or  collective  assets  would  arise  in  case  of  a 
warlike  adventure  carried  to  such  extremities  as  would 
summarily  cancel  vested  rights  of  ownership  and  turn 
them  to  warlike  uses.  While  the  rights  of  ownership  hold, 
the  common  man,  who  does  not  own  these  things,  draws 
no  profit  from  their  inclusion  in  the  national  domain ; 
indeed,  he  is  at  some  cost  to  guarantee  their  safe  tenure 
by  their  rightful  owners. 

In  so  pursuing  their  quest  of  the  Kingdom,  the  Power 
and  the  Glory,  by  use  of  the  national  resources  and  by 
sanction  of  the  national  spirit,  the  constituted  authorities 
also  assume  the  guardianship  of  sundry  material  interests 
that  are  presumed  to  touch  the  common  good ; such  as 
security  of  person  and  property  in  dealings  with  aliens, 
whether  at  home  or  abroad ; security  of  investment  and 
trade,  and  vindication  of  their  citizens  before  the  law  in 
foreign  parts ; and,  chiefly  and  ubiquitously,  furtherance 
and  extension  of  the  national  trade  into  foreign  parts, 
particularly  of  the  export  trade,  on  terms  advantageous  to 
the  traders  of  the  nation. 

The  last  named  of  these  advantages  is  the  one  on  which 
stress  is  apt  to  fall  in  the  argument  of  all  those  who 
advocate  an  unfolding  of  national  power,  as  being  a mat- 
ter of  vital  material  benefit  to  the  common  man.  The 
other  items  indicated  above,  it  is  plain  on  the  least  re- 
flection, are  matters  of  slight  if  any  material  consequence 
to  him.  The  common  man — that  is  ninety-nine  and  a 


70 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


fraction  in  one  hundred  of  the  nation’s  common  men — 
has  no  dealings  with  aliens  in  foreign  parts,  as  capitalist, 
trader,  missionary  or  wayfaring  man,  and  has  no  occasion 
for  security  of  person  or  property  under  circumstances 
that  raise  any  remotest  question  of  the  national  prowess 
or  the  national  prestige;  nor  does  he  seek  or  aspire  to 
trade  to  foreign  parts  on  any  terms,  equitable  or  other- 
wise, or  to  invest  capital  among  aliens  under  foreign  rule, 
or  to  exploit  concessions  or  take  orders,  for  acceptance 
or  delivery ; nor,  indeed,  does  he  at  all  commonly  come 
into  even  that  degree  of  contact  with  abroad  that  is  im- 
plied in  the  purchase  of  foreign  securities.  Virtually  the 
sole  occasion  on  which  he  comes  in  touch  with  the  world 
beyond  the  frontier  is  when,  and  if,  he  goes  away  from 
home  as  an  emigrant,  and  so  ceases  to  enjoy  the  tutelage 
of  the  nation’s  constituted  authorities.  But  the  common 
man,  in  point  of  fact,  is  a home-keeping  body,  who  touches 
foreign  parts  and  aliens  outside  the  national  frontiers 
only  at  the  second  or  third  remove,  if  at  all,  in  the  oc- 
casional purchase  of  foreign  products,  or  in  the  sale  of 
goods  that  may  find  their  way  abroad  after  he  has  lost 
sight  of  them.  The  exception  to  this  general  rule  would 
be  found  in  the  case  of  those  under-sized  nations  that 
are  too  small  to  contain  the  traffic  in  which  their  common- 
place population  are  engaged,  and  that  have  neither 
national  prowess  nor  national  prestige  to  fall  back  on 
in  a conceivable  case  of  need, — and  whose  citizens,  in- 
dividually, appear  to  be  as  fortunately  placed  in  their 
workday  foreign  relations,  without  a background  of 
prowess  and  prestige,  as  the  citizens  of  the  great  powers 
who  are  most  abundantly  provided  in  these  respects. 

With  wholly  negligible  exceptions,  these  matters  touch 
the  needs  or  the  sensibilities  of  the  common  man  only 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  71 

through  the  channel  of  the  national  honour,  which  rnay  be 
injured  in  the  hardships  suffered  by  his  compatriots  in 
foreign  parts,  or  which  may,  again,  be  repaired  or  en- 
hanced by  the  meritorious  achievements  of  the  same 
compatriots;  of  whose  existence  he  will  commonly  have 
no  other  or  more  substantial  evidence,  and  in  whose  traffic 
he  has  no  share  other  than  this  vicarious  suffering  of 
vague  and  remote  indignity  or  vainglory  by  force  of  the 
wholly  fortuitous  circumstance  that  they  are  (inscrutably) 
his  compatriots.  These  immaterial  goods  of  vicarious 
prestige  are,  of  course,  not  to  be  undervalued,  nor  is  the 
fact  to  be  overlooked  or  minimised  that  they  enter  into 
the  sum  total  of  the  common  citizen’s  “psychic  income,” 
for  whatever  they  may  foot  up  to ; but  evidently  their 
consideration  takes  us  back  to  the  immaterial  category 
of  prestige  value,  from  which  the  argument  just  now  was 
hopefully  departing  with  a view  to  consideration  of  the 
common  man’s  material  interest  in  that  national  enter- 
prise about  which  patriotic  aspirations  turn. 

These  things,  then,  are  matters  in  which  the  common 
man  has  an  interest  only  as  they  have  a prestige  value. 
But  there  need  be  no  question  as  to  their  touching  his  sen- 
sibilities and  stirring  him  to  action,  and  even  to  acts  of 
bravery  and  self-sacrifice.  Indignity  or  ill  treatment  of 
his  compatriots  in  foreign  parts,  even  when  well  deserved, 
as  is  not  infrequently  the  case,  are  resented  with  a 
vehemence  that  is  greatly  to  the  common  man’s  credit, 
and  greatly  also  to  the  gain  of  those  patriotic  statesmen 
who  find  in  such  grievances  their  safest  and  most  reliable 
raw  materials  for  the  production  of  international  difficul- 
ty. That  he  will  so  respond  to  the  stimulus  of  these, 
materially  speaking  irrelevant,  vicissitudes  of  good  or 
ill  that  touch  the  fortunes  of  his  compatriots,  as  known  to 


72 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


him  by  hearsay,  bears  witness,  of  course,  to  the  high  qual- 
ity of  his  manhood ; but  it  falls  very  far  short  of  arguing 
that  these  promptings  of  his  patriotic  spirit  have  any  value 
as  traits  that  count  toward  his  livelihood  or  his  economic 
serviceability  in  the  community  in  which  he  lives.  It 
is  all  to  his  credit,  and  it  goes  to  constitute  him  a desir- 
able citizen,  in  the  sense  that  he  is  properly  amenable  to 
the  incitements  of  patriotic  emulation;  but  it  is  none 
the  less  to  be  admitted,  however  reluctantly,  that  this 
trait  of  impulsively  vicarious  indignation  or  vainglory  is 
neither  materially  profitable  to  himself  nor  an  asset  of  the 
slightest  economic  value  to  the  community  in  which  he 
lives.  Quite  the  contrary,  in  fact.  So  also  is  it  true  that 
the  common  man  derives  no  material  advantage  from  the 
national  success  along  this  line,  though  he  commonly  be- 
lieves that  it  all  somehow  inures  to  his  benefit.  It  would 
seem  that  an  ingrown  bias  of  community  interest,  blurred 
and  driven  by  a jealously  sensitive  patriotic  pride,  bends 
his  faith  uncritically  to  match  his  inclination.  His  per- 
suasion is  a work  of  preconception  rather  than  of  percep- 
tion. 

But  the  most  substantial  and  most  unqualified  material 
benefit  currently  believed  to  be  derivable  from  a large 
unfolding  of  national  prowess  and  a wide  extension  of 
the  national  domain  is  an  increased  volume  of  the  nation’s 
foreign  trade,  particularly  of  the  export  trade.  “Trade 
follows  the  Flag.”  And  this  larger  trade  and  enhanced 
profit  is  presumed  to  inure  to  the  joint  benefit  of  the 
citizens.  Such  is  the  profession  of  faith  of  the  sagacious 
statesmen  and  such  is  also  the  unreflecting  belief  of  the 
common  man. 

It  may  be  left  an  open  question  if  an  unfolding  of  nat- 
ional prowess  and  prestige  increases  the  nation’s  trade, 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  73 

whether  in  imports  or  in  exports.  There  is  no  available 
evidence  that  it  has  any  effect  of  the  kind.  What  is  not 
an  open  question  is  the  patent  fact  that  such  an  extension 
of  trade  confers  no  benefit  on  the  common  man,  who  is  not 
engaged  in  the  import  or  export  business.  More  particu- 
larly does  it  yield  him  no  advantage  at  all  commensurate 
with  the  cost  involved  in  any  endeavour  so  to  increase  the 
volume  of  trade  by  increasing  the  nation’s  power  and 
extending  its  dominion.  The  profits  of  trade  go  not  to 
the  common  man  at  large  but  to  the  traders  whose  capital 
is  invested;  and  it  is  a completely  idle  matter  to  the 
common  citizen  whether  the  traders  who  profit  by  the 
nation’s  trade  are  his  compatriots  or  not.^ 

The  pacifist  argument  on  the  economic  futility  of 
national  ambitions  will  commonly  rest  its  case  at  this 
point;  having  shown  as  unreservedly  as  need  be  that 
national  ambition  and  all  its  works  belong  of  right  under 
that  rubric  of  the  litany  that  speaks  of  Fire,  Flood  and 
Pestilence.  But  an  hereditary  bent  of  human  nature  is 
not  to  be  put  out  of  the  way  with  an  argument  showing 
that  it  has  its  disutilities.  So  with  the  patriotic  animus; 
it  is  a factor  to  be  counted  with,  rather  than  to  be  ex- 
orcised. 

As  has  been  remarked  above,  in  the  course  of  time 
and  change  the  advance  of  the  industrial  arts  and  of  the 
institutions  of  ownership  have  taken  such  a turn  that 
the  working  system  of  industry  and  business  no  longer 
runs  on  national  lines  and,  indeed,  no  longer  takes  ac- 
count of  national  frontiers, — except  in  so  far  as  the 

^All  this,  which  should  be  plairf  without  demonstration,  has 
been  repeatedly  shown  in  the  expositions  of  various  peace  ad- 
vocates, typically  by  Mr.  AngelL 


74 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


national  policies  and  legislation,  arbitrarily  and  partially, 
impose  these  frontiers  on  the  workings  of  trade  and  in- 
dustry. The  effect  of  such  regulation  for  political  ends 
is,  with  wholly  negligible  exceptions,  detrimental  to  the 
efficient  working  of  the  industrial  system  under  modern 
conditions ; and  it  is  therefore  deterimental  to  the  material 
interests  of  the  common  citizen.  But  the  case  is  not  the 
same  as  regards  the  interests  of  the  traders.  Trade  is 
a competitive  affair,  and  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  the 
traders  engaged  in  any  given  line  of  business  to  extend 
their  own  markets  and  to  exclude  competing  traders. 
Competition  may  be  the  soul  of  trade,  but  monopoly  is 
necessarily  the  aim  of  every  trader.  And  the  national 
organisation  is  of  service  to  its  traders  in  so  far  as  it 
shelters  them,  wholly  or  partly,  from  the  competition  of 
traders  of  other  nationalities,  or  in  so  far  as  it  furthers 
their  enterprise  by  subvention  or  similar  privileges  as 
against  their  competitors,  whether  at  home  or  abroad. 
The  gain  that  so  comes  to  the  nation’s  traders  from  any 
preferential  advantage  afforded  them  by  national  regula- 
tions, or  from  any  discrimination  against  traders  of  for- 
eign nationality,  goes  to  the  traders  as  private  gain.  It 
is  of  no  benefit  to  any  of  their  compatriots ; since  there 
is  no  community  of  usufruct  that  touches  these  gains  of 
the  traders.  So  far  as  concerns  his  material  advantage, 
it  is  an  idle  matter  to  the  common  citizen  whether  he 
deals  with  traders  of  his  own  nationality  or  with  aliens ; 
both  alike  will  aim  to  buy  cheap  and  sell  dear,  and  will 
charge  him  “what  the  traffic  will  bear.”  Nor  does  it 
matter  to  him  whether  the  gains  of  this  trade  go  to  aliens 
or  to  his  compatriots ; in  either  case  equally  they  im- 
mediately pass  beyond  his  reach,  and  are  equally  re- 
moved from  any  touch  of  joint  interest  on  his  part.  Being 


On  the  Nature  and  Uses  of  Patriotism  75 

private  property,  under  modern  law  and  custom  he  has 
no  use  of  them,  whether  a national  frontier  does  or  does 
not  intervene  between  his  domicile  and  that  of  their 
owner. 

These  are  facts  that  every  man  of  sound  mind  knows 
and  acts  on  without  doubt  or  hesitation  in  his  own  work- 
day affairs.  He  would  scarcely  even  find  amusement  in  so 
futile  a proposal  as  that  his  neighbor  should  share  his 
business  profits  with  him  for  no  better  reason  than  that 
he  is  a compatriot.  But  when  the  matter  is  presented  as 
a proposition  in  national  policy  and  embroidered  with  an 
invocation  of  his  patriotic  loyalty  the  common  citizen  will 
commonly  be  found  credulous  enough  to  accept  the 
sophistry  without  abatement.  His  archaic  sense  of  group 
solidarity  will  still  lead  him  at  his  own  cost  to  favor  his 
trading  compatriots  by  the  imposition  of  onerous  trade 
regulations  for  their  private  advantage,  and  to  interpose 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  alien  traders.  All  this  ingenious 
policy  of  self-defeat  is  greatly  helped  out  by  the  patriotic 
conceit  of  the  citizens ; who  persuade  themselves  to  see  in 
it  an  accession  to  the  power  and  prestige  of  their  own 
nation  and  a disadvantage  to  rival  nationalities.  It  is, 
indeed,  more  than  doubtful  if  such  a policy  of  self-defeat 
as  is  embodied  in  current  international  trade  discrimina- 
tions could  be  insinuated  into  the  legislation  of  any  civil- 
ized nation  if  the  popular  intelligence  were  not  so  clouded 
with  patriotic  animosity  as  to  let  a prospective  detriment 
to  their  foreign  neighbors  count  as  a gain  to  themselves. 

So  that  the  chief  material  use  of  the  patriotic  bent  in 
modern  populations,  therefore,  appears  to  be  its  use  to  a 
limited  class  of  persons  engaged  in  foreign  trade,  or  in 
business  that  comes  in  competition  with  foreign  industry. 
It  serves  their  private  gain  by  lending  effectual  counte- 


76 


Of  the  Nature  of  Peace. 


nance  to  such  restraint  of  international  trade  as  would  not 
be  tolerated  within  the  national  domain.  In  so  doing  it 
has  also  the  secondary  and  more  sinister  effect  of  dividing 
the  nations  on  lines  of  rivalry  and  setting  up  irreconcil- 
able claims  and  ambitions,  of  no  material  value  but  of 
far-reaching  effect  in  the  way  of  provocation  to  further 
international  estrangement  and  eventual  breach  of  the 
peace. 

How  all  this  falls  in  with  the  schemes  of  militant  states- 
men, and  further  reacts  on  the  freedom  and  personal 
fortunes  of  the  common  man,  is  an  extensive  and  intricate 
topic,  though  not  an  obscure  one ; and  it  has  already  been 
spoken  of  above,  perhaps  as  fully  as  need  be. 


Chapter  III 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace 

The  considerations  set  out  in  earlier  chapters  have 
made  it  appear  that  the  patriotic  spirit  of  modern  peoples 
is  the  abiding  source  of  contention  among  nations.  Ex- 
cept for  their  patriotism  a breach  of  the  peace  among  mod- 
ern peoples  could  not  well  be  had.  So  much  will  doubtless 
be  assented  to  as  a matter  of  course.  It  is  also  a common- 
place of  current  aphoristic  wisdom  that  both  parties  to  a 
warlike  adventure  in  modern  times  stand  to  lose,  materi- 
ally; whatever  nominal — that  is  to  say  political— gains 
may  be  made  by  one  or  the  other.  It  has  also  appeared 
from  these  considerations  recited  in  earlier  passages 
that  this  patriotic  spirit  prevails  throughout,  among  all 
civilised  peoples,  and  that  it  pervades  one  nation  about 
as  ubiquitously  as  another.  Nor  is  there  much  evidence 
of  a weakening  of  this  sinister  proclivity  with  the  pas- 
sage of  time  or  the  continued  advance  in  the  arts  of  life. 
The  only  civilized  nations  that  can  be  counted  on  as 
habitually  peaceable  are  those  who  are  so  feeble  or  are 
so  placed  as  to  be  cut  off  from  hope  of  gain  through  con- 
tention. Vainglorious  arrogance  may  run  at  a higher  ten- 
sion among  the  more  backward  and  boorish  nations ; but 
it  is  not  evident  that  the  advance  guard  among  the  civil- 
ised peoples  are  imbued  with  a less  complete  national  self- 
complacency.  If  the  peace  is  to  be  kept,  therefore,  it  will 
have  to  be  kept  by^  and  between  peoples  made  up,  in  effect. 


78 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  complete  patriots ; which  comes  near  being  a contradic- 
tion in  terms.  Patriotism  is  useful  for  breaking  the  peace, 
not  for  keeping  it.  It  makes  for  national  pretensions  and 
international  jealously  and  distrust,  with  warlike  enter- 
prise always  in  perspective;  as  a way  to  national  gain 
or  a recourse  in  case  of  need.  And  there  is  commonly 
no  settled  demarkation  between  these  two  contrasted 
needs  that  urge  a patriotic  people  forever  to  keep  one  eye 
on  the  chance  of  a recourse  to  arms. 

Therefore  any  calculus  of  the  Chances  of  Peace  ap- 
pears to  become  a reckoning  of  the  forces  which  may  be 
counted  on  to  keep  a patriotic  nation  in  an  unstable  equi- 
librium of  peace  for  the  time  being.  As  has  just  been 
remarked  above,  among  civilised  peoples  only  those  na- 
tions can  be  counted  on  consistently  to  keep  the  peace  who 
are  so  feeble  or  otherwise  so  placed  as  to  be  cut  off  from 
hope  of  national  gain.  And  these  can  apparently  be 
so  counted  on  only  as  regards  aggression,  not  as  regards 
the  national  defense,  and  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  not 
drawn  into  warlike  enterprise,  collectively,  by  their  more 
competent  neighbors.  Even  the  feeblest  and  most  futile 
of  them  feels  in  honour  bound  to  take  up  arms  in  defense 
of  such  national  pretensions  as  they  still  may  harbour;  and 
all  of  them  harbour  such  pretensions.  In  certain  ex- 
treme cases,  which  it  might  seem  invidious  to  specify 
more  explicitly,  it  is  not  easy  to  discover  any  specific 
reasons  for  the  maintenance  of  a national  establish- 
ment, apart  from  the  vindication  of  certain  national  pre- 
tensions which  would  quietly  lapse  in  the  absence  of  a 
national  establishment  on  whom  their  vindication  is  in- 
cumbent. 

Of  the  rest,  the  greater  nations  that  are  spoken  of  as 
Powers  no  such  general  statement  will  hold.  These  are 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  79 

the  peoples  who  stand,  in  matters  of  national  concern, 
on  their  own  initiative;  and  the  question  of  peace  and 
war  at  large  is  in  effect,  a question  of  peace  and  war 
among  these  Powers.  They  are  not  so  numerous  that  they 
can  be  sifted  into  distinct  classes,  and  yet  they  differ 
among  themselves  in  such  a way  that  they  may,  for  the 
purpose  in  hand,  fairly  be  ranged  under  two  distinguish- 
able if  not  contrasted  heads : those  which  may  safely  be 
counted  on  spontaneously  to  take  the  offensive,  and  those 
which  will  fight  on  provocation.  Typically  of  the  former 
description  are  Germany  and  Japan.  Of  the  latter  are  the 
French  and  British,  and  less  confidently  the  American  re- 
public. In  any  summary  statement  of  this  kind  Russia  will 
have  to  be  left  on  one  side  as  a doubtful  case,  for  reasons 
to  which  the  argument  may  return  at  a later  point;  the 
prospective  course  of  things  in  Russia  is  scarcely  to  be  ap- 
praised on  the  ground  of  its  past.  Spain  and  Italy,  being 
dubious  Powers  at  the  best,  need  not  detain  the  argument ; 
they  are,  in  the  nature  of  things,  subsidiaries  who  wait  on 
the  main  chance.  And  Austria,  with  whatever  the  name 
may  cover,  is  for  the  immediate  purpose  to  be  counted 
under  the  head  of  Germany. 

There  is  no  invidious  comparison  intended  in  so  set- 
ting off  these  two  classes  of  nations  in  contrast  to  one 
another.  It  is  not  a contrast  of  merit  and  demerit  or  of 
prestige.  Imperial  Germany  and  Imperial  Japan  are,  in- 
the  nature  of  things  as  things  go,  bent  in  effect  on  a 
disturbance  of  the  peace, — with  a view  to  advance  the 
cause  of  their  own  dominion.  On  a large  view  of  the 
case,  such  as  many  German  statesmen  were  in  the  habit 
of  professing  in  the  years  preceding  the  great  war,  it 
may  perhaps  appear  reasonable  to  say — as  they  were  in  the 
habit  of  saying — that  these  Imperial  Powers  are  as  well 


80 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


within  the  lines  of  fair  and  honest  dealing  in  their  cam- 
paign of  aggression  as  the  other  Powers  are  in  taking  a 
defensive  attitude  against  their  aggression.  Some  sort 
of  international  equity  has  been  pleaded  in  justification 
of  their  demand  for  an  increased  share  of  dominion.  At 
least  it  has  appeared  that  these  Imperial  statesmen  have 
so  persuaded  themselves  after  very  mature  deliberation; 
and  they  have  showed  great  concern  to  persuade  others  of 
the  equity  of  their  Imperial  claim  to  something  more  than 
the  law  would  allow.  These  sagacious,  not  to  say  astute, 
persons  have  not  only  reached  a conviction  to  this  ef- 
fect, but  they  have  become  possessed  of  this  conviction  in 
such  plenary  fashion  that,  in  the  German  case,  they  have 
come  to  admit  exceptions  or  abatement  of  the  claim  only 
when  and  in  so  far  as  the  campaign  of  equitable  aggres- 
sion on  which  they  had  entered  has  been  proved  imprac- 
ticable by  the  fortunes  of  war. 

With  some  gift  for  casuistry  one  may,  at  least  con- 
ceivably, hold  that  the  felt  need  of  Imperial  self-aggran- 
disement may  become  so  urgent  as  to  justify,  or  at  least 
to  condone,  forcible  dispossession  of  weaker  nationalities. 
This  might,  indeed  it  has,  become  a sufficiently  perplex- 
ing question  of  casuistry,  both  as  touches  the  punctilios 
of  national  honour  and  as  regards  an  equitable  division 
between  rival  Powers  in  respect  of  the  material  means  of 
mastery.  So  in  private  life  it  may  become  a moot  ques- 
tion— in  point  of  equity — whether  the  craving  of  a klep- 
tomaniac may  not  on  occasion  rise  to  such  an  intolerable 
pitch  of  avidity  as  to  justify  him  in  seizing  whatever 
valuables  he  can  safely  lay  hands  on,  to  ease  the  discom- 
fort of  ungratified  desire.  In  private  life  any  such  en- 
deavour to  better  oneself  at  one’s  neighbors’  cost  is  not 
commonly  reprobated  if  it  takes  effect  on  a decently  large 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  81 

scale  and  shrewdly  within  the  flexibilities  of  the  law  or 
with  the  connivance  of  its  officers.  Governing  inter- 
national endeavours  of  this  class  there  is  no  law  so  in- 
flexible that  it  can  not  be  conveniently  made  over  to  fit 
particular  circumstances.  And  in  the  absence  of  law  the 
felt  need  of  a formal  justification  will  necessarily  appeal 
to  the  unformulated  equities  of  the  case,  with  some  such 
outcome  as  alluded  to  above.  All  that,  of  course,  is 
for  the  diplomatists  to  take  care  of. 

But  any  speculation  on  the  equities  involved  in  the 
projected  course  of  empire  to  which  these  two  enter- 
prising nations  are  committing  themselves  must  run  within 
the  lines  of  diplomatic  parable,  and  will  have  none  but  a 
speculative  interest.  It  is  not  a matter  of  equity.  Ac- 
cepting the  situation  as  it  stands,  it  is  evident  that  any 
peace  can  only  have  a qualified  meaning,  in  the  sense  of 
armistice,  so  long  as  there  is  opportunity  for  national 
enterprise  of  the  character  on  which  these  two  enterpris- 
ing national  establishments  are  bent,  and  so  long  as  these 
and  the  like  national  establishments  remain.  So,  taking 
the  peaceable  professions  of  their  spokesmen  at  a dis- 
count of  one  hundred  percent,  as  one  necessarily  must, 
and  looking  to  the  circumstantial  evidence  of  the  case, 
it  is  abundantly  plain  that  at  least  these  two  imperial 
Powers  may  be  counted  on  consistently  to  manoeuvre  for 
warlike  advantage  so  long  as  any  peace  compact  holds,  and 
to  break  the  peace  so  soon  as  the  strategy  of  Imperial  en- 
terprise appears  to  require  it. 

There  has  been  much  courteous  make-believe  of  ami- 
able and  upright  solicitude  on  this  head  the  past  few 
years,  both  in  diplomatic  intercourse  and  among  men  out 
of  doors ; and  since  make-believe  is  a matter  of  course 
in  diplomatic  intercourse  it  is  right  and  seemly,  of  course, 
6 


82 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  no  overt  recognition  of  unavowed  facts  should  be  al- 
lowed to  traverse  this  run  of  make-believe  within  the 
precincts  of  diplomatic  intercourse.  But  in  any  ingenu- 
ous inquiry  into  the  nature  of  peace  and  the  conditions 
,of  its  maintenance  there  can  be  no  harm  in  conveniently 
leaving  the  diplomatic  make-believe  on  one  side  and  look- 
ing to  the  circumstances  that  condition  the  case,  rather 
than  to  the  formal  professions  designed  to  mask  the  cir- 
cumstances. 

Chief  among  the  relevant  circumstances  in  the  current 
situation  are  the  imperial  designs  of  Germany  and  Japan. 
These  two  national  establishments  are  very  much  alike. 
So  much  so  that  for  the  present  purpose  a single  line  of 
analysis  will  passably  cover  both  cases.  The  same  line 
of  analysis  will  also  apply,  with  slight  adaptation,  to 
more  than  one  of  the  other  Powers,  or  near-Powers,  of  the 
modern  world;  but  in  so  far  as  such  is  held  to  be  the 
case,  that  is  not  a consideration  that  weakens  the  argument 
as  applied  to  these  two,  which  are  to  be  taken  as  the  con- 
summate type-form  of  a species  of  national  establish- 
ments. They  are,  between  them,  the  best  instance  there 
is  of  what  may  be  called  a Dynastic  State. 

Except  as  a possible  corrective  of  internal  disorders 
and  discontent,  neither  of  the  two  States  “desires”  w'ar; 
but  both  are  bent  on  dominion,  and  as  the  dominion  aimed 
at  is  not  to  be  had  except  by  fighting  for  it,  both  in  effect 
are  incorrigibly  bent  on  warlike  enterprise.  And  in 
neither  case  will  considerations  of  equity,  humanity,  de- 
cency, veracity,  or  the  common  good  be  allowed  to  trouble 
the  quest  of  dominion.  As  lies  in  the  nature  of  the 
dynastic  State,  imperial  dominion,  in  the  ambitions  of 
both,  is  beyond  price;  so  that  no  cost  is  too  high  so  long 


On  the  Crnditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  83 

as  ultimate  success  attends  the  imperial  enterprise.  So 
much  is  commonplace  knowledge  among  all  men  who  are 
at  all  conversant  with  the  facts. 

To  anyone  who  harbors  a lively  sentimental  prejudice 
for  or  against  either  or  both  of  the  two  nations  so  spoken 
of,  or  for  or  against  the  manner  of  imperial  enterprise  to 
which  both  are  committed,  it  may  seem  that  what  has 
just  been  said  of  them  and  their  relation  to  the  world’s 
peace  runs  on  something  of  a bias  and  conveys  something 
of  dispraise  and  reprobation.  Such  is  not  the  intention, 
however,  though  the  appearance  is  scarcely  to  be  avoided. 
It  is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  argument  unam- 
biguously to  recognise  the  nature  of  these  facts  with  which 
the  inquiry  is  concerned ; and  any  plain  characterisation 
of  the  facts  will  unavoidably  carry  a fringe  of  sugges- 
tions of  this  character,  because  current  speech  is  adapted 
for  their  reprobation.  The  point  aimed  at  is  not  this 
inflection  of  approval  or  disapproval.  The  facts  are  to 
be  taken  impersonally  for  what  they  are  worth  in  their 
causal  bearing  on  the  chance  of  peace  or  war ; not  at  their 
sentimental  value  as  traits  of  conduct  to  be  appraised  in 
point  of  their  goodness  or  expediency. 

So  seen  without  prejudice,  then,  if  that  may  be,  this 
Imperial  enterprise  of  these  two  Powers  is  to  be  rated  as 
the  chief  circumstance  bearing  on  the  chances  of  peace  and 
conditioning  the  terms  on  which  any  peace  plan  must  be 
drawn.  Evidently,  in  the  presence  of  these  two  Imperial 
Powers  any  peace  compact  will  be  in  a precarious  case; 
equally  so  whether  either  or  both  of  them  are  parties 
to  such  compact  or  not.  No  engagement  binds  a dynastic 
statesman  in  case  it  turns  out  not  to  further  the  dynastic 
enterprise.  The  question  then  recurs : How  may  peace 
be  maintained  within  the  horizon  of  German  or  Japanese 


-84 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


ambitions?  There  are  two  obvious  alternatives,  neither 
of  which  promises  an  easy  way  out  of  the  quandary  in 
which  the  world’s  peace  is  placed  by  their  presence : Sub- 
mission to  their  dominion,  or  Elimination  of  these  two 
Powers.  Either  alternative  would  offer  a sufficiently  de- 
terrent outlook,  and  yet  any  project  for  devising  some 
middle  course  of  conciliation  and  amicable  settlement, 
which  shall  be  practicable  and  yet  serve  the  turn,  scarcely 
has  anything  better  to  promise.  The  several  nations  now 
engaged  on  a war  with  the  greater  of  these  Imperial 
Powers  hold  to  a design  of  elimination,  as  being  the  only 
measure  that  merits  hopeful  consideration.  The  Imperial 
Power  in  distress  bespeaks  peace  and  goodwill. 

Those  advocates,  whatever  their  nationality,  who  speak 
for  negotiation  with  a view  to  a peace  compact  which  is 
to  embrace  these  States  intact,  are  aiming,  in  effect,  to 
put  things  in  train  for  ultimate  submission  to  the  mastery 
of  these  Imperial  Powers.  In  these  premises  an  ami- 
cable settlement  and  a compact  of  perpetual  peace  will 
necessarily  be  equivalent  to  arranging  a period  of  re- 
cuperation and  recruiting  for  a new  onset  of  dynastic 
enterprise.  For,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  no  compact 
binds  the  dynastic  statesman,  and  no  consideration  other 
than  the  pursuit  of  Imperial  dominion  commands  his  at- 
tention. 

There  is,  of  course,  no  intention  to  decry  this  single- 
mindedness  that  is  habitually  put  in  evidence  by  the 
dynastic  statesmen.  Nor  should  it  be  taken  as  evidence 
of  moral  obliquity  in  them.  It  is  rather  the  result  of  a 
peculiar  moral  attitude  or  bent,  habitual  to  such  states- 
men, and  in  its  degree  also  habitual  to  their  compatriots, 
and  is  indispensably  involved  in  the  Imperial  frame  of 
mind.  The  consummation  of  Imperial  mastery  being  tlie 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  85 

highest  and  ubiquitously  ulterior  end  of  all  endeavour,  its 
pursuit  not  only  relieves  its  votaries  from  the  observance 
of  any  minor  obligations  that  run  counter  to  its  needs, 
but  it  also  imposes  a moral  obligation  to  make  the  most  of 
any  opportunity  for  profitable  deceit  and  chicanery  that 
may  offer.  In  short,  the  dynastic  statesman  is  under  the 
governance  of  a higher  morality,  binding  him  to  the 
service  of  his  nation’s  ambition — or  in  point  of  fact,  to 
the  personal  service  of  his  dynastic  master — to  which  it  is 
his  dutiful  privilege  loyally  to  devote  all  his  powers  of 
force  and  fraud. 

Democratically-minded  persons,  who  are  not  moved  by 
the  call  of  loyalty  to  a gratuitous  personal  master,  may 
have  some  difficulty  in  appreciating  the  force  and  the 
moral  austerity  of  this  spirit  of  devotion  to  an  ideal  of 
dynastic  aggrandisement,  and  in  seeing  how  its  paramount 
exigence  will  set  aside  all  meticulous  scruples  of  personal 
rectitude  and  veracity,  as  being  a shabby  with-holding  of 
service  due. 

To  such  of  these  doubters  as  still  have  retained  some 
remnants  of  their  religious  faith  this  attitude  of  loyalty 
may  perhaps  be  made  intelligible  by  calling  to  mind  the 
analogous  self-surrender  of  the  religious  devotee.  And 
in  this  connection  it  may  also  be  to  the  purpose  to  recall 
that  in  point  of  its  genesis  and  derivation  that  unreserved 
self-abasement  and  surrender  to  the  divine  ends  and 
guidance,  which  is  the  chief  grace  and  glory  of  the 
true  believer,  is  held  by  secular  students  of  these  matters 
to  be  only  a sublimated  analogue  or  counterfeit  of  this 
other  dutiful  abasement  that  constitutes  loyalty  to  a tem- 
poral master.  The  deity  is  currently  spoken  of  as  The 
Heavenly  King,  under  whose  dominion  no  sinner  has 
a right  that  He  is  bound  to  respect;  very  much  after  the 


86 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


fashion  in  which  no  subject  of  a dynastic  state  has  a 
right  which  the  State  is  bound  to  respect.  Indeed,  all 
these  dynastic  establishments  that  so  seek  the  Kingdom, 
the  Power  and  the  Glory  are  surrounded  with  a penumbra 
of  divinity,  and  it  is  commonly  a bootless  question  where 
the  dynastic  powers  end  and  the  claims  of  divinity  begin. 
There  is  something  of  a coalescence.^ 

The  Kaiser  holds  dominion  by  divine  grace  and  is  ac- 
countable to  none  but  God,  if  to  Him.  The  whole  case 
is  in  a still  better  state  of  repair  as  touches  the  Japanese 
establishment,  where  the  Emperor  is  a lineal  descendant  of 
the  supreme  deity,  Amaterazu  (o  mi  Kami),  and  where, 
by  consequence,  there  is  no  line  of  cleavage  between  a 
divine  and  a secular  mastery.  Pursuant  to  this  more 
unqualified  authenticity  of  autocratic  rule,  there  is  also 
to  be  found  in  this  case  a correspondingly  unqualified 
devotion  in  the  subjects  and  an  unqualified  subservience 
to  dynastic  ends  on  the  part  of  the  officers  of  the  crown. 
The  coalescence  of  dynastic  rule  with  the  divine  order  is 
less  complete  in  the  German  case,  but  all  observers  bear 
witness  that  it  all  goes  far  enough  also  in  the  German 
case.  This  state  of  things  is  recalled  here  as  a means 
of  making  plain  that  the  statesmen  of  these  Imperial 

i“To  us  the  state  is  the  most  indispensable  as  well  as  the  high- 
est requisite  to  our  earthly  existence  All  individualistic 

endeavor  ....  must  be  unreservedly  subordinated  to  this  lofty 

claim The  state  eventually  is  of  infinitely  more 

value  than  the  sum  of  all  the  individuals  within  its  jurisdiction.” 
“This  conception  of  the  state,  which  is  as  much  a part  of  our 
life  as  is  the  blood  in  our  veins,  is  nowhere  to  be  found  in  the 
English  Constitution,  and  is  quite  foreign  to  English  thought, 
and  to  that  of  America  as  well.” — Eduard  Clever,  England,  its 
Political  Organisation  and  Development  and  the  War  against 
Germany,  translated  by  H.  S.  White.  Boston  1916.  pp.  30-31. 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  87 

Powers  must  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  and  without  blame, 
be  drawn  out  from  under  the  customary  restraint  of  those 
principles  of  vulgar  morality  that  are  embodied  in  the 
decalogue.  It  is  not  that  the  subject,  or — what  comes  to 
the  same  thing — the  servant  of  such  a dynastic  State 
may  not  be  upright,  veracious  and  humane  in  private  life, 
but  only  that  he  must  not  be  addicted  to  that  sort  of  thing 
in  such  manner  or  degree  as  might  hinder  his  usefulness 
for  dynastic  purposes.  These  matters  of  selfishly  in- 
dividual integrity  and  humanity  have  no  weight  as  against 
the  exigencies  of  the  dynastic  enterprise. 

These  considerations  may  not  satisfy  all  doubters  as 
to  the  moral  sufficiency  of  these  motives  that  so  suffice 
to  decide  the  dynastic  statesmen  on  their  enterprise  of 
aggression  by  force  and  fraud ; but  it  should  be  evident 
that  so  long  as  these  statesmen  continue  in  the  frame  of 
mind  spoken  of,  and  so  long  as  popular  sentiment  in 
these  countries  continues,  as  hitherto,  to  lend  them  ef- 
fectual support  in  the  pursuit  of  such  Imperial  enterprise, 
so  long  it  must  also  remain  true  that  no  enduring  peace 
can  be  maintained  within  the  sweep  of  their  Imperial  am- 
bition. Any  peace  compact  would  necessarily  be,  in 
effect,  an  armistice  terminable  at  will  and  serving  as  a 
season  of  preparation  to  meet  a deferred  opportunity. 
For  the  peaceable  nations  it  would,  in  effect,  be  a respite 
and  a season  of  preparation  for  eventual  submission  to  the 
Imperial  rule. 

By  advocates  of  such  a negotiated  compact  of  perpetual 
peace  it  has  been  argued  that  the  populace  underlying 
these  Imperial  Powers  will  readily  be  brought  to  realise 
the  futility  and  inexpediency  of  such  dynastic  enterprise, 
if  only  the  relevant  facts  are  brought  to  their  knowledge, 
and  that  so  these  Powers  will  be  constrained  to  keep  the 


88 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


peace  by  default  of  popular  support  for  their  warlike 
projects.  What  is  required,  it  is  believed  by  these  san- 
guine persons,  is  that  information  be  competently  con- 
veyed to  the  common  people  of  these  warlike  nations, 
showing  them  that  they  have  nothing  to  apprehend  in  the 
way  of  aggression  or  oppressive  measures  from  the  side 
of  their  more  peaceable  neighbours ; whereupon  their  war- 
like animus  will  give  place  to  a reasonable  and  enlight- 
ened frame  of  mind.  This  argument  runs  tacitly  or  ex- 
plicitly, on  the  premise  that  these  peoples  who  have  so 
enthusiastically  lent  themselves  to  the  current  warlike 
enterprise  are  fundamentally  of  the  same  racial  complex- 
ion and  endowed  with  the  same  human  nature  as  their 
peaceable  neighbours, who  would  be  only  too  glad  to  keep 
the  peace  on  any  terms  of  tolerable  security  from  ag- 
gression. If  only  a fair  opportunity  is  offered  for  the 
interested  peoples  to  come  to  an  understanding,  it  is  held, 
a good  understanding  will  readily  be  reached ; at  least 
so  far  as  to  result  in  a reasonable  willingness  to  submit 
questions  in  dispute  to  an  intelligent  canvass  and  an  equit- 
able arbitration. 

Projects  for  a negotiated  peace  compact,  to  include  the 
dynastic  States,  can  hold  any  prospect  of  a happy  issue 
’only  if  this  line  of  argument,  or  its  equivalent,  is  pertinent 
and  conclusive ; and  the  argument  is  to  the  point  only  in 
so  far  as  its  premises  are  sound  and  will  carry  as  far  as 
the  desired  conclusion.  Therefore  a more  detailed  at- 
tention to  the  premises  on  which  it  runs  will  be  in  place, 
before  any  project  of  the  kind  is  allowed  to  pass  inspect- 
tion. 

As  to  homogeneity  of  race  and  endowment  among  the 
several  nations  in  question,  the  ethnologists,  who  are  com- 
petent to  speak  of  that  matter,  are  ready  to  assert  that  this 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  89 

homogeneity  goes  much  farther  among  the  nations  of 
Europe  than  any  considerable  number  of  peace  advocates 
would  be  ready  to  claim.  In  point  of  race,  and  broadly 
speaking,  there  is  substantially  no  difference  between 
these  warring  nations,  along  any  east-and-west  line ; while 
the  progressive  difference  in  racial  complexion  that  is 
always  met  with  along  any  north-and-south  line,  nowhere 
coincides  with  a national  or  linguistic  frontier.  In  no 
case  does  a political  division  between  these  nations  mark 
or  depend  on  a difference  of  race  or  of  hereditary  endow- 
ment. And,  to  give  full  measure,  it  may  be  added  that  also 
in  no  case  does  a division  of  classes  within  any  one  of 
these  nations,  into  noble  and  base,  patrician  and  plebeian, 
lay  and  learned,  innocent  and  vicious,  mark  or  rest  on 
any  slightest  traceable  degree  of  difference  in  race  or  in 
heritable  endowment.  On  the  point  of  racial  homogeneity 
there  is  no  fault  to  find  with  the  position  taken. 

If  the  second  postulate  in  this  groundwork  of  premises 
on  which  the  advocates  of  negotiable  peace  base  their 
hopes  were  as  well  taken  there  need  be  no  serious  mis- 
giving as  to  the  practicability  of  such  a plan.  The  plan 
counts  on  information,  persuasion  and  reflection  to  subdue 
national  animosities  and  jealousies,  at  least  in  such  meas- 
ure as  would  make  them  amenable  to  reason.  The  question 
of  immediate  interest  on  this  head,  therefore,  would  be 
as  to  how  far  this  populace  may  be  accessible  to  the  con- 
templated line  of  persuasion.  At  present  they  are,  noto- 
riously, in  a state  of  obsequious  loyalty  to  the  dynasty, 
single-minded  devotion  to  the  fortunes  of  the  Fatherland, 
and  uncompromising  hatred  of  its  enemies.  In  this 
frame  of  mind  there  is  nothing  that  is  new,  except  the 
degree  of  excitement.  The  animus,  it  will  be  recalled,  was 
all  there  and  on  the  alert  when  the  call  came,  so  that  the 


90 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


excitement  came  on  with  the  sweep  of  a conflagration  on 
the  first  touch  of  a suitable  stimulus.  The  German  people 
at  large  was  evidently  in  a highly  unstable  equilibrium,  so 
that  an  unexampled  enthusiasm  of  patriotic  self-sacrifice 
followed  immediately  on  the  first  incitement  to  man- 
slaughter, very  much  as  if  the  nation  had  been  held  under 
an  hypnotic  spell.  One  need  only  recall  the  volume  of 
overbearing  magniloquence  that  broke  out  all  over  the 
place  in  that  beginning,  when  The  Day  was  believed  to  be 
dawning. 

Such  a popular  frame  of  mind  is  not  a transient  epi- 
sode, to  be  created  at  short  notice  and  put  aside  for  a 
parcel  of  salutary  advice.  The  nation  that  will  make  such 
a massive  concerted  move  with  the  alacrity  shown  in  this 
instance  must  be  living  in  a state  of  alert  readiness  for 
just  such  an  onset.  Yet  this  is  not  to  be  set  down  as 
anything  in  the  way  of  a racial  trait  specifically  dis- 
tinguishing the  German  people  from  those  other  adjacent 
nationalities  that  are  incapable  of  a similarly  swift  and 
massive  response  to  the  appeal  of  patriotism.  These 
adjacent  nationalities  are  racially  indentical  with  the  Ger- 
man people,  but  they  do  not  show  the  same  warlike  aban- 
don in  nearly  the  same  degree. 

But  for  all  that,  it  is  a national  trait,  not  to  be  acquired 
or  put  away  by  taking  thought.  It  is  just  here  that  the  line 
of  definition  runs : it  is  a national  trait,  not  a racial  one. 
It  is  not  Nature,  but  it  is  Second  Nature.  But  a national 
trait,  while  it  is  not  heritable  in  the  simple  sense  of  that 
term,  has  the  same  semblance,  or  the  same  degree,  of 
hereditary  persistence  that  belongs  to  the  national  in- 
stitutions, usages,  conventionalities,  beliefs,  which  dis- 
tinguish the  given  nation  from  its  neighbors.  In  this  in- 
stance it  may  be  said  more  specifically  that  this  eager 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  91 

loyalty  is  a heritage  of  the  German  people  at  large  in 
the  same  sense  and  with  the  same  degree  of  permanence 
as  the  institution  of  an  autocratic  royalty  has  among  them, 
or  a privileged  nobility.  Indeed,  it  is  the  institutional 
counterfoil  of  these  establishments.  It  is  of  an  institution- 
al character,  just  as  the  corresponding  sense  of  national 
solidarity  and  patriotic  devotion  is  among  the  neighbor- 
ing peoples  with  whom  the  German  nation  comes  in  com- 
parison. And  an  institution  is  an  historical  growth,  with 
just  so  much  of  a character  of  permanence  and  con- 
tinuity of  transmission  as  is  given  it  by  the  circumstances 
out  of  which  it  has  grown.  Any  institution  is  a product 
of  habit,  or  perhaps  more  accurately  it  is  a body  of  habits 
of  thought  bearing  on  a given  line  of  conduct,  which 
prevails  with  such  generality  and  uniformity  throughout 
the  group  as  to  have  become  a matter  of  common  sense. 

Such  an  article  of  institutional  furniture  is  an  outcome 
of  usage,  not  of  reflection  or  deliberate  choice ; and  it  has 
consequently  a character  of  self-legitimation,  so  that  it 
stands  in  the  accredited  scheme  of  things  as  intrinsically 
right  and  good,  and  not  merely  as  a shrewdly  chosen  ex- 
pedient ad  interim.  It  affords  a norm  of  life,  inosculating 
with  a multiplicity  of  other  norms,  with  which  it  goes  to 
make  up  a balanced  scheme  of  ends,  ways  and  means  gov- 
erning human  conduct ; and  no  one  such  institutional  item, 
therefore,  is  materially  to  be  disturbed,  discarded  or  a- 
bated  except  at  the  cost  of  serious  derangement  to  the 
balanced  scheme  of  things  in  which  it  belongs  as  an  in- 
tegral constitutent.  Nor  can  such  a detail  norm  of  con- 
duct and  habitual  propensity  come  into  bearing  and  hold 
its  place,  except  by  force  of  habituation  which  is  at  the 
same  time  consonant  with  the  common  run  of  habituation 
to  which  the  given  community  is  subject.  It  follows 


92 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  the  more  rigorous,  comprehensive,  unremitting  and 
long-continued  the  habituation  to  which  a given  institu- 
tional principle  owes  its  vogue,  the  more  intimately  and 
definitively  will  it  be  embedded  in  the  common  sense  of 
the  community,  the  less  chance  is  there  of  its  intrinsic 
necessity  being  effectually  questioned  or  doubted,  and  the 
less  chance  is  there  of  correcting  it  or  abating  its  force 
in  case  circumstances  should  so  change  as  to  make  its 
continued  rule  visibly  inexpedient.  Its  abatement  will  be 
a work  not  of  deliberation  and  design,  but  of  defection 
through  disuse. 

Not  that  reflection  and  sane  counsel  will  count  for 
nothing  in  these  premises,  but  only  that  these  exertions  of 
intelligence  will  count  for  relatively  very  little  by  com- 
parison with  the  run  of  habituation  as  enforced  by  the  cir- 
cumstances conditioning  any  given  case;  and  further, 
that  wise  counsel  and  good  resolutions  can  take  effect  in 
the  way  of  amending  any  untoward  institutional  bent  only 
by  way  of  suitable  habituation,  and  only  at  such  a rate 
of  change  as  the  circumstances  governing  habituation  will 
allow.  It  is,  at  the  best,  slow  work  to  shift  the  settled 
lines  of  any  community’s  scheme  of  common  sense.  Now, 
national  solidarity,  and  more  particularly  an  unquestioning 
loyalty  to  the  sovereigpi  and  the  dynasty,  is  a matter  of 
course  and  of  commonsense  necessity  with  the  German 
people.  It  is  not  necessary  to  call  to  mind  that  the  Japan- 
ese nation,  which  has  here  been  coupled  with  the  German, 
are  in  the  same  case,  only  more  so. 

Doubtless  it  would  be  exceeding  the  premises  to  claim 
that  it  should  necessarily  take  the  German  people  as  long- 
continued  and  as  harsh  a schooling  to  unlearn  their  excess 
of  chauvinism,  their  servile  stooping  to  gratuitous  author- 
ity, and  their  eager  subservience  to  the  dynastic  ambitions 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  93 

of  their  masters,  as  that  which  has  in  the  course  of  history 
induced  these  habits  in  them.  But  it  would  seem  reason- 
able to  expect  that  there  should  have  to  be  some  measure 
of  proportion  between  what  it  has  cost  them  in  time  and 
experience  to  achieve  their  current  frame  of  mind  in 
this  bearing  and  what  it  would  cost  to  divest  themselves 
of  it.  It  is  a question  of  how  long  a time  and  how  ex- 
acting a discipline  would  be  required  so  far  to  displace  the 
current  scheme  of  commonsense  values  and  convictions  in 
force  in  the  Fatherland  as  to  neutralise  their  current 
high-wrought  principles  of  servility,  loyalty  and  national 
animosity ; and  on  the  solution  of  this  difficulty  appear  to 
depend  the  chances  of  success  for  any  proposed  peace 
compact  to  which  the  German  nation  shall  be  made  a 
party,  on  terms  of  what  is  called  an  “honorable  peace.” 

The  national,  or  rather  the  dynastic  and  warlike,  animus 
of  this  people  is  of  the  essence  of  their  social  and  political 
institutions.  Without  such  a groundwork  of  popular 
sentiment  neither  the  national  establishment,  nor  the 
social  order  on  which  it  rests  and  through  which  it  works, 
could  endure.  And  with  this  underlying  national  senti- 
ment intact  nothing  but  a dynastic  establishment  of  a 
somewhat  ruthless  order,  and  no  enduring  system  of  law 
and  order  not  based  on  universal  submission  to  personal 
rule,  could  be  installed.  Both  the  popular  animus  and  the 
correlative  coercive  scheme  of  law  and  order  are  of 
historical  growth.  Both  have  been  learned,  acquired,  and 
are  in  no  cogent  sense  original  with  the  German  people. 
But  both  alike  and  conjointly  have  come  out  of  a very 
protracted,  exacting  and  consistent  discipline  of  mas- 
tery and  subjection,  running  virtually  unbroken  over  the 
centuries  that  have  passed  since  the  region  that  is  now  the 
Fatherland  first  passed  under  the  predaceous  rule  of  its 


94 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


Teutonic  invaders, — for  no  part  of  the  “Fatherland”  is 
held  on  other  tenure  than  that  of  forcible  seizure  in 
ancient  times  by  bands  of  invaders,  with  the  negligible 
exception  of  Holstein  and  a slight  extent  of  territory  ad- 
joining that  province  to  the  south  and  south-west.  Since 
the  time  when  such  peoples  as  were  overtaken  in  this  re- 
gion by  the  Germanic  barbarian  invasions,  and  were  re- 
duced to  subjection  and  presently  merged  with  their  alien 
masters,  the  same  general  fashion  of  law  and  order  that 
presently  grew  out  of  that  barbarian  conquest  has  contin- 
ued to  govern  the  life  of  those  peoples,  with  relatively 
slight  and  intermittent  relaxation  of  its  rigors.  Contrasted 
with  its  beginnings,  in  the  shameful  atrocities  of  the  Dark 
Ages  and  the  prehistoric  phases  of  this  German  occupa- 
tion, the  later  stages  of  this  system  of  coercive  law  and 
order  in  the  Fatherland  will  appear  humane,  not  to  say 
genial;  but  as  compared  with  the  degree  of  mitigation 
which  the  like  order  of  things  presently  underwent  else- 
where in  western  Europe,  it  has  throughout  the  historical 
period  preserved  a remarkable  degree  of  that  character  of 
arrogance  and  servility  which  it  owes  to  its  barbarian  and 
predatory  beginnings. 

The  initial  stages  of  this  Germanic  occupation  of  the 
Fatherland  are  sufficiently  obscure  under  the  cloud  of 
unrecorded  antiquity  that  covers  them ; and  then,  an 
abundance  of  obscurantism  has  also  been  added  by  the 
vapours  of  misguided  vanity  that  have  surrounded  so 
nearly  all  historical  inquiry  on  the  part  of  patriotic  Ger- 
man scholars.  Yet  there  are  certain  outstanding  features 
in  the  case,  in  history  and  prehistory,  that  are  too  large 
or  too  notorious  to  be  set  aside  or  to  be  covered  over,  and 
these  may  suffice  to  show  the  run  of  circumstances  which 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  95 

have  surrounded  the  German  peoples  and  shaped  their 
civil  and  political  institutions,  and  whose  discipline  has 
guided  German  habits  of  thought  and  preserved  the  Ger- 
man spirit  of  loyalty  in  the  shape  in  which  it  underlies 
the  dynastic  State  of  the  present  day. 

Among  the  most  engaging  of  those  fables  that  make 
the  conventional  background  of  German  history  is  the 
academic  legend  of  a free  agricultural  village  com.munity 
made  up  of  ungraded  and  masterless  men.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary here  to  claim  that  such  a village  community  never 
played  a part  in  the  remoter  prehistoric  experiences  out 
of  which  the  German  people,  or  their  ruling  classes,  came 
into  the  territory  of  the  Fatherland;  such  a claim  might 
divert  the  argument.  But  it  is  sufficiently  patent  to  stu- 
dents of  those  matters  today  that  no  such  community  of 
free  and  ungraded  men  had  any  part  in  the  Germanic 
beginnings;  that  is  to  say,  in  the  early  experiences  of 
the  Fatherland  under  German  rule.  The  meager  and 
ambiguous  remarks  of  Tacitus  on  the  state  of  domestic 
and  civil  economy  among  the  inhabitants  of  Germany 
need  no  longer  detain  anyone,  in  the  presence  of  the 
available  archaeological  and  historical  evidence.  The  cir- 
cumstantial evidence  of  the  prehistoric  antiquities  which 
touch  this  matter,  as  well  as  the  slight  allusions  of  his- 
torical records  in  antiquity,  indicate  unambiguously 
enough  that  when  the  Germanic  immigrants  moved  into 
the  territories  of  the  Fatherland  they  moved  in  as  in- 
vaders, or  rather  as  marauders,  and  made  themselves  mas- 
ters of  the  people  already  living  on  the  land.  And  his- 
tory quite  as  unambiguously  declares  that  when  the 
Fatherland  first  comes  under  its  light  it  presents  a dark 
and  bloody  ground  of  tumultuous  contention  and  intrigue ; 
where  princes  and  princelings,  captains  of  war  and  of 


96 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


rapine  as  well  as  the  captains  of  superstition,  spend  the 
substance  of  an  ignominiously  sordid  and  servile  populace 
in  an  endless  round  of  mutual  raiding,  treachery,  assas- 
sinations and  supersession. 

Taken  at  their  face  value,  the  recorded  stories  of  that 
early  time  would  leave  one  to  infer  that  the  common  peo- 
ple, whose  industry  supported  this  superstructure  of  sor- 
did mastery,  could  have  survived  only  by  oversight.  But 
touched  as  it  is  with  poetic  license  and  devoted  to  the 
admirable  life  of  the  master  class — admirable  in  their 
own  eyes  and  in  those  of  their  chroniclers,  as  undoubt- 
edly also  in  the  eyes  of  the  subject  populace — the  history 
of  that  time  doubtless  plays  up  the  notable  exploits  and 
fortunes  of  its  conspicuous  personages,  somewhat  to  the 
neglect  of  the  obscure  vicissitudes  of  life  and  fortune 
among  that  human  raw  material  by  use  of  which  the 
admirable  feats  of  the  master  class  were  achieved,  and 
about  the  use  of  which  the  dreary  traffic  of  gjeed  and 
crime  went  on  among  the  masters. 

Of  the  later  history,  what  covers,  say,  the  last  one 
thousand  years,  there  is  no  need  to  speak  at  length.  With 
transient,  episodic,  interniptions  it  is  for  the  Fatherland 
a continuation  out  of  these  beginnings,  leading  out  into 
a more  settled  system  of  subjection  and  mastery  and  a 
progressively  increased  scale  of  princely  enterprise,  rest- 
ing on  an  increasingly  useful  and  increasingly  loyal  pop- 
ulace. In  aU  this  later  history  the  posture  of  things  in 
the  Fatherland  is  by  no  means  unique,  nor  is  it  even  strik- 
ingly peculiar,  by  contrast  with  the  rest  of  western  Eu- 
rope, except  in  degree.  It  is  of  the  same  general  kind 
as  the  rest  of  what  has  gone  to  make  the  historical  ad- 
vance of  medieval  and  modern  times ; but  it  differs  from 
the  generality  in  a more  sluggish  movement  and  a more 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  97 

tenacious  adherence  to  what  would  be  rated  as  the  un- 
toward features  of  mediaevalism.  The  approach  to  a 
modern  scheme  of  institutions  and  modern  conceptions  of 
life  and  of  human  values  has  been  slow,  and  hitherto 
incomplete,  as  compared  with  those  communities  that 
have,  for  good  or  ill,  gone  farthest  along  the  ways  of 
modernity.  Habituation  to  personal  subjection  and  sub- 
servience under  the  rigorous  and  protracted  discipline  of 
standardised  service  and  fealty  has  continued  later,  and 
with  later  and  slighter  mitigation,  in  the  Fatherland;  so 
as  better  to  have  conserved  the  spiritual  attitude  of  the 
feudal  order.  Law  and  order  in  the  Fatherland  has  in  a 
higher  degree  continued  to  mean  unquestioning  obedience 
to  a personal  master  and  unquestioning  subservience  to 
the  personal  ambitions  of  the  master.  And  since  freedom, 
in  the  sense  of  discretionary  initiative  on  the  part  of  the 
common  man,  does  not  fit  into  the  framework  of  such  a 
system  of  dependence  on  personal  authority  and  surveil- 
lance, any  degree  of  such  free  initiative  will  be  “licence” 
in  the  eyes  of  men  bred  into  the  framework  of  this  system ; 
whereas  “liberty,”  as  distinct  from  “licence,”  is  not  a mat- 
ter of  initiative  and  self-direction,  but  of  latitude  in  the 
service  of  a master.  Hence  no  degree  of  curtailment  in 
this  delegated  “liberty”  will  be  resented  or  repudiated  by 
popular  indignation,  so  long  as  the  master  to  whom  serv- 
ice is  due  can  give  assurance  that  it  is  expedient  for  his 
purposes. 

The  age-long  course  of  experience  and  institutional  dis- 
cipline out  of  which  the  current  German  situation  has 
come  may  be  drawn  schematically  to  the  following  effect : 
In  the  beginning  a turmoil  of  conquest,  rapine,  servitude, 
and  contention  between  rival  bands  of  marauders  and 
their  captains,  gradually,  indeed  imperceptibly,  fell  into 
7 


98 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


lines  of  settled  and  conventionalised  exploitation ; with 
repeated  interruptions  due  to  new  incursions  and  new 
combinations  of  rapacious  chieftains.  Out  of  it  all  in  the 
course  of  time  came  a feudal  regime,  under  which  per- 
sonal allegiance  and  service  to  petty  chiefs  was  the  sole 
and  universal  accredited  bond  of  solidarity.  As  the  out- 
come of  further  unremitting  intrigue  and  contention 
among  feudal  chiefs,  of  high  and  low  degree,  the  popu- 
lace fell  into  larger  parcels,  under  the  hands  of  feudal 
lords  of  larger  dominion,  and  the  bias  of  allegiance  and 
service  came  to  hold  with  some  degree  of  permanence  and 
uniformity,  or  at  least  of  consistency,  over  a considerable 
reach  of  country,  including  its  inhabitants.  With  the 
rise  of  States  came  allegiance  to  a dynasty,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  narrower  and  more  ephemeral  allegiance 
to  the  semi-detached  person  of  a victorious  prince ; and 
the  relative  permanence  of  territorial  frontiers  under  this 
rule  gave  room  for  an  effectual  recrudescence  of  the  an- 
cient propensity  to  a sentimental  group  solidarity ; in 
which  the  accredited  territorial  limits  of  the  dynastic  do- 
minion served  to  outline  the  group  that  so  was  felt  to 
belong  together  under  a joint  dispensation  and  with  some- 
thing of  a joint  interest  in  matters  of  fame  and  fortune. 
As  the  same  notion  is  more  commonly  and  more  sugges- 
tively expressed,  a sense  of  nationality  arose  within  the 
sweep  of  the  dynastic  rule.  This  sense  of  community 
interest  that  is  called  nationality  so  came  in  to  reenforce 
the  sense  of  allegiance  to  the  dynastic  establishment  and 
so  has  coalesced  with  it  to  produce  that  high-wrought  loy- 
alty to  the  State,  that  draws  equally  on  the  sentiment  of 
community  interest  in  the  nation  and  on  the  prescriptive 
docility  to  the  dynastic  head.  The  sense  of  national  soli- 
darity and  of  feudal  loyalty  and  service  have  coalesced, 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  99 

to  bring  this  people  to  that  climax  of  patriotic  devotion 
beyond  which  there  lies  no  greater  height  along  this  way. 
But  this  is  also  as  far  as  the  German  people  have  gone ; 
and  it  is  scarcely  to  be  claimed  that  the  Japanese  have 
yet  reached  this  stage;  they  would  rather  appear  to  be, 
essentially,  subjects  of  the  emperor,  and  only  inchoately 
a Japanese  nation.  Of  the  German  people  it  seems  safe 
to  say  that  they  have  achieved  such  a coalescence  of  un- 
impaired feudal  fealty  to  a personal  master  and  a full- 
blown sense  of  national  solidarity,  without  any  perceptible 
slackening  in  either  strand  of  the  double  tie  which  so 
binds  them  in  the  service  of  the  dynastic  State. 

Germany,  in  other  words,  is  somewhat  in  arrears,  as 
compared  with  those  Europeans  that  have  gone  farthest 
along  this  course  of  institutional  growth,  or  perhaps  rather 
institutional  permutation.  It  is  not  that  this  retardation 
of  the  German  people  in  this  matter  of  national  spirit  is 
to  be  counted  as  an  infirmity,  assuredly  not  as  a handicap 
in  the  pursuit  of  that  national  prestige  on  which  all  pa- 
triotic endeavour  finally  converges.  For  this  purpose  the 
failure  to  distinguish  between  the  ambitions  of  the  dy- 
nastic statesmen  and  the  interests  of  the  commonwealth 
is  really  a prodigious  advantage,  which  their  rivals,  of 
more  mature  growth  politically,  have  lost  by  atrophy  of 
this  same  dynastic  axiom  of  subservience.  These  others, 
of  whom  the  French  and  the  English-speaking  peoples 
make  up  the  greater  part  and  may  be  taken  as  the  typical 
instance,  have  had  a different  history,  in  part.  The  disci- 
pline of  experience  has  left  a somewhat  different  residue 
of  habits  of  thought  embedded  in  their  institutional  equip- 
ment and  effective  as  axiomatic  premises  in  their  further 
apprehension  of  what  is  worth  while,  and  why. 


100 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


It  is  not  that  the  diflerence  between  these  two  con- 
trasted strains  of  the  Western  civilisation  is  either  pro- 
found or  very  pronounced;  it  is  perhaps  rather  to  be 
stated  as  a difference  of  degree  than  of  kind ; a retarda- 
tion of  spiritual  growth,  in  respect  of  the  prevalent  and 
controlling  habits  of  thought  on  certain  heads,  in  the  one 
case  as  against  the  other.  Therefore  any  attempt  to 
speak  with  sufficient  definition,  so  as  to  bring  out  this  na- 
tional difference  of  animus  in  any  convincing  way,  will 
unavoidably  have  an  appearance  of  over-statement,  if  not 
also  of  bias.  And  in  any  case,  of  course,  it  is  not  to  be 
expected  that  the  national  difference  here  spoken  for  can 
be  brought  home  to  the  apprehension  of  any  unspoiled 
son  of  the  Fatherland,  since  it  does  not  lie  within  that 
perspective. 

It  is  not  of  the  nature  of  a divergence,  but  rather  a 
differential  in  point  of  cultural  maturity,  due  to  a differ- 
ential in  the  rate  of  progression  through  that  sequence 
of  institutional  phases  through  which  the  civilised  peoples 
of  Europe,  jointly  and  severally,  have  been  led  by  force 
of  circumstance.  In  this  movement  out  of  the  Dark  Ages 
and  onward,  circumstances  have  fallen  out  differently  for 
those  Europeans  that  chanced  to  live  within  the  confines 
of  the  Eatherland,  different  with  such  effect  as  to  have 
in  the  present  placed  these  others  at  a farther  remove 
from  the  point  of  departure,  leaving  them  furnished  with 
less  of  that  archaic  frame  of  mind  that  is  here  in  question. 
Possessed  of  less,  but  by  no  means  shorn  of  all — perhaps 
not  of  the  major  part — of  that  barbaric  heritage. 

Circumstances  have  so  fallen  out  that  these — typically 
the  Erench  and  the  English-speaking  peoples — have  left 
behind  and  partly  forgotten  that  institutional  phase  in 
which  the  people  of  Imperial  Germany  now  live  and  move 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  101 

and  have  their  being.  The  French  partly  because  they — ■ 
that  is  the  common  people  of  the  French  lands — entered 
the  procession  with  a very  substantial  lead,  having  never 
been  put  back  to  a point  abreast  of  their  neighbors  across 
the  Rhine,  in  that  phase  of  European  civilisation  from 
which  the  peoples  of  the  Fatherland  tardily  emerged  into 
the  feudal  age.  So,  any  student  who  shall  set  out  to 
account  for  the  visible  lead  which  the  French  people  still 
so  obstinately  maintain  in  the  advance  of  European  cul- 
ture, will  have  to  make  up  his  account  with  this  notable 
fact  among  the  premises  of  his  inquiry,  that  they  have 
had  a shorter  course  to  cover  and  have  therefore,  in  the 
sporting  phrase,  had  the  inside  track.  They  measure 
from  a higher  datum  line.  Among  the  advantages  which 
so  have  come,  in  a sense  unearned,  to  the  Erench  people, 
is  their  uninterrupted  retention,  out  of  Roman — and  per- 
haps pre-Roman — times,  of  the  conception  of  a common- 
wealth, a community  of  men  with  joint  and  mutual  inter- 
ests apart  from  any  superimposed  dependence  on  a joint 
feudal  superior.  The  French  people  therefore  became  a 
nation,  with  unobtrusive  facility,  so  soon  as  circumstances 
permitted,  and  they  are  today  the  oldest  “nation”  in  Eu- 
rope. They  therefore  were  prepared  from  long  before- 
hand, with  an  adequate  principle  (habit  of  thought)  of 
national  cohesion  and  patriotic  sentiment,  to  make  the 
shift  from  a dynastic  State  to  a national  commonwealth 
whenever  the  occasion  for  such  a move  should  arise; 
that  is  to  say,  whenever  the  dynastic  State,  by  a suitable 
conjunction  of  infirmity  and  irksomeness,  should  pass  the 
margin  of  tolerance  in  this  people’s  outraged  sense  of  na- 
tional shame.  The  case  of  the  German  people  in  their 
latterday  attitude  toward  dynastic  vagaries  may  afford  a 
term  of  comparison.  These  appear  yet  incapable  of  dis- 


102  On  the  Nature  of  Peace 

tinguishing  between  national  shame  and  dynastic  ambi- 
tion. 

By  a different  course  and  on  lines  more  nearly  parallel 
with  the  life-history  of  the  German  peoples,  the  English- 
speaking  peoples  have  reached  what  is  for  the  present 
purpose  much  the  same  ground  as  the  French,  in  that 
they  too  have  made  the  shift  from  the  dynastic  State  to 
the  national  commonwealth.  The  British  started  late, 
but  the  discipline  of  servitude  and  unmitigated  personal 
rule  in  their  case  was  relatively  brief  and  relatively  in- 
effectual; that  is  to  say,  as  compared  with  what  their 
German  cousins  had  to  endure  and  to  learn  in  the  like 
connection.  So  that  the  British  never  learned  the  lesson 
of  dynastic  loyalty  fully  by  heart;  at  least  not  the  popu- 
lace; whatever  may  be  true  for  the  privileged  classes, 
the  gentlemen,  whose  interests  were  on  the  side  of  privi- 
lege and  irresponsible  mastery.  Here  as  in  the  French 
case  it  was  the  habits  of  thought  of  the  common  man, 
not  of  the  class  of  gentlemen,  that  made  the  obsolescence 
of  the  dynastic  State  a foregone  conclusion  and  an  easy 
matter — as  one  speaks  of  easy  achievement  in  respect  of 
matters  of  that  magnitude.  It  is  now  some  two  and  a 
half  centuries  since  this  shift  in  the  national  point  of  view 
^overtook  the  English-speaking  community.  Perhaps  it 
would  be  unfair  to  say  that  that  period,  or  that  period  plus 
what  further  time  may  yet  have  to  be  added,  marks  the 
interval  by  which  German  habits  of  thought  in  these  prem- 
ises are  in  arrears,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  find  secure  ground 
for  a different  and  more  moderate  appraisal. 

The  future,  of  course,  is  not  to  be  measured  in  terms 
of  the  past,  and  the  tempo  of  the  present  and  of  the  cal- 
culable future  is  in  many  bearings  very  different  from 
that  which  has  ruled  even  in  the  recent  historical  past. 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  103 

But  then,  on  the  other  hand,  habituation  always  requires 
time;  more  particularly  such  habituation  as  is  to  take 
effect  throughout  a populous  nation  and  is  counted  on  to 
work  a displacement  of  a comprehensive  institutional  sys- 
tem and  of  a people’s  outlook  on  life. 

Germany  is  still  a dynastic  State.  That  is  to  say,  its 
national  establishment  is,  in  effect,  a self-appointed  and 
irrespwDnsible  autocracy  which  holds  the  nation  in  usufruct, 
working  through  an  appropriate  bureaucratic  organisa- 
tion, and  the  people  is  imbued  with  that  spirit  of  abne- 
gation and  devotion  that  is  involved  in  their  enthusias- 
tically supporting  a government  of  that  character.  Now, 
it  is  in  the  nature  of  a dynastic  State  to  seek  dominion, 
that  being  the  whole  of  its  nature.  And  a dynastic  estab- 
lishment which  enjoys  the  unqualified  usufruct  of  such 
resources  as  are  placed  at  its  disposal  by  the  feudalistic 
loyalty  of  the  German  people  runs  no  chance  of  keeping 
the  peace,  except  on  terms  of  the  unconditional  surrender 
of  all  those  whom  it  may  concern.  No  solemn  engage- 
ment and  no  pious  resolution  has  any  weight  in  the  bal- 
ance against  a cultural  fatality  of  this  magnitude. 

This  account  of  the  derivation  and  current  state  of 
German  nationalism  will  of  course  appear  biased  to  any- 
one who  has  been  in  the  habit  of  rating  German  Culture 
high  in  all  its  bearings,  and  to  whom  at  the  same  time 
the  ideals  of  peace  and  liberty  appeal.  Indeed,  such  a 
critic,  gifted  with  the  due  modicum  of  asperity,  might 
well  be  provoked  to  call  it  all  a more  or  less  ingenious 
diatribe  of  partisan  malice.  But  it  can  be  so  construed 
only  by  those  who  see  the  question  at  issue  as  a point  of 
invidious  distinction  between  this  German  animus  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  corresponding  frame  of  mind  of  the 


104 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace^ 


neighboring  peoples  on  the  other  hand.  There  may  also 
appear  to  the  captious  to  be  some  air  of  deprecation  about 
the  characterisation  here  offered  of  the  past  history  of 
political  traffic  within  the  confines  of  the  Fatherland. 
All  of  which,  of  course,  touches  neither  the  veracity  of 
the  characterisation  nor  the  purpose  with  which  so  un- 
grateful a line  of  analysis  and  exposition  has  been  en- 
tered upon.  It  is  to  be  regretted  if  facts  that  may  flutter 
the  emotions  of  one  and  another  among  the  sensitive  and 
unreflecting  can  not  be  drawn  into  such  an  inquiry  with- 
out having  their  cogency  discounted  beforehand  on  ac- 
count of  the  sentimental  value  imputed  to  them.  Of 
course  no  offense  is  intended  and  no  invidious  compari- 
son is  aimed  at. 

Even  if  the  point  of  it  all  were  an  invidious  comparison 
it  would  immediately  have  to  be  admitted  that  the  net 
showing  in  favor  of  these  others,  e.  the  French  or  the 
English-speaking  peoples,  is  by  no  means  so  unreservedly 
to  their  credit  as  such  a summary  statement  of  the  Ger- 
man case  might  seem  to  imply.  As  bearing  on  the  chances 
of  a peace  contingent  upon  the  temper  of  the  contracting 
nationalities,  it  is  by  no  means  a foregone  conclusion  that 
such  a peace  compact  would  hold  indefinitely  even  if  it 
depended  solely  on  the  pacific  animus  of  these  others  that 
have  left  the  dynastic  State  behind.  These  others,  in  fact, 
are  also  not  yet  out  of  the  woods.  They  may  not  have 
the  same  gift  of  gratuitous  and  irresponsible  truculence 
as  their  German  cousins,  in  the  same  alarming  degree ; 
but  as  was  said  in  an  earlier  passage,  they  too  are  ready 
to  fight  on  provocation.  They  are  patriotic  to  a degree ; 
indeed  to  such  a degree  that  rnything  which  visibly 
touches  the  national  prestige  will  readily  afford  a casus 
belli.  But  it  remains  true  that  the  popular  temper  among 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  105 

them  is  of  the  defensive  order;  perhaps  of  an  unnecessa- 
rily enthusiastic  defensive  order,  but  after  all  in  such  a 
frame  of  mind  as  leaves  them  willing  to  let  well  enough 
alone,  to  live  and  let  live. 

And  herein  appears  to  lie  the  decisive  difference  be- 
tween those  peoples  whose  patriotic  affections  center 
about  the  fortunes  of  an  impersonal  commonwealth  and 
those  in  whom  is  superadded  a fervent  aspiration  for 
dynastic  ascendency.  The  latter  may  be  counted  on  to 
break  the  peace  when  a promising  opportunity  offers. 

The  contrast  may  be  illustrated,  though  not  so  sharply 
as  might  be  desirable,  in  the  different  temper  shown  by 
the  British  people  in  the  Boer  war  on  the  one  hand,  as 
compared  with  the  popularity  of  the  French-Prussian  war 
among  the  German  people  on  the  other  hand.  Both  were 
aggressive  wars,  and  both  were  substantially  unprovoked. 
Diplomatically  speaking,  of  course,  sufficient  provocation 
was  found  in  either  case,  as  how  should  it  not?  But  in 
point  of  substantial  provocation  and  of  material  induce- 
ment, both  were  about  equally  gratuitous.  In  either  case 
the  war  could  readily  have  been  avoided  without  material 
detriment  to  the  community  and  without  perceptible  lesion 
to  the  national  honour.  Both  were  “engineered”  on 
grounds  shamelessly  manufactured  ad  hoc  by  interested 
parties ; in  the  one  case  by  a coterie  of  dynastic  statesmen, 
in  the  other  by  a junta  of  commercial  adventurers  and 
imperialistic  politicians.  In  neither  case  had  the  people 
any  interest  of  gain  or  loss  in  the  quarrel,  except  as  it 
became  a question  of  national  prestige.  But  both  the  Ger- 
man and  the  British  community  bore  the  burden  and 
fought  the  campaign  to  a successful  issue  for  those  inter- 
ested parties  who  had  precipitated  the  quarrel.  The  Brit- 
ish people  at  large,  it  is  true,  bore  the  burden;  which 


106 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


comes  near  being  all  that  can  be  said  in  the  way  of  pop- 
ular approval  of  this  war,  which  political  statemen  have 
since  then  rated  as  one  of  the  most  profitable  enterprises 
in  which  the  forces  of  the  realm  have  been  engaged.  On 
the  subject  of  this  successful  war  the  common  man  is  still 
inclined  to  cover  his  uneasy  sense  of  decency  with  a 
recital  of  extenuating  circumstances.  What  parallels  all 
this  in  the  German  case  is  an  outbreak  of  patriotic  aban- 
don and  an  admirable  spirit  of  unselfish  sacrifice  in  fur- 
therance of  the  dynastic  prestige,  an  intoxication  of  patri- 
otic blare  culminating  in  the  triumphant  coronation  at 
Versailles.  Nor  has  the  sober  afterthought  of  the  past 
forty-six  years  cast  a perceptible  shadow  of  doubt  across 
the  glorious  memory  of  that  patriotic  debauch. 

Such  is  the  difference  of  animus  between  a body  of 
patriotic  citizens  in  a modern  commonwealth  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  loyal  subjects  of  a dynastic  State  on  the 
other  hand.  There  need  be  no  reflections  on  the  intrinsic 
merits  of  either.  Seen  in  dispassionate  perspective  from 
outside  the  turmoil,  there  is  not  much  to  choose,  in  point 
of  sane  and  self-respecting  manhood,  between  the  slug- 
gish and  shamefaced  abettor  of  a sordid  national  crime, 
and  a ranting  patriot  who  glories  in  serving  as  cat’s-paw 
to  a syndicate  of  unscrupulous  politicians  bent  on  domin- 
ion for  dominion’s  sake.  But  the  question  here  is  not  as 
to  the  relative  merits  or  the  relative  manhood  contents 
of  the  two  contrasted  types  of  patriot.  Doubtless  both 
and  either  have  manhood  enough  and  to  spare ; at  least, 
so  they  say.  But  the  point  in  question  is  the  simpler  and 
nowise  invidious  one,  as  to  the  availability  of  both  or 
either  for  the  perpetuation  of  the  world’s  peace  under  a 
compact  of  vigilant  neutrality.  Plainly  the  German  frame 
of  mind  admits  of  no  neutrality;  the  quest  of  dominion 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  107 

is  not  compatible  with  neutrality,  and  the  substantial  core 
of  German  national  life  is  still  the  quest  of  dominion 
under  dynastic  tutelage.  How  it  stands  with  the  spirit 
that  has  repeatedly  come  in  sight  in  the  international  rela- 
tions of  the  British  community  is  a question  harder  to 
answer. 

It  may  be  practicable  to  establish  a peace  of  neutrals 
on  the  basis  of  such  national  spirit  as  prevails  among 
these  others — the  French  and  English-speaking  peoples, 
together  with  the  minor  nationalities  that  cluster  about 
the  North  Sea — ^because  their  habitual  attitude  is  that  of 
neutrality,  on  the  whole  and  with  allowance  for  a belli- 
cose minority  in  all  these  countries.  By  and  large,  these 
peoples  have  come  to  the  tolerant  attitude  that  finds  ex- 
pression in  the  maxim.  Live  and  let  live.  But  they  are  all 
and  several  sufficiently  patriotic.  It  may,  indeed,  prove 
that  they  are  more  than  sufficiently  patriotic  for  the  pur- 
poses of  a neutral  peace.  They  stand  for  peace,  but  it 
is  “peace  with  honour which  means,  in  more  explicit 
terms,  peace  with  undiminished  national  prestige.  Now, 
national  prestige  is  a very  particular  commodity,  as  has 
been  set  out  in  earlier  passages  of  this  inquiry;  and  a 
peace  which  is  to  be  kept  only  on  terms  of  a jealous 
maintenance  of  the  national  honour  is  likely  to  be  in  a 
somewhat  precarious  case.  If,  and  when,  the  national 
honour  is  felt  to  require  an  enhanced  national  ascendancy, 
the  case  for  a neutral  peace  immediately  becomes  critical. 
And  the  greater  the  number  and  diversity  of  pretensions 
and  interests  that  are  conceived  to  be  bound  up  with  the 
national  honour,  the  more  unstable  will  the  resulting  situa- 
tion necessarily  be. 

The  upshot  of  all  this  recital  of  considerations  appears 
to  be  that  a neutral  peace  compact  may,  or  it  may  not, 


108 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


be  practicable  in  the  absence  of  such  dynastic  States  as 
Germany  and  Japan;  whereas  it  has  no  chance  in  the 
presence  of  these  enterprising  national  establishments. 

No  one  will  be  readier  or  more  voluble  in  exclaiming 
against  the  falsity  of  such  a discrimination  as  is  here  at- 
tempted, between  the  democratic  and  the  dynastic  nations 
of  the  modern  world,  than  the  spokesmen  of  these  dy- 
nastic Powers.  No  one  is  more  outspoken  in  profes- 
sions of  universal  peace  and  catholic  amity  than  these 
same  spokesmen  of  the  dynastic  Powers ; and  nowhere 
is  there  more  urgent  need  of  such  professions.  Official 
and  “inspired”  professions  are,  of  course,  to  be  over- 
looked ; at  least,  so  charity  would  dictate.  But  there 
have,  in  the  historic  present,  been  many  professions  of 
this  character  made  also  by  credible  spokesmen  of  the 
German,  and  perhaps  of  the  Japanese,  people,  and  in  all 
sincerity.  By  way  of  parenthesis  it  should  be  said  that 
this  is  not  intended  to  apply  to  expressions  of  conviction 
and  intention  that  have  come  out  of  Germany  these  two 
years  past  (December  1916).  Without  questioning  the 
credibility  of  these  witnesses  that  have  borne  witness  to 
the  pacific  and  genial  quality  of  national  sentiment  in  the 
German  people,  it  will  yet  be  in  place  to  recall  the  run  of 
facts  in  the  national  life  of  Germany  in  this  historical 
present  and  the  position  of  these  spokesmen  in  the  Ger- 
man community. 

The  German  nation  is  of  a peculiar  composition  in  re- 
spect of  its  social  structure.  So  far  as  bears  on  the  ques- 
tion in  hand,  it  is  made  up  of  three  distinctive  constituent 
factors,  or  perhaps  rather  categories  or  conditions  of  men. 
The  populace  is  of  course  the  main  category,  and  in  the 
last  resort  always  the  main  and  decisive  factor.  Next  in 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace 


109 


point  of  consequence  as  well  as  of  numbers  and  initiative 
is  the  personnel  of  the  control, — the  ruling  class,  the  ad- 
ministration, the  official  community,  the  hierarchy  of  civil 
and  political  servants,  or  whatever  designation  may  best 
suit;  the  category  comprises  that  pyramidal  superstruc- 
ture of  privilege  and  control  whereof  the  sovereign  is  the 
apex,  and  in  whom,  under  any  dynastic  rule,  is  in  effect 
vested  the  usufruct  of  the  populace.  These  two  classes 
or  conditions  of  men,  the  one  of  which  orders  and  the 
other  obeys,  make  up  the  working  structure  of  the  nation, 
and  they  also  between  them  embody  the  national  life  and 
carry  forward  the  national  work  and  aim.  Intermediate 
between  them,  or  rather  beside  them  and  overlapping 
the  commissure,  is  a third  category  whose  life  articulates 
loosely  with  both  the  others  at  the  same  time  that  it  still 
runs  along  in  a semi-detached  way.  This  slighter  but  more 
visible,  and  particularly  more  audible,  category  is  made 
up  of  the  “Intellectuals,”  as  a late,  and  perhaps  vulgar, 
designation  would  name  them. 

These  are  they  who  chiefly  communicate  with  the  world 
outside,  and  at  the  same  time  they  do  what  is  academi- 
cally called  thinking.  They  are  in  intellectual  contact  and 
communication  with  the  world  at  large,  in  a contact  of 
give  and  take,  and  they  think  and  talk  in  and  about  those 
concepts  that  go  in  under  the  caption  of  the  humanities 
in  the  world  at  large.  The  category  is  large  enough  to 
constitute  an  intellectual  community,  indeed  a community 
of  somewhat  formidable  magnitude,  taken  in  absolute 
terms,  although  in  percentages  of  the  population  at  large 
their  numbers  will  foot  up  to  only  an  inconsiderable  figure. 
Their  contact  with  the  superior  class  spoken  of  above  is 
fairly  close,  being  a contact,  in  the  main,  of  service  on 
the  one  side  and  of  control  on  the  other.  With  the  popu- 


110 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


lace  their  contact  and  communion  is  relatively  slight,  the 
give  and  take  in  the  case  being  neither  intimate  nor  far- 
reaching.  More  particularly  is  there  a well-kept  limit  of 
moderation  on  any  work  of  indoctrination  or  intellectual 
guidance  which  this  class  may  carry  down  among  the 
people  at  large,  dictated  and  enforced  by  dynastic  expe- 
diency. This  category,  of  the  Intellectuals,  is  sufficiently 
large  to  live  its  own  life  within  itself,  without  drawing 
on  the  spiritual  life  of  the  community  at  large,  and  of 
sufficiently  substantial  quality  to  carry  its  own  peculiar 
scheme  of  intellectual  conventions  and  verities.  Of  the 
great  and  highly  meritorious  place  and  work  of  these  In- 
tellectuals in  the  scheme  of  German  culture  it  is  needless 
to  speak.  What  is  to  the  point  is  that  they  are  the  ac- 
credited spokesmen  of  the  German  nation  in  all  its  com- 
monplace communication  with  the  rest  of  civilised  Eu- 
rope. 

The  Intellectuals  have  spoken  with  conviction  and  sin- 
cerity of  the  spiritual  state  of  the  German  people,  but  in 
so  doing,  and  in  so  far  as  bears  on  the  character  of  Ger- 
man nationalism,  they  have  been  in  closer  contact,  intel- 
lectually and  sympathetically,  with  the  intellectual  and 
spiritual  life  of  civilised  Europe  at  large  than  with  the 
movements  of  the  spirit  among  the  German  populace. 
And  their  canvassing  of  the  concepts  which  so  have  come 
under  their  attention  from  over  the  national  frontiers  has 
been  carried  forward — so  far,  again,  as  bears  on  the  ques- 
tions that  are  here  in  point — with  the  German-dynastic 
principles,  logic  and  mechanism  of  execution  under  their 
immediate  observation  and  supplying  the  concrete  mate- 
rials for  inquiry.  Indeed,  it  holds  true,  by  and  large,  that 
nothing  else  than  this  German-dynastic  complement  of 
ways  and  means  has,  or  can  effectually,  come  under  their 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  111 

observation  in  such  a degree  of  intimacy  as  to  give  body 
and  definition  to  the  somewhat  abstract  theorems  on  cul- 
tural aims  and  national  preconceptions  that  have  come 
to  them  from  outside.  In  short,  they  have  borrowed  these 
theoretical  formulations  from  abroad,  without  the  con- 
crete apparatus  of  ways  and  means  in  which  these  theo- 
rems are  embodied  in  their  foreign  habitat,  and  have  so 
found  themselves  construing  these  theoretical  borrowings 
in  the  only  concrete  terms  of  which  they  have  had  first- 
hand and  convincing  knowledge.  Such  an  outcome  would 
be  fairly  unavoidable,  inasmuch  as  these  Intellectuals, 
however  much  they  are,  in  the  spirit,  citizens  of  the  cos- 
mopolitan republic  of  knowledge  and  intelligence,  they 
are  after  all,  in  propria  persona,  immediately  and  unre- 
mittingly subjects  of  the  German-dynastic  State;  so  that 
all  their  detail  thinking  on  the  aims,  ways  and  means  of 
life,  in  all  its  civil  and  political  bearings,  is  unavoidably 
shaped  by  the  unremitting  discipline  of  their  workday 
experience  under  this  dynastic  scheme.  The  outcome  has 
been  that  while  they  have  taken  up,  as  they  have  under- 
stood them,  the  concepts  that  rule  the  civic  life  of  these 
other,  maturer  nations,  they  have  apprehended  and  de- 
veloped these  theorems  of  civic  life  in  the  terms  and  by 
the  logic  enforced  in  that  system  of  control  and  surveil- 
lance known  to  them  by  workday  experience, — the  only 
empirical  terms  at  hand. 

The  apex  of  growth  and  the  center  of  diffusion  as  re- 
gards the  modem  culture  in  respect  of  the  ideals  and 
logic  of  civic  life — other  phases  of  this  culture  than  this 
its  civil  aspect  do  not  concern  the  point  here  in  question 
— this  apex  of  growth  and  center  of  diffusion  lie  outside 
the  Fatherland,  in  an  environment  alien  to  the  German 
institutional  scheme.  Yet  so  intrinsic  to  the  cultural  drift 


112 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  modern  mankind  are  these  aims  and  this  logic,  that  in 
taking  over  and  further  enriching  the  intellectual  heritage 
of  this  modern  world  the  Intellectuals  of  the  Fatherland 
have  unavoidably  also  taken  over  those  conceptions  of 
civil  initiative  and  masterless  self-direction  that  rule  the 
logic  of  life  in  a commonwealth  of  ungraded  men.  They 
have  taken  these  over  and  assimilated  them  as  best  their 
experience  would  permit.  But  workday  experience  and 
its  exigencies  are  stubborn  things ; and  in  this  process  of 
assimilation  of  these  alien  conceptions  of  right  and  honest 
living,  it  is  the  borrowed  theorems  concerning  civic  rights 
and  duties  that  have  undergone  adaptation  and  revision, 
not  the  concrete  system  of  ways  and  means  in  which  these 
principles,  so  accepted,  are  to  be  put  in  practice.  Neces- 
sarily so,  since  in  the  German  scheme  of  law  and  order 
the  major  premise  is  the  dynastic  State,  whereas  the 
major  premise  of  the  modern  civilised  scheme  of  civic  life 
is  the  absence  of  such  an  organ.  So,  the  development  and 
elaboration  of  these  modern  principles  of  civic  liberty — 
and  this  elaboration  has  taken  on  formidable  dimensions 
— under  the  hand  of  the  German  Intellectuals  has  uni- 
formly run  out  into  Pickwickian  convolutions,  greatly 
suggestive  of  a lost  soul  seeking  a place  to  rest.  With 
unquestionably  serious  purpose  and  untiring  endeavour, 
they  have  sought  to  embody  these  modern  civilised  pre- 
conceptions in  terms  afforded  by,  or  in  terms  compatible 
with,  the  institutions  of  the  Fatherland;  and  they  have 
been  much  concerned  and  magniloquently  elated  about 
the  German  spirit  of  freedom  that  so  was  to  be  brought  to 
final  and  consummate  realisation  in  the  hfe  of  a free 
people.  But  at  no  point  and  in  no  case  have  either  the 
proposals  or  their  carrying  out  taken  shape  as  a concrete 
application  of  tlie  familiar  principle  of  popular  self-direc- 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  113 

tion.  It  has  always  come  to  something  in  the  way  of  a 
concessive  or  expedient  mitigation  of  the  antagonistic 
principle  of  personal  authority.  Where  the  forms  of  self- 
government  or  of  individual  self-direction  have  conces- 
sively been  installed,  under  the  Imperial  rule,  they  have 
turned  out  to  be  an  imitative  structure  with  some  shrewd 
provision  for  their  coercion  or  inhibition  at  the  discretion 
of  an  irresponsible  authority. 

Neither  the  sound  intelligence  nor  the  good  faith  of 
these  Intellectuals  of  the  Fatherland  is  to  be  impugned. 
That  the — necessarily  vague  and  circumlocutory — exposi- 
tions of  civic  institutions  and  popular  liberty  which  they 
have  so  often  and  so  largely  promulgated  should  have 
been  used  as  a serviceable  blind  of  dynastic  statecraft  is 
not  to  be  set  down  to  their  discredit.  Circumstances  over 
which  they  could  have  no  control,  since  they  were  circum- 
stances that  shaped  their  own  habits  of  thought,  have 
placed  it  beyond  their  competence  to  apprehend  or  to  for- 
mulate these  alien  principles  (habits  of  thought)  con- 
cretely in  those  alien  institutional  details  and  by  the  alien 
logic  with  which  they  could  have  no  working  acquaintance. 

To  one  and  another  this  conception  of  cultural  soli- 
darity within  the  nation,  and  consequent  cultural  aliency 
between  nations,  due  to  the  different  habits  of  life  and  of 
thought  enforced  by  the  two  diverse  institutional  systems, 
may  be  so  far  unfamiliar  as  to  carry  no  conviction.  It 
may  accordingly  not  seem  out  of  place  to  recall  that  the 
institutional  system  of  any  given  community,  particularly 
for  any  community  living  under  a home-bred  and  time- 
tried  system  of  its  own,  will  necessarily  be  a balanced 
system  of  interdependent  and  mutually  concordant  parts 
working  together  in  one  comprehensive  plan  of  law  and 
order.  Through  such  an  institutional  system,  as,  e.  g., 
8 


114 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  German  Imperial  organisation,  there  will  run  a degree 
of  logical  consistency,  consonant  with  itself  throughout, 
and  exerting  a consistent  discipline  throughout  the  com- 
munity; whereby  there  is  enforced  a consistent  drift  or 
bent  in  the  prevalent  habits  of  life,  and  a correlative  bent 
in  the  resulting  habits  of  thought  prevalent  in  the  com- 
munity. It  is,  in  fact,  this  possession  of  a common  scheme 
of  use  and  wont,  and  a consequent  common  outlook  and 
manner  of  thinking,  that  constitutes  the  most  intrinsic 
bond  of  solidarity  in  any  nationality,  and  that  finally  marks 
it  off  from  any  other. 

It  is  equally  a matter  of  course  that  any  other  given 
community,  living  under  the  rule  of  a substantially  dif- 
ferent, or  divergent,  system  of  institutions,  will  be  ex- 
posed to  a course  of  workday  discipline  running  to  a dif- 
ferent, perhaps  divergent,  effect ; and  that  this  other  com- 
munity will  accordingly  come  in  for  a characteristically 
different  discipline  and  fall  under  the  rule  of  a different 
commonsense  outlook.  Where  an  institutional  difference 
of  this  kind  is  somewhat  large  and  consistent,  so  as  to 
amount  in  effect  to  a discrepancy,  as  may  fairly  be  said 
of  the  difference  between  Imperial  Germany  and  its  like 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  English-speaking  nations  on  the 
other  hand,  there  the  difference  in  everyday  conceptions 
may  readily  make  the  two  peoples  mutually  unintelligible 
to  one  another,  on  those  points  of  institutional  principle 
that  are  involved  in  the  discrepancy.  This  is  the  state 
of  the  case  as  between  the  German  people,  including  the 
Intellectuals,  and  the  peoples  against  whom  their  precon- 
ceptions of  national  destiny  have  arrayed  them.  And  the 
many  vivid  expressions  of  consternation,  abhorrence  and 
incredulity  that  have  come  out  of  this  community  of  In- 
tellectuals in  the  course  of  the  past  two  years  of  trial 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  115 

and  error,  bear  sufificient  testimony  to  the  rigorous  con- 
straint which  these  German  preconceptions  and  their  logic 
exercise  over  the  Intellectuals,  no  less  than  over  the 
populace. 

Conversely,  of  course,  it  is  nearly  as  impracticable  for 
those  who  have  grown  up  under  the  discipline  of  demo- 
cratic institutions  to  comprehend  the  habitual  outlook  of 
the  commonplace  German  patriot  on  national  interests 
and  aims ; not  quite,  perhaps,  because  the  discipline  of 
use  and  wont  and  indoctrination  is  neither  so  rigorous  nor 
so  consistent  in  their  case.  But  there  is,  after  all,  preva- 
lent among  them  a sufficiently  evident  logical  inability  to 
understand  and  appreciate  the  paramount  need  of  na- 
tional, that  is  to  say  dynastic,  ascendancy  that  actuates  all 
German  patriots;  just  as  these  same  patriots  are  simi- 
larly unable  to  consider  national  interests  in  any  other 
light  than  that  of  dynastic  ascendancy. 

Going  simply  on  the  face  value  of  the  available  evi- 
dence, any  outsider  might  easily  fall  into  the  error  of  be- 
lieving that  when  the  great  adventure  of  the  war  opened 
up  before  them,  as  well  as  when  presently  the  shock  of 
baffled  endeavour  brought  home  its  exasperating  futility, 
the  Intellectuals  of  the  Fatherland  distinguished  them- 
selves above  all  other  classes  and  conditions  of  men  in  the 
exuberance  of  their  patriotic  abandon.  Such  a view  would 
doubtless  be  almost  wholly  erroneous.  It  is  not  that  the 
Intellectuals  reached  a substantially  superior  pitch  of 
exaltation,  but  only  that,  being  trained  in  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, they  were  able  to  express  their  emotions  with  great 
facility.  There  seems  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  popu- 
lace fell  short  of  the  same  measure  in  respect  of  their 
prevalent  frame  of  mind. 


116 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


To  return  to  the  workings  of  the  Imperial  dynastic 
State  and  the  forces  engaged.  It  plainly  appears  that  the 
Intellectuals  are  to  be  counted  as  supernumeraries,  except 
so  far  as  they  serve  as  an  instrument  of  publicity  and  in- 
doctrination in  the  hands  of  the  discretionary  authorities. 
The  working  factors  in  the  case  are  the  dynastic  organi- 
sation of  control,  direction  and  emolument,  and  the  pop- 
ulace at  large  by  use  of  whose  substance  the  traffic  in 
dynastic  ascendancy  and  emolument  is  carried  on.  These 
two  are  in  fairly  good  accord,  on  the  ancient  basis  of 
feudal  loyalty.  Hitherto  there  is  no  evident  ground  for 
believing  that  this  archaic  tie  that  binds  the  populace  to 
the  dynastic  ambitions  has  at  all  perceptibly  weakened. 
And  the  possibility  of  dynastic  Germany  living  at  peace 
with  the  world  under  any  compact,  therefore  translates 
itself  into  the  possibility  of  the  German  people’s  unlearn- 
ing its  habitual  deference  and  loyalty  to  the  dynasty. 

As  its  acquirement  has  been  a work  of  protracted 
habituation,  so  can  its  obsolescence  also  come  about  only 
through  more  or  less  protracted  habituation  under  a sys- 
tem of  use  and  wont  of  a different  or  divergent  order. 
The  elements  of  such  a systematic  discipline  running  to 
an  effect  at  cross  purposes  with  this  patriotic  animus  are 
not  absent  from  the  current  situation  in  the  Fatherland; 
the  discipline  of  the  modern  industrial  system,  for  in- 
stance, runs  to  such  a divergent  effect;  but  this,  and 
other  conceivable  forces  which  may  reenforce  it,  will 
after  all  take  time,  if  they  are  to  work  a decisive  change 
in  the  current  frame  of  mind  of  the  patriotic  German 
community.  During  the  interval  required  for  such  a 
change  in  the  national  temper,  the  peace  of  the  world 
would  be  conditioned  on  the  inability  of  the  dynastic 
State  to  break  it.  So  that  the  chances  of  success  for  any 


On  the  Conditions  of  a Lasting  Peace  117 

neutral  peace  league  will  vary  inversely  as  the  available 
force  of  Imperial  Germany,  and  it  could  be  accounted 
secure  only  in  the  virtual  elimination  of  the  Imperial 
State  as  a national  Power. 

If  the  gradual  obsolescence  of  the  spirit  of  militant 
loyalty  in  the  German  people,  through  disuse  under  a 
regime  of  peace,  industry,  self-government  and  free  trade, 
is  to  be  the  agency  by  force  of  which  dynastic  imperialism 
is  to  cease,  the  chance  of  a neutral  peace  will  depend 
on  the  thoroughness  with  which  such  a regime  of  self- 
direction  can  be  installed  in  this  case,  and  on  the  space 
of  time  required  for  such  obsolescence  through  disuse. 
Obviously,  the  installation  of  a workable  regime  of  self- 
government  on  peaceable  lines  would  in  any  case  be  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty  among  a people  whose  past  ex- 
perience has  so  singularly  incapacitated  them  for  self- 
government;  and  obviously,  too,  the  interval  of  time 
required  to  reach  secure  ground  along  this  line  of  ap- 
proach would  be  very  considerable.  Also,  in  view  of 
these  conditions,  obviously,  this  scheme  for  maintaining 
the  peace  of  nations  by  a compact  of  neutrals  based  on 
a compromise  with  an  aspiring  dynastic  State  resolves 
itself  into  the  second  of  the  two  alternatives  spoken  of  at 
the  outset,  viz.,  a neutral  peace  based  on  the  elimination 
of  Germany  as  a war  power,  together  with  the  elim- 
ination of  any  materials  suitable  for  the  formation  of  a 
formidable  coalition.  And  then,  with  Im.perial  Germany 
supposedly  eliminated  or  pacified,  there  would  still  remain 
the  Japanese  establishment,  to  which  all  the  arguments 
pertinent  in  the  case  of  Germany  will  apply  without 
abatement;  except  that,  at  least  hitherto,  the  dynastic 
statesmen  of  Japan  have  not  had  the  disposal  of  so  mas- 
sive a body  of  resources,  in  population,  industry,  or  raw 
materials. 


CHAPTER  IV 


Peace  Without  Honour 

The  argument  therefore  turns  back  to  a choice  between 
the  two  alternatives  alluded  to : peace  in  submission  to 
the  rule  of  the  German  dynastic  establishment  (and  to 
Japan),  or  peace  through  elimination  of  these  enterpris- 
ing Powers.  The  former  alternative,  no  doubt,  is  suf- 
ficiently unattractive,  but  it  is  not  therefore  to  be  put 
aside  without  a hearing.  As  goes  without  saying,  it  is 
repugnant  to  the  patriotic  sentiments  of  those  peoples 
whom  the  Imperial  German  establishment  have  elected  for 
submission.  But  if  this  unreflecting  patriotic  revulsion 
can  once  be  made  amenable  to  reason,  there  is  always 
something  to  be  said  in  favor  of  such  a plan  of  peaceable 
submission,  or  at  least  in  extenuation  of  it;  and  if  it  is 
kept  in  mind  that  the  ulterior  necessity  of  such  submission 
must  always  remain  in  perspective  as  a condition  prece- 
dent to  a peaceful  settlement,  so  long  as  one  or  both  of 
these  enterprising  Powers  remains  intact,  it  will  be  seen 
that  a sane  appraisal  of  the  merits  of  such  a regime  of 
peace  is  by  no  means  uncalled  for.  For  neither  of  these 
two  Powers  is  there  a conclusive  issue  of  endeavour  short 
of  paramount  dominion. 

There  should  also  be  some  gain  of  insight  and  sobriety 
in  recalling  that  the  Intellectuals  of  the  Fatherland,  who 
have  doubtless  pondered  this  matter  longer  and  more 

118 


Peace  Without  Honour 


119 


dispassionately  than  all  other  men,  have  spoken  very 
highly  of  the  merits  of  such  a plan  of  universal  submis- 
sion to  the  rule  of  this  German  dynastic  establishment. 
They  had,  no  doubt,  been  considering  the  question  both 
long  and  earnestly,  as  to  what  would,  in  the  light  of  rea- 
son, eventually  be  to  the  best  interest  of  those  peoples 
whose  manifest  destiny  was  eventual  tutelage  under  the 
Imperial  crown ; and  there  need  also  be  no  doubt  that 
in  that  time  (two  years  past)  they  therefore  spoke  ad- 
visedly and  out  of  the  fulness  of  the  heart  on  this  head. 
The  pronouncements  that  came  out  of  the  community 
of  Intellectuals  in  that  season  of  unembarrassed  elation 
and  artless  avowal  are  doubtless  to  be  taken  as  an  out- 
come of  much  thoughtful  canvassing  of  what  had  best 
be  done,  not  as  an  enforced  compromise  with  untoward 
necessities  but  as  the  salutary  course  freely  to  be  pur- 
sued with  an  eye  single  to  the  best  good  of  all  concerned. 

It  is  true,  the  captious  have  been  led  to  speak  slight- 
ingly of  the  many  utterances  of  this  tenour  coming  out  of 
the  community  of  Intellectuals,  as,  e.  g.,  the  lay  sermons 
of  Professor  Ostwald  dating  back  to  that  season;  but 
no  unprejudiced  reader  can  well  escape  the  persuasion 
that  these,  as  well  as  the  very  considerable  volume  of 
similar  pronouncements  by  many  other  men  of  eminent 
scholarship  and  notable  for  benevolent  sentiments,  are 
faithfully  to  be  accepted  as  the  expressions  of  a pro- 
found conviction  and  a consciously  generous  spirit.  In 
so  speaking  of  the  advantages  to  be  derived  by  any  sub- 
ject people  from  submission  to  the  German  Imperial  rule, 
these  Intellectuals  are  not  to  be  construed  as  formulating 
the  drift  of  vulgar  patriotic  sentiment  among  their  com- 
patriots at  large,  but  rather  as  giving  out  the  deliverances 
of  their  own  more  sensitive  spirit  and  maturer  delibera- 


120 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


tion,  as  men  who  are  in  a position  to  see  human  affairs 
and  interests  in  a larger  perspective.  Such,  no  doubt, 
would  be  their  own  sense  of  the  matter. 

Reflection  on  the  analogous  case  of  the  tutelage  exer- 
cised by  the  American  government  over  the  subject  Phil- 
ippinos  may  contribute  to  a just  and  temperate  view  of 
what  is  intended  in  the  regime  of  tutelage  and  submission 
so  spoken  for  by  the  German  Intellectuals, — and,  it  may 
be  added,  found  good  by  the  Imperial  statesmen.  There 
would,  of  course,  be  the  difference,  as  against  the  case 
of  the  Philippinos,  that  whereas  the  American  government 
is  after  all  answerable,  in  the  last  resort  and  in  a some- 
what random  fashion,  to  a popular  opinion  that  runs  on 
democratic  preconceptions,  the  German  Imperial  estab- 
lishment on  the  other  hand  is  answerable  to  no  one,  ex- 
cept it  be  to  God,  who  is  conceived  to  stand  in  somewhat 
the  relation  of  a silent  partner,  or  a minority  stock- 
holder in  this  dynastic  enterprise. 

Yet  it  should  not  be  overlooked  that  any  presumptive 
hard  usage  which  the  vassal  peoples  might  look  for  at 
the  hands  of  the  German  dynasty  would  necessarily  be 
tempered  with  considerations  of  expediency  as  dictated 
by  the  exigencies  of  usufruct.  The  Imperial  establish- 
ment has  shown  itself  to  be  wise,  indeed  more  wise  than 
amiable,  but  wise  at  least  in  its  intentions,  in  the  use 
which  it  has  made  of  subject  peoples  hitherto.  It  is  true, 
a somewhat  accentuated  eagerness  on  the  part  of  the 
Imperial  establishment  to  get  the  maximum  service  in  a 
minimum  of  time  and  at  a minimum  cost  from  these  sub- 
ject populations, — as,  e.  g.,  in  Silesia  and  Poland,  in 
Schleswig-Holstein,  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  or  in  its  African 
and  Oceanic  possessions, — has  at  times  led  to  practices 
altogether  dubious  on  humanitarian  grounds,  at  the  same 


Peace  Without  Honour 


121 


time  that  in  point  of  thrifty  management  they  have  gone 
beyond  “what  the  traffic  will  bear.”  Yet  it  is  not  to  be 
overlooked — and  in  this  connection  it  is  a point  of  some 
weight — that,  so  far  as  the  predatory  traditions  of  its 
statecraft  will  permit,  the  Imperial  establishment  has  in 
all  these  matters  been  guided  by  a singularly  unreserved 
attention  to  its  own  material  advantage.  Where  its  man- 
agement in  these  premises  has  yielded  a less  profitable  usu- 
fruct than  the  circumstances  would  reasonably  admit,  the 
failure  has  been  due  to  an  excess  of  cupidity  rather  than 
the  reverse. 

The  circumstantial  evidence  converges  to  the  effect 
that  the  Imperial  establishment  may  confidently  be  count- 
ed on  to  manage  the  affairs  of  its  subject  peoples  with  an 
eye  single  to  its  own  material  gain,  and  it  may  with  equal 
confidence  be  counted  on  that  in  the  long  run  no  unad- 
vised excesses  will  be  practised.  Of  course,  an  excessive 
adventure  in  atrocity  and  predation,  due  to  such  human 
infirmity  in  its  agents  or  in  its  directorate  as  has  been 
shown  in  various  recent  episodes,  is  to  be  looked  for  now 
and  again;  but  these  phenomena  would  come  in  by  way 
of  fluctuating  variations  from  the  authentic  routine,  rather 
than  as  systematic  features  of  it. 

That  superfluity  of  naughtiness  that  has  given  char- 
acter to  the  current  German  Imperial  policy  in  Belgium, 
e.  g.,  or  that  similarly  has  characterised  the  dealings  of 
Imperial  Japan  in  Korea  during  the  late  “benevolent  as- 
similation” of  that  people  into  Japanese-Imperial  usu- 
fruct, is  not  fairly  to  be  taken  to  indicate  what  such  an 
Imperial  establishment  may  be  expected  to  do  with  a sub- 
ject people  on  a footing  of  settled  and  long-term  exploi- 
tation. At  the  outset,  in  both  instances,  the  policy  of 
frightfulness  was  dictated  by  a well-advised  view  to 


122 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


economy  of  effort  in  reducing  the  subject  people  to  an 
abject  state  of  intimidation,  according  to  the  art  of  war 
as  set  forth  in  the  manuals ; whereas  latterly  the  some- 
what profligate  excesses  of  the  government  of  occupa- 
tion— decently  covered  with  diplomatic  parables  on  benev- 
olence and  legality — have  been  dictated  by  military  con- 
venience, particularly  by  the  need  of  forced  labor  and 
the  desirability  of  a reduced  population  in  the  acquired 
territory.  So  also  the  “personally  conducted”  dealings 
with  the  Armenians  by  use  of  the  Turks  should  probably 
also  best  be  explained  as  an  endeavour  to  reduce  the 
numbers  of  an  undesirable  population  beforehand,  with- 
out incurring  unnecessary  blame.  All  these  things  are, 
at  the  most,  misleading  indications  of  what  the  Imperial 
policy  would  be  like  under  settled  conditions  and  in  the 
absence  of  insubordination. 

By  way  of  contrast,  such  as  may  serve  to  bring  the 
specific  traits  of  this  prospective  Imperial  tutelage  of 
nations  into  a better  light,  the  Ottoman  usufruct  of  the 
peoples  of  the  Turkish  dominions  offers  an  instructive 
instance.  The  Ottoman  tutelage  is  today  spoken  of  by 
its  apologists  in  terms  substantially  identical  with  the 
sketches  of  the  future  presented  by  hopeful  German  pa- 
triots in  the  early  months  of  the  current  war.  But  as  is 
so  frequently  the  case  in  such  circumstances,  these  ex- 
pressions of  the  officers  have  to  be  understood  in  a diplo- 
matic sense;  not  as  touching  the  facts  in  any  other 
than  a formal  way.  It  is  sufficiently  evident  that  the 
Ottoman  management  of  its  usufruct  has  throughout 
been  ill-advised  enough  persisently  to  charge  more  than 
the  traffic  would  bear,  probably  due  in  great  part  to  lack 
of  control  over  its  agents  or  ramifications,  by  the  central 
office.  The  Ottoman  establishment  has  not  observed,  or 


Peace  Without  Honour 


123 


enforced,  the  plain  rules  of  economy  in  its  utilisation  of 
the  subject  peoples,  and  finds  itself  today  bankrupt  in 
consequence.  What  may  afford  more  of  a parallel  to  the 
prospective  German  tutelage  of  the  nations  is  the  proce- 
dure of  the  Japanese  establishment  in  Korea,  Manchuria, 
or  China;  which  is  also  duly  covered  with  an  ostensibly 
decent  screen  of  diplomatic  parables,  but  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  which  is  overt  enough  in  all  respects  but  the 
the  nomenclature.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  even  this 
Japanese  usufruct  and  tutelage  runs  on  somewhat  less 
humane  and  complaisant  lines  than  a well-advised  econ- 
omy of  resources  would  dictate  for  the  prospective  Ger- 
man usufruct  of  the  Western  nations. 

There  is  the  essential  difference  between  the  two 
cases  that  while  Japan  is  over-populated,  so  that  it 
becomes  the  part  of  a wise  government  to  find  additional 
lands  for  occupancy,  and  that  so  it  is  constrained  by  its 
imperial  ambitions  to  displace  much  of  the  population  in 
its  subject  territories,  the  Fatherland  on  the  other  hand 
is  under-populated — notoriously,  though  not  according 
to  the  letter  of  the  diplomatic  parables  on  this  head — and 
for  the  calculable  future  must  continue  to  be  under-popu- 
lated ; provided  that  the  state  of  the  industrial  arts  con- 
tinues subject  to  change  in  the  same  general  direction  as 
hitherto,  and  provided  that  no  radical  change  affects  the 
German  birth-rate.  So,  since  the  Imperial  government 
has  no  need  of  new  lands  for  occupancy  by  its  home 
population,  it  will  presumably  be  under  no  inducement  to 
take  measures  looking  to  the  partial  depopulation  of  its 
subject  territories. 

The  case  of  Belgium  and  the  measures  looking  to  a 
reduction  of  its  population  may  raise  a doubt,  but  prob- 
ably not  a well  taken  doubt.  It  is  rather  that  since  it  has 


124 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


become  evident  that  the  territory  can  not  be  held,  it  is 
thought  desirable  to  enrich  the  Fatherland  with  whatever 
property  can  be  removed,  and  to  consume  the  accumulated 
man-power  of  the  Belgian  people  in  the  service  of  the 
war.  It  would  appear  that  it  is  a war-measure,  de- 
signed to  make  use  of  the  enemy’s  resources  for  his 
defeat.  Indeed,  under  conditions  of  settled  occupation  or 
subjection,  any  degree  of  such  depopulation  would  en- 
tail an  economic  loss,  and  any  well-considered  adminis- 
trative policy  would  therefore  look  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  acquired  territories  in  undiminished 
numbers  and  unimpaired  serviceability. 

The  resulting  scheme  of  Imperial  usufruct  should  ac- 
cordingly be  of  a considerate,  not  to  say  in  effect  humane, 
character, — always  provided  that  the  requisite  degree 
of  submission  and  subservience  (“law  and  order”)  can  be 
enforced  by  a system  of  coercion  so  humane  as  not  to  re- 
duce the  number  of  the  inhabitants  or  materially  to  lower 
their  physical  powers.  Such  would,  by  reasonable  ex- 
pectation, be  the  character  of  this  projected  Imperial 
tutelage  and  usufruct  of  the  nations  of  Christendom. 
In  its  working-out  this  German  project  should  accord- 
ingly differ  very  appreciably  from  the  policy  which  its 
imperial  ambitions  have  constrained  the  Japanese  estab- 
lishment to  pursue  in  its  dealings  with  the  life  and  for- 
tunes of  its  recently,  and  currently,  acquired  subject 
peoples. 

The  better  to  appreciate  in  some  concrete  fashion  what 
should,  by  reasonable  expectation,  be  the  terms  on  which 
life  might  so  be  carried  on  suh  pace  gennanica,  attention 
may  be  invited  to  certain  typical  instances  of  such  peace 
by  abnegation  among  contemporary  peoples.  Perhaps  at 
the  top  of  the  list  stands  India,  with  its  many  and  varied 


Peace  Without  Honour 


125 


native  peoples,  subject  to  British  tutelage,  but,  the  British 
apologists  say,  not  subject  to  British  usufruct.  The 
margin  of  tolerance  in  this  instance  is  fairly  wide,  but 
its  limits  are  sharply  drawn.  India  is  wanted  and  held, 
not  for  tribute  or  revenue  to  be  paid  into  the  Imperial 
treasury,  nor  even  for  exclusive  trade  privileges  or  pref- 
erences, but  mainly  as  a preserve  to  provide  official  occu- 
pation and  emoluments  for  British  gentlemen  not  other- 
wise occupied  or  provided  for ; and  secondarily  as  a means 
of  safeguarding  lucrative  British  investments,  that  is 
to  say,  investments  by  British  capitalists  of  high  and  low 
degree.  The  current  British  professions  on  the  subject 
of  this  occupation  of  India,  and  at  times  the  shamefaced 
apology  for  it,  is  that  the  people  of  India  suffer  no  hard- 
ship by  this  means ; the  resulting  governmental  establish- 
ment being  no  more  onerous  and  no  more  expensive  to 
them  than  any  equally,  or  even  any  less,  competent  gov- 
ernment of  their  own  would  necessarily  be.  The  fact, 
however,  remains,  that  India  affords  a much  needed  and 
very  considerable  net  revenue  to  the  class  of  British 
gentlemen,  in  the  shape  of  official  salaries  and  pensions, 
which  the  British  gentry  at  large  can  on  no  account 
forego.  Narrowed  to  these  proportions  it  is  readily  con- 
ceivable that  the  British  usufruct  of  India  should  rest 
with  no  extraordinary  weight  on  the  Indian  people  at 
large,  however  burdensome  it  may  at  times  become  to 
those  classes  who  aspire  to  take  over  the  usufruct  in  case 
the  British  establishment  can  be  dislodged.  This  case 
evidently  differs  very  appreciably  from  the  projected 
German  usufruct  of  neighboring  countries  in  Europe. 

A case  that  may  be  more  nearly  in  point  would  be  that 
of  any  one  of  the  countries  subject  to  the  Turkish  rule  in 
recent  times;  although  these  instances  scarcely  show  just 


126 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


what  to  expect  under  the  projected  German  regime. 
The  Turkish  rule  has  been  notably  inefficient,  considered 
as  a working  system  of  dynastic  usufruct;  whereas  it  is 
confidently  expected  that  the  corresponding  German  sys- 
tem would  show  quite  an  exceptional  degree  of  efficiency 
for  the  purpose.  This  Turkish  inefficiency  has  had  a 
two-fold  effect,  which  should  not  appear  in  the  German 
case.  Through  administrative  abuses  intended  to  serv'e  the 
personal  advantage  of  the  irresponsible  officials,  the  under- 
lying peoples  have  suffered  a progressive  exhaustion 
and  dilapidation  ; whereby  the  central  authority,  the  dynas- 
tic establishment,  has  also  grown  progressively,  cumu- 
latively weaker  and  therefore  less  able  to  control  its 
agents ; and,  in  the  second  place,  on  the  same  grounds,  in 
the  pursuit  of  personal  gain,  and  prompted  by  personal 
animosities,  these  irresponsible  agents  have  persistently 
carried  their  measures  of  extortion  beyond  reasonable 
bounds, — that  is  to  say  beyond  the  bounds  which  a well 
considered  plan  of  permanent  usufruct  would  counte- 
nance. All  this  would  be  otherwise  and  more  sensibly  ar- 
ranged under  German  Imperial  auspices. 

One  of  the  nations  that  have  fallen  under  Turkish  rule 
— and  Turkish  peace — affords  a valuable  illustration  of 
a secondary  point  that  is  to  be  considered  in  connection 
with  any  plan  of  peace  by  submission.  The  Armenian 
people  have  in  later  time  come  partly  under  Russian  do- 
minion, and  so  have  been  exposed  to  the  Russian  system 
of  bureaucratic  exploitation ; and  the  difference  between 
Russian  and  Turkish  Armenia  is  instructive.  According 
to  all  credible — that  is  unofficial — accounts,  conditions  are 
perceptibly  more  tolerable  in  Russian  Armenia.  Well 
informed  persons  relate  that  the  cause  for  this  more 
lenient,  or  less  extreme,  administration  of  affairs  under 


Peace  Without  Honour 


127 


Russian  officials  is  a selective  death  rate  among  them, 
such  that  a local  official  who  persistently  exceeds  a cer- 
tain ill-defined  limit  of  tolerance  is  removed  by  what 
would  under  other  circumstances  be  called  an  untimely 
death.  No  adequate  remedy  has  been  found,  within  the 
large  limits  which  Russian  bureaucratic  administration 
habitually  allows  itself  in  questions  of  coercion.  The 
Turk,  on  the  other  hand,  less  deterred  by  considerations 
of  long-term  expediency,  and,  it  may  be,  less  easily  in- 
fluenced by  outside  opinion  on  any  point  of  humanity, 
has  found  a remedy  in  the  systematic  extirpation  of  any 
village  in  which  an  illicit  death  occurs.  One  will  incline 
to  presume  that  on  this  head  the  German  Imperial  pro- 
cedure would  be  more  after  the  Russian  than  after  the 
Turkish  pattern;  although  latterday  circumstantial  evi- 
dence will  throw  some  sinister  doubt  on  the  reasonable- 
ness of  such  an  expectation. 

It  is  plain,  however,  that  the  Turkish  remedy  for  this 
form  of  insubordination  is  a wasteful  means  of  keeping 
the  peace.  Plainly,  to  the  home  office,  the  High  Com- 
mand, the  extinction  of  a village  with  its  population  is  a 
more  substantial  loss  than  the  unseasonable  decease  of 
one  of  its  administrative  agents ; particularly  when  it  is 
called  to  mind  that  such  a decease  will  presumably  follow 
only  on  such  profligate  excesses  of  naughtiness  as  are 
bound  to  be  inexcusably  unprofitable  to  the  central  author- 
ity. It  may  be  left  an  open  question  how  far  a corrective 
of  this  nature  can  hopefully  be  looked  to  as  applicable, 
in  case  of  need,  under  the  projected  German  Imperial 
usufruct. 

It  may,  I apprehend,  be  said  without  offense  that  there 
is  no  depth  of  depravity  below  the  ordinary  reach  of  the 
Russian  bureaucracy;  but  this  organisation  finds  itself 


128 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


constrained,  after  all,  to  use  circumspection  and  set  some 
limits  on  individual  excursions  beyond  the  bounds  of  de- 
cency and  humanity,  so  soon  as  these  excesses  touch  the 
common  or  joint  interest  of  the  organisation.  Any  excess 
of  atrocity,  beyond  a certain  margin  of  tolerance,  on  the 
part  of  any  one  of  its  members  is  likely  to  work  pecuniary 
mischief  to  the  rest ; and  then,  the  bureaucratic  conduct  of 
affairs  is  also,  after  all,  in  an  uncertain  degree  subject  to 
some  surveillance  by  popular  sentiment  at  home  or  abroad. 
The  like  appears  not  to  hold  true  of  the  Turkish  official 
organisation.  The  difference  may  be  due  to  a less  prov- 
ident spirit  among  the  latter,  as  already  indicated.  But 
a different  tradition,  perhaps  an  outgrowth  of  this  lack  of 
providence  and  of  the  consequent  growth  of  a policy  of 
“frightfulness,”  may  also  come  in  for  a share  in  the  out- 
come ; and  there  is  also  a characteristic  difference  in  point 
of  religious  convictions,  which  may  go  some  way  in  the 
same  direction.  The  followers  of  Islam  appear  on  the 
whole  to  take  the  tenets  of  their  faith  at  their  face  value 
— servile,  intolerant  and  fanatic — whereas  the  Russian 
official  class  may  perhaps  without  undue  reproach  be  con- 
sidered to  have  on  the  whole  outlived  the  superstitious 
conceits  to  which  they  yield  an  expedient  pro  forma  ob- 
servance. So  that  when  worse  comes  to  w'orst,  and  the 
Turk  finds  himself  at  length  with  his  back  against  the 
last  consolations  of  the  faith  that  makes  all  things  straight, 
he  has  the  assured  knowledge  that  he  is  in  the  right  as 
against  the  unbelievers ; whereas  the  Russian  bureaucrat 
in  a like  case  only  knows  that  he  is  in  the  wrong.  The 
last  extremity  is  a less  conclusive  argument  to  the  man 
in  whose  apprehension  it  is  not  the  last  extremity.  Again, 
there  is  some  shadow  of  doubt  falls  on  the  question  as 
to  which  of  these  is  more  nearly  in  the  German  Imperial 
spirit. 


Peace  Without  Honour 


129 


On  the  whole,  the  case  of  China  is  more  to  the  point. 
By  and  large,  the  people  of  China,  more  particularly  the 
people  of  the  coastal-plains  region,  have  for  long  habit- 
ually lived  under  a regime  of  peace  by  non-resistance. 
The  peace  has  been  broken  transiently  from  time  to 
time,  and  local  disturbances  have  not  been  infrequent ; 
but,  taken  by  and  large,  the  situation  has  habitually  been 
of  the  peaceful  order,  on  a ground  of  non-resisting  sub- 
mission. But  this  submission  has  not  commonly  been  of 
a whole-hearted  kind,  and  it  has  also  commonly  been  as- 
sociated with  a degree  of  persistent  sabotage ; which  has 
clogged  and  retarded  the  administration  of  governmental 
law  and  order,  and  has  also  been  conducive  to  a large 
measure  of  irresponsible  official  corruption.  The  habitual 
scheme  of  things  Chinese  in  this  bearing  may  fairly  be 
described  as  a peace  of  non-resistance  tempered  with 
sabotage  and  assassination.  Such  was  the  late  Manchu 
regime,  and  there  is  no  reason  in  China  for  expecting  a 
substantially  different  outcome  from  the  Japanese  in- 
vasion that  is  now  under  way.  The  nature  of  this  Japan- 
ese incursion  should  be  sufficiently  plain.  It  is  an  enter- 
prise in  statecraft  after  the  order  of  Macchiavelli,  Met- 
ternich,  and  Bismarck.  Of  course,  the  conciliatory  fables 
given  out  by  the  diplomatic  service,  and  by  the  other 
apologists,  are  to  be  taken  at  the  normal  discount  of 
one-hundred  percent.  The  relatively  large  current  out- 
put of  such  fables  may  afford  a hint  as  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  designs  which  the  fables  are  intended  to  cover. 

The  Chinese  people  have  had  a more  extended  experi- 
ence in  peace  of  this  order  than  all  others,  and  their  case 
should  accordingly  be  instructive  beyond  all  others.  Not 
that  a European  peace  by  non-resistance  need  be  ex- 
pected to  run  very  closely  on  the  Chinese  lines,  but  there 
9 


130 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


should  be  a reasonable  expectation  that  the  large  course 
of  things  would  be  somewhat  on  the  same  order  in  both 
cases.  Neither  the  European  traditions  and  habitual  tem- 
perament nor  the  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts  will 
permit  one  to  look  for  anything  like  a close  parallel  in 
detail ; but  it  remains  true,  when  all  is  said,  that  the 
Chinese  experience  of  peace  under  submission  to  alien 
masters  affords  the  most  instructive  illustration  of  such 
a regime,  as  touches  its  practicability,  its  methods,  its 
cultural  value,  and  its  effect  on  the  fortunes  of  the  sub- 
ject peoples  and  of  their  masters. 

Now,  it  may  be  said  by  way  of  preliminary  generalisa- 
tion that  the  life-history  of  the  Chinese  people  and  their 
culture  is  altogether  the  most  imposing  achievement 
which  the  records  of  mankind  have  to  show ; whereas  the 
history  of  their  successive  alien  establishments  of  mastery 
and  usufruct  is  an  unbroken  sequence  of  incredibily 
shameful  episodes, — always  beginning  in  unbounded 
power  and  vainglory,  running  by  way  of  misrule,  waste 
and  debauchery,  to  an  inglorious  finish  in  abject  corrup- 
tion and  imbecility.  Always  have  the  gains  in  civilisation, 
industry  and  in  the  arts,  been  made  by  the  subject  Chi- 
nese, and  always  have  their  alien  masters  contributed 
nothing  to  the  outcome  but  misrule,  waste,  corruption  and 
decay.  And  yet  in  the  long  run,  with  all  this  handicap  and 
misrule,  the  Chinese  people  have  held  their  place  and  made 
headway  in  those  things  to  which  men  look  with  af- 
fection and  esteem  when  they  come  to  take  stock  of  what 
things  are  worth  while.  It  would  be  a hopeless  task  to 
count  up  how  many  dynasties  of  masterful  barbarians, 
here  and  there,  have  meanwhile  come  up  and  played  their 
ephemeral  role  of  vainglorious  nuisance  and  gone  under 


Peace  Without  Honour 


131 


in  shame  and  confusion,  and  dismissed  with  the  invariable 
verdict  of  “Good  Riddance !” 

It  may  at  first  sight  seem  a singular  conjuncture  of  cir- 
cumstances, but  it  is  doubtless  a consequence  of  the  same 
conjuncture,  that  the  Chinese  people  have  also  kept  their 
hold  through  all  history  on  the  Chinese  lands.  They 
have  lived  and  multiplied  and  continued  to  occupy  the  land, 
while  their  successive  alien  masters  have  come  and  gone. 
So  that  today,  as  the  outcome  of  conquest,  and  of  what 
would  be  rated  as  defeat,  the  people  continue  to  be 
Chinese,  with  an  unbroken  pedigree  as  well  as  an  unbroken 
line  of  home-bred  culture  running  through  all  the  ages  of 
history.  In  the  biological  respect  the  Chinese  plan  of  non- 
resistance  has  proved  eminently  successful. 

And,  by  the  way,  much  the  same,  though  not  in  the  same 
degree,  is  true  for  the  Armenian  people ; who  have  con- 
tinued to  hold  their  hill  country  through  good  days  and 
evil,  apparently  without  serious  or  enduring  reduction  of 
their  numbers  and  without  visible  lapse  into  barbarism, 
while  the  successive  disconnected  dynasties  of  their  con- 
quering rulers  have  come  and  gone,  leaving  nothing  but 
an  ill  name.  “This  fable  teaches”  that  a diligent  atten- 
tion to  the  growing  of  crops  and  children  is  the  sure  and 
appointed  way  to  the  maintenance  of  a people  and  its  cul- 
ture even  under  the  most  adverse  conditions,  and  that 
eventual  death  and  shameful  destruction  inexorably  wait 
on  any  “ruling  race.”  Hitherto  the  rule  has  not  failed. 
The  rule,  indeed,  is  grounded  in  the  heritable  traits  of 
human  nature,  from  which  there  is  no  escape. 

For  its  long-term  biological  success,  as  well  as  for  the 
continued  integrity  of  a people’s  culture,  a peace  of  non- 
resistance,  under  good  or  evil  auspices,  is  more  to  be  de- 
sired than  imperial  dominion.  But  these  things  are  not 


132 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


all  that  modern  peoples  live  for,  perhaps  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  in  no  case  are  these  chief  among  the  things  for 
which  civilised  Europeans  are  willing  to  live.  They 
urgently  need  also  freedom  to  live  their  own  life  in  their 
own  way,  or  rather  to  live  within  the  bonds  of  convention 
which  they  have  come  in  for  by  use  and  wont,  or  at 
least  they  believe  that  such  freedom  is  essential  to  any 
life  that  shall  be  quite  worth  while.  So  also  they  have 
a felt  need  of  security  from  arbitrary  interference  in  their 
pursuit  of  a livelihood  and  in  the  free  control  of  their  own 
pecuniary  concerns.  And  they  want  a discretionary 
voice  in  the  management  of  their  joint  interests,  whether 
as  a nation  or  in  a minor  civil  group.  In  short,  they  want 
personal,  pecuniary  and  political  liberty,  free  from  all 
direction  or  inhibition  from  without.  They  are  also 
much  concerned  to  maintain  favorable  economic  condi- 
tions for  themselves  and  their  children.  And  last,  but 
chiefly  rather  than  least,  they  commonly  are  hide-bound 
patriots  inspired  with  an  intractable  felt  need  of  national 
prestige. 

It  is  an  assemblage  of  peoples  in  such  a frame  of  mind 
to  whom  the  pacifists  are  proposing,  in  effect,  a plan  for 
eventual  submission  to  an  alien  dynasty,  under  the  form 
of  a neutral  peace  compact  to  include  the  warlike  Powers. 
There  is  little  likelihood  of  such  a scheme  being  found 
acceptable,  with  popular  sentiment  running  as  it  now  does 
in  the  countries  concerned.  And  yet,  if  the  brittle  temper 
in  which  any  such  proposal  is  rejected  by  popular  opinion 
in  these  countries  today  could  be  made  to  yield  sufficient- 
ly to  reflection  and  deliberate  appraisal,  it  is  by  no  means 
a foregone  conclusion  that  its  acceptance  would  not  be  the 
best  way  out  of  a critical  situation.  The  cost  of  disabling 
and  eliminating  the  warlike  Power  whose  dominion  is 


Peace  Without  Honour 


133 


feared,  or  even  of  staving  off  the  day  of  surrender,  is 
evidently  serious  enough.  The  merits  of  the  alternative 
should  be  open  to  argument,  and  should,  indeed,  be  allow- 
ed due  consideration.  And  any  endeavour  to  present  them 
without  heat  should  presumably  find  a hearing.  It  ap- 
pears to  have  been  much  of  the  fault  of  the  pacifists  who 
speak  for  the  Peace  League  that  they  have  failed  or  re- 
fused to  recognise  these  ulterior  consequences  of  the  plan 
which  they  advocate;  so  that  they  appear  either  not  to 
know  what  they  are  talking  about,  or  to  avoid  talking 
about  what  they  know. 

It  will  be  evident  from  beforehand  that  the  grave  dif- 
ficulty to  be  met  in  any  advocacy  of  peace  on  terms  of 
non-resistant  subjection  to  an  alien  dynastic  rule — “peace 
at  any  price” — is  a difficulty  of  the  psychological  order. 
Whatever  may  be  conceived  to  hold  true  for  the  Chinese 
people,  such  submission  is  repugnant  to  the  sentiments  of 
the  Western  peoples.  Which  in  turn  evidently  is  due  to 
the  prevalence  of  certain  habitual  preconceptions  among 
modern  civilised  men, — certain  acquired  traits  of  temper 
and  bias,  of  the  nature  of  fixed  ideas.  That  something  in 
the  way  of  a reasonably  contented  and  useful  life  is  pos- 
sible under  such  a regime  as  is  held  in  prospect,  and  even 
some  tolerable  degree  of  well-being,  is  made  evident  in  the 
Chinese  case.  But  the  Chinese  tolerance  of  such  a regime 
goes  to  argue  that  they  are  charged  with  fewer  preconcep- 
tions at  variance  with  the  exigencies  of  life  under  these 
conditions.  So,  it  is  commonly  accepted,  and  presumably 
to  be  accepted,  that  the  Chinese  people  at  large  have  little 
if  any  effectual  sense  of  nationality;  their  patriotism  ap- 
pears to  be  nearly  a negligible  quantity.  This  would 
appear  to  an  outsider  to  have  been  their  besetting  weak- 
ness, to  which  their  successful  subjection  by  various  and 


134 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


sundry  ambitious  aliens  has  been  due.  But  it  appears  also 
to  have  been  the  infirmity  by  grace  of  which  this  people 
have  been  obliged  to  learn  the  ways  of  submission,  and 
so  have  had  the  fortune  to  outlive  their  alien  masters,  all 
_and  sundry,  and  to  occupy  the  land  and  save  the  uncon- 
'■aminated  integrity  of  their  long-lived  civilisation. 

Some  account  of  the  nature  and  uses  of  this  spirit  of 
patriotism  that  is  held  of  so  great  account  among  Western 
nations  has  already  been  set  out  in  an  earlier  passage. 
One  or  two  points  in  the  case,  that  bear  on  the  argument 
here,  may  profitably  be  recalled.  The  patriotic  spirit,  or 
the  tie  of  nationalism,  is  evidently  of  the  nature  of  habit, 
whatever  proclivity  to  the  formation  of  such  a habit 
may  be  native  to  mankind.  More  particularly  is  it  a mat- 
ter of  habit — it  might  even  be  called  a matter  of  for- 
tuitous habit — what  particular  national  establishment  a 
given  human  subject  will  become  attached  to  on  reaching 
what  is  called  “years  of  discretion”  and  so  becoming  a 
patriotic  citizen. 

The  analogy  of  the  clam  may  not  be  convincing,  but  it 
may  at  least  serve  to  suggest  what  may  be  the  share  play- 
ed by  habituation  in  the  matter  of  national  attachment. 
The  young  clam,  after  having  passed  the  free-swimming 
phase  of  his  life,  as  well  as  the  period  of  attachment 
to  the  person  of  a carp  or  similar  fish,  drops  to  the  bot- 
tom and  attaches  himself  loosely  in  the  place  and  station 
in  life  to  which  he  has  been  led;  and  he  loyally  sticks  to 
his  particular  patch  of  oose  and  sand  through  good  for- 
tune and  evil.  It  is,  under  Providence,  something  of  a 
fortuitous  matter  where  the  given  clam  shall  find  a 
resting  place  for  the  sole  of  his  foot,  but  it  is  also, 
after  all,  “his  own.  his  native  land”  etc.  It  lies  in  the 


Peace  Without  Honour 


135 


nature  of  a clam  to  attach  himself  after  this  fashion, 
loosely,  to  the  bottom  where  he  finds  a living,  and  he 
would  not  be  a “good  clam  and  true”  if  he  failed  to  do 
so;  but  the  particular  spot  for  which  he  forms  this  at- 
tachment is  not  of  the  essence  of  the  case.  At  least,  so 
they  say. 

It  may  be,  as  good  men  appear  to  believe  or  know,  that 
all  men  of  sound,  or  at  least  those  of  average,  mind  will 
necessarily  be  of  a patriotic  temper  and  be  attached  by 
ties  of  loyalty  to  some  particular  national  establishment, 
ordinarily  the  particular  establishment  which  is  formally 
identified  with  the  land  in  which  they  live ; although  it 
is  always  possible  that  a given  individual  may  be  an 
alien  in  the  land,  and  so  may  owe  allegiance  to  and  be 
ruled  by  a patriotic  attachment  to  another  national  estab- 
lishment, to  which  the  conventionalities  governing  his 
special  case  have  assigned  him  as  his  own  proper  nation. 
The  analogy  of  the  clam  evidently  does  not  cover  the 
case.  The  patriotic  citizen  is  attached  to  his  own  pro- 
per nationality  not  altogether  by  the  accident  of  domicile, 
but  rather  by  the  conventions,  legal  or  customary,  which 
assign  him  to  this  or  that  national  establishment  according 
to  certain  principles  of  use  and  wont. 

Mere  legal  citizenship  or  allegiance  does  not  decide  the 
matter  either ; at  least  not  by  any  means  unavoidably ; as 
appears  in  the  case  of  the  Chinese  subject  under  Manchu 
or  Japanese  rule;  and  as  appears  perhaps  more  per- 
spicuously in  the  case  of  the  “hyphenate”  American  citi- 
zen, whose  formal  allegiance  is  to  the  nation  in  whose 
land  he  prefers  to  live,  all  the  while  that  his  patriotic  af- 
fection centers  on  his  spiritual  Fatherland  in  whose  for- 
tunes he  has  none  but  a non-resident  interest.  Indeed, 
the  particular  national  tie  that  will  bind  the  affections — 


136 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  is  to  say  the  ef?ectual  patriotic  attachment — of  any 
given  individual  may  turn  out  on  closer  scrutiny  to  be 
neither  that  of  domicile  or  of  formal  legal  allegiance,  nor 
that  of  putative  origin  or  pedigree,  but  only  a reflex  of 
certain  national  animosities ; which  may  also  turn  out  on 
examination  to  rest  on  putative  grounds — as  illustrated 
by  a subsidiary  class  of  hyphenate  American  citizens 
whose  affections  have  come  to  be  bound  up  in  the  national 
fortunes  of  one  foreign  Power  for  the  simple,  but  suffici- 
ent, reason  that,  on  conventional  grounds,  they  bear  malice 
against  another  equally  foreign  Power. 

Evidently  there  is  much  sophistication,  not  to  say  con- 
ventionalised affectation,  in  all  this  national  attachment 
and  allegiance.  It  will  perhaps  not  do  to  say  that  it  is  al- 
together a matter  of  sophistication.  Yet  it  may  not  exceed 
the  premises  to  say  that  the  particular  choice,  the  concrete 
incidence,  of  this  national  attachment  is  in  any  given  case 
a matter  of  sophistication,  largely  tempered  with  fortuity. 
One  is  born  into  a given  nationality — or,  in  case  of  dynas- 
tic allegiance,  into  service  and  devotion  to  a (fortuitously) 
given  sovereign— or  at  least  so  it  is  commonly  believed. 
Still  one  can  without  blame,  and  without  excessive  shame, 
shift  one’s  allegiance  on  occasion.  What  is  not  counte- 
nanced among  civilised  men  is  to  shift  out  of  allegiance  to 
any  given  nationality  or  dynasty  without  shifting  into 
the  like  complication  of  gainless  obligations  somewhere 
else.  Such  a shifting  of  national  or  dynastic  base  is  not 
quite  reputable,  though  it  is  also  not  precisely  disrepu- 
table. The  difficulty  in  the  case  appears  to  be  a moral  dif- 
ficulty, not  a mental  or  a pecuniary  one,  and  assuredly 
not  a physical  difficulty,  since  the  relation  in  question  is 
not  a physical  relation.  It  would  appear  to  be  of  the 
moral  order  of  things,  in  that  sense  of  the  term  in  which 


Peace  Without  Honour 


137 


conventional  proprieties  are  spoken  of  as  moral.  That 
is  to  say,  it  is  a question  of  conforming  to  current  expecta- 
tions under  a code  of  conventional  proprieties.  Like  much 
of  the  conventional  code  of  behavior  this  patriotic  attach- 
ment has  the  benefit  of  standardised  decorum,  and  its  out- 
ward manifestations  are  enjoined  by  law.  All  of  which 
goes  to  show  how  very  seriously  the  whole  matter  is  re- 
garded. 

And  yet  it  is  also  a matter  of  common  notoriety  that 
large  aggregates  of  men,  not  to  speak  of  sporadic  in- 
dividuals, will  on  occasion  shift  their  allegiance  with  the 
most  felicitous  effect  and  with  no  sensible  loss  of  self- 
respect  or  of  their  good  name.  Such  a shift  is  to  be  seen 
in  multiple  in  the  German  nation  within  the  past  half- 
century,  when,  for  instance,  the  Hanoverians,  the  Saxons, 
and  even  the  Holsteiners  in  very  appreciable  numbers, 
not  to  mention  the  subjects  of  minuscular  principalities 
whose  names  have  been  forgotten  in  the  shuffle,  all  be- 
came good  and  loyal  subjects  of  the  Empire  and  of  the 
Imperial  dynasty, — good  and  loyal  without  reservation,  as 
has  abundantly  appeared.  So  likewise  within  a similar 
period  the  inhabitants  of  the  Southern  States  repudiated 
their  allegiance  to  the  Union,  putting  in  its  place  an 
equivalent  loyalty  to  their  new-made  country;  and  then, 
when  the  new  national  establishment  slipped  out  from 
under  their  feet  they  returned  as  whole-heartedly  as  need 
be  to  their  earlier  allegiance.  In  each  of  these  moves,  taken 
with  deliberation,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  this  body 
of  citizens  have  been  moved  by  an  unimpeachable  spirit  of 
patriotic  honour.  No  one  who  is  in  any  degree  conversant 
with  the  facts  is  likely  to  question  the  declaration  that  it 
would  be  a perversion,  not  to  say  an  inversion,  of  fact  to 
rate  their  patriotic  devotion  to  the  Union  today  lower 


138 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


than  that  of  any  other  section  of  the  country  or  any  other 
class  or  condition  of  men. 

But  there  is  more,  and  in  a sense  worse,  to  be  found 
along  the  same  general  line  of  evidence  touching  this 
sublimated  sentiment  of  group  solidarity  that  is  called 
nationalism.  The  nation,  of  course,  is  large ; the  larger 
the  better,  it  is  believed.  It  is  so  large,  indeed,  that  con- 
sidered as  a group  or  community  of  men  living  together 
it  has  no  sensible  degree  of  homogeneity  in  any  of  their 
material  circumstances  or  interests ; nor  is  anything  more 
than  an  inconsiderable  fraction  of  the  aggregate  popula- 
tion, territory,  industry,  or  daily  life  known  to  any  one 
of  these  patriotic  citizens  except  by  remote  and  highly 
dubious  hearsay.  The  one  secure  point  on  which  there  is 
a (constructive)  uniformity  is  the  matter  of  national  al- 
legiance; which  grows  stronger  and  more  confident  with 
every  increase  in  aggregate  mass  and  volume.  It  is  also 
not  doubtful,  e.  g.,  that  if  the  people  of  the  British 
Dominions  in  North  America  should  choose  to  throw  in 
their  national  lot  with  the  Union,  all  sections  and  classes, 
except  those  whose  pecuniary  interest  in  a protective  tariff 
might  be  conceived  to  suffer,  would  presently  welcome 
them ; nor  is  it  doubtful  that  American  nationality  would 
cover  the  new  and  larger  aggregate  as  readily  as  the  old. 
Much  the  same  will  hold  true  with  respect  to  the  other 
countries  colonised  under  British  auspices.  And  there  is 
no  conclusive  reason  for  drawing  the  limit  of  admissible 
national  extension  at  that  point. 

So  much,  however,  is  fairly  within  the  possibilities  of 
the  calculable  future;  its  realisation  would  turn  in  great 
measure  on  the  discontinuance  of  certain  outworn  or  dis- 
serviceable  institutional  arrangements ; as,  e.  g.,  the  rem- 
nants of  a decayed  monarchy,  and  the  legally  protected 


Peace  Without  Honour 


139 


vested  interests  of  certain  business  enterprises  and  of  cer- 
tain office-holding  classes.  What  more  and  farther  might 
practicably  be  undertaken  in  this  way,  in  the  absence  of 
marplot  office-holders,  office-seekers,  sovereigns,  priests 
and  monopolistic  business  concerns  sheltered  under  na- 
tional animosities  and  restraints  of  trade,  would  be  some- 
thing not  easy  to  assign  a limit  to.  All  the  minor  neutrals, 
that  cluster  about  the  North  Sea,  could  unquestionably 
be  drawn  into  such  a composite  nationality,  in  the  absence, 
or  with  due  disregard,  of  those  classes,  families  and  in- 
dividuals whose  pecuniary  or  invidious  gain  is  dependent 
on  or  furthered  by  the  existing  division  of  these  peoples. 

The  projected  defensive  league  of  neutrals  is,  in  effect, 
an  inchoate  coalescence  of  the  kind.  Its  purpose  is  the 
safeguarding  of  the  common  peace  and  freedom,  which  is 
also  the  avowed  purpose  and  justification  of  all  those 
modem  nations  that  have  outlived  the  regime  of  dynas- 
tic ambition  and  so  of  enterprise  in  dominion  for  domin- 
ion’s sake,  and  have  passed  into  the  neutral  phase  of  na- 
tionality; or  it  should  perhaps  rather  be  said  that  such 
is  the  end  of  endeavour  and  the  warrant  of  existence  and 
power  for  these  modern  national  establishments  in  so  far 
as  they  have  outlived  and  repudiated  such  ambitions  of 
a dynastic  or  a quasi-dynastic  order,  and  so  have  taken 
their  place  as  intrinsically  neutral  commonwealths. 

It  is  only  in  the  common  defense  (or  in  the  defense  of 
the  like  conditions  of  life  for  their  fellowmen  elsewhere) 
that  the  citizens  of  such  a commonwealth  can  without 
shame  entertain  or  put  in  evidence  a spirit  of  patriotic 
solidarity ; and  it  is  only  by  specious  and  sophistical  ap- 
peal to  the  national  honour — a conceit  surviving  out  of 
the  dynastic  past — that  the  populace  of  such  a common- 
wealth can  be  stirred  to  anything  beyond  a defense  of 


140 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


their  own  proper  liberties  or  the  liberties  of  like-minded 
men  elsewhere,  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  still  imbued  with 
something  of  the  dynastic  animus  and  the  chauvinistic 
animosities  which  they  have  formally  repudiated  in  re- 
pudiating the  feudalistic  principles  of  the  dynastic  State. 

The  “nation,”  without  the  bond  of  dynastic  loyalty,  is 
after  all  a make-shift  idea,  an  episodic  half-way  station 
in  the  sequence,  and  loyalty,  in  any  proper  sense,  to  the 
nation  as  such  is  so  much  of  a make-believe,  that  in  the 
absence  of  a common  defense  to  be  safeguarded  any  such 
patriotic  conceit  must  lose  popular  assurance  and,  with 
the  passing  of  generations,  fall  insensibly  into  abeyance 
as  an  archaic  affectation.  The  pressure  of  danger  from 
without  is  necessary  to  keep  the  national  spirit  alert  and 
stubborn,  in  case  the  pressure  from  within,  that  comes 
of  dynastic  usufruct  working  for  dominion,  has  been  with- 
drawn. With  further  extension  of  the  national  bounda- 
ries, such  that  the  danger  of  gratuitous  infraction  from 
without  grows  constantly  less  menacing,  while  the  tradi- 
tional regime  of  international  animosities  falls  more  and 
more  remotely  into  the  background,  the  spirit  of  nation- 
alism is  fairly  on  the  way  to  obsolescence  through  dis- 
use. In  other  words,  the  nation,  as  a commonwealth, 
being  a partisan  organisation  for  a defensive  purpose,  be- 
comes functa  officio  in  respect  of  its  nationalism  and  its 
patriotic  ties  in  somewhat  the  same  measure  as  the  na- 
tional coalition  grows  to  such  a size  that  partisanship  is 
displaced  by  a cosmopolitan  security. 

Doubtless  the  falling  into  abeyance  through  disuse  of 
so  pleasing  a virtue  as  patriotic  devotion  will  seem  an 
impossibly  distasteful  consummation;  and  about  tastes 
there  is  no  disputing,  but  tastes  are  mainly  creations  of 
habit.  Except  for  tlie  disquieting  name  of  the  thing,  there 


Peace  Without  Honour 


141 


is  today  little  stands  in  the  way  of  a cosmopolitan  order 
of  human  intercourse  unobtrusively  displacing  national 
allegiance ; except  for  vested  interests  in  national  offices 
and  international  discriminations,  and  except  for  those 
peoples  among  whom  national  life  still  is  sufficiently 
bound  up  with  dynastic  ambition. 

In  an  earlier  passage  the  patriotic  spirit  has  been  de- 
fined as  a sense  of  partisan  solidarity  in  point  of  pres- 
tige, and  sufficient  argument  has  been  spent  in  confirming 
the  definition  and  showing  its  implications.  With  the 
passing  of  all  occasion  for  a partisan  spirit  as  touches  the 
common  good,  through  coalescence  of  the  parts  between 
which  partisan  discrepancies  have  hitherto  been  kept  up, 
there  would  also  have  passed  all  legitimate  occasion  for 
or  provocation  to  an  intoxication  of  invidious  prestige 
on  national  lines, — and  there  is  no  prestige  that  is  not  of 
an  invidious  nature,  that  being,  indeed,  the  whole  of  its 
nature.  He  would  have  to  be  a person  of  praeternatural 
patriotic  sensibilities  who  could  fall  into  an  emotional 
state  by  reason  of  the  national  prestige  of  such  a coali- 
tion commonwealth  as  would  be  made  up,  e.  g.,  of  the 
French  and  English-speaking  peoples,  together  with  those 
other  neutrally  and  peaceably  inclined  European  com- 
munities that  are  of  a sufficiently  mature  order  to  have 
abjured  dynastic  ambitions  of  dominion,  and  perhaps 
including  the  Chinese  people  as  well.  Such  a coalition 
may  now  fairly  be  said  to  be  within  speaking  distance, 
and  with  its  consummation,  even  in  the  inchoate  shape  of 
a defensive  league  of  neutrals,  the  eventual  abeyance  of 
that  national  allegiance  and  national  honour  that  bulks  so 
large  in  the  repertory  of  current  eloquence  would  also 
come  in  prospect. 


142 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


All  this  is  by  no  means  saying  that  love  of  country,  and 
of  use  and  wont  as  it  runs  in  one’s  home  area  and  among 
one’s  own  people,  would  suffer  decay,  or  even  abatement. 
The  provocation  to  nostalgia  would  presumably  be  as  good 
as  ever.  It  is  even  conceivable  that  under  such  a (contem- 
plated) regime  of  unconditional  security,  attachment  to 
one’s  own  habitat  and  social  circumstances  might  grow  to 
something  more  than  is  commonly  seen  in  the  precarious 
situation  in  which  the  chances  of  a quiet  life  are  placed 
today.  But  nostalgia  is  not  a bellicose  distemper,  nor 
does  it  make  for  gratuitous  disturbance  of  peaceable  alien 
peoples ; neither  is  it  the  spirit  in  which  men  lend  them- 
selves to  warlike  enterprise  looking  to  profitless  dominion 
abroad.  Men  make  patriotic  sacrifices  of  life  and  sub- 
stance in  spite  of  home-sickness  rather  than  by  virtue  of  it. 

The  aim  of  this  long  digression  has  been  to  show  that 
patriotism,  of  that  bellicose  kind  that  seeks  satisfaction  in 
inflicting  damage  and  discomfort  on  the  people  of  other 
nations,  is  not  of  the  essence  of  human  life ; that  it  is  of 
the  nature  of  habit,  induced  by  circumstances  in  the  past 
and  handed  on  by  tradition  and  institutional  arrangements 
into  the  present ; and  that  men  can,  without  mutilation, 
'divest  themselves  of  it,  or  perhaps  rather  be  divested  of 
it  by  force  of  circumstances  which  will  set  the  current 
of  habituation  the  contrary  way. 

The  change  of  habituation  necessary  to  bring  about  such 
a decay  of  the  bellicose  national  spirit  would  appear  to 
be  of  a negative  order,  at  least  in  the  main.  It  would 
be  an  habitvation  to  unconditional  peace  and  security;  in 
other  words,  to  the  absence  of  provocation,  rather  than 
a coercive  training  away  from  the  bellicose  temper.  This 
bellicose  temper,  as  it  affects  men  collectively,  appears  to 


Peace  Without  Honour 


143 


be  an  acquired  trait ; and  it  should  logically  disappear  in 
time  in  the  absence  of  those  conditions  by  impact  of  which 
it  has  been  acquired.  Such  obsolescence  of  patriotism, 
however,  would  not  therefore  come  about  abruptly  or 
swiftly,  since  the  patriotic  spirit  has  by  past  use  and 
wont,  and  by  past  indoctrination,  been  so  thoroughly 
worked  into  the  texture  of  the  institutional  fabric  and  into 
the  commonsense  taste  and  morality,  that  its  effectual 
obsolescence  will  involve  a somewhat  comprehensive  dis- 
placement and  mutation  throughout  the  range  of  insti- 
tutions and  popular  conceits  that  have  been  handed  down. 
And  institutional  changes  take  time,  being  creations  of 
habit.  Yet,  again,  there  is  the  qualification  to  this  last, 
that  since  the  change  in  question  appears  to  be  a matter, 
not  of  acquiring  a habit  and  confirming  it  in  the  shape 
of  an  article  of  general  use  and  wont,  but  of  forgetting 
what  once  was  learned,  the  time  and  experience  to  be 
allowed  for  its  decay  need  logically  not  equal  that  required 
for  its  acquirement,  either  in  point  of  duration  or  in  point 
of  the  strictness  of  discipline  necessary  to  inculcate  it. 

While  the  spirit  of  nationalism  is  such  an  acquired 
trait,  and  while  it  should  therefore  follow  that  the  chief 
agency  in  divesting  men  of  it  must  be  disuse  of  the  dis- 
cipline out  of  which  it  has  arisen,  yet  a positive,  and  even 
something  of  a drastic  discipline  to  the  contrary  effect 
need  not  be  altogether  ineffectual  in  bringing  about  its 
obsolescence.  The  case  of  the  Chinese  people  seems  to 
argue  something  of  the  sort.  Not  that  the  Chinese  are 
simply  and  neutrally  unpatriotic;  they  appear  also  to  be 
well  charged  with  disloyalty  to  their  alien  rulers.  But 
along  with  a sense  of  being  on  the  defensive  in  their 
common  concerns,  there  is  also  the  fact  that  they  appear 
not  to  be  appreciably  patriotic  in  the  proper  sense ; they 


144 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


are  not  greatly  moved  by  a spirit  of  nationality.  And 
this  failure  of  the  national  spirit  among  them  can  scarcely 
be  set  down  to  a neutral  disuse  of  that  discipline  which 
has  on  the  other  hand  induced  a militant  nationalism  in 
the  peoples  of  Christendom;  it  should  seem  more  prob- 
able. at  least,  that  this  relative  absence  of  a national  am- 
bition is  traceable  in  good  part  to  its  having  been  posi- 
tively bred  out  of  them  by  the  stern  repression  of  all  such 
aspirations  under  the  autocratic  rule  of  their  alien  masters. 

Peace  on  terms  of  submission  and  non-resistance  to 
the  ordinary  exactions  and  rulings  of  those  Imperial  au- 
thorities to  whom  such  submission  may  become  neces- 
sary, then,  will  be  contingent  on  the  virtual  abeyance  of 
the  spirit  of  national  pride  in  the  peoples  who  so  are  to 
come  under  Imperial  rule.  A sufficient,  by  no  means  nec- 
essarily a total,  elimination  or  decadence  of  this  proclivity 
will  be  the  condition  precedent  of  any  practicable  scheme 
for  a general  peace  on  this  footing.  How  large  an  allow- 
ance of  such  animus  these  prospectively  subject  peoples 
might  still  carry,  without  thereby  assuring  the  defeat  of 
any  such  plan,  would  in  great  measure  depend  on  the 
degree  of  clemency  or  rigor  with  which  the  superior  au- 
thority might  enforce  its  rule.  It  is  not  that  a peace 
plan  of  this  nature  need  precisely  be  considered  to  fall 
outside  the  limits  of  possibility,  on  account  of  this  neces- 
sary condition,  but  it  is  at  the  best  a manifestly  doubtful 
matter.  Advocates  of  a negotiated  peace  should  not  fail 
to  keep  in  mind  and  make  public  that  the  plan  which  they 
advocate  carries  with  it,  as  a sequel  or  secondary  phase, 
such  an  unconditional  surrender  and  a consequent  regime 
of  non-resistance,  and  that  there  still  is  grave  doubt 
whether  the  peoples  of  these  Western  nations  are  at  pres- 


Peace  Without  Honour 


145 


ent  in  a sufnciently  tolerant  frame  of  mind,  or  can  in  the 
calculable  future  come  in  for  such  a tolerantly  neutral 
attitude  in  point  of  national  pride,  as  to  submit  in  any 
passable  fashion  to  any  alien  Imperial  rule. 

If  the  spiritual  difficulty  presented  by  this  prevalent 
spirit  of  national  pride — sufficiently  stubborn  still,  how- 
ever inane  a conceit  it  may  seem  on  sober  reflection — if 
this  animus  of  factional  insubordination  could  be  over- 
come or  in  some  passable  measure  be  conciliated  or  abated, 
there  is  much  to  be  said  in  favor  of  such  a plan  of  peace- 
able submission  to  an  extraneous  and  arbitrary  authority, 
and  therefore  also  for  that  plan  of  negotiated  peace  by 
means  of  which  events  would  be  put  in  train  for  its  real- 
isation. 

Any  passably  dispassionate  consideration  of  the  pro- 
jected regime  will  come  unavoidably  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  prospectively  subject  peoples  should  have  no  legiti- 
mate apprehension  of  loss  or  disadvantage  in  the  material 
respect.  It  is,  of  course,  easy  for  an  unreflecting  person  to 
jump  to  the  conclusion  that  subjection  to  an  alien  power 
must  bring  grievous  burdens,  in  the  way  of  taxes  and 
similar  impositions.  But  reflection  will  immediately  show 
that  no  appreciable  increase,  over  the  economic  burdens 
already  carried  by  the  populace  under  their  several  na- 
tional establishments,  could  come  of  such  a move. 

As  bearing  on  this  question  it  is  well  to  call  to  mind 
that  the  contemplated  imperial  dominion  is  designed  to 
be  very  wide-reaching  and  with  very  ample  powers.  Its 
nearest  historical  analogue,  of  course,  is  the  Roman  impe- 
rial dominion — in  the  days  of  the  Antonines — and  that 
the  nearest  analogue  to  the  projected  German  peace  is 
the  Roman  peace,  in  the  days  of  its  best  security.  There 
is  every  warrant  for  the  presumption  that  the  contem- 

lO 


146 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


plated  Imperial  dominion  is  to  be  substantially  all-inclu- 
sive. Indeed  there  is  no  stopping  place  for  the  projected 
enterprise  short  of  an  all-inclusive  dominion.  And  there 
will  consequently  be  no  really  menacing  outside  power  to 
be  provided  against.  Consequently  there  will  be  but  little 
provision  necessary  for  the  common  defense,  as  com- 
pared, e.  g.,  with  the  aggregate  of  such  provision  found 
necessary  for  self-defense  on  the  part  of  the  existing  na- 
tions acting  in  severalty  and  each  jealously  guarding  its 
own  national  integrity.  Indeed,  compared  with  the  bur- 
den of  competitive  armament  to  which  the  peoples  of 
Europe  have  been  accustomed,  the  need  of  any  armed 
force  under  the  new  regime  should  be  an  inconsiderable 
matter,  even  when  there  is  added  to  the  necessary  modi- 
cum of  defensive  preparation  the  more  imperative  and 
weightier  provision  of  force  with  which  to  keep  the 
peace  at  home. 

Into  the  composition  of  this  necessary  modicum  of 
armed  force  slight  if  any  contingents  of  men  would  be 
drawn  from  the  subject  peoples,  for  the  reason  that  no 
great  numbers  would  be  needed;  as  also  because  no 
devoted  loyalty  to  the  dynasty  could  reasonably  be  looked 
for  among  them,  even  if  no  positive  insecurity  were  felt 
to  be  involved  in  their  employment.  On  this  head  the 
projected  scheme  unambiguously  commends  itself  as  a 
measure  of  economy,  both  in  respect  of  the  pecuniary  bur- 
dens demanded  and  as  regards  the  personal  annoyance 
of  military  service. 

As  a further  count,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  bur- 
den of  the  Imperial  government  and  its  bureaucratic  ad- 
ministration— what  would  be  called  the  cost  of  main- 
tenance and  repairs  of  the  dynastic  establishment  and  its 
apparatus  of  control — would  be  borne  by  the  subject  peo- 
ples. Here  again  one  is  warranted  in  looking  for  a sub- 


Peace  Without  Honour 


147 


stantial  economy  to  be  efifected  by  such  a centralised 
authority,  and  a consequent  lighter  aggregate  burden  on 
the  subjects.  Doubtless,  the  “overhead  charges”  would 
not  be  reduced  to  their  practicable  minimum.  Such  a 
governmental  establishment,  with  its  bureaucratic  person- 
nel, its  “civil  list”  and  its  privileged  classes,  would  not  be 
conducted  on  anything  like  a parsimonious  footing.  There 
is  no  reason  to  apprehend  any  touch  of  modesty  in  the 
exactions  of  such  a dynastic  establishment  for  itself  or 
in  behalf  of  its  underlying  hierarchy  of  gentlefolk. 

There  is  also  to  be  counted  in,  in  the  concrete  instance 
on  which  the  argument  here  turns,  a more  or  less  con- 
siderable burden  of  contributions  toward  the  maintenance 
and  augmentation  of  that  culture  that  has  been  the  topic 
of  so  many  encomiums.  At  this  point  it  should  be  recalled 
that  it  is  the  pattern  of  Periclean  Athens  that  is  continu- 
ally in  mind  in  these  encomiums.  Which  brings  up,  in 
this  immediate  connection,  the  dealings  of  Periclean 
Athens  with  the  funds  of  the  League,  and  the  source  as 
well  as  the  destination  of  these  surplus  funds.  Out  of 
it  all  came  the  works  on  the  Acropolis,  together  with 
much  else  of  intellectual  and  artistic  life  that  converged 
upon  and  radiated  from  this  Athenian  center  of  culture. 
The  vista  of  Denkmdler  that  so  opens  to  the  vision  of  a 
courageous  fancy  is  in  itself  such  a substance  of  things 
hoped  for  as  should  stir  the  heart  of  all  humane  persons.^ 
The  cost  of  this  subvention  of  Culture  would  doubtless 
be  appreciable,  but  those  grave  men  who  have  spent  most 
thought  on  this  prospective  cultural  gain  to  be  had  from 
the  projected  Imperial  rule  appear  to  entertain  no  doubt 
as  to  its  being  worth  all  that  it  would  cost. 


Wenk  ’malt 


148 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


Any  one  who  is  inclined  to  rate  the  prospective  pecu- 
niary costs  and  losses  high  would  doubtless  be  able  to  find 
various  and  sundry  items  of  minor  importance  to  add  to 
this  short  list  of  general  categories  on  the  side  of  cost; 
but  such  additional  items,  not  fairly  to  be  included  under 
these  general  captions,  would  after  all  be  of  minor  im- 
portance, in  the  aggregate  or  in  detail,  and  would  not 
appreciably  affect  the  grand  balance  of  pecuniary  profit 
and  loss  to  be  taken  account  of  in  any  appraisal  of  the 
projected  Imperial  regime.  There  should  evidently  be 
little  ground  to  apprehend  that  its  installation  would  en- 
tail a net  loss  or  a net  increase  of  pecuniary  burdens. 
There  is,  of  course,  the  ill-defined  and  scarcely  definable 
item  of  expenditure  under  the  general  head  of  Gentility, 
Dignity,  Distinction,  Magnificence,  or  whatever  term  may 
seem  suitable  to  designate  that  consumption  of  goods  and 
services  that  goes  to  maintain  the  high  repute  of  the  Court 
and  to  keep  the  underlying  gentlefolk  in  countenance.  In 
its  pecuniary  incidence  this  line  of  (necessary)  expen- 
diture belongs  under  the  rubric  of  Conspicuous  Waste ; 
and  one  will  always  have  to  face  the  disquieting  flexibility 
of  this  item  of  expenditure.  The  consumptive  demand  of 
this  kind  is  in  an  eminent  degree  “indefinitely  extensible,’’ 
as  the  phrasing  of  the  economists  would  have  it,  and  as 
various  historical  instances  of  courtly  splendor  and  fash- 
ionable magnificence  will  abundantly  substantiate.  There 
is  a constant  proclivity  to  advance  this  conventional 
“standard  of  living’’  to  the  limit  set  by  the  available 
means ; and  yet  these  conventional  necessities  will  ordi- 
narily not,  in  the  aggregate,  take  up  all  the  available 
means ; although  now  and  again,  as  under  the  Ancien 
Regime,  and  perhaps  in  Imperial  Rome,  the  standard  of 
splendid  living  may  also  exceed  the  current  means  in 


Peace  Without  Honour 


149 


hand  and  lead  to  impoverishment  of  the  underlying  com- 
munity. 

An  analysis  of  the  circumstances  governing  this  flexi- 
bility of  the  conventional  standard  of  living  and  of  pe- 
cuniary magnificence  can  not  be  gone  into  here.  In  the 
case  under  consideration  it  will  have  to  be  left  as  an  inde- 
terminate but  considerable  item  in  the  burden  of  cost 
which  the  projected  Imperial  rule  may  be  counted  on  to 
impose  on  the  underlying  peoples.  The  cost  of  the  Im- 
perial court,  nobility,  and  civil  service,  therefore,  would 
be  a matter  of  estimate,  on  which  no  close  agreement 
would  be  expected ; and  yet,  here  as  in  an  earlier  connec- 
tion, it  seems  a reasonable  expectation  that  sufficient  dig- 
nity and  magnificence  could  be  put  in  evidence  by  such 
a large-scale  establishment  at  a lower  aggregate  cost  than 
the  aggregate  of  expenditures  previously  incurred  for  the 
like  ends  by  various  nations  working  in  severalty  and  at 
cross  purposes. 

Doubtless  it  would  be  altogether  a mistaken  view  of  this 
production  of  dignity  by  means  of  a lavish  expenditure  on 
superfluities,  to  believe  that  the  same  principle  of  economy 
should  apply  here  as  was  found  applicable  in  the  matter 
of  armament  for  defense.  With  the  installation  of  a col- 
lective national  establishment,  to  include  substantially  all 
the  previously  competing  nations,  the  need  of  defensive 
armament  should  in  all  reason  decline  to  something  very- 
inconsiderable  indeed.  But  it  would  be  hasty  to  conclude 
that  with  the  coalescence  of  these  nations  under  one  para- 
mount control  the  need  of  creating  notoriety  and  prestige 
for  this  resulting  central  establishment  by  the  consump- 
tion of  decorative  superfluities  would  likewise  decline. 
The  need  of  such  dignity  and  magnificence  is  only  in  part, 
perhaps  a minor  part,  of  a defensive  character.  For  the 


150 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


greater  part,  no  doubt,  the  motive  to  this  conspicuously 
wasteful  consumption  is  personal  vanity,  in  Imperial  pol- 
icy as  well  as  in  the  private  life  of  fashion, — or  perhaps 
one  should  more  deferentially  say  that  it  is  a certain  range 
of  considerations  which  would  be  identified  as  personal 
vanity  in  case  they  were  met  with  among  men  beneath 
the  Imperial  level.  And  so  far  as  the  creation  of  this  form 
of  “good-will”  by  this  manner  of  advertising  is  traceable 
to  such,  or  equivalent,  motives  of  a personal  incidence, 
the  provocation  to  economy  along  this  line  would  presum- 
ably not  be  a notable  factor  in  the  case.  And  one  returns 
perforce  to  the  principle  already  spoken  of  above,  that  the 
consumptive  need  of  superfluities  is  indefinitely  exten- 
sible, with  the  resulting  inference  tliat  nothing  conclusive 
is  to  be  said  as  to  the  prospective  magnitude  of  this  item 
in  the  Imperial  bill  of  expense,  or  of  the  consequent  pe- 
cuniary burdens  which  it  would  impose  on  the  underlying 
peoples. 

So  far  the'argument  has  run  on  the  pecuniary  incidence 
of  this  projected  Imperial  dominion  as  it  falls  on  the 
underlying  community  as  a whole,  with  no  attempt  to  dis- 
criminate between  the  divergent  interests  of  the  different 
classes  and  conditions  of  men  that  go  to  make  up  any 
modern  community.  The  question  in  hand  is  a question 
of  pecuniary  burdens,  and  therefore  of  the  pecuniary  in- 
terests of  these  several  distinguishable  classes  or  condi- 
tions of  men.  In  all  these  modern  nations  that  now  stand 
in  the  article  of  decision  between  peace  by  submission 
or  a doubtful  and  melancholy  alternative, — in  all  of  them 
men  are  by  statute  and  custom  inviolably  equal  before 
the  law,  of  course ; they  are  ungraded  and  masterless  men 
before  the  law.  But  these  same  peoples  are  also  alike 


Peace  Without  Honour 


151 


in  the  respect  that  pecuniary  duties  and  obligations  among 
them  are  similarly  sacred  and  inviolable  under  the  dis- 
passionate findings  of  the  law.  This  pecuniary  equality 
is,  in  effect,  an  impersonal  equality  between  pecuniary 
magnitudes ; from  which  it  follows  that  these  citizens  of 
the  advanced  nations  are  not  ungraded  men  in  the  pe- 
cuniary respect ; nor  are  they  masterless,  in  so  far  as  a 
greater  pecuniary  force  will  always,  under  this  impersonal 
equality  of  the  law,  stand  in  a relation  of  mastery  toward 
a lesser  one. 

Class  distinctions,  except  pecuniary  distinctions,  have 
fallen  away.  But  all  these  modern  nations  are  made  up 
of  pecuniary  classes,  differing  from  one  another  by  minute 
gradations  in  the  marginal  cases,  but  falling,  after  all, 
and  in  the  large,  into  two  broadly  and  securely  distin- 
guishable pecuniary  categories : those  who  have  more  and 
those  who  have  less.  Statisticians  have  been  at  pains  to 
ascertain  that  a relatively  very  small  numerical  minority 
of  the  citizens  in  these  modern  nations  own  all  but  a rel- 
atively very  small  proportion  of  the  aggregate  wealth  in 
the  country.  So  that  it  appears  quite  safe  to  say  that  in 
such  a country  as  America,  e.  g.,  something  less  than  ten 
percent  of  the  inhabitants  own  something  more  than  ninety 
percent  of  the  country’s  wealth.  It  would  scarcely  be  a 
wild  overstraining  of  its  practical  meaning  to  say  that 
this  population  is  made  up  of  two  classes : those  who  own 
the  country’s  wealth,  and  those  who  do  not.  In  strict  ac- 
curacy, as  before  the  law,  this  characterisation  will  not 
hold ; whereas  in  practical  effect,  it  is  a sufficiently  close 
approximation.  This  latter  class,  who  have  substantially 
no  other  than  a fancied  pecuniary  interest  in  the  nation’s 
material  fortunes,  are  the  category  often  spoken  of  as 
The  Common  Man.  It  is  not  necessary,  nor  is  it  desired. 


152 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


to  find  a corresponding  designation  for  the  other  cate- 
gory, those  who  own. 

The  articulate  recognition  of  this  division  into  con- 
trasted pecuniary  classes  or  conditions,  with  correspond- 
ingly  (at  least  potentially)  divergent  pecuniary  interests, 
need  imply  no  degree  of  approval  or  disapproval  of  the 
arrangement  which  is  so  recognised.  The  recognition  of 
it  is  necessary  to  a perspicuous  control  of  the  argument, 
as  bears  on  the  possible  systematic  and  inherent  discrep- 
ancy among  these  men  in  respect  of  their  material  inter- 
ests under  the  projected  Imperial  rule.  Substantially,  it 
is  a distinction  between  those  who  have  and  those  who 
have  not,  and  in  a question  of  prospective  pecuniary  loss 
the  man  who  has  nothing  to  lose  is  differently  placed  from 
the  one  who  has.  It  would  perhaps  seem  flippant,  and 
possibly  lacking  in  the  courtesy  due  one’s  prospective  lord 
paramount,  to  say  with  the  poet,  Cantabit  vacuus  coram 
latrone  viator. 

But  the  whole  case  is  not  so  simple.  It  is  only  so  long 
as  the  projected  pecuniary  inroad  is  conceived  as  a simple 
sequestration  of  wealth  in  hand,  that  such  a characterisa- 
tion can  be  made  to  serv^e.  The  Imperial  aim  is  not  a 
passing  act  of  pillage,  but  a perpetual  usufruct;  and  the 
whole  question  takes  on  a different  and  more  complex 
shape  when  it  so  touches  the  enduring  conditions  of  life 
and  livelihood.  The  citizen  who  has  nothing,  or  who  has 
no  capitalisable  source  of  unearned  income,  yet  has  a 
pecuniary  interest  in  a livelihood  to  be  gained  from  day 
to  day,  and  he  is  yet  vulnerable  in  the  pecuniary  respect 
in  that  his  livelihood  may  with  the  utmost  facility  be  laid 
under  contribution  by  various  and  sundry  well-tried  con- 
trivances. Indeed,  the  common  man  who  depends  for  his 
livelihood  on  his  daily  earnings  is  in  a more  immediately 


Peace  Without  Honour 


153 


precarious  position  than  those  who  have  something  appre- 
ciable laid  up  against  a rainy  day,  in  the  shape  of  a cap- 
italised source  of  income.  Only  that  it  is  still  doubtful 
if  his  position  is  precarious  in  such  a fashion  as  to  lay 
him  open  to  a notable  increase  of  hardship,  or  to  loss 
of  the  amenities  of  life,  in  the  same  relative  degree  as  his 
well-to-do  neighbour. 

In  point  of  fact  it  may  well  be  doubted  if  this  common 
man  has  anything  to  apprehend  in  the  way  of  added  hard- 
ship or  loss  of  creature  comforts  under  the  contemplated 
regime  of  Imperial  tutelage..  He  would  presum.ably  find 
himself  in  a precarious  case  under  the  arbitrary  and  irre- 
sponsible authority  of  an  alien  master  working  through  an 
alien  master  class.  The  doubt  which  presents  itself  is  as 
to  whether  this  common  man  would  be  more  precariously 
placed,  or  would  come  in  for  a larger  and  surer  sum  of 
hard  usage  and  scant  living,  under  this  projected  order 
of  things,  than  what  he  already  is  exposed  to  in  his  pe- 
cuniary relations  with  his  well-to-do  compatriots  under 
the  current  system  of  law  and  order. 

Under  this  current  regime  of  law  and  order,  according 
to  the  equitable  principles  of  Natural  Rights,  the  man 
without  means  has  no  pecuniary  rights  which  his  well- 
to-do  pecuniary  master  is  bound  to  respect.  This  may 
have  been  an  unintended,  as  it  doubtless  was  an  unfore- 
seen, outcome  of  the  move  out  of  feudalism  and  prescrip- 
tive rights  and  immunities,  into  the  system  of  individual 
liberty  and  manhood  franchise;  but  as  commonly  hap- 
pens in  case  of  any  substantial  change  in  the  scheme  of 
institutional  arrangements,  unforeseen  consequences  come 
in  along  with  those  that  have  been  intended.  In  that 
period  of  history  when  Western  Europe  was  gathering 
that  experience  out  of  which  the  current  habitual  scheme 


154 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  law  and  order  has  come,  the  right  of  property  and  free 
contract  was  a complement  and  safeguard  to  that  indi- 
vidual initiative  and  masterless  equality  of  men  for  which 
the  spokesmen  of  the  new  era  contended.  That  it  is  no 
longer  so  at  every  turn,  or  even  in  the  main,  in  later  time, 
is  in  great  part  due  to  changes  of  the  pecuniary  order, 
that  have  come  on  since  then,  and  that  seem  not  to  have 
cast  their  shadow  before. 

In  all  good  faith,  and  with  none  but  inconsequential 
reservations,  the  material  fortunes  of  modern  civilised 
men — together  with  much  else — have  so  been  placed  on  a 
pecuniary  footing,  with  little  to  safeguard  them  at  any 
point  except  the  inalienable  right  of  pecuniary  self-direc- 
tion and  initiative,  in  an  environment  where  virtually  all 
the  indispensable  means  of  pecuniary  self-direction  and 
initiative  are  in  the  hands  of  that  contracted  category  of 
owners  spoken  of  above.  A numerical  minority — under 
ten  percent  of  the  population — constitutes  a conclusive 
pecuniary  majority — over  ninety  percent  of  the  means — 
under  a system  of  law  and  order  that  turns  on  the  in- 
alienable right  of  owners  to  dispose  of  the  means  in  hand 
as  may  suit  their  convenience  and  profit, — always  barring 
recourse  to  illegal  force  or  fraud.  There  is,  however,  a 
very  appreciable  margin  of  legal  recourse  to  force  and 
of  legally  protected  fraud  available  in  case  of  need.  Of 
course  the  expedients  here  referred  to  as  legally  available 
force  and  fraud  in  the  defense  of  pecuniary  rights  and 
the  pursuit  of  pecuniary  gain  are  not  force  and  fraud  de 
jure  but  only  de  facto.  They  are  further,  and  well  known, 
illustrations  of  how  the  ulterior  consequences  of  given 
institutional  arrangements  and  given  conventionalised 
principles  (habits  of  thought)  of  conduct  may  in  time 
come  to  run  at  cross  purposes  with  the  initial  pui-pose 


Peace  Without  Honour 


155 


that  led  to  the  acceptance  of  these  institutions  and  to  th 
confirmation  and  standardisation  of  these  habitual  norms 
of  conduct.  For  the  time  being,  however,  they  are  “fund- 
amentally and  eternally  right  and  good.” 

Being  a pecuniary  majority — what  may  be  called  a 
majority  of  the  corporate  stock — of  the  nation,  it  is  also 
fundamentally  and  eternally  right  and  good  that  the  pe- 
cuniary interests  of  the  owners  of  the  material  means  of 
life  should  rule  unabated  in  all  those  matters  of  public 
policy  that  touch  on  the  material  fortunes  of  the  com- 
munity at  large.  Barring  a slight  and  intermittent  mutter 
of  discontent,  this  arrangement  has  also  the  cordial  ap- 
proval of  popular  sentiment  in  these  modern  democratic 
nations.  One  need  only  recall  the  paramount  importance 
which  is  popularly  attached  to  the  maintenance  and  ex- 
tension of  the  nation’s  trade — for  the  use  of  the  investors 
— or  the  perpetuation  of  a protective  tariff — for  the  use 
of  the  protected  business  concerns — or,  again,  the  scrupu- 
lous regard  with  which  such  a body  of  public  servants  as 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  will  safeguard  the 
legitimate  claim  of  the  railway  companies  to  a “reason- 
able” rate  of  earnings  on  the  capitalised  value  of  the 
presumed  earning-capacity  of  their  property. 

Again,  in  view  of  the  unaccustomed  freedom  with 
which  it  is  here  necessary  to  speak  of  these  delicate  mat- 
ters, it  may  be  in  place  to  disclaim  all  intention  to  criticise 
the  established  arrangements  on  their  merits  as  details  of 
public  policy.  All  that  comes  in  question  here,  touching 
these  and  the  like  features  of  the  established  law  and 
order,  is  the  bearing  of  all  this  on  the  material  fortunes 
of  the  common  man  under  the  current  regime,  as  con- 
trasted with  what  he  would  reasonably  have  to  look  for 


156 


On  the  Mature  of  Peace 


under  the  projected  regime  of  Imperial  tutelage  that 
would  come  in,  consequent  upon  this  national  surrender 
to  Imperial  dominion. 

In  these  democratic  countries  public  policy  is  guided 
primarily  by  considerations  of  business  expediency,  and 
the  administration,  as  well  as  the  legislative  power,  is  in 
the  hands  of  businessmen,  chosen  avowedly  on  the  ground 
of  their  businesslike  principles  and  ability.  There  is  no 
power  in  such  a community  that  can  over-rule  the  exigen- 
cies of  business,  nor  would  popular  sentiment  countenance 
any  exercise  of  power  that  should  traverse  these  exigen- 
cies, or  that  would  act  to  restrain  trade  or  discourage  the 
pursuit  of  gain.  An  apparent  exception  to  the  rule  occurs 
in  wartime,  when  military  exigencies  may  over-rule  the 
current  demands  of  business  traffic;  but  the  exception  is 
in  great  part  only  apparent,  in  that  the  warlike  operations 
are  undertaken  in  whole  or  in  part  with  a view  to  the 
protection  or  extension  of  business  traffic. 

National  surveillance  and  regulation  of  business  traffic 
in  these  countries  hitherto,  ever  since  and  in  so  far  as 
the  modern  democratic  order  of  things  has  taken  effect, 
has  uniformly  been  of  the  nature  of  interference  with 
trade  and  investment  in  behalf  of  the  nation’s  mercantile 
community  at  large,  as  seen  in  port  and  shipping  regula- 
tions and  in  the  consular  service,  or  in  behalf  of  particular 
favored  groups  or  classes  of  business  concerns,  as  in  pro- 
tective tariffs  and  subsidies.  In  all  this  national  manage- 
ment of  pecuniary  affairs,  under  modern  democratic  prin- 
ciples, the  common  man  comes  into  the  case  only  as  raw 
material  of  business  traffic, — as  consumer  or  as  laborer. 
He  is  one  of  the  industrial  agencies  by  use  of  which  the 
businessman  who  employs  him  supplies  himself  with 


Peace  Without  Honour 


157 


goods  for  the  market,  or  he  is  one  of  the  units  of  con- 
sumptive demand  that  make  up  this  market  in  which  the 
business  man  sells  his  goods,  and  so  “realises”  on  his  in- 
vestment. He  is,  of  course,  free,  under  modern  principles 
of  the  democratic  order,  to  deal  or  not  to  deal  with  this 
business  community,  whether  as  laborer  or  as  consumer, 
or  as  small-scale  producer  engaged  in  purveying  materials 
or  services  on  terms  defined  by  the  community  of  business 
interests  engaged  on  so  large  a scale  as  to  count  in  their 
determination.  That  is  to  say,  he  is  free  de  jure  to  take 
or  leave  the  terms  offered.  De  facto  he  is  only  free  to 
take  them — with  inconsequential  exceptions — the  alterna- 
tive being  obsolescence  by  disuse,  not  to  choose  a harsher 
name  for  a distasteful  eventuality. 

The  general  ground  on  which  the  business  system,  as 
it  works  under  the  over-ruling  exigencies  of  the  so-called 
“big  business,”  so  defines  the  terms  of  life  for  the  com- 
mon man,  who  works  and  buys,  is  the  ground  afforded 
by  the  principle  of  “charging  what  the  traffic  will  bear;” 
that  is  to  say,  fixing  the  terms  of  hiring,  buying  and  selling 
at  such  a figure  as  will  yield  the  largest  net  return  to  the 
business  concerns  in  whom,  collectively  or  in  severalty, 
the  discretion  vests.  Discretion  in  these  premises  does  not 
vest  in  any  business  concern  that  does  not  articulate  with 
the  system  of  “big  business,”  or  that  does  not  dispose  of 
resources  sufficient  to  make  it  a formidable  member  of 
the  system.  Whether  these  concerns  act  in  severalty  or 
by  collusion  and  conspiracy,  in  so  defining  the  pecuniary 
terms  of  life  for  the  community  at  large,  is  substantially 
an  idle  question,  so  far  as  bears  on  the  material  interest 
of  the  common  man.  The  base-line  is  still  what  the  traffic 
will  bear,  and  it  is  still  adhered  to,  so  nearly  as  the  human 
infirmity  of  the  discretionary  captains  of  industry  will 


158 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


admit,  whether  the  due  approximation  to  this  base-line 
is  reached  by  a process  of  competitive  bidding  or  by  col- 
lusive advisement. 

The  generalisation  so  offered,  touching  the  material 
conditions  of  life  for  the  common  man  under  the  modem 
mle  of  big  business,  may  seem  unwarrantably  broad. 
It  may  be  worth  while  to  take  note  of  more  than  one  point 
in  qualification  of  it,  chiefly  to  avoid  the  appearance  of 
having  overlooked  any  of  the  material  circumstances  of 
the  case.  The  “system’’  of  large  business,  working  its 
material  consequences  through  the  system  of  large-scale 
industry,  but  more  particularly  by  way  of  the  large-scale 
and  wide-reaching  business  of  trade  in  the  proper  sense, 
draws  into  the  net  of  its  control  all  parts  of  the  com- 
munity and  all  its  inhabitants,  in  some  degree  of  depend- 
ence. But  there  is  always,  hitherto,  an  appreciable  frac- 
tion of  the  inhabitants — as,  e.  g.,  outlying  agricultural 
sections  that  are  in  a “backward”  state — who  are  by  no 
means  closely  bound  in  the  orderly  system  of  business, 
or  closely  dependent  on  the  markets.  They  may  be  said 
to  enjoy  a degree  of  independence,  by  virtue  of  their 
foregoing  as  much  as  may  be  of  the  advantages  offered  by 
modem  industrial  specialisation.  So  also  there  are  the 
minor  and  interstitial  trades  that  are  still  carried  on  by 
handicraft  methods ; these,  too,  are  still  somewhat  loosely 
held  in  the  fabric  of  the  business  system.  There  is  one 
thing  and  another  in  this  way  to  be  taken  account  of  in 
any  exhaustive  survey,  but  the  accounting  for  them  will 
after  all  amount  to  nothing  better  than  a gleaning  of 
remnants  and  partial  exceptions,  such  as  will  in  no  ma- 
terial degree  derange  the  general  proposition  in  hand. 

Again,  there  mns  through  the  length  and  breadth  of 
this  business  community  a certain  measure  of  incom- 


Peace  Without  Honour 


159 


petence  or  inefficiency  of  managfement,  as  seen  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  conceivable  perfect  working  of  the 
system  as  a whole.  It  may  be  due  to  a slack  attention 
here  and  there ; or  to  the  exigencies  of  business  strategy 
which  may  constrain  given  business  concerns  to  an  occa- 
sional attitude  of  “watchful  waiting”  in  the  hope  of  catch- 
ing a rival  off  his  guard;  or  to  a lack  of  perfect  mutual 
understanding  among  the  discretionary  businessmen,  due 
sometimes  to  an  over-careful  guarding  of  trade  secrets 
or  advance  information ; or,  as  also  happens,  and  quite 
excusably,  to  a lack  of  perfect  mutual  confidence  among 
these  businessmen,  as  to  one  another’s  entire  good  faith 
or  good-will.  The  system  is  after  all  a competitive  one, 
in  the  sense  that  each  of  the  discretionary  directors  of 
business  is  working  for  his  own  pecuniary  gain,  whether 
in  cooperation  with  his  fellows  or  not.  “An  honest  man 
will  bear  watching.”  As  in  other  collusive  organisations 
for  gain,  confederates  are  apt  to  fall  out  when  it  comes  to 
a division  of  what  is  in  hand.  In  one  way  and  another 
the  system  is  beset  with  inherent  infirmities,  which  hinder 
its  perfect  work;  and  in  so  far  it  will  fall  short  of  the 
full  realisation  of  that  rule  of  business  that  inculcates 
charging  what  the  traffic  will  bear,  and  also  in  so  far 
the  pressure  which  the  modem  system  of  business  man- 
agement brings  to  bear  on  the  common  man  will  also  fall 
short  of  the  last  straw — perhaps  even  of  the  next-to-the- 
last.  Again  it  turns  out  to  be  a question  not  of  the  fail- 
ure of  the  general  proposition  as  formulated,  but  rather 
as  to  the  closeness  of  approximation  to  its  theoretically 
perfect  work.  It  may  be  remarked  by  the  way  that 
vigilant  and  impartial  surveillance  of  this  system  of  busi- 
ness enterprise  by  an  external  authority  interested  only 
in  aggregate  results,  rather  than  in  the  differential  gains 


160 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  the  interested  individuals,  might  hopefully  be  counted 
on  to  correct  some  of  these  short-comings  which  the  sys- 
tem shows  when  running  loose  under  the  guidance  of  its 
own  multifarious  incentives. 

On  the  opposite  side  of  the  account,  it  is  also  worth 
noting  that,  while  modern  business  management  may  now 
and  again  fall  short  of  what  the  traffic  will  bear,  it  hap- 
pens more  commonly  that  its  exactions  will  exceed  that 
limit.  This  will  particularly  be  true  in  businessmen’s 
dealings  with  hired  labour,  as  also  and  perhaps  with  equal- 
ly far-reaching  consequences  in  an  excessive  recourse  to 
sophistications  and  adulterants  and  an  excessively  par- 
simonious provision  for  the  safety,  health  or  comfort  of 
their  customers — as,  e.  g.,  in  passenger  traffic  by  rail, 
water  or  tramway.  The  discrepancy  to  which  attention  is 
invited  here  is  due  to  a discrepancy  between  business  ex- 
pediency, that  is  expediency  for  the  purpose  of  gain  by 
a given  businessman,  on  the  one  hand,  and  serviceability 
to  the  common  good,  on  the  other  hand.  The  business 
concern’s  interest  in  the  traffic  in  which  it  engages  is  a 
short-term  interest,  or  an  interest  in  the  short-term  re- 
turns, as  contrasted  with  the  long-term  or  enduring  inter- 
est which  the  community  at  large  has  in  the  public  serv- 
ice over  which  any  such  given  business  concern  disposes. 
The  business  incentive  is  that  afforded  by  the  prospective 
net  pecuniary  gain  from  the  traffic,  substantially  an  inter- 
est in  profitable  sales ; while  the  community  at  large,  or 
the  common  man  that  goes  to  make  up  such  a commu- 
nity, has  a material  interest  in  this  traffic  only  as  regards 
the  services  rendered  and  the  enduring  effects  that  follow 
from  it. 

The  businessman  has  not,  or  at  least  is  commonly  not 
influenced  by,  any  interest  in  the  ulterior  consequences 


Peace  Without  Honour 


161 


of  the  transactions  in  which  he  is  immediately  engaged. 
This  appears  to  hold  true  in  an  accentuated  degree  in  the 
domain  of  that  large-scale  business  that  draws  its  gains 
from  the  large-scale  modern  industry  and  is  managed 
on  the  modern  footing  of  corporation  finance.  This  mod- 
ern fashion  of  business  organisation  and  management  ap- 
parently has  led  to  a substantial  shortening  of  the  term 
over  which  any  given  investor  maintains  an  effective  in- 
terest in  any  given  corporate  enterprise,  in  which  his 
investments  may  be  placed  for  the  time  being.  With  the 
current  practice  of  organising  industrial  and  mercantile 
enterprises  on  a basis  of  vendible  securities,  and  with  the 
nearly  complete  exemption  from  personal  responsibility 
and  enduring  personal  attachment  to  any  one  corporate  en- 
terprise which  this  financial  expedient  has  brought,  it  has 
come  about  that  in  the  common  run  of  cases  the  investor, 
as  well  as  the  directorate,  in  any  given  enterprise,  has  an 
interest  only  for  the  time  being.  The  average  term  over 
which  it  is  (pecuniarily)  incumbent  on  the  modern  busi- 
nessman to  take  account  of  the  working  of  any  given 
enterprise  has  shortened  so  far  that  the  old-fashioned 
accountability,  that  once  was  depended  on  to  dictate  a 
sane  and  considerate  management  with  a view  to  perma- 
nent good-will,  has  in  great  measure  become  inoperative. 

By  and  large,  it  seems  unavoidable  that  the  pecuniary 
interests  of  the  businessmen  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
material  interests  of  the  community  on  the  other  hand 
are  diverging  in  a more  and  more  pronounced  degree,  due 
to  institutional  circumstances  over  which  no  prompt  con- 
trol can  be  had  without  immediate  violation  of  that 
scheme  of  personal  rights  in  which  the  constitution  of 
modern  democratic  society  is  grounded.  The  quandary 
in  which  these  communities  find  themselves,  as  an  out- 

II 


162 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


come  of  their  entrance  upon  “the  simple  and  obvious 
system  of  Natural  Liberty,”  is  shown  in  a large  and 
instructive  way  by  what  is  called  “labor  trouble,”  and 
in  a more  recondite  but  no  less  convincing  fashion  by  the 
fortunes  of  the  individual  workman  under  the  modern 
system. 

The  cost  of  production  of  a modern  workman  has  con- 
stantly increased,  with  the  advance  of  the  industrial  arts. 
The  period  of  preparation,  of  education  and  training, 
necessary  to  turn  out  competent  workmen,  has  been  in- 
creasing; and  the  period  of  full  workmanlike  efficiency 
has  been  shortening,  in  those  industries  that  employ  the 
delicate  and  exacting  processes  of  the  modern  technol- 
ogy. The  shortening  of  this  working-life  of  the  workman 
is  due  both  to  a lengthening  of  the  necessary  period  of 
preparation,  and  to  the  demand  of  these  processes  for 
so  full  a use  of  the  workman’s  forces  that  even  the  be- 
ginning of  senescence  will  count  as  a serious  disability, 
— in  many  occupations  as  a fatal  disability.  It  is  also 
a well  ascertained  fact  that  effectual  old  age  will  be 
brought  on  at  an  earlier  period  by  overwork;  overwork 
shortens  the  working  life-time  of  the  workman.  Thor- 
ough speeding-up  (“Scientific  Management”?)  will  un- 
duly shorten  this  working  life-time,  and  so  it  may,  some- 
what readily,  result  in  an  uneconomical  consumption  of 
the  community’s  man-power,  by  consuming  the  workmen 
at  a higher  rate  of  speed,  a higher  pressure,  with  a more 
rapid  rate  of  deterioration,  than  would  give  the  largest 
net  output  of  product  per  unit  of  man-power  available, 
or  per  unit  of  cost  of  production  of  such  man-power. 

On  this  head  the  guiding  incentives  of  the  businessman 
and  the  material  interest  of  the  community  at  large — not 
to  speak  of  the  selfish  interest  of  the  individual  workman 


Peace  Without  Honour 


163 


i — are  systematically  at  variance.  The  cost  of  production 
of  workmen  does  not  fall  on  the  business  concern  which 
employs  them,  at  least  not  in  such  definite  fashion  as  to 
make  it  appear  that  the  given  business  concern  or  busi- 
nessman has  a material  interest  in  the  economical  con- 
sumption of  the  man-power  embodied  in  this  given  body 
of  employees.  Some  slight  and  exceptional  qualification 
of  this  statement  is  to  be  noted,  in  those  cases  where  the 
processes  in  use  are  such  as  to  require  special  training, 
not  to  be  had  except  by  a working  habituation  to  these 
processes  in  the  particular  industrial  plant  in  question. 
So  far  as  such  special  training,  to  be  had  only  as  em- 
ployees of  the  given  concern,  is  a necessary  part  of  the 
workman’s  equipment  for  this  particular  work,  so  far 
the  given  employer  bears  a share  and  an  interest  in  the 
cost  of  production  of  the  workmen  employed ; and  so 
far,  therefore,  the  employer  has  also  a pecuniary  interest 
in  the  economical  use  of  his  employees;  which  usually 
shows  itself  in  the  way  of  some  special  precautions  being 
taken  to  prevent  the  departure  of  these  workmen  so  long 
as  there  is  a clear  pecuniary  loss  involved  in  replacing 
them  with  men  who  have  not  yet  had  the  special  training 
required.  Evidently  this  qualifying  consideration  covers 
no  great  proportion  of  the  aggregate  man-power  con- 
sumed in  industrial  enterprises  under  business  manage- 
ment. And  apart  from  the  instances,  essentially  excep- 
tional, where  such  a special  consideration  comes  in,  the 
businessmen  in  charge  will,  quite  excusably  as  things  go, 
endeavour  to  consume  the  man-power  of  which  they  dis- 
pose in  the  persons  of  their  employees,  not  at  the  rate 
that  would  be  most  economical  to  the  community  at  large, 
in  view  of  the  cost  of  their  replacement,  nor  at  such  a 
rate  as  would  best  suit  the  taste  or  the  viability  of  the 


164 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


particular  workman,  but  at  such  a rate  as  will  yield  the 
largest  net  pecuniary  gain  to  the  employer. 

There  is  on  record  an  illustrative,  and  indeed  an  illus- 
trious, instance  of  such  cannily  gainful  consumption  of 
man-power  carried  out  systematically  and  with  consist- 
ently profitable  effect  in  one  of  the  staple  industries  of  the 
country.  In  this  typical,  though  exceptionally  thorough- 
going and  lucrative  enterprise,  the  set  rule  of  the  man- 
agement was,  to  employ  none  but  select  workmen,  in 
each  respective  line  of  work;  to  procure  such  select 
workmen  and  retain  them  by  offering  wages  slightly  over 
the  ordinary  standard ; to  work  them  at  the  highest  pace 
and  pressure  attainable  with  such  a picked  body;  and 
to  discharge  them  on  the  first  appearance  of  aging  or  of 
failing  powers.  In  the  rules  of  the  management  was  also 
included  the  negative  proviso  that  the  concern  assumed 
no  responsibility  for  the  subsequent  fortunes  of  dis- 
charged workmen,  in  the  way  of  pension,  insurance  or 
the  like. 

This  enterprise  was  highly  successful  and  exceedingly 
profitable,  even  beyond  the  high  average  of  profits  among 
enterprises  in  the  same  line  of  business.  Out  of  it  came 
one  of  the  greater  and  more  illustrious  fortunes  that 
have  been  accumulated  during  the  past  century;  a for- 
tune which  has  enabled  one  of  the  most  impressive  and 
most  gracious  of  this  generation’s  many  impressive  phi- 
lanthropists, never  weary  in  well-doing ; but  who,  through 
this  cannily  gainful  consumption  of  man-power,  has  been 
placed  in  the  singular  position  of  being  unable,  in  spite 
of  avowedly  unremitting  endeavour,  to  push  his  con- 
tinued disbursements  in  the  service  of  humanity  up  to 
the  figure  of  his  current  income.  The  case  in  question 
is  one  of  the  most  meritoriovis  known  to  the  records  of 


Peace  Without  Honour 


165 


modern  business,  and  while  it  will  conveniently  serve  to 
illustrate  many  an  other,  and  perhaps  more  consequential 
truth  come  to  realisation  in  the  march  of  Triumphant 
Democracy,  it  will  also  serve  to  show  the  gainfulness  of 
an  unreservedly  canny  consumption  of  man-power  with 
an  eye  single  to  one’s  own  net  gain  in  terms  of  money. 

Evidently  this  is  a point  in  the  articulation  of  the 
modern  economic  system  where  a sufficiently  ruthless 
outside  authority,  not  actuated  by  a primary  regard  for 
the  pecuniary  interests  of  the  employers,  might  conceiv- 
ably with  good  effect  enforce  a more  economical  con- 
sumption of  the  country’s  man-power.  It  is  not  a mat- 
ter on  which  one  prefers  to  dwell,  but  it  can  do  no  harm 
to  take  note  of  the  fact  for  once  in  a way,  that  these 
several  national  establishments  of  the  democratic  order, 
as  they  are  now  organised  and  administered,  do  some- 
what uniformly  and  pervasively  operate  with  an  effectual 
view  to  the  advantage  of  a class,  so  far  as  may  plaus- 
ibly be  done.  They  are  controlled  by  and  administered 
in  behalf  of  those  elements  of  the  population  that,  for  the 
purpose  in  hand,  make  up  a single  loose-knit  class, — the 
class  that  lives  by  income  rather  than  by  work.  It  may 
be  called  the  class  of  the  business  interests,  or  of  cap- 
ital, or  of  gentlemen.  It  all  comes  to  much  the  same,  for 
the  purpose  in  hand. 

The  point  in  speaking  of  this  contingent  whose  place 
in  the  economy  of  human  affairs  it  is  to  consume,  or  to 
own,  or  to  pursue  a margin  of  profit,  is  simply  that  of 
contrasting  this  composite  human  contingent  with  the 
common  man;  whose  numbers  account  for  some  nine- 
tenths  or  more  of  the  community,  while  his  class  accounts 
for  something  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  invested  wealth. 


166 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


and  appreciably  less  than  that  proportion  of  the  discre- 
tionary national  establishment, — the  government,  national 
or  local,  courts,  attorneys,  civil  service,  diplomatic  and 
consular,  military  and  naval.  The  arrangement  may  be 
called  a gentlemen’s  government,  if  one  would  rather 
have  it  that  way ; but  a gentleman  is  necessarily  one  who 
lives  on  free  income  from  invested  wealth — without  such 
a source  of  free,  that  is  to  say  unearned,  income  he  be- 
comes a decayed  gentleman.  Again,  pushing  the  phras- 
ing back  a step  farther  toward  the  ground  facts,  there 
are  those  who  would  spealc  of  the  current  establishments 
as  “capitalistic;”  but  this  term  is  out  of  line  in  that  it 
fails  to  touch  the  human  element  in  the  case,  and  institu- 
tions, such  as  governmental  establishments  and  their  func- 
tioning, are  after  all  nothing  but  the  accustomed  ways 
and  means  of  human  behaviour;  so  that  “capitalistic” 
becomes  a synonym  for  “businessmen’s”  government  so 
soon  as  it  is  designated  in  terms  of  the  driving  incentives 
and  the  personnel.  It  is  an  organisation  had  with  a view 
to  the  needs  of  business  (i.  e.  pecuniary)  enterprise,  and 
is  made  up  of  businessmen  and  gentlemen,  which  comes 
to  much  the  same,  since  a gentleman  is  only  a business- 
man in  the  second  or  some  later  generation.  Except  for 
''the  slightly  odious  suggestion  carried  by  the  phrase,  one 
might  aptly  say  that  the  gentleman,  in  this  bearing,  is 
only  a businessman  gone  to  seed. 

By  and  large,  and  taking  the  matter  naively  at  the 
simple  face  value  of  the  material  gain  or  loss  involved, 
it  should  seem  something  of  an  idle  question  to  the  com- 
mon man  whether  his  collective  affairs  are  to  be  man- 
aged by  a home-bred  line  of  businessmen  and  their  suc- 
cessive filial  generations  of  gentlemen,  with  a view  to 
accelerate  the  veiocity  and  increase  the  volume  of  com- 


Peace  Without  Honour 


167 


petitive  gain  and  competitive  spending,  on  the  one  hand, 
or  by  an  alien  line  of  officials,  equally  aloof  from  his 
common  interests,  and  managing  affairs  with  a view  to 
the  usufruct  of  his  productive  powers  in  furtherance  of 
the  Imperial  dominion. 

Not  that  the  good  faith  or  the  generous  intentions  of 
these  governments  of  gentlemen  is  questioned  or  is  in 
any  degree  questionable ; what  is  here  spoken  of  is  only 
the  practical  effect  of  the  policies  which  they  pursue, 
doubtless  with  benevolent  intentions  and  well-placed  com- 
placency. In  effect,  things  being  as  they  are  today  in 
the  civilised  world’s  industry  and  trade,  it  happens,  as 
in  some  sort  an  unintended  but  all-inclusive  accident,  that 
the  guidance  of  affairs  by  business  principles  works  at 
cross  purposes  with  the  material  interests  of  the  com- 
mon man. 

So  ungraceful  a view  of  the  sacred  core  of  this  modern 
democratic  organisation  will  need  whatever  evidence  can 
be  cited  to  keep  it  in  countenance.  Therefore  indulgence 
is  desired  for  one  further  count  in  this  distasteful  recital 
of  ineptitudes  inherent  in  this  institutional  scheme  of  civ- 
ilised life.  This  count  comes  under  the  head  of  what 
may  be  called  capitalistic  sabotage.  “Sabotage”  is  em- 
ployed to  designate  a wilful  retardation,  interruption  or 
obstruction  of  industry  by  peaceable,  and  ordinarily  by 
legally  defensible,  measures.  In  its  present  application, 
particularly,  there  is  no  design  to  let  the  term  denote  or 
insinuate  a recourse  to  any  expedients  or  any  line  of 
conduct  that  is  in  any  degree  legally  dubious,  or  that  is 
even  of  questionable  legitimacy. 

Sabotage  so  understood,  as  not  comprising  recourse 
to  force  or  fraud,  is  a necessary  and  staple  expedient  of 
business  management,  and  its  employment  is  grounded  in 


168 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  elementary  and  indefeasible  rights  of  ownership. 
It  is  simply  that  the  businessman,  like  any  other  owner, 
is  vested  with  the  right  freely  to  use  or  not  to  use  his 
property  for  any  given  purpose.  His  decision,  for  rea- 
sons of  his  own,  not  to  employ  the  property  at  his  dis- 
posal in  a particular  way  at  a particular  time,  is  well 
and  blamelessly  within  his  legitimate  discretion,  under 
the  rights  of  property  as  universally  accepted  and  de- 
fended by  modern  nations.  In  the  particular  instance 
of  the  American  nation  he  is  protected  in  this  right  by 
a constitutional  provision  that  he  must  not  be  deprived  of 
his  property  without  due  process  of  law.  When  the  prop- 
erty at  his  disposal  is  in  the  shape  of  industrial  plant  or 
industrial  material,  means  of  transportation  or  stock  of 
goods  awaiting  distribution,  then  his  decision  not  to  em- 
ploy this  property,  or  to  limit  its  use  to  something  less 
than  full  capacity,  in  the  way  for  which  it  is  adapted,  be- 
comes sabotage,  nonnally  and  with  negligible  exceptions. 
In  so  doing  he  hinders,  retards  or  obstructs  the  working 
of  the  country’s  industrial  forces  by  so  much.  It  is  a 
matter  of  course  and  of  absolute  necessity  to  the  con- 
duct of  business,  that  any  discretionar}"  businessman  must 
be  free  to  deal  or  not  to  deal  in  any  given  case ; to  limit 
or  to  withhold  the  equipment  under  his  control,  without 
reservation.  Business  discretion  and  business  strategy, 
in  fact,  has  no  other  means  by  which  to  work  out  its 
aims.  So  that,  in  effect,  all  business  sagacity  reduces 
itself  in  the  last  analysis  to  a judicious  use  of  sabotage. 
Under  modern  conditions  of  large  business,  particularly, 
the  relation  of  the  discretionary  businessman  to  industry 
is  that  of  authoritative  permission  and  of  authoritative 
limitation  or  stoppage,  and  on  his  shrewd  use  of  this 
authority  depends  the  gainfulness  of  his  enterprise. 


Peace  Without  Honour 


169 


If  this  authority  were  exercised  with  an  eye  single  to 
the  largest  and  most  serviceable  output  of  goods  and 
services,  or  to  the  most  economical  use  of  the  country’s 
material  resources  and  man-power,  regardless  of  pecun- 
iary consequences,  the  course  of  management  so  carried 
out  would  be  not  sabotage  but  industrial  strategy.  But 
business  is  carried  on  for  pecuniary  gain,  not  with  an 
unreserved  view  to  the  largest  and  most  serviceable  out- 
put or  to  the  economical  use  of  resources.  The  volume 
and  serviceability  of  the  output  must  wait  unreservedly 
on  the  very  particular  pecuniary  question  of  what  quan- 
tity and  what  degree  of  serviceability  will  yield  the  largest 
net  return  in  terms  of  price.  Uneconomical  use  of  equip- 
ment, labor  and  resources  is  necessarily  an  everyday  mat- 
ter under  these  circumstances,  as  in  the  duplication  of 
plant  and  processes  between  rival  concerns,  and  in  the 
wasteful  use  of  all  resources  that  do  not  involve  ex- 
penditure on  the  part  of  the  given  concern. 

It  has  been  the  traditional  dogma  among  economists 
and  publicists  in  these  modern  communities  that  free  com- 
petition between  the  businessmen  in  charge  will  inde- 
feasibly  act  to  bring  the  productiveness  of  industry  to 
the  highest  practicable  pitch  and  would  lead  to  the  most 
unreserved  and  vigilant  endeavour  to  serve  the  com- 
munity’s material  needs  at  all  points.  The  reasons  for 
the  failure  of  this  genial  expectation,  particularly  under 
latterday  business  management,  might  be  shown  in  some 
detail,  if  that  were  needed  to  enforce  the  argument  as  it 
runs  in  the  present  connection.  But  a summary  indica- 
tion of  the  commoner  varieties  and  effects  of  sabotage 
as  it  is  systematically  applied  in  the  businesslike  con- 
duct of  industry  will  serve  the  purpose  as  well  and  with 
less  waste  of  words  and  patience. 


170 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


It  is  usual  to  notice,  and  not  unusual  to  deplore  the 
duplication  of  plant  and  appliances  in  many  lines  of  in- 
dustry, due  to  competitive  management,  as  in  factories 
engaged  in  the  same  class  of  manufacture,  in  parallel 
or  otherwise  competing  railways  and  boat  lines,  in  retail 
merchandising,  and  in  some  degree  also  in  the  wholesale 
trade.  The  result,  of  course,  is  sabotage;  in  the  sense 
that  this  volume  of  appliances,  materials  and  workmen 
are  not  employed  to  the  best  advantage  for  the  com- 
munity. One  effect  of  the  arrangement  is  an  increased 
necessary  cost  of  the  goods  and  services  supplied  by 
these  means.  The  reason  for  it  is  competition  for  gain 
to  be  got  from  the  traffic.  That  all  this  is  an  untoward 
state  of  things  is  recognised  on  all  hands;  but  no  lively 
regret  is  commonly  spent  on  the  matter,  since  it  is  com- 
monly recognised  that  under  the  circumstances  there  is 
no  help  for  it  except  at  the  cost  of  a more  untoward 
remedy. 

The  competitive  system  having  been  tried  and  found 
good — or  at  least  so  it  is  assumed — it  is  felt  that  the 
system  will  have  to  be  accepted  with  the  defects  of  its 
qualities.  Its  characteristic  qualities  are  held  to  be  good, 
acceptable  to  the  tastes  of  modern  men  whose  habits 
of  thought  have  been  standardised  in  its  terms;  and  it 
would  be  only  reluctantly  and  by  tardy  concession  that 
these  modern  men  could  bring  themselves  to  give  up  that 
scheme  of  “Natural  Liberty”  within  the  framework  of 
which  runs  this  competitive  system  of  business  manage- 
ment and  its  wasteful  manifolding  of  half-idle  equipment 
and  nugatory  work.  The  common  man,  at  the  worst, 
comforts  himself  and  his  neighbour  with  the  sage  reflec- 
tion that  “It  might  have  been  worse.”  The  businessmen, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  also  begun  to  take  note  of  this 


Peace  Without  Honour 


171 


systematic  waste  by  duplication  and  consequent  incom- 
petence, and  have  taken  counsel  how  to  intercept  the 
waste  and  divert  it  to  their  own  profit.  The  business- 
men’s remedy  is  consolidation  of  competing  concerns,  and 
monopoly  control. 

To  the  common  man,  with  his  preconceptions  on  the 
head  of  “restraint  of  trade,”  the  proposed  remedy  seems 
more  vicious  than  the  evil  it  is  designed  to  cure.  The 
fault  of  the  remedy  plainly  is  not  that  the  mismanage- 
ment of  affairs  due  to  competitive  business  can  not  be 
corrected  by  recourse  to  monopoly,  but  only  that  the 
community,  it  is  presumed,  would  still  suffer  all  the  bur- 
dens and  discomforts  of  the  regime  of  competition  and 
sabotage,  with,  possibly,  further  inconveniences  and  im- 
positions at  the  hands  of  the  businesslike  monopoly ; 
which,  men  are  agreed,  may  fairly  be  depended  on  to 
use  its  advantage  unsparingly  under  the  business  prin- 
ciple of  charging  what  the  traffic  will  bear. 

There  is  also  this  other  singular  phenomenon  in  this 
modern  industrial  world,  that  something  not  very  far 
short  of  one-half  the  industrial  equipment  systematically 
lies  idle  for  something  approaching  one-half  the  time, 
or  is  worked  only  to  one-half  its  capacity  half  the  time; 
not  because  of  competition  between  these  several  indus- 
trial concerns,  but  because  business  conditions  will  not 
allow  its  continued  productive  use;  because  the  volume 
of  product  that  would  be  turned  out  if  the  equipment 
were  working  uninterruptedly  at  its  full  capacity  could 
not  be  sold  at  remunerative  prices.  From  time  to  time 
one  establishment  and  another  will  shut  down  during  a 
period  of  slack  times,  for  the  same  reason. 

This  state  of  things  is  singular  only  as  seen  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  community’s  material  interest,  not 


172 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  it  is  in  any  degree  unfamiliar  or  that  any  serious 
fault  is  found  with  the  captains  of  industry  for  so  shut- 
ting off  the  industrial  process  and  letting  the  industrial 
equipment  lie  waste.  As  all  men  know,  the  exigencies  of 
business  will  not  tolerate  production  to  supply  the  com- 
munity’s needs  under  these  circumstances;  although,  as 
is  equally  notorious,  these  slack  times,  when  production 
of  goods  is  unadvisable  on  grounds  of  business  expedi- 
ency, are  commonly  times  of  wide-spread  privation, 
"hard  times,”  in  the  community  at  large,  when  the  failure 
of  the  supply  is  keenly  felt. 

It  is  not  that  the  captains  of  industry  are  at  fault  in  so 
failing,  or  refusing,  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  commu- 
nity under  these  circumstances,  but  only  that  they  are 
helpless  under  the  exigencies  of  business.  They  can  not 
supply  the  goods  except  for  a price,  indeed  not  except 
for  a remunerative  price,  a price  which  will  add  some- 
thing to  the  capital  values  which  they  are  venturing  in 
their  various  enterprises.  So  long  as  the  exigencies  of 
price  and  of  pecuniary  gain  rule  the  case,  there  is  mani- 
festly no  escaping  this  enforced  idleness  of  the  country’s 
productive  forces. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  also  to  remark,  by  way  of 
parenthesis,  that  this  highly  productive  state  of  the  in- 
dustrial arts,  which  is  embodied  in  the  industrial  plant 
and  processes  that  so  are  systematically  and  advisedly 
retarded  or  arrested  under  the  rule  of  business,  is  at  the 
same  time  the  particular  pride  of  civilised  men  and  the 
most  tangible  achievement  of  the  civilised  world. 

A conservative  estimate  of  this  one  item  of  capitalistic 
sabotage  could  scarcely  appraise  it  at  less  than  a twenty- 
five  percent  reduction  from  the  normally  possible  pro- 
ductive capacity  of  the  community,  at  an  average  over 


Peace  Without  Honour 


173 


any  considerable  period;  and  a somewhat  thorough  re- 
view of  the  pertinent  facts  would  probably  persuade 
any  impartial  observer  that,  one  year  with  another,  such 
businesslike  enforced  idleness  of  plant  and  personnel 
lowers  the  actual  output  of  the  country’s  industry  by 
something  nearer  fifty  percent  of  its  ordinary  capacity 
when  fully  employed.  To  many,  such  an  assertion  may 
seem  extravagant,  but  with  further  reflection  on  the  well- 
known  facts  in  the  case  it  will  seem  less  so  in  proportion 
as  the  unfamiliarity  of  it  wears  off. 

However,  the  point  of  attention  in  the  case  is  not  the 
precise,  nor  the  approximate,  percentages  of  this  arrest 
and  retardation,  this  partial  neutralisation  of  modern  im- 
provements in  the  industrial  arts ; it  is  only  the  notorious 
fact  that  such  arrest  occurs,  systematically  and  advisedly, 
under  the  rule  of  business  exigencies,  and  that  there  is 
no  corrective  to  be  found  for  it  that  will  comport  with 
those  fundamental  articles  of  the  democratic  faith  on 
which  the  businessmen  necessarily  proceed.  Any  effec- 
tual corrective  would  break  the  framework  of  demo- 
cratic law  and  order,  since  it  would  have  to  traverse  the 
inalienable  right  of  men  who  are  born  free  and  equal, 
each  freely  to  deal  or  not  to  deal  in  any  pecuniary  con- 
juncture that  arises. 

But  it  is  at  the  same  time  plain  enough  that  this,  in 
the  larger  sense  untoward,  discrepancy  between  produc- 
tive capacity  and  current  productive  output  can  readily 
be  corrected,  in  some  appreciable  degree  at  least,  by  any 
sufficient  authority  that  shall  undertake  to  control  the 
country’s  industrial  forces  without  regard  to  pecuniary 
profit  and  loss.  Any  authority  competent  to  take  over 
the  control  and  regulate  the  conduct  of  the  community’s 
industry  with  a view  to  maximum  output  as  counted  by 


174 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


weight  and  tale,  rather  than  by  net  aggregate  price-income 
over  price-cost,  can  readily  effect  an  appreciable  increase 
in  the  effectual  productive  capacity;  but  it  can  be  done 
only  by  violating  that  democratic  order  of  things  within 
which  business  enterprise  runs.  The  several  belligerent 
nations  of  Europe  are  showing  that  it  can  be  done,  that 
the  sabotage  of  business  enterprise  can  be  put  aside  by 
sufficiently  heroic  measures.  And  they  are  also  showing 
that  they  are  all  aware,  and  have  always  been  aware,  that 
the  conduct  of  industry  on  business  principles  is  incom- 
petent to  bring  the  largest  practicable  output  of  goods 
and  services;  incompetent  to  such  a degree,  indeed,  as 
not  to  be  tolerable  in  a season  of  desperate  need,  when 
the  nation  requires  the  full  use  of  its  productive  forces, 
equipment  and  man-power,  regardless  of  the  pecuniary 
claims  of  individuals. 

Now,  the  projected  Imperial  dominion  is  a power  of 
the  character  required  to  bring  a sufficient  corrective  to 
bear,  in  case  of  need,  on  this  democratic  situation  in  which 
the  businessmen  in  charge  necessarily  manage  the  coun- 
try’s industry  at  cross  purposes  with  the  community’s — 
that  is  the  common  man’s — material  interest.  It  is  an  ex- 
traneous power,  to  whom  the  continued  pecuniary  gain 
of  these  nations’  businessmen  is  a minor  consideration, 
a negligible  consideration  in  case  it  shall  appear  that  the 
Imperial  usufruct  of  the  underlying  nation’s  productive 
forces  is  in  any  degree  impaired  by  the  businessmen’s 
management  of  it  for  their  own  net  gain.  It  is  difficult 
to  see  on  what  grounds  of  self-interest  such  an  Imperial 
government  could  consent  to  tolerate  the  continued  man- 
agement of  these  underlying  nations’  industries  on  busi- 
ness principles,  that  is  to  say  on  the  principle  of  the 


Peace  Without  Honour 


175 


maximum  pecuniary  gain  to  the  businesslike  managers; 
and  recent  experience  seems  to  teach  that  no  excessive, 
that  is  to  say  no  inconvenient,  degree  of  consideration 
for  vested  rights,  and  the  like,  would  long  embarrass  the 
Imperial  government  in  its  administration  of  its  usufruct. 

It  should  be  a reasonable  expectation  that,  without 
malice  and  with  an  unprejudiced  view  to  its  own  usu- 
fruct of  these  underlying  countries,  the  Imperial  estab- 
lishment would  take  due  care  that  no  systematically, 
and  in  its  view  gratuitously,  uneconomical  methods 
should  continue  in  the  ordinary  conduct  of  their  industry. 
Among  other  considerations  of  weight  in  this  connection 
is  the  fact  that  a contented,  well-fed,  and  not  wantonly 
over-worked  populace  is  a valuable  asset  in  such  a case. 
Similarly,  by  contraries,  as  an  asset  in  usufruct  to  such 
an  alien  power,  a large,  wealthy,  spendthrift,  body  of 
gentlefolk,  held  in  high  esteem  by  the  common  people, 
would  have  but  a slight  value,  conceivably  even  a negative 
value,  in  such  a case.  A wise  administration  would  pre- 
sumably look  to  their  abatement,  rather  than  otherwise. 
At  this  point  the  material  interest  of  the  common  man 
would  seem  to  coincide  with  that  of  the  Imperial  establish- 
ment. Still,  his  preconceived  notions  of  the  wisdom  and 
beneficence  of  his  gentlefolk  would  presumably  hinder 
his  seeing  the  matter  in  that  reasonable  light. 

Under  the  paramount  surveillance  of  such  an  alien 
power,  guided  solely  by  its  own  interest  in  the  usufruct 
of  the  country  and  its  population,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that 
class  privileges  and  discrimination  would  be  greatly 
abated  if  not  altogether  discontinued.  The  point  is  in 
some  doubt,  partly  because  this  alien  establishment  whose 
dominion  is  in  question  is  itself  grounded  in  class  pre- 
rogatives and  discrimination,  and  so,  not  improbably. 


176 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace^ 


it  would  carry  over  into  its  supervision  of  the  underlying 
nations  something  of  a bias  in  favor  of  class  privileges. 
And  a similar  order  of  things  might  also  result  by 
choice  of  a class-system  as  a convenient  means  of  control 
and  exploitation.  The  latter  consideration  is  presumably 
the  more  cogent,  since  the  Imperial  establishment  in  ques- 
tion is  already,  by  ancient  habit,  familiar  with  the  method 
of  control  by  class  and  privilege ; and,  indeed,  unfamiliar 
with  any  other  method.  Such  a government,  which  gov- 
erns without  effectual  advice  or  formal  consent  of  the 
governed,  will  almost  necessarily  rest  its  control  of  the 
country  on  an  interested  class,  of  sufficient  strength  and 
bound  by  sufficiently  grave  interest  to  abet  the  Imperial 
establishment  effectually  in  all  its  adventures  and  enter- 
prises. 

But  such  a privileged  order,  that  is  to  be  counted  in  to 
share  dynastic  usufruct  and  liabilities,  in  good  days  and 
evil,  will  be  of  a feudalistic  complexion  rather  than  some- 
thing after  the  fashion  of  a modern  business  community 
doing  business  by  investment  and  pecuniary  finesse.  It 
would  still  be  a reasonable  expectation  that  discrimina- 
tion between  pecuniary  classes  should  fall  away  under  this 
projected  alien  tutelage;  more  particularly  all  such  dis- 
crimination as  is  designed  to  benefit  any  given  class  or 
interest  at  the  cost  of  the  whole,  as,  e.  g.,  protective 
tariffs,  monopolistic  concessions  and  immunities,  engross- 
ing of  particular  lines  of  material  resources,  and  the  like. 

The  character  of  the  economic  policy  to  be  pursued 
should  not  be  difficult  of  apprehension,  if  only  these  un- 
derlying peoples  are  conceived  as  an  estate  in  tail  within 
the  dynastic  line  of  descent.  The  Imperial  establishment 
which  so  is  prospectively  to  take  over  the  surveillance  of 
these  modern  peoples  under  this  projected  enterprise 


Peace  Without  Honour 


177 


in  dominion,  may  all  the  more  readily  be  conceived  as 
handling  its  new  and  larger  resources  somewhat  unre- 
servedly as  an  estate  to  be  administered  with  a shrewd 
eye  to  the  main  chance,  since  such  has  always  been  its 
relation  to  the  peoples  and  territories  whose  usufruct  it 
already  enjoys.  It  is  only  that  the  circumstances  of 
the  case  will  admit  a freer  and  more  sagacious  application 
of  those  principles  of  usufruct  that  lie  at  the  root  of  the 
ancient  Culture  of  the  Fatherland. 

This  excessively  long,  and  yet  incomplete,  review  of  the 
presumptive  material  advantages  to  accrue  to  the  common 
man  under  a regime  of  peace  by  unconditional  surrender 
to  an  alien  dynasty,  brings  the  argument  apparently  to  the 
conclusion  that  such  an  eventuality  might  be  fortunate 
rather  than  the  reverse ; or  at  least  that  it  has  its  compen- 
sations, even  if  it  is  not  something  to  be  desired.  Such 
should  particularly  appear  to  be  the  presumption  in  case 
one  is  at  all  inclined  to  make  much  of  the  cultural  gains  to 
be  brought  in  under  the  new  regime.  And  more  particu- 
larity should  a policy  of  nonresistant  submission  to  the 
projected  new  order  seem  expedient  in  view  of  the  ex- 
ceedingly high,  not  to  say  prohibitive,  cost  of  resistance, 
or  even  of  materially  retarding  its  fulfillment. 


IS 


CHAPTER  V 


Peace  and  Neutrality 

Considered  simply  on  the  face  of  the  tangible  material 
interests  involved,  the  choice  of  the  common  man  in 
these  premises  should  seem  very  much  of  a foregone  con- 
clusion, if  he  could  persuade  himself  to  a sane  and  per- 
spicuous consideration  of  these  statistically  apparent 
merits  of  the  case  alone.  It  is  at  least  safely  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  has  nothing  to  lose,  in  a material  way,  and 
there  is  reason  to  look  for  some  slight  gain  in  creature 
comforts  and  in  security  of  life  and  limb,  consequent 
upon  the  elimination,  or  at  least  the  partial  disestablish- 
ment, of  pecuniary  necessity  as  the  sole  bond  and  criterion 
of  use  and  wont  in  economic  concerns. 

But  man  lives  not  by  bread  alone.  In  point  of  fact, 
and  particularly  as  touches  the  springs  of  action  among 
that  common  run  that  do  not  habitually  formulate  their 
aspirations  and  convictions  in  extended  and  grammatically 
defensible  documentary  form,  and  the  drift  of  whose  im- 
pulses therefore  is  not  masked  or  deflected  by  the  illusive 
consistencies  of  set  speech, — as  touches  the  common  run, 
particularly,  it  will  hold  true  with  quite  an  unacknowl- 
edged generality  that  the  material  means  of  life  are, 
after  all,  means  only ; and  that  when  the  question  of  what 
things  are  worth  while  is  brought  to  the  final  test,  it  is 
not  these  means,  nor  the  life  conditioned  on  these  means, 
that  are  seen  to  serve  as  the  decisive  criterion ; but  always 

178 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


179 


it  is  some  ulterior,  immaterial  end,  in  the  pursuit  of 
which  these  material  means  find  their  ulterior  ground  of 
valuation.  Neither  the  overt  testimony  nor  the  circum- 
stantial evidence  to  this  effect  is  unequivocal ; but  seen  in 
due  perspective,  and  regard  being  had  chiefly  to  the 
springs  of  concerted  action  as  shown  in  any  massive  move- 
ment of  this  common  run  of  mankind,  there  is,  after  all, 
little  room  to  question  that  the  things  which  commend 
themselves  as  indefeasibly  worth  while  are  the  things  of 
the  human  spirit. 

These  ideals,  aspirations,  aims,  ends  of  endeavour,  are 
by  no  means  of  a uniform  or  homogeneous  character 
throughout  the  modern  communities,  still  less  throughout 
the  civilised  world,  or  throughout  the  checkered  range  of 
classes  and  conditions  of  men;  but,  with  such  frequency 
and  amplitude  that  it  must  be  taken  as  a major  premise 
in  any  attempted  insight  into  human  behaviour,  it  will 
hold  true  that  they  are  of  a spiritual,  immaterial  nature. 

The  caution  may,  parenthetically,  not  be  out  of  place, 
that  this  characterisation  of  the  ulterior  springs  of  action 
as  essentially  not  of  the  nature  of  creature  comforts,  need 
be  taken  in  no  wider  extension  than  that  which  so  is 
specifically  given  it.  It  will  be  found  to  apply  as  touches 
the  conduct  of  the  common  run ; what  modification  of  it 
might  be  required  to  make  it  at  all  confidently  applicable 
to  the  case  of  one  and  another  of  those  classes  into 
whose  scheme  of  life  creature  comforts  enter  with  more 
pronounced  effect  may  be  more  of  a delicate  point.  But 

since  it  is  the  behaviour,  and  the  grounds  of  behaviour, 
of  the  common  run  that  are  here  in  question,  the  case  of 
their  betters  in  this  respect  may  conveniently  be  left  on 
one  side- 


180 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


The  question  in  hand  touches  the  behavior  of  the  com- 
mon man,  taken  in  the  aggregate,  in  face  of  the  quandary 
into  which  circumstances  have  led  him ; since  the  question 
of  what  these  modern  peoples  will  do  is  after  all  a ques- 
tion of  what  the  common  man  in  the  aggregate  will  do, 
of  his  own  motion  or  by  persuasion.  His  betters  may 
be  in  a position  to  guide,  persuade,  cajole,  mislead,  and 
victimise  him ; for  among  the  many  singular  conceits  that 
beset  the  common  man  is  the  persuasion  that  his  betters 
are  in  some  way  better  than  he,  wiser,  more  beneficent. 
But  the  course  that  may  so  be  chosen,  with  or  without 
guidance  or  persuasion  from  the  superior  classes,  as  well 
as  the  persistence  and  energy  with  which  this  course  is 
pursued,  is  conditioned  on  the  frame  of  mind  of  the 
common  run. 

Just  what  will  be  the  nature  and  the  concrete  expression 
of  these  ideal  aspirations  that  move  the  common  run  is 
a matter  of  habitual  preconceptions ; and  habits  of  thought 
vary  from  one  people  to  another  according  to  the  diver- 
sity of  experience  to  which  they  have  been  exposed. 
Among  the  Western  nations  the  national  prestige  has 
come  to  seem  worth  while  as  an  ulterior  end,  perhaps  be- 
yond all  else  that  is  comprised  in  the  secular  scheme  of 
things  desirable  to  be  had  or  to  be  achieved.  And  in  the 
apprehension  of  such  of  them  as  have  best  preserved 
the  habits  of  thought  induced  by  a long  experience  in 
feudal  subjection,  the  service  of  the  sovereign  or  the 
dynasty  still  stands  over  as  the  substantial  core  of  the 
cultural  scheme,  upon  which  sentiment  and  endeavour 
converge.  In  the  past  ages  of  the  democratic  peoples,  as 
well  as  in  the  present-day  use  and  wont  among  subjects  of 
the  dynastic  States — as  e.  g.,  Japan  or  Germany — men  are 
known  to  have  resolutely  risked,  and  lost,  their  life  for 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


181 


the  sake  of  the  sovereign’s  renown,  or  even  to  save  the 
sovereign’s  life;  whereas,  of  course,  even  the  slightest 
and  most  nebulous  reflection  would  make  it  manifest 
that  in  point  of  net  material  utility  the  sovereign’s  de- 
cease is  an  idle  matter  as  compared  with  the  loss  of  an 
able-bodied  workman.  The  sovereign  may  always  be 
replaced,  with  some  prospect  of  public  advantage,  or 
failing  that,  it  should  be  remarked  that  a regency  or 
inter-regnum  will  commonly  be  a season  of  relatively 
economical  administration.  Again,  religious  enthusiasm, 
and  the  furtherance  of  religious  propaganda,  may  come  to 
serve  the  same  general  purpose  as  these  secular  ideals,  and 
will  perhaps  serve  it  just  as  well.  Certain  “principles,”  of 
personal  liberty  and  of  opportunity  for  creative  self- 
direction  and  an  intellectually  worthy  life,  perhaps  may 
also  become  the  idols  of  the  people,  for  which  they  will 
then  be  willing  to  risk  their  material  fortune ; and  where 
this  has  happened,  as  among  the  democratic  peoples  of 
Christendom,  it  is  not  selfishly  for  their  own  personal  op- 
portunity to  live  untroubled  under  the  light  of  these  high 
principles  that  these  opinionated  men  are  ready  to  con- 
tend, but  rather  impersonally  for  the  human  right  which 
under  these  principles  is  the  due  of  all  mankind,  and 
particularly  of  the  incoming  and  of  later  generations. 

On  these  and  the  like  intangible  ends  the  common  man 
is  set  with  such  inveterate  predilection  that  he  will,  on 
provocation,  stick  at  nothing  to  put  the  project  through. 
For  such  like  ends  the  common  man  will  lay  down  his 
life;  at  least,  so  they  say.  There  may  always  be  some- 
thing of  rhetorical  affectation  in  it  all ; but,  after  all,  there 
js  sufficient  evidence  to  hand  of  such  substance  and  ten- 
acity in  the  common  man’s  hold  on  these  ideal  aspirations, 
on  these  idols  of  his  human  spirit,  as  to  warrant  the  as- 


182 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


sertion  that  he  is,  rather  commonly,  prepared  to  go  to 
greater  lengths  in  the  furtherance  of  these  immaterial 
gains  that  are  to  inure  to  someone  else  than  for  any  per- 
sonal end  of  his  own,  in  the  way  of  creature  comforts 
or  even  of  personal  renown. 

For  such  ends  the  common  man,  in  democratic  Christen- 
dom is,  on  provocation,  willing  to  die ; or  again,  the 
patient  and  perhaps  more  far-seeing  common  man  of 
pagan  China  is  willing  to  live  for  these  idols  of  an 
inveterate  fancy,  through  endless  contumely  and  hard 
usage.  The  conventional  Chinese  preconceptions,  in  the 
way  of  things  that  are  worth  while  in  their  own  right, 
appear  to  differ  from  those  current  in  the  Occident  in 
such  a way  that  the  preconceived  ideal  is  not  to  be 
realised  except  by  way  of  continued  life.  The  common 
man’s  accountability  to  the  cause  of  humanity,  in  China, 
is  of  so  intimately  personal  a character  that  he  can  meet 
it  only  by  tenaciously  holding  his  place  in  the  sequence  of 
generations ; whereas  among  the  peoples  of  Christendom 
there  has  arisen  out  of  their  contentious  past  a preconcep- 
tion to  the  effect  that  this  human  duty  to  mankind  is  of 
the  nature  of  a debt,  which  can  be  cancelled  by  bank- 
ruptcy proceedings,  so  that  the  man  who  unprofitably 
dies  fighting  for  the  cause  has  thereby  constructively 
paid  the  reckoning  in  full. 

Evidently,  if  the  common  man  of  these  modern  nations 
that  are  prospectively  to  be  brought  under  tutelage  of  the 
Imperial  government  could  be  brought  to  the  frame  of 
mind  that  is  habitual  with  his  Chinese  counterpart,  there 
should  be  a fair  hope  that  pacific  counsels  would  prevail 
and  that  Christendom  would  so  come  in  for  a regime  of 
peace  by  submission  under  this  Imperial  tutelage.  But 
there  are  always  these  preconceptions  of  self-will  and  in- 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


18J 


subordination  to  be  counted  with  among  these  nations, 
and  there  is  the  ancient  habit  of  a contentious  national 
solidarity  in  defense  of  the  nation’s  prestige,  more  urgent 
among  these  peoples  than  any  sentiment  of  solidarity  with 
mankind  at  large,  or  any  ulterior  gain  in  civilisation  that 
might  come  of  continued  discipline  in  the  virtues  of 
patience  and  diligence  under  distasteful  circumstances. 

The  occidental  conception  of  manhood  is  in  some  con- 
siderable measure  drawn  in  negative  terms.  So  much 
60  that  whenever  a question  of  the  manly  virtues  comes 
under  controversy  it  presently  appears  that  at  least  the 
indispensable  minimum,  and  indeed  the  ordinary  mar- 
ginal modicum,  of  what  is  requisite  to  a worthy  manner 
of  life  is  habitually  formulated  in  terms  of  what  not. 
This  appearance  is  doubtless  misleading  if  taken  with- 
out the  universally  understood  postulate  on  the  basis  of 
which  negative  demands  are  formulated.  There  is  a 
good  deal  of  what  would  be  called  historical  accident  in 
all  this.  The  indispensable  demands  of  this  modern 
manhood  take  the  form  of  refusal  to  obey  extraneous 
authority  on  compulsion;  of  exemption  from  coercive 
direction  and  subservience ; of  insubordination,  in  short. 
But  it  is  always  understood  as  a matter  of  course  that 
this  insubordination  is  a refusal  to  submit  to  irresponsible 
or  autocratic  rule.  Stated  from  the  positive  side  it  would 
be  freedom  from  restraint  by  or  obedience  to  any  author- 
ity not  constituted  by  express  advice  and  consent  of  the 
governed.  And  as  near  as  it  may  be  formulated,  when 
reduced  to  the  irreducible  minimum  of  concrete  proviso, 
this  is  the  final  substance  of  things  which  neither  shame 
nor  honour  will  permit  the  modern  civilised  man  to  yield. 
To  no  arrangement  for  the  abrogation  of  this  minimum 
of  free  initiative  and  self-direction  will  he  consent  to  be 


184 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


a party,  whether  it  touches  the  conditions  of  life  for  his 
own  people  who  are  to  come  after,  or  as  touches  the 
fortunes  of  such  aliens  as  are  of  a like  mind  on  this 
head  and  arc  unable  to  make  head  against  invasion  of 
these  human  rights  from  outside. 

As  has  just  been  remarked,  the  negative  form  so 
often  taken  by  these  demands  is  something  of  an  historical 
accident,  due  to  the  fact  that  these  modern  peoples  came 
into  their  highly  esteemed  system  of  Natural  Liberty 
out  of  an  earlier  system  of  positive  checks  on  self-direc- 
tion and  initative ; a system,  in  effect,  very  much  after  the 
fashion  of  that  Imperial  jurisdiction  that  still  prevails 
in  the  dynastic  States — as,  e.  g.,  Germany  or  Japan — ■ 
whose  projected  dominion  is  now  the  immediate  object  of 
apprehension  and  repugnance.  How  naively  the  negative 
formulation  gained  acceptance,  and  at  the  same  time 
how  intrinsic  to  the  new  dispensation  was  the  aspiration 
for  free  initiative,  appears  in  the  confident  assertion  of  its 
most  genial  spokesman,  that  when  these  positive  checks 
are  taken  away,  “The  simple  and  obvious  system  of 
Natural  Liberty  establishes  itself  of  its  own  accord.” 

The  common  man,  in  these  modem  communities,  shows 
a brittle  temper  when  any  overt  move  is  made  against 
this  heritage  of  civil  liberty.  He  may  not  be  altogether 
well  advised  in  respect  of  what  liberties  he  will  defend 
and  what  he  will  submit  to ; but  the  fact  is  to  be  counted 
with  in  any  projected  peace,  that  there  is  always  this 
refractory  residue  of  terms  not  open  to  negotiation  or 
compromise.  Now  it  also  happens,  also  by  historical  ac- 
cident, that  these  residual  principles  of  civil  liberty  have 
come  to  blend  and  coalesce  with  a stubborn  preconception 
of  national  integrity  and  national  prestige.  So  that  in  the 
workday  apprehension  of  the  common  man,  not  given  to 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


185 


analytic  excursions,  any  infraction  of  the  national  in- 
tegrity or  any  abatement  of  the  national  prestige  has 
come  to  figure  as  an  insufferable  infringement  on  his 
personal  liberty  and  on  those  principles  of  humanity  that 
make  up  the  categorical  articles  of  the  secular  creed  of 
Christendom.  The  fact  may  be  patent  on  reflection  that 
the  common  man’s  substantial  interest  in  the  national 
integrity  is  slight  and  elusive,  and  that  in  sober  common 
sense  the  national  prestige  has  something  less  than  a 
neutral  value  to  him;  but  this  state  of  the  substantially 
j>ertinent  facts  is  not  greatly  of  the  essence  of  the  case, 
since  his  preconceptions  in  these  premises  do  not  run  to 
that  effect,  and  since  they  are  of  too  hard  and  fast  a 
texture  to  suffer  any  serious  abatement  within  such  a 
space  of  time  as  can  come  in  question  here  and  now. 

The  outlook  for  a speedy  settlement  of  the  world’s 
peace  on  a plan  of  unconditional  surrender  to  the  pro- 
jected Imperial  dominion  seems  unpromisingly  dubious, 
in  view  of  the  stubborn  temper  shown  by  these  modern 
peoples  wherever  their  preconceived  ideas  of  right  and 
honest  living  appear  to  be  in  jeopardy;  and  the  expedi- 
ency of  entering  into  any  negotiated  compact  of  diplo- 
matic engagements  and  assurances  designed  to  serve  as 
groundwork  to  an  eventual  enterprise  of  that  kind  must 
therefore  also  be  questionable  in  a high  degree.  It  is 
even  doubtful  if  any  allowance  of  time  can  be  counted  on 
to  bring  these  modern  peoples  to  a more  reasonable,  more 
worldly-wise,  frame  of  mind;  so  that  they  would  come 
to  see  their  interest  in  such  an  arrangement,  or  would 
divest  themselves  of  their  present  stubborn  and  perhaps 
fantastic  prejudice  against  an  autocratic  r6gime  of  the 
kind  spoken  for.  At  least  for  the  present  any  such  hope  of 


186 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


a peaceable  settlement  seems  illusive.  What  may  be  prac- 
ticable in  this  way  in  the  course  of  time  is  of  course  still 
more  obscure ; but  argument  on  the  premises  which  the 
present  affords  does  not  point  to  a substantially  different 
outcome  in  the  calculable  future. 

For  the  immediate  future — say,  within  the  life-time  of 
the  oncoming  generation — the  spiritual  state  of  the  peo- 
ples concerned  in  this  international  quandary  is  not  likely 
to  undergo  so  radical  a change  as  to  seriously  invalidate 
an  argument  that  proceeds  on  the  present  lie  of  the  land 
in  this  respect.  Preconceptions  are  a work  of  habit  im- 
pinging on  a given  temperamental  bent;  and  where,  as  in 
these  premises,  the  preconceptions  have  taken  on  an  in- 
stitutionalised form,  have  become  conventionalised  and 
commonly  accepted,  and  so  have  been  woven  into  the 
texture  of  popular  common  sense,  they  must  needs  be  a 
work  of  protracted  and  comprehensive  habituation  im- 
pinging on  a popular  temperamental  bent  of  so  general  a 
prevalence  that  it  may  be  called  congenital  to  the  com- 
munity at  large.  A heritable  bent  pervading  the  group 
within  which  inheritance  runs,  does  not  change,  so  long 
as  the  racial  complexion  of  the  group  remains  passably 
intact ; a conventionalised,  commonly  established  habit  of 
mind  will  change  only  slowly,  commonly  not  without  the 
passing  of  at  least  one  generation,  and  only  by  grace  of  a 
sufficiently  searching  and  comprehensive  discipline  of  ex- 
perience. For  good  or  ill,  the  current  situation  is  to  be 
counted  on  not  to  lose  character  over  night  or  with  a 
revolution  of  the  seasons,  so  far  as  concerns  these  spiritual 
factors  that  make  or  mar  the  fortunes  of  nations. 

At  the  same  time  these  spiritual  assets,  being  of  the 
nature  of  habit,  are  also  bound  to  change  character  more 
or  less  radically,  by  insensible  shifting  of  ground,  but 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


187 


incontinently, — provided  only  that  the  conditions  of  life, 
and  therefore  the  discipline  of  experience,  undergo  any 
substantial  change.  So  the  immediate  interest  shifts  to 
the  presumptive  rate  and  character  of  those  changes  that 
are  in  prospect,  due  to  the  unremitting  change  of  cir- 
cumstances under  which  these  modern  peoples  live  and  to 
the  discipline  of  which  they  are  unavoidably  exposed.  For 
the  present  and  for  the  immediate  future  the  current 
state  of  things  is  a sufficiently  stable  basis  of  argument ; 
but  assurance  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  premises  af- 
forded by  the  current  state  of  things  thins  out  in  pro- 
portion as  the  perspective  of  the  argument  runs  out  into 
the  succeeding  years.  The  bearing  of  it  all  is  twofold,  of 
course.  This  progressive,  cumulative  habituation  under 
changing  circumstances  affects  the  case  both  of  those 
democratic  peoples  whose  fortunes  are  in  the  hazard,  and 
also  of  those  dynastic  States  by  whom  the  projected  enter- 
prise in  dominion  is  to  be  carried  into  effect. 

The  case  of  the  two  formidable  dynastic  States  whose 
names  have  been  coupled  together  in  what  has  already 
been  said  is  perhaps  the  more  immediately  interesting  in 
the  present  connection.  As  matters  stand,  and  in  the 
measure  in  which  they  continue  so  to  stand,  the  case  of 
these  is  in  no  degree  equivocal.  The  two  dynastic  estab- 
lishments seek  dominion,  and  indeed  they  seek  nothing 
else,  except  incidentally  to  and  in  furtherance  of  the  main 
quest.  As  has  been  remarked  before,  it  lies  in  the  nature 
of  a dynastic  State  to  seek  dominion,  that  being  the  whole 
of  its  nature  in  so  far  as  it  runs  true  to  form.  But  a 
dynastic  State,  like  any  other  settled,  institutionalised  com- 
munity of  men,  rests  on  and  draws  its  effectual  driving 
force  from  the  habit  of  mind  of  its  underlying  community, 


188 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  common  man  in  the  aggregate,  his  preconceptions  and 
ideals  as  to  what  things  are  worth  while.  Without  a 
suitable  spiritual  ground  of  this  kind  such  a dynastic 
State  passes  out  of  the  category  of  formidable  Powers 
and  into  that  of  precarious  despotism. 

In  both  of  the  two  States  here  in  question  the  dynastic 
establishment  and  its  bodyguard  of  officials  and  gentle- 
folk may  be  counted  on  to  persevere  in  the  faith  that  now 
animates  them,  until  an  uneasy  displacement  of  senti- 
ment among  the  underlying  populace  may  in  time  induce 
them  judiciously  to  shift  their  footing.  Like  the  ruling 
classes  elsewhere,  they  are  of  a conservative  temper  and 
may  be  counted  on  so  to  continue.  They  are  also  not 
greatly  exposed  to  the  discipline  of  experience  that 
makes  for  adaptive  change  in  habits  of  life,  and  there- 
fore in  the  correlated  habits  of  thought.  It  is  always  the 
common  man  that  is  effectually  reached  by  any  exacting 
or  wide-reaching  change  in  the  conditions  of  life.  He  is 
relatively  unsheltered  from  any  forces  that  make  for 
adaptive  change,  as  contrasted  with  the  case  of  his  betters ; 
and  however  sluggish  and  reluctant  may  be  liis  response  to 
such  discipline  as  makes  for  a displacement  of  outworn 
preconceptions,  yet  it  is  always  out  of  the  mass  of  this 
common  humanity  that  those  movements  of  disaffection 
and  protest  arise,  which  lead,  on  occasion,  to  any  material 
realignment  of  the  institutional  fabric  or  to  any  sub- 
stantial shift  in  the  line  of  policy  to  be  pursued  under 
the  guidance  of  their  betters. 

The  common  mass  of  humanity,  it  may  be  said  in 
parenthesis,  is  of  course  not  a homogeneous  body.  Un- 
common men,  in  point  of  native  gifts  of  intelligence, 
sensibility,  or  personal  force,  will  occur  as  frequently,  in 
proportion  to  the  aggregate  numbers,  among  the  common 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


189 


mass  as  among  their  betters.  Since  in  any  one  of  these 
nations  of  Christendom,  with  their  all-inclusive  hybrid- 
isation, the  range,  frequency  and  amplitude  of  variations 
in  hereditary  endowment  is  the  same  throughout  all 
classes.  Class  differentiation  is  a matter  of  habit  and 
convention;  and  in  distinction  from  his  betters  the  com- 
mon man  is  common  only  in  point  of  numbers  and  in  point 
of  the  more  general  and  more  exacting  conditions  to  which 
he  is  exposed.  He  is  in  a position  to  be  more  hardly  rid- 
den by  the  discipline  of  experience,  and  is  at  the  same  time 
held  more  consistently  to  such  a body  of  preconceptions, 
and  to  such  changes  only  in  this  body  of  preconceptions,  as 
fall  in  with  the  drift  of  things  in  a larger  mass  of  human- 
ity. But  all  the  while  it  is  the  discipline  which  impinges 
on  the  sensibilities  of  this  common  mass  that  shapes  the 
spiritual  attitude  and  temper  of  the  community  and  so 
defines  what  may  and  what  may  not  be  undertaken  by  the 
constituted  leaders.  So  that,  in  a way,  these  dynastic 
States  are  at  the  mercy  of  that  popular  sentiment  whose 
creatures  they  are,  and  are  subject  to  undesired  changes 
of  direction  and  efficiency  in  their  endeavors,  contingent 
on  changes  in  the  popular  temper;  over  which  they  have 
only  a partial,  and  on  the  whole  a superficial  control. 

A relatively  powerful  control  and  energetic  direction  of 
the  popular  temper  is  and  has  been  exercised  by  these 
dynastic  establishments,  with  a view  to  its  utilisation  in 
the  pursuit  of  the  dynastic  enterprise ; and  much  has  visi- 
bly been  accomplished  in  that  way ; chiefly,  perhaps,  by 
military  discipline  in  subordination  to  personal  authority, 
and  also  by  an  unsparing  surveillance  of  popular  educa- 
tion, with  a view  to  fortify  the  preconceptions  handed 
down  from  the  passing  order  as  well  as  to  eliminate  all 
subversive  innovation.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  the  well-con- 


190 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


ceived  and  shrewdly  managed  endeavors  of  the  German 
Imperial  system  in  this  direction,  e.  g.,  there  has  been 
evidence  of  an  obscurely  growing  uneasiness,  not  to  say 
disaffection,  among  the  underlying  mass.  So  much  so 
that  hasty  observers,  and  perhaps  biased,  have  reached 
the  inference  that  one  of  the  immediate  contributory 
causes  that  led  to  the  present  war  was  the  need  of  a 
heroic  remedy  to  correct  this  untoward  drift  of  sentiment. 

For  the  German  people  the  government  of  the  present 
dynastic  incumbent  has  done  all  that  could  (humanly 
speaking)  be  expected  in  the  way  of  endeavoring  to  con- 
serve the  passing  order  and  to  hold  the  popular  imagina- 
tion to  the  received  feudalistic  ideals  of  loyal  service.  And 
yet  the  peoples  of  the  Empire  are  already  caught  in  the 
net  of  that  newer  order  which  they  are  now  endeavoring 
to  break  by  force  of  arms.  They  are  inextricably  impli- 
cated in  the  cultural  complex  of  Christendom;  and  with- 
in this  Western  culture  those  peoples  to  whom  it  fell  to 
lead  the  exodus  out  of  the  Egypt  of  feudalism  have  come 
quite  naturally  to  set  the  pace  in  all  the  larger  conform- 
ities of  civilised  life.  Within  the  confines  of  Christen- 
dom today,  for  good  or  ill,  whatever  usage  or  customary 
rule  of  conduct  falls  visibly  short  of  the  precedent  set 
by  these  cultural  pioneers  is  felt  to  fall  beneath  the  pre- 
scriptive commonplace  level  of  civilisation.  Failure  to 
adopt  and  make  use  of  those  tried  institutional  expedients 
on  which  these  peoples  of  the  advance  guard  have  set  their 
mark  of  authentication  is  today  presumptively  a mistake 
and  an  advantage  foregone ; and  a people  who  are  denied 
the  benefit  of  these  latterday  ways  and  means  of  civic 
life  are  uneasy  with  a sense  of  grievance  at  the  hands 
of  their  rulers.  Besides  which,  the  fashion  in  articles  of 
institutional  equipage  so  set  by  the  authentic  pioneers  of 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


191 


culture  has  also  come  to  be  mandatory,  as  a punctilio  of 
the  governmental  proprieties ; so  that  no  national  estab- 
lishment which  aspires  to  a decorous  appearance  in  the 
eyes  of  the  civilised  world  can  longer  afford  to  be  seen 
without  them.  The  forms  at  least  must  be  observed. 
Hence  the  “representative”  and  pseudo-representative  in- 
stitutions of  these  dynastic  States. 

These  dynastic  States  among  the  rest  have  partly  fol- 
lowed the  dictates  of  civilised  fashion,  partly  yielded  to 
the,  more  or  less  intelligent,  solicitations  of  their  sub- 
jects, or  the  spokesmen  of  their  subjects,  and  have  in- 
stalled institutional  apparatus  of  this  modern  pattern — 
more  in  point  of  form  than  of  substance,  perhaps.  Yet 
in  time  the  adoption  of  the  forms  is  likely  to  have  an 
effect,  if  changing  circumstances  favor  their  taking  effect. 
Such  has  on  the  whole  been  the  experience  of  those  peo- 
ples who  have  gone  before  along  this  trail  of  political 
advance.  As  instance  the  growth  of  discretionary  powers 
under  the  hands  of  parliamentary  representatives  in  those 
cases  where  the  movement  has  gone  on  longest  and 
farthest;  and  these  instances  should  not  be  considered 
idle,  as  intimations  of  what  may  presumptively  be  looked 
for  under  the  Imperial  establishments  of  Germany  or 
Japan.  It  may  be  true  that  hitherto,  along  with  the 
really  considerable  volume  of  imitative  gestures  of  dis- 
cretionary deliberation  delegated  to  these  parliamentary 
bodies,  they  have  as  regards  all  graver  matters  brought 
to  their  notice  only  been  charged  with  a (limited)  power 
to  talk.  It  may  be  true  that,  for  the  present,  on  critical 
or  weighty  measures  the  parliamentary  discretion  extends 
no  farther  than  respectfully  to  say : “Ja  wohl!”  But  then, 
Ja  wohl  is  also  something;  and  there  is  no  telling  where 
it  may  all  lead  to  in  the  long  course  of  years.  One  has 


192 


Qn  the  Nature  of  Peace 


a vague  apprehension  that  this  "Ja  wohlN  may  some  day 
come  to  be  a customarily  necessary  form  of  authentication, 
so  that  withholding  it  {Behiit’  es  Gott!)  may  even  come 
to  count  as  an  effectual  veto  on  measures  so  pointedly 
neglected.  More  particularly  will  the  formalities  of  rep- 
resentation and  self-government  be  likely  to  draw  the 
substance  of  such  like  ^‘free  institutions”  into  the  effect- 
ual conduct  of  public  affairs  if  it  turns  out  that  the 
workday  experiences  of  these  people  takes  a turn  more 
conducive  to  habits  of  insubordination  than  has  been  the 
case  hitherto. 

Indications  are,  again,  not  wanting,  that  even  in  the 
Empire  the  discipline  of  workday  experience  is  already 
diverging  from  that  line  that  once  trained  the  German 
subjects  into  the  most  loyal  and  unrepining  subservience 
to  dynastic  ambitions.  Of  course,  just  now,  under  the 
shattering  impact  of  warlike  atrocities  and  patriotic  clam- 
our, the  workday  spirit  of  insubordination  and  critical 
scrutiny  is  gone  out  of  sight  and  out  of  hearing. 

Something  of  this  inchoate  insubordination  has  showed 
itself  repeatedly  during  the  present  reign,  sufficient  to 
provoke  many  shrewd  protective  measures  on  the  side  of 
the  dynastic  establishment,  both  by  way  of  political 
strategy  and  by  arbitrary  control.  Disregarding  many 
minor  and  inconsequential  divisions  of  opinion  and  coun- 
sel among  the  German  people  during  this  eventful  reign, 
the  political  situation  has  been  moving  on  the  play  of 
three,  incipiently  divergent,  strains  of  interest  and  senti- 
ment: (a)  the  dynasty  (together  with  the  Agrarians,  of 
whom  in  a sense  the  dynasty  is  a part) ; (b)  the  business- 
men, or  commercial  interest  (including  investors)  ; and 
(c)  the  industrial  workmen.  Doubtless  it  would  be  easier 
to  overstate  than  to  indicate  with  any  nice  precision  what 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


193 


has  been  the  nature,  and  especially  the  degree,  of  this 
alienation  of  sentiment  and  divergence  of  conscious  in- 
terest among  these  several  elements.  It  is  not  that  there 
has  at  any  point  been  a perceptible  faltering  in  respect  of 
loyalty  to  the  crown  as  such.  But  since  the  crown  belongs, 
by  origin,  tradition,  interest  and  spiritual  identity,  in  the 
camp  of  the  Agrarians,  the  situation  has  been  such  as 
would  inevitably  take  on  a character  of  disaffection  to- 
ward the  dynastic  establishment,  in  the  conceivable  ab- 
sence of  that  strong  surviving  sentiment  of  dynastic 
loyalty  that  still  animates  all  classes  and  conditions  of 
men  in  the  Fatherland.  It  would  accordingly,  again,  be 
an  overstatement  to  say  that  the  crown  has  been  standing 
precariously  at  the  apex  of  a political  triangle,  the  other 
two  corners  of  which  are  occupied  by  these  two  divided 
and  potentially  recalcitrant  elements  of  the  body  politic, 
held  apart  by  class  antipathy  and  divergent  pecuniary  in- 
terest, and  held  in  check  by  divided  counsels;  but  some- 
thing after  that  fashion  is  what  would  have  resulted  under 
similar  conditions  of  strain  in  any  community  where  the 
modem  spirit  of  insubordination  has  taken  effect  in  any 
large  measure. 

Both  of  these  elements  of  incipient  disturbance  in  the 
dynastic  economy,  the  modern  commercial  and  working 
classes,  are  creatures  of  the  new  era ; and  they  are  system- 
atically out  of  line  with  the  received  dynastic  tradition  of 
fealty,  both  in  respect  of  their  pecuniary  interests  and  in 
respect  of  that  discipline  of  experience  to  which  their 
workday  employment  subjects  them.  They  are  substan- 
tially the  same  two  classes  or  groupings  that  came  for- 
ward in  the  modernisation  of  the  British  community, 
with  a gradual  segregation  of  interest  and  a consequent 
induced  solidaritj^  of  class  sentiment  and  class  animosi- 
13 


194 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


ties.  But  with  the  difference  that  in  the  British  case  the 
movement  of  changing  circumstances  was  slow  enough  to 
allow  a fair  degree  of  habituation  to  the  altered  econ- 
omic conditions;  whereas  in  the  German  case  the  move 
into  modern  economic  conditions  has  been  made  so 
precipitately  as  to  have  carried  the  mediaeval  frame  of 
mind  over  virtually  intact  into  this  era  of  large  business 
and  machine  industry.  In  the  Fatherland  the  commercial 
and  industrial  classes  have  been  called  on  to  play  their 
part  without  time  to  learn  their  lines. 

The  case  of  the  English-speaking  peoples,  who  have 
gone  over  this  course  of  experience  in  more  consecutive 
fashion  than  any  others,  teaches  that  in  the  long  run,  if 
these  modern  economic  conditions  persist,  one  or  the  other 
or  both  of  these  creatures  of  the  modern  era  must  prevail, 
and  must  put  the  dynastic  establishment  out  of  commis- 
sion ; although  the  sequel  has  not  yet  been  seen  in  this 
British  case,  and  there  is  no  ground  afforded  for  inference 
as  to  which  of  the  two  will  have  the  fortune  to  survive 
and  be  invested  with  the  hegemony.  Meantime  the  op- 
portunity of  the  Imperial  establishment  to  push  its  enter- 
prise in  dominion  lies  in  the  interval  of  time  so  required 
for  the  discipline  of  experience  under  modern  conditions 
to  work  out  through  the  growth  of  modern  habits  of 
thought  into  such  modern  (i.  e.  civilised)  institutional 
forms  and  such  settled  principles  of  personal  insubordina- 
tion as  will  put  any  effectual  dynastic  establishment  out 
of  commission.  The  same  interval  of  time,  that  must  so 
be  allowed  for  the  decay  of  the  dynastic  spirit  among  the 
German  people  under  the  discipline  of  life  by  the  methods 
of  modern  trade  and  industry,  marks  the  period  during 
which  no  peace  compact  will  be  practicable,  except  with 
the  elimination  of  the  Imperial  establishment  as  a pos- 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


195 


sible  warlike  power.  All  this,  of  course,  applies  to  the 
case  of  Japan  as  well,  with  the  difference  that  while  the 
Japanese  people  are  farther  in  arrears,  they  are  also  a 
smaller,  less  formidable  body,  more  exposed  to  outside 
forces,  and  their  mediaevalism  is  of  a more  archaic  and 
therefore  more  precarious  type. 

What  length  of  time  will  be  required  for  this  decay  of 
the  dynastic  spirit  among  the  people  of  the  Empire  is,  of 
course,  impossible  to  say.  The  factors  of  the  case  are  not 
of  a character  to  admit  anything  like  calculation  of  the 
rate  of  movement ; but  in  the  nature  of  the  factors  involv- 
ed it  is  also  contained  that  something  of  a movement  in 
this  direction  is  unavoidable,  under  Providence.  As  a 
preliminary  consideration,  these  peoples  of  the  Empire 
and  its  allies,  as  well  as  their  enemies  in  the  great  war,  will 
necessarily  come  out  of  their  warlike  experience  in  a 
more  patriotic  and  more  vindictive  frame  of  mind  than 
that  in  which  they  entered  on  this  adventure.  Fighting 
makes  for  malevolence.  The  war  is  itself  to  be  counted  as 
a set-back.  A very  large  proportion  of  those  who  have 
lived  through  it  will  necessarily  carry  a warlike  bent 
through  life.  By  that  much,  whatever  it  may  count  for, 
the  decay  of  the  dynastic  spirit — or  the  growth  of  toler- 
ance and  equity  in  national  sentiment,  if  one  chooses  to  put 
it  that  way — will  be  retarded  from  beforehand.  So  also 
the  Imperial  establishment,  or  whatever  is  left  of  it,  may 
be  counted  on  to  do  everything  in  its  power  to  preserve  the 
popular  spirit  of  loyalty  and  national  animosity,  by  all 
means  at  its  disposal ; since  the  Imperial  establishment 
finally  rests  on  the  effectual  body  of  national  animosity. 
What  hindrance  will  come  in  from  this  agency  of  re- 
tardation can  at  least  vaguely  be  guessed  at,  in  the  light  of 


196 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace^ 


what  has  been  accomplished  in  that  way  under  the  stren- 
uously reactionary  rule  of  the  present  reign. 

Again,  there  is  the  chance,  as  there  always  is  a chance 
of  human  folly,  that  the  neighboring  peoples  will  under- 
take, whether  jointly  or  severally,  to  restrict  or  prohibit 
trade  relations  between  the  people  of  the  Empire  and  their 
enemies  in  the  present  war;  thereby  fomenting  inter- 
national animosity,  as  well  as  contributing  directly  to  the 
economic  readiness  for  war  both  on  their  own  part  and 
on  that  of  the  Empire.  This  is  also,  and  in  an  eminent  de- 
gree, an  unknown  factor  in  the  case,  on  which  not  even 
a reasonable  guess  can  be  made  beforehand.  These  are, 
all  and  several,  reactionary  agencies,  factors  of  retarda- 
tion, making  for  continuation  of  the  current  international 
situation  of  animosity,  distrust,  chicane,  trade  rivalry, 
competitive  armament,  and  eventual  warlike  enterprise. 

To  offset  these  agencies  of  conservatism  there  is  noth- 
ing much  that  can  be  counted  on  but  that  slow,  random, 
and  essentially  insidious  working  of  habituation  that 
tends  to  the  obsolescence  of  the  received  preconceptions; 
partly  by  supplanting  them  with  something  new,  but  more 
effectually  by  their  falling  into  disuse  and  decay.  There 
is,  it  will  have  to  be  admitted,  little  of  a positive  char- 
acter that  can  be  done  toward  the  installation  of  a regime 
of  peace  and  good-will.  The  endeavours  of  the  pacifists 
should  suffice  to  convince  any  dispassionate  observer  of 
the  substantial  futility  of  creative  efforts  looking  to  such 
an  end.  Much  can  doubtless  be  done  in  the  way  of  pre- 
cautionary measures,  mostly  of  a negative  character,  in 
the  way  especially  of  removing  sources  of  infection  and 
(possibly)  of  so  sterilising  the  apparatus  of  national  life 
that  its  working  shall  neither  maintain  animosities  and  in- 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


197 


terests  at  variance  with  the  conditions  of  peace  nor  con- 
tribute to  their  spread  and  growth. 

There  is  necessarily  little  hope  or  prospect  that  any 
national  establishment  will  contribute  materially  or  in  any 
direct  way  to  the  obsolescence  of  warlike  sentiments  and 
ambitions ; since  such  establishments  are  designed  for  the 
making  of  war  by  keeping  national  jealousies  intact,  and 
their  accepted  place  in  affairs  is  that  of  preparation  for 
eventual  hostilities,  defensive  or  offensive.  Except  for  the 
contingency  of  eventual  hostilities,  no  national  establish- 
ment could  be  kept  in  countenance.  They  would  all  fall 
into  the  decay  of  desuetude,  just  as  has  happened  to  the 
dynastic  establishments  among  those  peoples  who  have 
(passably)  lost  the  spirit  of  dynastic  aggression. 

The  modern  industrial  occupations,  the  modern  tech- 
nology, and  that  modern  empirical  science  that  runs  so 
close  to  the  frontiers  of  technology,  all  work  at  cross  pur- 
poses with  the  received  preconceptions  of  the  nationalist 
order ; and  in  a more  pronounced  degree  they  are  at  cross 
purposes  with  that  dynastic  order  of  preconceptions  that 
converges  on  Imperial  dominion.  The  like  is  true,  with 
a difference,  of  the  ways,  means  and  routine  of  business 
enterprise  as  it  is  conducted  in  the  commercialised  com- 
munities of  today.  The  working  of  these  agencies  runs 
to  this  effect  not  by  way  of  deliberate  and  destructive 
antagonism,  but  almost  wholly  by  force  of  systematic, 
though  unintended  and  incidental,  neglect  of  those  values, 
standards,  verities,  and  grounds  of  discrimination  and 
conviction  that  make  up  the  working  realities  of  the 
national  spirit  and  of  dynastic  ambition.  The  working 
concepts  of  this  new,  essentially  mechanistic,  order  of 
human  interests,  do  not  necessarily  clash  with  those  of 
the  old  order,  essentially  the  order  of  personages  and 


198 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


personalities ; the  two  are  incommensurable,  and  they  are 
incompatible  only  in  the  sense  and  degree  implied  in 
that  state  of  the  case.  The  profoundest  and  most  meri- 
torious truths  of  dynastic  politics  can  on  no  provocation 
and  by  no  sleight  of  hand  be  brought  within  the  logic  of 
that  system  of  knowledge  and  appraisal  of  values  by 
which  the  mechanistic  technology  proceeds.  Within  the 
premises  of  this  modern  mechanistic  industry  and  science 
all  the  best  values  and  verities  of  the  dynastic  order 
are  simply  “incompetent,  irrelevant  and  impertinent.” 

There  is  accordingly  no  unavoidable  clash  and  no  nec- 
essary friction  between  the  two  schemes  of  knowledge  or 
the  two  habits  of  mind  that  characterise  the  two  con- 
trasted cultural  eras.  It  is  only  that  a given  individual — 
call  him  the  common  man — will  not  be  occupied  with  both 
of  these  incommensurable  systems  of  logic  and  apprecia- 
tion at  the  same  time  or  bearing  on  the  same  point ; and 
further  that  in  proportion  as  his  waking  hours  and  his 
mental  energy  are  fully  occupied  within  the  lines  of  one 
of  these  systems  of  knowledge,  design  and  emplojunent, 
in  much  the  same  measure  he  w’ill  necessarily  neglect  the 
other,  and  in  time  he  will  lose  proficiency  and  interest  in 
its  pursuits  and  its  conclusions.  The  man  who  is  so  held 
by  his  daily  employment  and  his  life-long  attention  with- 
in the  range  of  habits  of  thought  that  are  valid  in  the 
mechanistic  technology,  will,  on  an  average  and  in  the 
long  run,  lose  his  grip  on  the  spiritual  virtues  of  national 
prestige  and  dynastic  primacy;  “for  they  are  foolishness 
unto  him ; neither  can  he  know  them,  because  they  are 
spiritually  discerned.” 

Not  that  the  adepts  in  this  modern  mechanistic  system 
of  knowledge  and  design  may  not  also  be  ver}'  good  pa- 
triots and  devoted  servants  of  the  dynasty.  The  artless 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


199 


and,  on  the  whole,  spontaneous  riot  of  dynastic  avidity 
displayed  to  the  astonished  eyes  of  their  fellow  crafts- 
men in  the  neutral  countries  by  the  most  eminent  scien- 
tists of  the  Fatherland  during  the  early  months  of  the 
war  should  be  sufficient  warning  that  the  archaic  pre- 
conceptions do  not  hurriedly  fly  out  of  the  window  when 
the  habits  of  thought  of  the  mechanistic  order  come  in 
at  the  door.  But  with  the  passage  of  time,  pervasively, 
by  imperceptible  displacement,  by  the  decay  of  habitual 
disuse,  as  well  as  by  habitual  occupation  v>^ith  these  other 
and  unrelated  ways  and  means  of  knowledge  and  belief, 
dynastic  loyalty  and  the  like  conceptions  in  the  realm  of 
religion  and  magic  pass  out  of  the  field  of  attention  and 
fall  insensibly  into  the  category  of  the  lost  arts.  Particu- 
larly will  this  be  true  of  the  common  man,  who  lives, 
somewhat  characteristically,  in  the  mass  and  in  the  pres- 
ent, and  whose  waking  hours  are  somewhat  fully  occu- 
pied with  what  he  has  to  do. 

With  the  commercial  interests  the  Imperial  establish- 
ment can  probably  make  such  terms  as  to  induce  their 
support  of  the  dynastic  enterprise,  since  they  can  appar- 
ently always  be  made  to  believe  that  an  extension  of  the 
Imperial  dominion  will  bring  correspondingly  increased 
opportunities  of  trade.  It  is  doubtless  a mistake,  but 
it  is  commonly  believed  by  the  interested  parties,  which 
is  just  as  good  for  the  purpose  as  if  it  were  true.  And 
it  should  be  added  that  in  this,  as  in  other  instances  of 
the  quest  of  larger  markets,  the  costs  are  to  be  paid  by 
someone  else  than  the  presumed  commercial  beneficiaries  ; 
which  brings  the  matter  under  the  dearest  principle  known 
to  businessmen : that  of  getting  something  for  nothing. 
It  will  not  be  equally  easy  to  keep  the  affections  of  the 
common  man  loyal  to  the  dynastic  enterprise  when  he 


200 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


begins  to  lose  his  grip  on  the  archaic  faith  in  dynastic 
dominion  and  comes  to  realise  that  he  has  also — indi- 
vidually and  in  the  mass — no  material  interest  even  in 
the  defense  of  the  Fatherland,  much  less  in  the  further 
extension  of  Imperial  rule. 

But  the  time  when  this  process  of  disillusionment  and 
decay  of  ideals  shall  have  gone  far  enough  among  the 
common  run  to  afford  no  secure  footing  in  popular  sen- 
timent for  the  contemplated  Imperial  enterprise, — this 
time  is  doubtless  far  in  the  future,  as  compared  with  the 
interval  of  preparation  required  for  a new  onset.  Habitu- 
ation takes  time,  particularly  such  habituation  as  can  be 
counted  on  to  derange  the  habitual  bent  of  a great  pop- 
ulation in  respect  of  their  dearest  preconceptions.  It  will 
take  a very  appreciable  space  of  time  even  in  the  case  of 
a populace  so  accessible  to  new  habits  of  thought  as  the 
German  people  are  by  virtue  of  their  slight  percentage  of 
illiteracy,  the  very  large  proportion  engaged  in  those 
modern  industries  that  constantly  require  some  intelligent 
insight  into  mechanistic  facts,  the  density  of  population 
and  the  adequate  means  of  communication,  and  the  ex- 
tent to  which  the  whole  population  is  caught  in  the  web 
of  mechanically  standardised  processes  that  condition  their 
daily  life  at  every  turn.  As  regards  their  technological 
situation,  and  their  exposure  to  the  discipline  of  industrial 
life,  no  other  population  of  nearly  the  same  volume  is 
placed  in  a position  so  conducive  to  a rapid  acquirement 
of  the  spirit  of  the  modern  era.  But,  also,  no  other 
people  comparable  with  the  population  of  the  Fatherland 
has  so  large  and  well-knit  a body  of  archaic  preconcep- 
tions to  unlearn.  Their  nearest  analogue,  of  course,  is 
the  Japanese  nation. 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


201 


In  all  this  there  is,  of  course,  no  inclination  to  cast  a 
slur  on  the  German  people.  In  point  of  racial  charac- 
teristics there  is  no  difference  between  them  and  their 
neighbours.  And  there  is  no  reason  to  question  their 
good  intentions.  Indeed,  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  no 
people  is  more  consciously  well-meaning  than  the  children 
of  the  Fatherland.  It  is  only  that,  with  their  archaic 
preconceptions  of  what  is  right  and  meritorious,  their 
best  intentions  spell  malevolence  when  projected  into  the 
civilised  world  as  it  stands  today.  And  by  no  fault  of 
theirs.  Nor  is  it  meant  to  be  intimated  that  their  rate 
of  approach  to  the  accepted  Occidental  standard  of  insti- 
tutional maturity  will  be  unduly  slow  or  unduly  reluctant, 
so  soon  as  the  pertinent  facts  of  modem  life  begin  effec- 
tively to  shape  their  habits  of  thought.  It  is  only  that, 
human  nature — and  human  second  nature — being  what 
it  always  has  been,  the  rate  of  approach  of  the  German 
people  to  a passably  neutral  complexion  in  matters  of  in- 
ternational animosity  and  aggression  must  necessarily  be 
slow  enough  to  allow  ample  time  for  the  renewed  prep- 
aration of  a more  unsparing  and  redoubtable  endeavour 
on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  establishment. 

What  makes  this  German  Imperial  establishment  re- 
doubtable, beyond  comparison,  is  the  very  simple  but  also 
very  grave  combination  of  circumstances  whereby  the 
German  people  have  acquired  the  use  of  the  modern 
industrial  arts  in  the  highest  state  of  efficiency,  at  the 
same  time  that  they  have  retained  unabated  the  fanatical 
loyalty  of  feudal  barbarism. ^ So  long,  and  in  so  far, 
as  this  conjunction  of  forces  holds  there  is  no  outlook 

^For  an  extended  discussion  of  this  point,  see  Imperial  Ger- 
many and  the  Industrial  Revolution,  especially  ch.  v.  and  vi. 


202 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


for  peace  except  on  the  elimination  of  Germany  as  a 
power  capable  of  disturbing  the  peace. 

It  may  seem  invidious  to  speak  so  recurrently  of  the 
German  Imperial  establishment  as  the  sole  potential  dis- 
turber of  the  peace  in  Europe.  The  reason  for  so  singling 
out  the  Empire  for  this  invidious  distinction — of  merit 
or  demerit,  as  one  may  incline  to  take  it — is  that  the  facts 
run  that  way.  There  is,  of  course,  other  human  mate- 
rial, and  no  small  volume  of  it  in  the  aggregate,  that  is 
of  much  the  same  character,  and  serviceable  for  the  same 
purposes  as  the  resources  and  man-power  of  the  Empire. 
But  this  other  material  can  come  effectually  into  bearing 
as  a means  of  disturbance  only  in  so  far  as  it  clusters 
about  the  Imperial  dynasty  and  marches  under  his  ban- 
ners. In  so  speaking  of  the  Imperial  establishment  as  the 
sole  enemy  of  a European  peace,  therefore,  these  out- 
lying others  are  taken  for  granted,  very'  much  as  one 
takes  the  nimbus  for  granted  in  speaking  of  one  of  the 
greater  saints  of  God. 

So  the  argument  returns  to  the  alternative:  Peace  by 
unconditional  surrender  and  submission,  or  peace  by 
elimination  of  Imperial  Germany  (and  Japan).  There 
is  no  middle  course  apparent.  The  old-fashioned — that 
is  to  say  nineteenth-century — plan  of  competitive  defen- 
sive armament  and  a balance  of  powers  has  been  tried, 
and  it  has  not  proved  to  be  a success,  even  so  early  in 
the  twentieth  century.  This  plan  offers  a substitute  {Er- 
satz) for  peace;  but  even  as  such  it  has  become  imprac- 
ticable. The  modern,  or  rather  the  current  late-modem, 
state  of  the  industrial  arts  does  not  tolerate  it.  Techno- 
logical knowledge  has  thrown  the  advantage  in  military 
affairs  definitively  to  the  offensive,  particularly  to  the 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


203 


offensive  that  is  prepared  beforehand  with  the  suitable 
appliances  and  with  men  ready  matured  in  that  rigorous 
and  protracted  training  by  which  alone  they  can  become 
competent  to  make  warlike  use  of  these  suitable  appli- 
ances provided  by  the  modem  technology.  At  the  same 
time,  and  by  grace  of  the  same  advance  in  technology, 
any  well-designed  offensive  can  effectually  reach  any 
given  community,  in  spite  of  distance  or  of  other  natural 
obstacles.  The  era  of  defensive  armaments  and  diplo- 
matic equilibration,  as  a substitute  for  peace,  has  been 
definitively  closed  by  the  modern  state  of  the  industrial 
arts. 

Of  the  two  alternatives  spoken  of  above,  the  former 
— peace  by  submission  under  an  alien  dynasty — is  pre- 
sumably not  a practicable  solution,  as  has  appeared  in  the 
course  of  the  foregoing  argument. 

The  modern  nations  are  not  spiritually  ripe  for  it. 
Whether  they  have  reached  even  that  stage  of  national 
sobriety,  or  neutrality,  that  would  enable  them  to  live 
at  peace  among  themselves  after  elimination  of  the  Im- 
perial Powers  is  still  open  to  an  uneasy  doubt.  It  would 
be  by  a precarious  margin  that  they  can  be  counted  on 
so  to  keep  the  peace  in  the  absence  of  provocation  from 
without  the  pale.  Their  predilection  for  peace  goes  to 
no  greater  lengths  than  is  implied  in  the  formula:  Peace 
with  Honour ; which  assuredly  does  not  cover  a peace 
of  non-resistance,  and  which,  in  effect,  leaves  the  distinc- 
tion between  an  offensive  and  a defensive  v/ar  somewhat 
at  loose  ends.  The  national  prestige  is  still  a live  asset 
in  the  mind  of  these  peoples;  and  the  limit  of  tolerance 
in  respect  of  this  patriotic  animosity  appears  to  be  drawn 
appreciably  closer  than  the  formula  cited  above  would 
necessarily  presume.  They  will  fight  on  provocation. 


204 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


and  the  degree  of  provocation  required  to  upset  the  se- 
renity of  these  sportsmanlike  modern  peoples  is  a point 
on  which  the  shrewdest  guesses  may  diverge.  Still,  opin- 
ion runs  more  and  more  consistently  to  the  effect  that 
if  these  modern — say  the  French  and  the  English-speaking 
— peoples  were  left  to  their  own  devices  the  peace  might 
fairly  be  counted  on  to  be  kept  between  them  indefinitely, 
barring  unforeseen  contingencies. 

Experience  teaches  that  warlike  enterprise  on  a mod- 
erate scale  and  as  a side  interest  is  by  no  means  incom- 
patible with  such  a degree  of  neutral  animus  as  these  peo- 
ples have  yet  acquired, — e.  g.,  the  Spanish-American  war, 
which  was  made  in  America,  or  the  Boer  war,  which 
was  made  in  England.  But  these  wars,  in  spite  of  the 
dimensions  which  they  presently  took  on,  w'ere  after  all 
of  the  nature  of  episodes, — the  one  chiefly  an  extension 
of  sportsmanship,  which  engaged  the  best  attention  of 
only  the  more  sportsmanlike  elements,  the  other  chiefly 
engineered  by  certain  business  interests  w'ith  a callous 
view  to  getting  something  for  nothing.  Both  episodes 
came  to  be  serious  enough,  both  in  their  immediate  in- 
cidence and  in  their  consequences;  but  neither  com- 
manded the  deliberate  and  cordial  support  of  the  com- 
munity at  large.  There  is  a meretricious  air  over  both; 
and  there  is  a.pparent  a popular  inclination  to  condone 
rather  than  to  take  pride  in  these  faits  accomplis.  The 
one  excursion  was  a product  of  sportsmanlike  bravado, 
fed  on  boyish  exuberance,  fomented  for  mercenary  ob- 
jects by  certain  business  interests  and  place-hunting  pol- 
iticians, and  incited  by  meretricious  newspapers  with  a 
view  to  increase  their  circulation.  The  other  was  set 
afoot  by  interested  businessmen,  backed  by  politicians, 
seconded  by  newspapers,  and  borne  by  the  community 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


205 


at  large,  in  great  part  under  misapprehension  and  stung 
by  wounded  pride. 

Opinions  will  diverge  widely  as  to  the  chances  of  peace 
in  a community  of  nations  among  whom  episodes  of  this 
character,  and  of  such  dimensions,  have  been  somewhat 
more  than  tolerated  in  the  immediate  past.  But  the  con- 
sensus of  opinion  in  these  same  countries  appears  to  be 
setting  with  fair  consistency  to  the  persuasion  that  the 
popular  spirit  shown  in  these  and  in  analogous  conjunc- 
tures in  the  recent  past  gives  warrant  that  peace  is  delib- 
erately desired  and  is  likely  to  be  maintained,  barring 
unforeseen  contingencies. 

In  the  large,  the  measures  conducive  to  the  perpetuation 
of  peace,  and  necessary  to  be  taken,  are  simple  and  ob- 
vious ; and  they  are  largely  of  a negative  character,  ex- 
ploits of  omission  and  neglect.  Under  modern  conditions, 
and  barring  aggression  from  without,  the  peace  is  kept 
by  avoiding  the  breal<ing  of  it.  It  does  not  break  of  it.self, 
— in  the  absence  of  such  national  establishments  as  are 
organised  with  the  sole  ulterior  view  of  warlike  enterprise. 
A policy  of  peace  is  obviously  a policy  of  avoidance, — 
avoidance  of  offense  and  of  occasion  for  annoyance. 

What  is  required  to  insure  the  maintenance  of  peace 
among  pacific  nations  is  the  neutralisation  of  all  those 
human  relations  out  of  which  international  grievances  are 
wont  to  arise.  And  what  is  necessary  to  assure  a reason- 
able expectation  of  continued  peace  is  the  neutralisation 
of  so  much  of  these  relations  as  the  patriotic  self-con- 
ceit and  credulity  of  these  peoples  will  permit.  These 
two  formulations  are  by  no  means  identical ; indeed,  the 
disparity  between  what  could  advantageously  be  dispensed 
with  in  the  way  of  national  rights  and  pretensions,  and 


206 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


what  the  common  run  of  modern  patriots  could  be  in- 
duced to  relinquish,  is  probably  much  larger  than  any  san- 
guine person  would  like  to  believe.  It  should  be  plain  on 
slight  reflection  that  the  greater  part,  indeed  substan- 
tially the  whole,  of  those  material  interests  and  demands 
that  now  engage  the  policy  of  the  nations,  and  that  serve 
on  occasion  to  set  them  at  variance,  might  be  neutralised 
or  relinquished  out  of  hand,  without  detriment  to  any 
one  of  the  peoples  concerned. 

The  greater  part  of  these  material  interests  over  which 
the  various  national  establishments  keep  watch  and  hold 
pretensions  are,  in  point  of  historical  derivation,  a legacy 
from  the  princely  politics  of  what  is  called  the  “Mer- 
cantilist” period ; and  they  are  uniformly  of  the  nature  of 
gratuitous  interference  or  discrimination  between  the  citi- 
zens of  the  given  nation  and  outsiders.  Except  (doubt- 
fully) in  the  English  case,  where  mercantilist  policies  are 
commonly  believed  to  have  been  adopted  directly  for  the 
benefit  of  the  commercial  interest,  measures  of  this  na- 
ture are  uniformly  traceable  to  the  endeavours  of  the 
crown  and  its  officers  to  strengthen  the  finances  of  the 
prince  and  give  him  an  advantage  in  warlike  enterprise. 
They  are  kept  up  essentially  for  the  same  eventual  end 
,of  preparation  for  war.  So,  e.  g.,  protective  tariffs,  and 
the  like  discrimination  in  shipping,  are  still  advocated  as  a 
means  of  making  the  nation  self-supporting,  self-con- 
tained, self-sufficient;  with  a view  to  readiness  in  the 
event  of  hostilities. 

A nation  is  in  no  degree  better  off  in  time  of  peace  for 
being  self-sufficient.  In  point  of  patent  fact  no  nation 
can  be  industrially  self-sufficient  except  at  the  cost  of 
foregoing  some  of  the  economic  advantages  of  that  spec- 
ialisation of  industry  which  the  modern  state  of  the  in- 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


2P)7 


dustrial  arts  enforces.  In  time  of  peace  there  is  no  benefit 
comes  to  the  community  at  large  from  such  restraint  of 
trade  with  the  outside  world,  or  to  any  class  or  section 
of  the  community  except  those  commercial  concerns  that 
are  favored  by  the  discrimination;  and  these  invariably 
gain  their  special  advantage  at  the  cost  of  their  compa- 
triots. Discrimination  in  trade — export,  import  or  ship- 
ping— has  no  more  beneficial  effect  when  carried  out 
publicly  by  the  national  authorities  than  when  effected 
surreptitiously  and  illegally  by  a private  conspiracy  in 
restraint  of  trade  within  a group  of  interested  business 
concerns. 

Hitherto  the  common  man  has  found  it  difficult  to  divest 
himself  of  an  habitual  delusion  on  this  head,  handed  down 
out  of  the  past  and  inculcated  by  interested  politicians,  to 
the  effect  that  in  some  mysterious  way  he  stands  to  gain 
by  limiting  his  own  opportunities.  But  the  neutralisation 
of  international  trade,  or  the  abrogation  of  all  discrimina- 
tion in  trade,  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom  as  touches  the 
perpetuation  of  peace.  The  first  effect  of  such  a neutral 
policy  would  be  wider  and  more  intricately  interlocking 
trade  relations,  coupled  with  a further  specialisation  and 
mutual  dependence  of  industry  between  the  several  coun- 
tries concerned ; which  would  mean,  in  terms  of  inter- 
national comity,  a lessened  readiness  for  warlike  opera- 
tions all  around.  \ 

It  used  to  be  an  argument  of  the  free-traders  that  the 
growth  of  international  commercial  relations  under  a 
free-trade  policy  would  greatly  conduce  to  a spirit  of 
mutual  understanding  and  forbearance  between  the  na- 
tions. There  may  or  may  not  be  something  appreciable 
in  the  contention;  it  has  been  doubted,  and  there  is  no 
considerable  evidence  to  be  had  in  support  of  it.  But 


208 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


what  is  more  to  the  point  is  the  tangible  fact  that  such 
specialisation  of  industry  and  consequent  industrial  inter- 
dependence would  leave  all  parties  to  this  relation  less 
capable,  materially  and  spiritually,  to  break  off  amicable 
relations.  So  again,  in  time  of  peace  and  except  with 
a view  to  eventual  hostilities,  it  would  involve  no  loss, 
and  presumably  little  pecuniary  gain,  to  any  country, 
locality,  town  or  class,  if  all  merchant  shipping  were 
registered  indiscriminately  under  neutral  colors  and  sailed 
under  the  neutral  no-man’s  flag,  responsible  indiscrim- 
inately to  the  courts  where  they  touched  or  where  their 
business  was  transacted. 

Neither  producers,  shippers,  merchants  nor  consumers 
have  any  slightest  interest  in  the  national  allegiance  of 
the  carriers  of  their  freight,  except  such  as  may  artificially 
be  induced  by  discriminatory  shipping  regulations.  In 
all  but  the  name — in  time  of  peace — the  world’s  merchant 
shipping  already  comes  near  being  so  neutralised,  and  the 
slight  further  simplification  required  to  leave  it  on  a 
neutral  p)eace  footing  would  be  little  else  than  a neglect  of 
such  vexatious  discrimination  as  is  still  in  force.  If  no 
nation  could  claim  the  allegiance,  and  therefore  the  usu- 
fruct, of  any  given  item  of  merchant  shipping  in  case 
of  eventual  hostilities,  on  account  of  the  domicile  of  the 
owners  or  the  port  of  registry,  that  would  create  a further 
handicap  on  eventual  warlike  enterprise  and  add  so  much 
to  the  margin  of  tolerance.  At  the  same  time,  in  the  event 
of  hostilities,  shipping  sailing  under  the  neutral  no-man’s 
flag  and  subject  to  no  national  allegiance  would  enjoy  such 
immunities  as  still  inure  to  neutral  shipping.  It  is  true, 
neutrality  has  not  carried  many  immunities  lately. 

Cumulatively  effective  usage  and  the  exigencies  of  a 
large,  varied,  shifting  and  extensive  maritime  trade  have 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


209 


in  the  course  of  time  brought  merchant  shipping  to  some- 
thing approaching  a neutral  footing.  For  most,  one  might 
venture  to  say  for  virtually  all,  routine  purposes  of  busi- 
ness and  legal  liability  the  merchant  shipping  comes  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  local  courts,  without  reservation. 
It  is  true,  there  still  are  formalities  and  reservations  which 
enable  questions  arising  out  of  incidents  in  the  shipping 
trade  to  become  subject  of  international  conference  and 
adjustment,  but  they  are  after  all  not  such  as  would  war- 
rant the  erection  of  national  apparatus  to  take  care  of 
them  in  case  they  were  not  already  covered  by  usage  to 
that  effect.  The  visible  drift  of  usage  toward  neutralisa- 
tion in  merchant  shipping,  in  maritime  trade,  and  in  inter- 
national commercial  transactions,  together  with  the  simi- 
larly visible  feasibility  of  a closer  approach  to  unreserved 
neutralisation  of  this  whole  range  of  traffic,  suggests  that 
much  the  same  line  of  considerations  should  apply  as 
regards  the  personal  and  pecuniary  rights  of  citizens  trav- 
eling or  residing  abroad.  The  extreme, — or,  as  seen 
from  the  present  point  of  view,  the  ultimate — term  in  the 
relinquishment  of  national  pretensions  along  this  line 
would  of  course  be  the  neutralisation  of  citizenship. 

This  is  not  so  sweeping  a move  as  a patriotically-minded 
person  might  imagine  on  the  first  alarm,  so  far  as  touches 
the  practical  status  of  the  ordinary  citizen  in  his  ordinary 
relations,  and  particularly  among  the  English-speaking 
peoples.  As  an  illustrative  instance,  citizenship  has  sat 
somewhat  lightly  on  the  denizens  of  the  American  re- 
public, and  with  no  evident  damage  to  the  community  at 
large  or  to  the  inhabitants  in  detail.  Naturalisation  has 
been  easy,  and  has  been  sought  with  no  more  eagerness, 
on  the  whole,  than  the  notably  low  terms  of  its  acquire- 
ment would  ind.icate.  Without  loss  fiv  discomfort  many 
14  . 


210 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


law-abiding  aliens  have  settled  in  this  country  and  spent 
the  greater  part  of  a life-time  under  its  laws  without  be- 
coming citizens,  and  no  one  the  Avorse  or  the  wiser  for 
it.  Not  infrequently  the  decisive  inducement  to  natu- 
ralisation on  the  part  of  immigrant  aliens  has  been,  and 
is,  the  desirability  of  divesting  themselves  of  their  rights 
of  citizenship  in  the  country  of  their  origin.  Not  that 
the  privilege  and  dignity  of  citizenship,  in  this  or  in  any 
other  country,  is  to  be  held  of  little  account.  It  is  rather 
that  under  modern  civilised  conditions,  and  among  a peo- 
ple governed  by  sentiments  of  humanity  and  equity,  the 
stranger  within  our  gates  suffers  no  obloquy  and  no  de- 
spiteful usage  for  being  a stranger.  It  may  be  admitted 
that  of  late,  with  the  fomentation  of  a more  accentuated 
nationalism  by  politicians  seeking  a raison  d’etre,  addi- 
tional difficulties  have  been  created  in  the  way  of  natu- 
ralisation and  the  like  incidents.  Still,  when  all  is  told 
of  the  average  American  citizen,  qua  citizen,  there  is  not 
much  to  tell.  The  like  is  true  throughout  the  English- 
speaking  peoples,  with  inconsequential  allowance  for  local 
color.  A definitive  neutralisation  of  citizenship  Avithin 
the  range  of  these  English-speaking  countries  would 
scarcely  ripple  the  surface  of  things  as  they  are — in  time 
of  peace. 

All  of  which  has  not  touched  the  sore  and  sacred  spot 
in  the  received  scheme  of  citizenship  and  its  rights  and 
liabilities.  It  is  in  the  event  of  hostilities  that  the  lia- 
bilities of  the  citizen  at  home  come  into  the  foreground, 
and  it  is  as  a source  of  patriotic  grievance  looking  to 
warlike  retaliation  that  the  rights  of  the  citizen  abroad 
chiefly  come  into  the  case. 

If,  as  was  once,  almost  inaudibly,  hinted  by  a well- 
regarded  statesman,  the  national  establishment  should 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


211 


refuse  to  jeopardise  the  public  peace  for  the  safeguarding 
of  the  person  and  property  of  citizens  who  go  out  in 
partes  infidelium  on  their  own  private  concerns,  and 
should  so  leave  them  under  the  uncurbed  jurisdiction  of 
the  authorities  in  those  countries  into  which  they  have 
intruded,  the  result  might  in  many  cases  be  hardship  to 
such  individuals.  This  would,  of  course,  be  true  almost 
exclusively  of  such  instances  only  as  occur  in  such  local- 
ities as  are,  temporarily  or  permanently,  outside  the  pale 
of  modern  law  and  order.  And,  it  may  be  in  place  to 
remark,  instances  of  such  hardship,  with  the  accompany- 
ing hazard  of  national  complications,  would,  no  doubt, 
greatly  diminish  in  frequency  consequent  upon  the  pro- 
mulgation of  such  a disclaimer  of  national  responsibility 
for  the  continued  well-being  of  citizens  who  so  expatriate 
themselves  in  the  pursuit  of  their  own  advantage  or 
amusement.  Meantime,  let  it  not  seem  inconsiderate  to 
recall  that  to  the  community  at  large  the  deplorable  case 
of  such  expatriates  under  hardship  involves  no  loss  or 
gain  in  the  material  respect;  and  that,  except  for  the 
fortuitous  circumstance  of  his  being  a compatriot,  the 
given  individual’s  personal  or  pecuniary  fortune  in  for- 
eign parts  has  no  special  claim  on  his  compatriots’  sym- 
pathy or  assistance;  from  which  it  follows  also  that  with 
the  definitive  neutralisation  of  citizenship  as  touches  ex- 
patriates, the  sympathy  which  is  now  somewhat  unin- 
telligently  confined  to  such  cases,  on  what  may  without 
offense  be  called  extraneous  grounds,  would  somewhat 
more  impartially  and  humanely  extend  to  fellow-men  in 
distress,  regardless  of  nativity  or  naturalisation. 

What  is  mainly  to  the  point  here,  however,  is  the  fact 
that  if  citizenship  were  so  neutralised  within  the  range 
of  neutral  countries  here  contemplated,  one  further  source 


212 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  provocation  to  international  jealousy  and  distrust 
would  drop  out  of  the  situation.  And  it  is  not  easy  to 
detect  any  element  of  material  loss  involved  in  such  a 
move.  In  the  material  respect  no  individual  would  be  any 
the  worse  off,  with  the  doubtful  and  dubious  exception  of 
the  expatriate  fortune-hunter,  who  aims  to  fish  safely  in 
troubled  waters  at  his  compatriots’  expense.  But  the  case 
stands  otherwise  as  regards  the  balance  of  immaterial 
assets.  The  scaffolding  of  much  highly-prized  sentiment 
would  collapse,  and  the  world  of  poetry  and  pageantry — 
particularly  that  of  the  tawdrier  and  more  vendible  po- 
etry and  pageantry — would  be  poorer  by  so  much.  The 
Man  Without  a Country  would  lose  his  pathetic  appeal, 
or  would  at  any  rate  lose  much  of  it.  It  may  be,  of 
course,  that  in  the  sequel  there  would  result  no  net  loss 
even  in  respect  of  these  immaterial  assets  of  sentimental 
animation  and  patriotic  self-complacency,  but  it  is  after 
all  fairly  certain  that  something  would  be  lost,  and  it  is 
by  no  means  clear  what  if  anything  would  come  in  to 
fill  its  place. 

An  historical  parallel  may  help  to  illustrate  the  point. 
In  the  movement  out  of  what  may  be  called  the  royal  age 
of  dynasties  and  chivalric  service,  those  peoples  who  have 
moved  out  of  that  age  and  out  of  its  spiritual  atmosphere 
have  lost  much  of  the  conscious  magnanimity  and  con- 
viction of  merit  that  once  characterised  that  order  of 
things,  as  it  still  continues  to  characterise  the  prevalent 
habit  of  mind  in  the  countries  that  still  continue  under 
the  archaic  order  of  dynastic  mastery  and  service.  But 
it  is  also  to  be  noted  that  these  peoples  who  so  have  moved 
out  of  the  archaic  order  appear  to  be  well  content  with 
this  change  of  spiritual  atmosphere,  and  they  are  even 
fairly  well  persuaded,  in  the  common  run,  that  the  move 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


213 


has  brought  them  some  net  gain  in  the  way  of  human  dig- 
nity and  neighbourly  tolerance,  such  as  to  offset  any  loss 
incurred  on  the  heroic  and  invidious  side  of  life.  Such 
is  the  tempering  force  of  habit.  Whereas,  e.  g.,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  peoples  of  these  surviving  dynastic  States, 
to  which  it  is  necessary  continually  to  recur,  who  have 
not  yet  moved  out  of  that  realm  of  heroics,  find  them- 
selves unable  to  see  anything  in  such  a prospective  shift 
but  net  loss  and  headlong  decay  of  the  spirit ; that  modi- 
cum of  forbearance  and  equity  that  is  requisite  to  the  con- 
duct of  life  in  a community  of  ungraded  masterless  men 
is  seen  by  these  stouter  stomachs  as  a loosening  of  the 
moral  fiber  and  a loss  of  nerve. 

What  is  here  tentatively  projected  under  the  phrase, 
“neutralization  of  citizenship,”  is  only  something  a little 
more  and  farther  along  the  same  general  line  of  move- 
ment which  these  more  modern  peoples  have  been  fol- 
lowing in  all  that  sequence  of  institutional  changes  that 
has  given  them  their  present  distinctive  character  of  com- 
monwealths, as  contrasted  with  the  dynastic  States  of 
the  mediaeval  order.  What  may  be  in  prospect — if  such 
a further  move  away  from  the  mediaeval  landmarks  is  to 
take  effect — may  best  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  later 
moves  in  the  same  direction  hitherto,  more  particularly  as 
regards  the  moral  and  aesthetic  merits  at  large  of  such  an 
institutional  mutation.  As  touches  this  last  previous  shift- 
ing of  ground  along  this  line,  just  spoken  of,  the  case 
stands  in  this  singular  but  significant  posture,  in  respect  of 
the  spiritual  values  and  valuations  involved : These  peo- 
ples who  have,  even  in  a doubtful  measure,  made  this 
transition  from  the  archaic  institutional  scheme,  of  fealty 
and  dynastic  exploit  and  coercion,  to  the  newer  scheme  of 


214 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  ungraded  commonwealth,  are  convinced,  to  the  point 
of  martyrdom,  that  anything  like  a return  to  the  old 
order  is  morally  impossible  as  well  as  insufferably  shame- 
ful and  irksome;  whereas  those  people,  of  the  retarded 
division  of  the  race,  who  have  had  no  experience  of  this 
new  order,  are  equally  convinced  that  it  is  all  quite  incom- 
patible with  a worthy  life. 

Evidently,  there  should  be  no  disputing  about  tastes. 
Evidently,  too,  these  retarded  others  will  not  move  on  into 
the  later  institutional  phase,  of  the  ungraded  common- 
wealth, by  preconceived  choice;  but  only,  if  at  all,  by 
such  schooling  of  experience  as  will  bring  them  insensibly 
to  that  frame  of  mind  out  of  which  the  ideal  of  the  un- 
graded commonwealth  emerges  by  easy  generalisation 
of  workday  practice.  Meantime,  having  not  yet  expe- 
rienced that  phase  of  sentiment  and  opinion  on  civic  rights 
and  immunities  that  is  now  occupied  by  their  institution- 
ally maturer  neighbours,  the  subjects  of  the  Imperial 
Fatherland,  e.  g.,  in  spite  of  the  most  laudable  intentions 
and  the  best  endeavour,  are,  by  failure  of  this  experience, 
unable  to  comprehend  either  the  ground  of  opposition 
to  their  well-meaning  projects  of  dominion  or  the  futil- 
ity of  trying  to  convert  these  their  elder  brothers  to  their 
own  prescriptive  acceptation  of  what  is  worth  while.  In 
time,  and  with  experience,  this  retarded  division  of  Chris- 
tendom may  come  to  the  same  perspective  on  matters  of 
national  usage  and  ideals  as  has  been  enforced  on  the 
more  modern  peoples  by  farther  habituation.  So,  also, 
in  time  and  with  experience,  if  the  drift  of  circumstance 
shall  turn  out  to  set  that  way,  the  further  move  away  from 
mediaeval  discriminations  and  constraint  and  into  the 
unspectacular  scheme  of  neutralisation  may  come  to  seem 
as  right,  good  and  beautiful  as  the  democratic  common- 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


215 


wealth  now  seems  to  the  English-speaking  peoples,  or  as 
the  Hohenzollern  Imperial  State  now  seems  to  the  sub- 
jects of  the  Fatherland.  There  is,  in  effect,  no  disputing 
about  tastes. 

There  is  little  that  is  novel,  and  nothing  that  is  to  be 
rated  as  constructive  innovation,  in  this  sketch  of  what 
might  not  inaptly  be  called  peace  by  neglect.  The  legal 
mind,  which  commonly  takes  the  initiative  in  counsels  on 
what  to  do,  should  scarcely  be  expected  to  look  in  that 
direction  for  a way  out,  or  to  see  its  way  out  in  that 
direction  in  any  case ; so  that  it  need  occasion  no  surprise 
if  the  many  current  projects  of  pacification  turn  on  in- 
genious and  elaborate  provisions  of  apparatus  and  pro- 
cedure, rather  than  on  that  simpler  line  of  expedients 
which  the  drift  of  circumstance,  being  not  possessed  of  a. 
legal  mind,  has  employed  in  the  sequence  of  institutional 
change  hitherto.  The  legal  mind  that  dominates  in  the 
current  deliberations  on  peace  is  at  home  in  exhaustive 
specifications  and  meticulous  demarkations,  and  it  is  there- 
fore prone  to  seek  a remedy  for  the  burden  of  supernu- 
merary devices  by  recourse  to  further  excesses  of  regu- 
lation. 

This  trait  of  the  legal  mind  is  not  a bad  fault  at  the 
worst,  and  the  quality  in  which  this  defect  inheres  is  of 
the  greatest  moment  in  any  project  of  constructive  engi- 
neering on  the  legal  and  political  plane.  But  it  is  less  to 
the  purpose,  indeed  it  is  at  cross  purposes,  in  such  a 
conjuncture  as  the  present ; when  the  nations  are  held 
up  in  their  quest  of  peace  chiefly  by  an  accumulation  of 
institutional  apparatus  that  has  out-stayed  its  usefulness. 
It  is  the  fortune  even  of  good  institutions  to  become  im- 
becile with  the  change  of  conditioning  circumstances,  and 
it  then  becomes  a question  of  their  disestablishment,  not 


216 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  their  rehabilitation.  If  there  is  anywhere  a safe  nega- 
tive conclusion,  it  is  that  an  institution  grown  mischievous 
by  obsolescence  need  not  be  replaced  by  a substitute. 

Instances  of  such  mischievous  institutional  arrange- 
ments, obsolete  or  in  process  of  obsolescence,  would  be, 
e.  g.,  the  French  monarchy  of  the  ancient  regime,  the 
Spanish  Inquisition,  the  British  corn  laws  and  the  “rot- 
ten boroughs,”  the  Barbary  pirates,  the  Turkish  rule  in 
Armenia,  the  British  crown,  the  German  Imperial  D\'- 
nasty,  the  European  balance  of  powers,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. In  some  sense,  at  least  in  the  sense  and  degree  im- 
plied in  their  selective  survival,  these  various  articles  of 
institutional  furniture,  and  many  like  them,  have  once 
presumably  been  suitable  to  some  end,  in  the  days  of  their 
origin  and  vigorous  growth;  and  they  have  at  least  in 
some  passable  fashion  met  some  felt  want;  but  if  they 
ever  had  a place  and  use  in  the  human  econcxny  they  have 
in  time  grown  imbecile  and  mischievous  by  force  of 
changing  circumstances,  and  the  question  is  not  how  to 
replace  them  with  something  else  to  the  same  purpose 
after  their  purpose  is  outworn.  A man  who  loses  a wart 
off  the  end  of  his  nose  does  not  apply  to  the  Ersats  bureau 
for  a convenient  substitute. 

' Now,  a large  proportion,  perhaps  even  substantially  the 
whole,  of  the  existing  apparatus  of  international  rights, 
pretensions,  discriminations,  covenants  and  provisos,  vis- 
ibly fall  in  that  class,  in  so  far  as  concerns  their  material 
serviceability  to  the  nation  at  large,  and  particularly  as 
regards  any  other  than  a warlike  purpose,  offensive  or 
defensive.  Of  course,  the  national  dignity  and  diplomatic 
punctilio,  and  the  like  adjuncts  and  instrumentalities  of 
the  national  honour,  all  have  their  prestige  value ; and 
they  are  not  likely  to  be  given  up  out  of  hand.  In  point 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


217 


of  fact,  however  solicitous  for  a lasting  peace  these  patri- 
otically-minded modern  peoples  may  be,  it  is  doubtful  if 
they  could  be  persuaded  to  give  up  any  appreciable  share 
of  these  appurtenances  of  national  jealousy  even  when 
their  retention  implies  an  imminent  breach  of  the  peace. 
Yet  it  is  plain  that  the  peace  will  be  secure  in  direct  pro- 
portion to  the  measure  in  which  national  discrimination 
and  prestige  are  allowed  to  pass  into  nothingness  and  be 
forgot. 

By  so  much  as  it  might  amount  to,  such  neutralisation 
of  outstanding  interests  between  these  pacific  nations 
should  bring  on  a degree  of  coalescence  of  these  nation- 
alities. In  effect,  they  are  now  held  apart  in  many  re- 
spects by  measures  of  precaution  against  their  coming  to 
a common  plan  of  use  and  wont.  The  degree  of  coa- 
lescence would  scarcely  be  extreme ; more  particularly  it 
could  not  well  become  onerous,  since  it  would  rest  on  con- 
venience, inclination  and  the  neglect  of  artificial  discrep- 
ancies. The  more  intimate  institutions  of  modern  life, 
that  govern  human  conduct  locally  and  in  detail,  need  not 
be  affected,  or  not  greatly  affected,  for  better  or  worse. 
Yet  something  appreciable  in  that  way  might  also  fairly 
be  looked  for  in  time. 

The  nature,  reach  and  prescriptive  force  of  this  pro- 
spective coalescence  through  neutralisation  may  perhaps 
best  be  appreciated  in  the  light  of  what  has  already  come 
to  pass,  without  design  or  mandatory  guidance,  in  those 
lines  of  human  interest  where  the  national  frontiers  in- 
terpose no  bar,  or  at  least  no  decisive  bar,  whether  by 
force  of  unconcern  or  through  impotence.  Fashions  of 
dress,  equipage  and  decorous  usage,  e.  g.,  run  with  some 
uniformity  throughout  tlrese  modern  nations,  and  indeed 


218 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


with  some  degree  of  prescriptive  force.  There  is,  of 
course,  nothing  mandatory,  in  the  simpler  sense,  about  all 
this ; nor  is  the  degree  of  conformity  extreme  or  uniform 
throughout.  But  it  is  a ready-made  generalisation  that 
only  those  communities  are  incorporated  in  this  cosmo- 
politan coalescence  of  usage  that  are  moved  by  their 
own  incitement,  and  only  so  far  as  they  have  an  effectually 
felt  need  of  conformity  in  these  premises.  It  is  true,  a 
dispassionate  outsider,  if  such  there  be,  would  perhaps 
be  struck  by  the  degree  of  such  painstaking  conformity 
to  canons  of  conduct  which  it  frequently  must  cost  serious 
effort  even  to  ascertain  in  such  detail  as  the  case  calls 
for.  Doubtless,  or  at  least  presumably,  conformity  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  fashions,  and  in  related  provinces 
of  decorum,  is  obligatory  in  a degree  that  need  not  be 
looked  for  throughout  the  scheme  of  use  and  wont  at 
large,  even  under  the  advisedly  established  non-interfer- 
ence of  the  authorities.  Still,  on  a point  on  which  the  evi- 
dence hitherto  is  extremely  scant  it  is  the  part  of  discre- 
tion to  hold  no  settled  opinion. 

A more  promising  line  of  suggestion  is  probably  that 
afforded  by  the  current  degree  of  contact  and  consistency 
among  the  modern  nations  in  respect  of  science  and  schol- 
arship, as  also  in  the  aesthetic  or  the  industrial  arts.  Local 
color  and  local  pride,  with  one  thing  and  another  in  the 
way  of  special  incitement  or  inhibition,  may  come  in  to 
vary  the  run  of  things,  or  to  blur  or  hinder  a common 
understanding  and  mutual  furtherance  and  copartnery  in 
these  matters  of  taste  and  intellect.  Yet  it  is  scarcely 
misleading  to  speak  of  the  peoples  of  Christendom  as  one 
community  in  these  respects.  The  sciences  and  the  arts 
are  held  as  a joint  stock  among  these  peoples,  in  their 
elements,  and  measurably  also  in  their  working-out.  It  is 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


219 


true,  these  interests  and  achievements  of  the  race  are 
not  cultivated  with  the  same  assiduity  or  with  identical 
effect  throughout ; but  it  is  equally  true  that  no  effectual 
bar  could  profitably  be  interposed,  or  would  be  tolerated 
in  the  long  run  in  this  field,  where  men  have  had  occa- 
sion to  learn  that  unlimited  collusion  is  more  to  the  pur- 
pose than  a clannish  discrimination. 

It  is,  no  doubt,  beyond  reasonable  hope  that  these  dem- 
ocratic peoples  could  be  brought  forthwith  to  concerted 
action  on  the  lines  of  such  a plan  of  peace  by  neutralisa- 
tion of  all  outstanding  national  pretensions.  Both  the 
French  and  the  English-speaking  peoples  are  too  eagerly 
set  on  national  aims  and  national  prestige,  to  allow  such 
a plan  to  come  to  a hearing,  even  if  something  of  the 
kind  should  be  spoken  for  by  their  most  trusted  leaders. 
By  settled  habit  they  are  thinking  in  terms  of  nationality, 
and  just  now  they  are  all  under  the  handicap  of  an  in- 
flamed national  pride.  Advocacy  of  such  a plan,  of 
course,  does  not  enter  seriously  into  the  purpose  of  this 
inquiry;  which  is  concerned  with  the  conditions  under 
which  peace  is  sought  today,  with  the  further  conditions 
requisite  to  its  perpetuation,  and  with  the  probable  ef- 
fects of  such  a peace  on  the  fortunes  of  these  peoples  in 
case  peace  is  established  and  effectually  maintained. 

It  is  a reasonable  question,  and  one  to  which  a provi- 
sional answer  may  be  found,  whether  the  drift  of  circum- 
stances in  the  present  and  for  the  immediate  future  may 
be  counted  on  to  set  in  the  direction  of  a progressive  neu- 
tralisation of  the  character  spoken  of  above,  and  there- 
fore possibly  toward  a perpetuation  of  that  peace  that  is 
to  follow  the  present  season  of  war.  So  also  is  it  an  open 
and  interesting  question  whether  the  drift  in  that  direc- 


220 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


tion,  if  such  is  the  set  of  it,  can  be  counted  on  to  prove 
sufficiently  swift  and  massive,  so  as  not  to  be  overtaken 
and  overborne  by  the  push  of  agencies  that  make  for  dis- 
sension and  warlike  enterprise. 

Anything  like  a categorical  answer  to  these  questions 
would  have  to  be  a work  of  vaticination  or  of  effrontery, 
— possibly  as  much  to  the  point  the  one  as  the  other.  But 
there  are  certain  conditions  precedent  to  a lasting  peace 
as  the  outcome  of  events  now  in  train,  and  there  are  cer- 
tain definable  contingencies  conditioned  on  such  current 
facts  as  the  existing  state  of  the  industrial  arts  and  the 
state  of  popular  sentiment,  together  with  the  conjuncture 
of  circumstances  under  which  these  factors  will  come  into 
action. 

The  state  of  the  industrial  arts,  as  it  bears  on  the  peace 
and  its  violation,  has  been  spoken  of  above.  It  is  of  such 
a character  that  a judiciously  prepared  offensive  launched 
by  any  Power  of  the  first  rank  at  an  opportune  time  can 
reach  and  lay  waste  any  given  country  of  the  habitable 
globe.  The  conclusive  evidence  of  this  is  at  hand,  and  it 
is  the  major  premise  underlying  all  current  proposals  and 
projects  of  peace,  as  w'ell  as  the  refusal  of  the  nations 
now  on  the  defensive  to  enter  into  negotiations  looking 
to  an  “inconclusive  peace.”  This  state  of  the  case  is  not 
commonly  recognised  in  so  many  words,  but  it  is  w'ell 
enough  understood.  So  that  all  peace  projects  that  shall 
hope  to  find  a hearing  must  make  up  their  account  with 
it,  and  must  show  cause  why  they  should  be  judged  com- 
petent to  balk  any  attempted  offensive.  In  an  inarticulate 
or  inchoate  fashion,  perhaps,  but  none  the  less  with  ever- 
increasing  certitude  and  increasing  apprehension,  this 
state  of  the  case  is  also  coming  to  be  an  article  of  pop- 
ular "knowledge  and  belief,”  wherever  much  or  little 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


221 


thought  is  spent  on  the  outlook  for  peace.  It  has  already 
had  a visible  effect  in  diminishing  the  exclusiveness  of 
nationalities  and  turning  the  attention  of  the  pacific  peo- 
ples to  the  question  of  feasible  w^ays  and  means  of  inter- 
national co-operation  in  case  of  need ; but  it  has  not  hith- 
erto visibly  lessened  the  militant  spirit  among  these  na- 
tions, nor  has  it  lowered  the  tension  of  their  national 
pride,  at  least  not  yet;  rather  the  contrary,  in  fact. 

The  effect,  upon  the  popular  temper,  of  this  inchoate 
realisation  of  the  fatality  that  so  lies  in  the  modern  state 
of  the  industrial  arts,  varies  from  one  country  to  another, 
according  to  the  varying  position  in  which  they  are  placed, 
or  in  which  they  conceive  themselves  to  be  placed. 
Among  the  belligerent  nations  it  has  put  the  spur  of  fear 
to  their  need  of  concerted  action  as  well  as  to  their  efforts 
to  strengthen  the  national  defense.  But  the  state  of  opin- 
ion and  sentiment  abroad  in  the  nation  in  time  of  war  is 
no  secure  indication  of  what  it  will  be  after  the  return  to 
peace.  The  American  people,  the  largest  and  most  imme- 
diately concerned  of  the  neutral  nations,  should  afford 
more  significant  evidence  of  the  changes  in  the  popular 
attitude  likely  to  follow  from  a growing  realisation  of 
this  state  of  the  case,  that  the  advantage  has  passed  de- 
finitively to  any  well  prepared  and  resolute  offensive,  and 
that  no  precautions  of  diplomacy  and  no  practicable  meas- 
ures of  defensive  armament  will  any  longer  give  security, 
— provided  always  that  there  is  anywhere  a national 
Power  actuated  by  designs  of  imperial  dominion. 

It  is,  of  course,  only  little  by  little  that  the  American 
people  and  their  spokesmen  have  come  to  realise  their 
own  case  under  this  late-modern  situation,  and  hitherto 
only  in  an  imperfect  degree.  Their  first  response  to  the 
stimulus  has  been  a display  of  patriotic  self-sufficiency 


222 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


and  a move  to  put  the  national  defense  on  a war-footing, 
such  as  would  be  competent  to  beat  off  all  aggression. 
Those  elements  of  the  population  who  least  realise  the 
gravity  of  the  situation,  and  who  are  at  the  same  time 
commercially  interested  in  measures  of  armament  or  in 
military  preferment,  have  not  beg^n  to  shift  forward  be- 
yond this  position  of  magniloquence  and  resolution ; nor 
is  there  as  yet  much  intimation  that  they  see  beyond  it, 
although  there  is  an  ever-recurring  hint  that  they  in  a 
degree  appreciate  the  practical  difficulty  of  persuading  a 
pacific  people  to  make  adequate  preparation  beforehand,  in 
equipment  and  trained  man-power,  for  such  a plan  of  self- 
sufficient  self-defense.  But  increasingly  among  those  who 
are,  by  force  of  temperament  or  insight  or  by  lack  of  the 
pecuniary  and  the  placeman’s  interest,  less  confident  of 
an  appeal  to  the  nation’s  prowess,  there  is  coming  for- 
ward an  evident  persuasion  that  warlike  preparations — 
“preparedness” — alone  and  carried  through  by  the  Re- 
public in  isolation,  will  sea  cely  serve  the  turn. 

There  are  at  least  two  lines  of  argument,  or  of  persua- 
sion, running  to  the  support  of  such  a view ; readiness 
for  a warlike  defense,  by  providin'^  equipment  and  trained 
men,  might  prove  a doubtfully  effectual  measure  even 
when  carried  to  the  limit  of  tolerance  that  will  always 
be  reached  presently  in  any  democratic  country;  an<l 
then,  too,  there  is  hope  of  avoiding  the  necessity  of  such 
warlike  preparation,  at  least  in  the  same  extreme  degree, 
by  means  of  some  practicable  working  arrangement  to  be 
effected  with  other  nations  who  are  in  the  same  case. 
Hitherto  the  farthest  reach  of  these  pacific  schemes  for 
maintaining  the  peace,  or  for  the  common  defense,  has 
taken  the  shape  of  a projected  league  of  neutral  nations 
to  keep  the  peace  by  enforcement  of  specified  interna- 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


223 


tional  police  regulations  or  by  compulsory  arbitration  of 
international  disputes.  It  is  extremely  doubtful  how  far, 
if  at  all,  popular  sentiment  of  any  effectual  force  falls  in 
with  this  line  of  precautionary  measures.  Yet  it  is  evi- 
dent that  popular  sentiment,  and  popular  apprehension, 
has  been  stirred  profoundly  by  the  events  of  the  past 
two  years,  and  the  resulting  change  that  is  already  visible 
in  the  prevailing  sentiment  as  regards  the  national  de- 
fense would  argue  that  more  far-reaching  changes  in  the 
same  connection  are  fairly  to  be  looked  for  within  a rea- 
sonable allowance  of  time. 

In  this  American  case  the  balance  of  effectual  public 
opinion  hitherto  is  to  all  appearance  quite  in  doubt,  but 
it  is  also  quite  unsettled.  The  first  response  has  been  a 
display  of  patriotic  emotion  and  national  self-assertion. 
The  further,  later  and  presumably  more  deliberate,  ex- 
pressions of  opinion  carry  a more  obvious  note  of  appre- 
hension and  less  of  stubborn  or  unreflecting  national 
pride.  It  may  be  too  early  to  anticipate  a material  shift 
of  base,  to  a more  neutral,  or  less  exclusively  national 
footing  in  matters  of  the  common  defense. 

The  national  administration  has  been  moving  at  an  ac- 
celerated rate  in  the  direction  not  of  national  isolation 
and  self-reliance  resting  on  a warlike  equipment  formid- 
able enough  to  make  or  break  the  peace  at  will — such 
as  the  more  truculent  and  irresponsible  among  the  poli- 
ticians have  spoken  for — ^but  rather  in  the  direction  of 
moderating  or  curtailing  all  national  pretensions  that  are 
not  of  undoubted  material  consequence,  and  of  seeking  a 
common  understanding  and  concerted  action  with  those 
nationalities  whose  effectual  interests  in  the  matters  of 
peace  and  war  coincide  with  the  American.  The  admin- 
istration has  grown  visibly  more  pacific  in  the  course  of 


224 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


its  exacting  experience, — ^more  resolutely,  one  might  even 
say  more  aggressively  pacific;  but  the  point  of  chief  at- 
tention in  all  this  strategy  of  peace  has  also  visibly  been 
shifting  somewhat  from  the  maintenance  of  a running 
equilibrium  between  belligerents  and  a keeping  of  the 
peace  from  day  to  day,  to  the  ulterior  and  altogether  dif- 
ferent question  of  what  is  best  to  be  done  toward  a con- 
clusive peace  at  the  close  of  hostilities,  and  the  ways  and 
means  of  its  subsequent  perpetuation. 

This  latter  is,  in  effect,  an  altogether  different  question 
from  that  of  preserving  neutrality  and  amicable  relations 
in  the  midst  of  importunate  belligerents,  and  it  may  even, 
conceivably,  perhaps  not  unlikely,  come  to  involve  a pre- 
cautionary breach  of  the  current  peace  and  a taking  of 
sides  in  the  war  with  an  urgent  view  to  a conclusive  out- 
come. It  would  be  going  too  far  to  impute  to  the  admin- 
istration, at  the  present  stage,  such  an  aggressive  attitude 
in  its  pursuit  of  a lasting  peace  as  could  be  called  a policy 
of  defensive  offense;  but  it  will  shock  no  one’s  sensi- 
bilities to  say  that  such  a policy,  involving  a taking  of 
sides  and  a renouncing  of  national  isolation,  is  visibly  less 
remote  from  the  counsels  of  the  administration  today  than 
it  has  been  at  any  earlier  period. 

In  this  pacific  attitude,  increasingly  urgent  and  increas- 
ingly far-reaching  and  apprehensive,  the  administration 
appears  to  be  speaking  for  the  common  man  rather  than 
for  the  special  interests  or  the  privileged  classes.  Such 
would  appear,  on  the  face  of  the  returns,  to  be  the  mean- 
ing of  the  late  election.  It  is  all  the  more  significant  on 
that  account,  since  in  the  long  run  it  is  after  all  the  com- 
mon man  that  will  have  to  pass  on  the  expediency  of  any 
settled  line  of  policy  and  to  bear  the  material  burden 
of  carrying  it  into  effect. 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


225 


It  may  seem  rash  to  presume  that  a popularly  accred- 
ited administration  in  a democratic  country  must  approx- 
imately reflect  the  effectual  changes  of  popular  sentiment 
and  desire.  Especially  would  it  seem  rash  to  anyone 
looking  on  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  undemocratic 
nation,  and  therefore  prone  to  see  the  surface  fluctuations 
of  excitement  and  shifting  clamor.  But  those  who  are 
within  the  democratic  pale  will  know  that  any  adminis- 
tration in  such  a country,  where  official  tenure  and  con- 
tinued incumbency  of  the  party  rest  on  a popular  vote, — • 
any  such  administration  is  a political  organisation  and  is 
guided  by  political  expediency,  in  the  tawdry  sense  of  the 
phrase.  Such  a political  situation  has  the  defects  of  its 
qualities,  as  has  been  well  and  frequently  expounded  by 
its  critics,  but  it  has  also  the  merits  of  its  shortcomings. 
In  a democracy  of  this  modern  order  any  incumbent  of 
high  office  is  necessarily  something  of  a politician,  quite 
indispensably  so ; and  a politician  at  the  same  time  nec- 
essarily is  something  of  a demagogue.  He  yields  to  the 
popular  drift,  or  to  the  set  of  opinion  and  demands  among 
the  effective  majority  on  whom  he  leans;  and  he  can 
not  even  appear  to  lead,  though  he  may  surreptitiously 
lead  opinion  in  adroitly  seeming  to  reflect  it  and  obey  it. 
Ostensible  leadership,  such  as  has  been  staged  in  this 
country  from  time  to  time,  has  turned  out  to  be  ostensible 
only.  The  politician  must  be  adroit ; but  if  he  is  also  to 
be  a statesman  he  must  be  something  more.  He  is  under 
the  necessity  of  guessing  accurately  what  the  drift  of 
events  and  opinion  is  going  to  be  on  the  next  reach 
ahead ; and  in  taking  coming  events  by  the  forelock  he 
may  be  able  to  guide  and  shape  the  drift  of  opinion  and 
sentiment  somewhat  to  his  own  liking.  But  all  the  while 
he  must  keep  within  the  lines  of  the  long-term  set  of  the 
IS 


226  On  the  Nature  of  Peace 

current  as  it  works  out  in  the  habits  of  thought  of  the 
common  man. 

Such  foresight  and  flexibility  is  necessary  to  continued 
survival,  but  flexibility  of  convictions  alone  does  not  meet 
the  requirements.  Indeed,  it  has  been  tried.  It  is  only 
the  minor  politicians — ^the  most  numerous  and  long- 
lived,  it  is  true — who  can  hold  their  place  in  the  crevices 
of  the  party  organisation,  and  get  their  livelihood  from  the 
business  of  party  politics,  without  some  power  of  vision 
and  some  hazard  of  forecast.  It  results  from  this  state 
of  the  case  that  the  drift  of  popular  sentiment  and  the 
popular  response  to  the  stimulus  of  current  events  is  re- 
flected more  faithfully  and  more  promptly  by  the  short- 
lived administrations  of  a democracy  than  by  the  stable 
and  formally  irresponsible  governmental  establishments 
of  the  older  order.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  these 
democratic  administrations  are  in  a less  advantageous 
position  for  the  purpose  of  guiding  popular  sentiment  and 
shaping  it  to  their  own  end.s. 

Now,  it  happens  that  at  no  period  within  the  past  half- 
century  has  the  course  of  events  moved  with  such  celerity 
or  with  so  grave  a bearing  on  the  common  good  and  the 
prospective  contingencies  of  national  life  as  during  the 
present  administration.  This  apparent  congruity  of  the 
administration’s  policy  with  the  drift  of  popular  feeling 
and  belief  will  incline  anyone  to  put  a high  rating  on  the 
administration’s  course  of  conduct,  in  international  rela- 
tions as  well  as  in  national  measures  that  have  a bearing 
on  international  relations,  as  indicating  the  course  taken 
by  sentiment  and  second  thought  in  the  community  at 
large, — for,  in  effect,  whether  or  not  in  set  form,  the  com- 
munity at  large  reflects  on  any  matters  of  such  gravity 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


227 


and  urgency  as  to  force  themselves  upon  the  attention  of 
the  common  man. 

Two  main  lines  of  reflection  have  visibly  been  enforced 
on  the  administration  by  the  course  of  events  in  the  inter- 
national field.  There  has  been  a growing  apprehension, 
mounting  in  the  later  months  to  something  like  the  rank 
of  a settled  conviction,  that  the  Republic  has  been  marked 
down  for  reduction  to  a vassal  state  by  the  dynastic 
Empire  now  engaged  with  its  European  adversaries.  In 
so  saying  that  the  Republic  has  been  marked  down  for 
subjection  it  is  not  intended  to  intimate  that  deliberate 
counsel  has  been  had  by  the  Imperial  establishment  on 
that  prospective  enterprise;  still  less  that  a resolution 
to  such  effect,  with  specification  of  ways  and  means,  has 
been  embodied  in  documentary  form  and  deposited  for 
future  reference  in  the  Imperial  archives.  All  that  is 
intended,  and  all  that  is  necessary  to  imply,  is  that  events 
are  in  train  to  such  effect  that  the  subjugation  of  the 
American  republic  will  necessarily  find  its  place  in  the 
sequence  presently,  provided  that  the  present  Imperial 
adventure  is  brought  to  a reasonably  auspicious  issue; 
though  it  does  not  follow  that  this  particular  enterprise 
need  be  counted  on  as  the  next  large  adventure  in  do- 
minion to  be  undertaken  when  things  again  fall  into  prom- 
ising shape.  This  latter  point  would,  of  course,  depend 
on  the  conjuncture  of  circumstances,  chief  of  which  would 
have  to  be  the  exigencies  of  imperial  dominion  shaping 
the  policy  of  the  Empire’s  natural  and  necessary  ally  in 
the  Far  East.  All  this  has  evidently  been  coming  more 
and  more  urgently  into  the  workday  deliberations  of  the 
American  administration.  Of  course,  it  is  not  spoken 
of  in  set  terms  to  this  effect  in  official  utterances,  per- 
haps not  even  within  doors ; that  sort  of  thing  is  not  done. 


228 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


But  it  can  do  no  harm  to  use  downright  expressions  in  a 
scientific  discussion  of  these  phenomena,  with  a view  to 
understanding  the  current  drift  of  things  in  this  field.. 

Beyond  this  is  the  similar  apprehension,  similarly 
though  more  slowly  and  reluctantly  rising  to  the  level  of 
settled  conviction,  that  the  American  commonwealth  is  not 
fit  to  take  care  of  its  own  case  single-handed.  This  ap- 
prehension is  enforced  more  and  more  unmistakably  with 
every  month  that  passes  on  the  theatre  of  war.  And  it 
is  reenforced  by  the  constantly  more  obvious  reflection 
that  the  case  of  the  American  commonwealth  in  this  mat- 
ter is  the  same  as  that  of  the  democratic  countries  of 
Europe,  and  of  the  other  European  colonies.  It  is  not, 
or  at  least  one  may  believe  it  is  not  yet,  that  in  the  patri- 
otic apprehension  of  the  common  man,  or  of  the  admin- 
istration which  speaks  for  him,  the  resources  of  the  coun- 
try would  be  inadequate  to  meet  any  contingencies  of  the 
kind  that  might  arise,  whether  in  respect  of  industrial 
capacity  or  in  point  of  man-power,  if  these  resources  w'ere 
turned  to  this  object  with  the  same  singleness  of  purpose 
and  the  same  drastic  procedure  that  marks  the  course  of 
a national  establishment  guided  by  no  considerations  short 
of  imperial  dominion.  The  doubt  presents  itself  rather 
as  an  apprehension  that  the  cost  would  be  extravagantly 
high,  in  all  respects  in  which  cost  can  be  counted ; which 
is  presently  seconded,  on  very  slight  reflection  and  review 
of  experience,  by  recognition  of  the  fact  that  a democracy 
is,  in  point  of  fact,  not  to  be  persuaded  to  stand  under 
arms  interminably  in  mere  readiness  for  a contingency, 
however  distasteful  the  contingency  may  be. 

In  point  of  fact,  a democratic  commonwealth  is  moved 
by  other  interests  in  the  main,  and  the  common  defense 
is  a secondary  consideration,  not  a primary  interest, — 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


229 


unless  in  the  exceptional  case  of  a commonwealth  so  placed 
under  the  immediate  threat  of  invasion  as  to  have  the 
common  defense  forced  into  the  place  of  paramount  con- 
sequence in  its  workday  habits  of  thought.  The  Amer- 
ican republic  is  not  so  placed.  Anyone  may  satisfy  him- 
self by  reasonable  second  thought  that  the  people  of  this 
nation  are  not  to  be  counted  on  to  do  their  utmost  in 
time  of  peace  to  prepare  for  war.  They  may  be  per- 
suaded to  do  much  more  than  has  been  their  habit,  and 
adventurous  politicians  may  commit  them  to  much  more 
than  the  people  at  large  would  wish  to  undertake,  but 
when  all  is  done  that  can  be  counted  on  for  a permanency, 
up  to  the  limit  of  popular  tolerance,  it  would  be  a bold 
guess  that  should  place  the  result  at  more  than  one-half 
of  what  the  country  is  capable  of.  Particularly  wmdd 
the  people’s  patience  balk  at  the  extensive  military  train- 
ing requisite  to  put  the  country  in  an  adequate  position 
of  defense  against  a sudden  and  well-prepared  offensive. 
It  is  otherwise  with  a dynastic  State,  to  the  directorate  of 
which  all  other  interests  are  necessarily  secondary,  sub- 
sidiary, and  mainly  to  be  considered  only  in  so  far  as 
they  are  contributory  to  the  nation’s  readiness  for  warlike 
enterprise. 

America  at  the  same  time  is  placed  in  an  extra-hazard- 
ous position,  between  the  two  seas  beyond  which  to  either 
side  lie  the  two  Imperial  Powers  whose  place  in  the  mod- 
ern economy  of  nations  it  is  to  disturb  the  peace  in  an 
insatiable  quest  of  dominion.  This  position  is  no  longer 
defensible  in  isolation,  under  the  later  state  of  the  indus- 
trial arts,  and  the  policy  of  isolation  that  has  guided  the 
national  policy  hitherto  is  therefore  falling  out  of  date. 
The  question  is  as  to  the  manner  of  its  renunciation, 
rather  than  the  fact  of  it.  It  may  end  in  a defensive  co- 


230 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


partnership  with  other  nations  who  are  placed  on  the 
defensive  by  the  same  threatening  situation,  or  it  may  end 
in  a bootless  struggle  for  independence,  but  the  choice 
scarcely  extends  beyond  this  alternative.  It  will  be  said, 
of  course,  that  America  is  competent  to  take  care  of 
itself  and  its  Monroe  doctrine  in  the  future  as  in  the  past. 
But  that  view,  spoken  for  cogently  by  thoughtful  men 
and  by  politicians  looking  for  party  advantage,  overlooks 
the  fact  that  the  modern  technology  has  definitively 
thrown  the  advantage  to  the  offensive,  and  that  interven- 
ing seas  can  no  longer  be  counted  on  as  a decisive  obstacle. 
On  this  latter  head,  what  was  reasonably  true  fifteen 
years  ago  is  doubtful  today,  and  it  is  in  all  reasonable 
expectation  invalid  for  the  situation  fifteen  years  hence. 

The  other  peoples  that  are  of  a neutral  temper  may 
need  the  help  of  America  sorely  enough  in  their  endeav- 
ours to  keep  the  peace,  but  America’s  need  of  cooperation 
is  sorer  still,  for  the  Republic  is  coming  into  a more  pre- 
carious place  than  any  of  the  others.  America  is  also, 
at  least  potentially,  the  most  democratic  of  the  greater 
Powers,  and  is  handicapped  with  all  the  disabilities  of  a 
democratic  commonwealth  in  the  face  of  war.  America 
j is  also  for  the  present,  and  perhaps  for  the  calculable  fu- 
ture, the  m.ost  powerful  of  these  greater  Powers,  in  point 
of  conceivably  available  resources,  though  not  in  actually 
available  fighting-power;  and  the  entrance  of  America 
unreservedly  into  a neutral  league  would  consequently  be 
decisive  both  of  the  purposes  of  the  league  and  of  its 
efficiency  for  the  purpose ; particularly  if  the  neutralisa- 
tion of  interests  among  the  members  of  the  league  were 
carried  so  far  as  to  make  withdrawal  and  independent 
action  disadvantageous. 


Peace  and  Neutrality 


231 


On  the  establishment  of  such  a neutral  league,  with 
such  neutralisation  of  national  interests  as  would  assure 
concerted  action  in  time  of  stress,  the  need  of  armament 
on  the  part  of  the  American  republic  would  disappear, 
at  least  to  the  extent  that  no  increase  of  armed  force 
would  be  advisable.  The  strength  of  the  Republic  lies  in 
its  large  and  varied  resources  and  the  unequalled  indus- 
trial capacity  of  its  population, — a capacity  which  is  today 
seriously  hampered  by  untoward  business  interests  and 
business  methods  sheltered  under  national  discrimination, 
but  which  would  come  more  nearly  to  its  own  so  soon 
as  these  national  discriminations  were  corrected  or  abro- 
gated in  the  neutralisation  of  national  pretensions.  The 
neutrally-minded  countries  of  Europe  have  been  con- 
strained to  learn  the  art  of  modern  war,  as  also  to  equip 
themselves  with  the  necessary  appliances,  sufficient  to 
meet  all  requirements  for  keeping  the  peace  through  such 
a period  as  can  or  need  be  taken  into  account, — provided 
the  peace  that  is  to  come  on  the  conclusion  of  the  pres- 
ent war  shall  be  placed  on  so  “conclusive”  a footing  as 
will  make  it  anything  substantially  more  than  a season  of 
recuperation  for  that  warlike  Power  about  whose  enter- 
prise in  dominion  the  whole  question  turns.  Provided 
that  suitably  “substantial  guarantees”  of  a reasonable 
quiescence  on  the  part  of  this  Imperial  Power  are  had, 
there  need  be  no  increase  of  the  American  armament. 
Any  increased  armament  would  in  that  case  amount  to 
nothing  better  than  an  idle  duplication  of  plant  and  per- 
sonnel already  on  hand  and  sufficient  to  meet  the  require- 
ments. 

To  meet  the  contingencies  had  in  view  in  its  formation, 
such  a league  would  have  to  be  neutralised  to  the  point 
that  all  pertinent  national  pretensions  would  fall  into  vir- 


232 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


tual  abe)faiKe,  so  that  all  the  necessary  resources  at  the 
disposal  of  the  federated  nations  would  automatically 
come  under  the  control  of  the  league’s  appointed  au- 
thorities without  loss  of  time,  whenever  the  need  might 
arise.  That  is  to  say,  national  interests  and  pretensions 
would  have  to  give  way  to  a collective  control  sufficient 
to  insure  prompt  and  concerted  action.  In  the  face  of 
such  a neutral  leagpie  Imperial  Japan  alone  would  be  un- 
able to  make  a really  serious  diversion  or  to  entertain  much 
hope  of  following  up  its  quest  of  dominion.  The  Japanese 
Imperial  establishment  might  even  be  persuaded  peaceably 
to  let  its  unoffending  neighbours  live  their  own  life  ac- 
cording to  their  own  light.  It  is,  indeed,  possibly  the  ap- 
prehension of  some  such  contingency  that  has  hurried  the 
rapacity  of  the  Island  Empire  into  the  headlong  indecen- 
cies of  the  past  year  or  two. 


CHAPTER  VT 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 

It  may  seem  early  (January  1917)  to  offer  a surmise 
as  to  what  must  be  the  manner  of  league  into  which  the 
pacific  nations  are  to  enter  and  by  which  the  peace  will 
be  kept,  in  case  such  a move  is  to  be  made.  But  the  cir- 
cumstances that  are  to  urge  such  a line  of  action,  and 
that  will  condition  its  carrying  out  in  case  it  is  entered  on, 
have  already  come  into  bearing  and  should,  on  the  whole, 
no  longer  be  especially  obscure  to  anyone  who  will  let 
the  facts  of  the  case  rather  than  his  own  predilections 
decide  what  he  will  believe.  By  and  large,  the  pressure 
of  these  conditioning  circumstances  may  be  seen,  and  the 
line  of  least  resistance  under  this  pressure  may  be  cal- 
culated, with  due  allowance  of  a margin  of  error  owing 
to  unknown  contingencies  of  time  and  minor  variables. 

Time  is  of  the  essence  of  the  case.  So  that  what  would 
have  been  dismissed  as  idle  vapour  two  years  ago  has  al- 
ready become  subject  of  grave  deliberation  today,  and 
may  rise  to  paramount  urgency  that  far  hence.  Time 
is  needed  to  appreciate  and  get  used  to  any  innovation  of 
appreciable  gravity,  particularly  where  the  innovation  de- 
pends in  any  degree  on  a change  in  public  sentiment,  as 
in  this  instance.  The  present  outlook  would  seem  to  be 
that  no  excess  of  time  is  allowed  in  these  premises ; but 
it  should  also  be  noted  that  events  are  moving  with  unex- 
ampled celerity,  and  are  impinging  on  the  popular  ap- 

233 


234 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


prehension  with  unexampled  force, — unexampled  on  such 
a scale.  It  is  hoped  that  a recital  of  these  circumstances 
that  provoke  to  action  along  this  line  will  not  seem  un- 
warrantably tedious,  and  that  a tentative  definition  of 
the  line  of  least  resistance  under  pressure  of  these  cir- 
cumstances may  not  seem  unwarrantably  presumptuous. 

The  major  premise  in  the  case  is  the  felt  need  of  secu- 
rity from  aggression  at  the  hands  of  Imperial  Germany 
and  its  auxiliary  Powers ; seconded  by  an  increasingly 
uneasy  apprehension  as  to  the  prospective  line  of  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  Imperial  Japan,  bent  on  a similar 
quest  of  dominion.  There  is  also  the  less  articulate  ap- 
prehension of  what,  if  anything,  may  be  expected  from 
Imperial  Russia ; an  obscure  and  scarcely  definable  fac- 
tor, which  comes  into  the  calculation  chiefly  by  way  of  re- 
enforcing the  urgency  of  the  situation  created  by  the  dy- 
nastic ambitions  of  these  other  two  Imperial  States.  Fur- 
ther, the  pacific  nations,  the  leading  ones  among  them 
being  the  French  and  English-speaking  peoples,  are  com- 
ing to  recognise  that  no  one  among  them  can  provide  for 
its  own  security  single-handed,  even  at  the  cost  of  their 
utmost  endeavour  in  the  way  pf  what  is  latterly  called 
“preparedness and  they  are  at  the  same  time  unwilling 
to  devote  their  force  unreservedly  to  warlike  preparation, 
having  nothing  to  gain.  The  solution  proposed  is  a league 
of  the  pacific  nations,  commonly  spoken  of  at  the  present 
stage  as  a league  to  enforce  peace,  or  less  ambitiously 
as  a league  to  enforce  arbitration.  The  question  being 
left  somewhat  at  loose  ends,  whether  the  projected  league 
is  to  include  the  two  or  three  Imperial  Powers  whose 
pacific  intentions  are,  euphemistically,  open  to  doubt. 

Such  is  the  outline  of  the  project  and  its  premises.  An 
attempt  to  fill  in  this  outline  will,  perhaps,  conduce  to 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


235 


an  appreciation  of  what  is  sought  and  of  what  the  condi- 
tioning circumstances  will  enforce  in  the  course  of  its 
realisation.  As  touches  the  fear  of  aggression,  it  has 
already  been  indicated,  perhaps  with  unnecessary  iteration, 
that  these  two  Imperial  Powers  are  unable  to  relinquish 
the  quest  of  dominion  through  warlike  enterprise,  because 
as  dynastic  States  they  have  no  other  ulterior  aim;  as 
has  abundantly  appeared  in  the  great  volume  of  expository 
statements  that  have  come  out  of  the  Fatherland  the  past 
few  years,  official,  semi-official,  inspired,  and  spontane- 
ous. “Assurance  of  the  nation’s  future”  is  not  trans- 
latable into  any  other  terms.  The  Imperial  dynasty  has 
no  other  ground  to  stand  on,  and  can  not  give  up  the  en- 
terprise so  long  as  it  can  muster  force  for  any  formidable 
diversion,  to  get  anything  in  the  way  of  dominion  by  seiz- 
ure, threat  or  chicane. 

This  is  coming  to  be  informally  and  loosely,  but  none 
the  less  definitively,  realised  by  the  pacific  nations ; and 
the  realisation  of  it  is  gaining  in  clearness  and  assurance 
as  time  passes.  And  it  is  backed  by  the  conviction  that, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  no  engagement  on  the  part  of 
such  a dynastic  State  has  any  slightest  binding  force,  be- 
yond the  material  constraint  that  would  enforce  it  from 
the  outside.  So  the  demand  has  been  diplomatically 
phrased  as  a demand  for  “substantial  guarantees.”  Any 
gain  in  resources  on  the  part  of  these  Powers  is  to  be 
counted  as  a gain  in  the  ways  and  means  of  disturbing 
the  peace,  without  reservation. 

The  pacific  nations  include  among  them  two  large  items, 
both  of  which  are  indispensable  to  the  success  of  the  proj- 
ect, the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom.  The 
former  brings  in  its  train,  virtually  without  exception  or 
question,  the  other  American  republics,  none  of  which 


236 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


can  practicably  go  in  or  stay  out  except  in  company  and 
collusion  with  the  United  States.  The  United  Kingdom 
after  the  same  fashion,  and  with  scarcely  less  assurance, 
may  be  counted  on  to  carry  the  British  colonies.  Evi- 
dently, without  both  of  these  groups  the  project  would 
not  even  make  a beginning.  Beyond  this  is  to  be  counted 
in  as  elements  of  strength,  though  scarcely  indispensable, 
France,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  the  Scandinavian 
countries.  The  other  west-European  nations  would  in  all 
probability  be  found  in  the  league,  although  so  far  as 
regards  its  work  and  its  fortunes  their  adhesion  would 
scarcely  be  a matter  of  decisive  consequence;  they  may 
therefore  be  left  somewhat  on  one  side  in  any  considera- 
tion of  the  circumstances  that  would  shape  the  league, 
its  aims  and  its  limitations.  The  Balkan  states,  in  the 
wider  acceptance,  they  that  frequent  the  Sign  of  the 
Double  Cross,  are  similarly  negligible  in  respect  of  the 
organisation  of  such  a league  or  its  resources  and  the 
mutual  concessions  necessaiy  to  be  made  between  its 
chief  members.  Russia  is  so  doubtful  a factor,  particu- 
larly as  regards  its  place  and  value  in  industry,  culture  and 
politics,  in  the  near  future,  as  to  admit  nothing  much 
more  than  a doubt  on  what  its  relation  to  the  situation 
will  be.  The  evil  intentions  of  the  Imperial-bureaucratic 
establishment  are  probably  no  more  to  be  questioned  than 
the  good  intentions  of  the  underlying  peoples  of  Russia. 
China  will  have  to  be  taken  in,  if  for  no  other  reason  than 
the  use  to  which  the  magnificent  resources  of  that  country 
would  be  turned  by  its  Imperial  neighbour  in  the  absence 
of  insurmountable  interference  from  outside.  But  China 
will  come  in  on  any  terms  that  include  neutrality  and 
security.  ~ 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


237 


The  question  then  arises  as  to  the  Imperial  Powers 
whose  dynastic  enterprise  is  primarily  to  be  hedged  against 
by  such  a league.  Reflection  will  show  that  if  the  league 
is  to  eflFect  any  appreciable  part  of  its  purpose,  these 
Powers  will  also  be  included  in  the  league,  or  at  least  in 
its  jurisdiction.  A pacific  league  not  including  these 
Powers,  or  not  extending  its  jurisdiction  and  surveillance 
to  them  and  their  conduct,  would  come  to  the  same  thing 
as  a coalition  of  nations  in  two  hostile  groups,  the  one 
standing  on  the  defensive  against  the  warlike  machina- 
tions of  the  other,  and  both  groups  bidding  for  the  favor 
of  those  minor  Powers  whose  traditions  and  current  as- 
pirations run  to  national  (dynastic)  aggrandizement  by 
way  of  political  intrigue.  It  would  come  to  a more  artic- 
ulate and  accentuated  form  of  that  balance  of  power  that 
has  latterly  gone  bankrupt  in  Europe,  with  the  most  cor- 
rupt and  unreliable  petty  monarchies  of  eastern  Europe 
vested  with  a casting  vote;  and  it  would  also  involve 
a system  of  competitive  armaments  of  the  same  general 
character  as  what  has  also  shown  itself  bankrupt.  It 
would,  in  other  words,  mean  a virtual  return  to  the  status 
quo  ante,  but  with  an  overt  recognition  of  its  provisional 
character,  and  with  the  lines  of  division  more  sharply 
drawn.  That  is  to  say,  it  would  amount  to  reinstating  the 
situation  which  the  projected  league  is  intended  to  avert. 
It  is  evidently  contained  in  the  premises  that  the  projected 
league  must  be  all-inclusive,  at  least  as  regards  its  juris- 
diction and  surveillance.  The  argument  will  return  to 
this  point  presently. 

The  purpose  of  the  projected  league  is  peace  and  secu- 
rity, commonly  spoken  of  under  patriotic  preconceptions 
as  “national”  peace  and  security.  This  will  have  to  mean 
a competent  enforcement  of  peace,  on  such  a footing  of 


238 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


overmastering  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  associated  pa- 
cific nations  as  to  make  security  a matter  of  ordinary 
routine.  It  is  true,  the  more  genial  spokesmen  of  the 
project  are  given  to  the  view  that  what  is  to  come  of  it 
all  is  a comity  of  neutral  nations,  amicably  adjusting 
their  own  relations  among  themselves  in  a spirit  of  peace 
and  good-will.  But  this  view  is  over-sanguine,  in  that  it 
overlooks  the  point  that  into  this  prospective  comity  of 
nations  Imperial  Germany  (and  Imperial  Japan)  fit  like 
a drunken  savage  with  a machine  gun.  It  also  overlooks 
the  patent  fatality  that  these  two  are  bound  to  come  into 
a coalition  at  the  next  turn,  with  whatever  outside  and 
subsidiary  resources  they  can  draw  on ; provided  only  that 
a reasonable  opening  for  further  enterprise  presents  itself. 
The  league,  in  other  terms,  must  be  in  a position  to 
enforce  peace  by  overmastering  force,  and  to  anticipate 
any  move  at  cross  purposes  with  the  security  of  the  pa- 
cific nations. 

This  end  can  be  reached  by  either  one  of  two  ways. 
If  the  dynastic  States  are  left  to  their  own  devices,  it  will 
be  incumbent  on  the  associated  nations  to  put  in  the 
field  a standing  force  sufficient  to  prevent  a recourse  to 
arms;  which  means  competitive  armament  and  universal 
military  rule.  Or  the  dynastic  States  may  be  taken  into 
partnership  and  placed  under  such  surveillance  and  con- 
straint as  to  practically  disarm  them ; which  would  ad- 
mit virtual  disarmament  of  the  federated  nations.  The 
former  arrangement  has  nothing  in  its  favour,  except 
the  possibility  that  no  better  or  less  irksome  arrangement 
can  be  had  under  existing  circumstances ; that  is  to  say 
that  the  pacific  nations  may  not  be  able  to  bring  these 
dynastic  states  to  terms  of  disarmament  under  surveil- 
lance. They  assuredly  can  not  except  by  force;  and 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


239 


this  is  the  precise  point  on  which  the  continued  hostili- 
ties in  Europe  turn  today.  In  diplomatic  parable  the 
German  Imperial  spokesmen  say  that  they  can  accept  (or 
as  they  prefer  to  phrase  it,  grant)  no  terms  that  do  not 
fully  safeguard  the  Future  of  the  Fatherland;  and  in 
similarly  diplomatic  parable  the  spokesmen  of  the  En- 
tente insist  that  Prussian  militarism  must  be  permanently 
put  out  of  commission;  but  it  all  means  the  same  thing, 
viz.  that  the  Imperial  establishment  is  to  be  (or  is  not  to 
be)  disabled  beyond  the  possibility  of  its  entering  on  a 
similar  warlike  enterprise  again,  when  it  has  had  time  for 
recuperation.  The  dynastic  statesmen,  and  the  lay  sub- 
jects of  the  Imperial  establishment,  are  strenuously  set 
on  securing  a fair  opportunity  for  recuperation  and  a 
wiser  endeavour  to  achieve  that  dominion  which  the  pres- 
ent adventure  promises  to  defeat;  while  the  Entente 
want  no  recurrence,  and  are  persuaded  that  a recurrence 
can  be  avoided  only  on  the  footing  of  a present  collapse 
of  the  Imperial  power  and  a scrupulously  enforced  pros- 
tration of  it  henceforth. 

Without  the  definitive  collapse  of  the  Imperial  power 
no  pacific  league  of  nations  can  come  to  anything  much 
more  than  armistice.  On  the  basis  of  such  a collapse  the 
league  may  as  well  administer  its  affairs  economically  by 
way  of  an  all-around  reduction  of  armaments,  as  by  the 
costlier  and  more  irksome  way  of  “preparedness.”  But 
a sensible  reduction  of  armaments  on  the  part  of  the  neu- 
tral nations  implies  disarmament  of  the  dynastic  States. 
Which  would  involve  a neutral  surveillance  of  the  affairs 
of  these  dynastic  States  in  such  detail  and  with  such  ex- 
ercise of  authority  as  would  reduce  their  governments 
to  the  effective  status  of  local  administrative  officials. 
Out  of  which,  in  turn,  would  arise  complications  that 


240 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


would  lead  to  necessary  readjustments  all  along  the  line. 
It  would  involve  the  virtual,  if  not  also  the  formal,  aboli- 
tion of  the  monarchy,  since  the  monarchy  has  no  other 
use  than  that  of  international  war  and  intrigue;  or  at 
least  it  would  involve  the  virtual  abrogation  of  its  pow- 
ers, reducing  it  to  the  same  status  of  faineantise  as  now 
characterises  the  British  crown.  Evidently  this  means  a 
serious  intermeddling  in  the  domestic  concerns  and  ar-^ 
rangements  of  the  Fatherland,  such  as  is  not  admissible 
under  the  democratic  principle  that  any  people  must  be 
left  free  to  follow  their  own  inclinations  and  devices  in 
their  own  concerns;  at  the  same  time  that  this  degree 
of  interference  is  imperative  if  the  peace  is  to  be  kept  on 
any  other  footing  than  that  of  eternal  vigilance  and  su- 
perior armed  force,  with  a people  whose  own  inclinations 
and  devices  are  of  the  kind  now  gp-own  familiar  in  the 
German  case, — all  of  which  also  applies,  with  accentua- 
tion, in  the  case  of  Imperial  Japan. 

Some  such  policy  of  neutral  surveillance  in  the  affairs 
of  these  peoples  whose  pacific  temper  is  under  suspicion, 
is  necessarily  involved  in  a plan  to  enforce  peace  by 
concert  of  the  pacific  nations,  and  it  will  necessarily  carry 
implications  and  farther  issues,  touching  not  only  these 
supposedly  recalcitrant  peoples,  but  also  as  regards  the 
pacific  nations  themselves.  Assuming  always  that  the 
prime  purpose  and  consistent  aim  of  the  projected  league 
is  the  peace  and  security  of  those  pacific  nations  on  whose 
initiative  it  is  to  be  achieved,  then  it  should  be  reasonable 
to  assume  that  the  course  of  procedure  in  its  organisation, 
administration  and  further  adaptations  and  adjustments 
must  follow  the  logic  of  necessities  leading  to  that  end. 
He  who  wills  the  end  must  make  up  his  account  with  the 


means. 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


241 


The  end  in  this  case  is  peace  an-d  security ; which  means, 
for  practical  purposes,  peace  and  good-will.  Ill-will  is 
not  a secure  foundation  of  peace.  Even  the  military 
strategists  of  the  Imperial  establishment  recommend  a 
programme  of  “frightfulness”  only  as  a convenient  mili- 
tary expedient,  essentially  a provisional  basis  of  tranquil- 
ity. In  the  long  run  and  as  a permanent  peace  measure 
it  is  doubtless  not  to  the  point.  Security  is  finally  to  be 
had  among  or  between  modern  peoples  only  on  the  ground 
of  a common  understanding  and  an  impartially  common 
basis  of  equity,  or  something  approaching  that  basis  as 
nearly  as  circumstances  will  permit.  Which  means  that 
in  so  far  as  the  projected  peace-compact  is  to  take  effect 
in  any  enduring  way,  and  leave  the  federated  nations  some 
degree  of  freedom  from  persistent  apprehension  and  ani- 
mosity, as  well  as  from  habitual  insecurity  of  life  and 
limb,  the  league  must  not  only  be  all-inclusive,  but  it  must 
be  inclusively  uniform  in  all  its  requirements  and  regu- 
lations. 

The  peoples  of  the  quondam  Imperial  nations  must 
come  into  the  league  on  a footing  of  formal  equality  with 
the  rest.  This  they  can  not  do  without  the  virtual  abdi- 
cation of  their  dynastic  governmental  establishments  and 
a consequent  shift  to  a democratic  form  of  organisation, 
and  a formal  abrogation  of  class  privileges  and  prerog- 
atives. 

However,  a virtual  abdication  or  cancelment  of  the  dy- 
nastic rule,  such  as  to  bring  it  formally  into  the  same 
class  with  the  British  crown,  would  scarcely  meet  the  re- 
quirements in  the  case  of  the  German  Imperial  establish- 
ment ; still  more  patently  not  in  the  case  of  Imperial 
Japan.  If,  following  the  outlines  of  the  decayed  British 
crown,  one  or  the  other  of  these  Imperial  establishments 

i6 


242 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


were  by  formal  enactment  reduced  to  a state  of  nominal 
desuetude,  the  effect  would  be  very  appreciably  different 
from  what  happens  in  the  British  community,  where  the 
crown  has  lost  its  powers  by  failure  of  the  requisite  sub- 
ordination on  the  part  of  the  people,  and  not  by  a formal 
abdication  of  rights.  In  the  German  case,  and  even  more 
in  the  Japanese  case,  the  strength  of  the  Imperial  estab- 
lishment lies  in  the  unimpaired  loyalty  of  the  populace; 
which  would  remain  nearly  intact  at  the  outset,  and  would 
thin  out  only  by  insensible  degrees  in  the  sequel ; so  that 
if  only  the  Imperial  establishment  were  left  formally 
standing  it  would  command  the  fealty  of  the  common 
run  in  spite  of  any  formal  abrogation  of  its  powers,  and 
the  course  of  things  would,  in  effect,  run  as  before  the 
break.  In  effect,  to  bring  about  a shift  to  a democratic 
basis  the  dynastic  slate  would  have  to  be  wiped  very 
clean  indeed.  And  this  shift  would  be  indispensable  to 
the  successful  conduct  of  such  a pacific  league  of  nations, 
since  any  other  than  an  effectually  democratic  national 
establishment  is  to  be  counted  on  unfailingly  to  intrigue 
for  dynastic  aggrandizement,  through  good  report  and 
evil. 

In  a case  like  that  of  Imperial  Germany,  with  its  fed- 
erated States  and  subsidiaries,  where  royalty  and  nobility 
still  are  potent  preconceptions  investing  the  popular  imag- 
ination, and  where  loyal  abnegation  in  the  presence  of 
authority  still  is  the  chief  and  staple  virtue  of  the  common 
man, — in  all  such  cases  virtual  abdication  of  the  dynastic 
initiative  under  constitutional  forms  can  be  had  only  by 
a formal  and  scrupulously  complete  abrogation  of  all 
those  legal  and  customary  arrangements  on  which  this 
irresponsible  exercise  of  authority  has  rested  and  through 
which  it  has  taken  effect.  Neutralisation  in  these  in- 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


243 


stances  will  mean  reduction  to  an  unqualified  democratic 
footing ; which  will,  at  least  at  the  outset,  not  be  accepta- 
ble to  the  common  people,  and  will  be  wholly  intolerable 
to  the  ruling  classes.  Such  a regime,  therefore,  while  it 
is  indispensable  as  a working  basis  for  a neutral  league 
of  peace,  would  from  the  outset  have  to  be  enforced 
against  the  most  desperate  resistance  of  the  ruling  classes, 
headed  by  the  dynastic  statesmen  and  war-lords,  and 
backed  by  the  stubborn  loyalty  of  the  subject  populace. 
It  would  have  to  mean  the  end  of  things  for  the  ruling 
classes  and  the  most  distasteful  submission  to  an  alien 
scheme  of  use  and  wont  for  the  populace.  And  yet  it  is 
also  an  indispensable  element  in  any  scheme  of  pacifica- 
tion that  aims  at  permanent  peace  and  security.  In  time, 
it  may  well  be  believed,  the  people  of  the  Fatherland 
might  learn  to  do  well  enough  without  the  gratuitous 
domination  of  their  ruling  classes,  but  at  the  outset  it 
would  be  a heartfelt  privation. 

It  follows  that  a league  to  enforce  peace  would  have  to 
begin  its  regime  with  enforcing  peace  on  terms  of  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  formidable  warlike  na- 
tions ; which  could  be  accomplished  only  by  the  absolute 
and  irretrievable  defeat  of  these  Powers  as  they  now 
stand.  The  question  will,  no  doubt,  present  itself.  Is  the 
end  worth  the  cost?  That  question  can,  of  course,  not 
be  answered  in  absolute  terms,  inasmuch  as  it  resolves 
itself  into  a question  of  taste  and  prepossession.  An  an- 
swer to  it  would  also  not  be  greatly  to  the  purpose  here, 
since  it  would  have  no  particular  bearing  on  the  course 
of  action  likely  to  be  pursued  by  these  pacific  nations  in 
their  quest  of  a settled  peace.  It  is  more  to  the  point  to 
ask  what  is  likely  to  be  the  practical  decision  of  these 


244 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


peoples  on  that  head  when  the  question  finally  presents 
itself  in  a concrete  form. 

Again  it  is  necessary  to  call  to  mind  that  any  momen- 
tous innovation  which  rests  on  popular  sentiment  will 
take  time ; that  consequently  anything  like  a plebiscite  on 
the  question  today  would  scarcely  give  a safe  index  of 
what  the  decision  is  likely  to  be  when  presently  put  to  the 
test;  and  that  as  things  go  just  now,  swiftly  and  urgent, 
any  time-allowance  counts  at  something  more  than  its 
ordinary  workday  coefficient.  What  can  apparently  be 
said  with  some  degree  of  confidence  is  that  just  now, 
during  these  two  years  past,  sentiment  has  been  moving 
in  the  direction  indicated,  and  that  any  growing  inclina- 
tion of  the  kind  is  being  strongly  re-enforced  by  a grow- 
ing realisation  that  nothing  but  heroic  remedies  will  avail 
at  this  juncture.  If  it  comes  to  be  currently  recognised 
that  a settled  peace  can  be  had  only  at  the  cost  of  eradi- 
cating privilege  and  royalty  from  the  warlike  nations,  it 
would  seem  reasonable  to  expect,  from  their  present  state 
of  mind,  that  the  pacific  nations  will  scarcely  hesitate 
to  apply  that  remedy, — provided  always  that  the  fortunes 
of  war  fall  out  as  that  measure  would  require,  and  pro- 
vided also  that  the  conflict  lasts  long  enough  and  severe 
enough  to  let  them  make  up  their  mind  to  anything  so 
drastic. 

There  is  a certain  side  issue  bearing  on  this  question  of 
the  ulterior  probabilities  of  popular  sentiment  and  na- 
tional policy  as  to  what  is  to  be  done  with  the  warlike 
nations  in  the  event  that  the  allied  nations  who  fight  for 
neutrality  have  the  disposal  of  such  matters.  This  side 
issue  may  seem  remote,  and  it  may  not  unlikely  be  over- 
looked among  the  mass  of  graver  and  more  tangible  con 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


245 


siderations.  It  was  remarked  above  that  the  United 
Kingdom  is  one  of  the  two  chief  pillars  of  the  projected 
house  of  peace ; and  it  may  be  added  without  serious  fear 
of  contradiction  or  annoyance  that  the  United  Kingdom  is 
also  the  one  among  these  pacific  nations  that  comes  near- 
est being  capable,  in  the  event  of  such  an  emergency, 
to  take  care  of  its  own  case  single-handed.  For  better 
or  worse,  British  adhesion  to  the  project  is  indispensable, 
and  the  British  are  in  a position  virtually  to  name  their 
own  terms  of  adhesion.  The  British  commonwealth — ■ 
a very  inclusive  phrase  in  this  connection — must  form  the 
core  of  the  pacific  league,  if  any,  and  British  sentiment 
will  have  a very  great  place  in  the  terms  of  its  formation 
and  in  the  terms  which  it  will  be  inclined  to  offer  the 
Imperial  coalition  at  the  settlement. 

Now,  it  happens  that  the  British  community  entered 
on  this  war  as  a democratic  monarchy  ruled  and  officered 
by  a body  of  gentlemen — doubtless  the  most  correct  and 
admirable  muster  of  gentlemen,  of  anything  approaching 
its  volume,  that  the  modern  world  can  show.  But  the 
war  has  turned  out  not  to  be  a gentlemen’s  war.  It  has 
on  the  contrary  been  a war  of  technological  exploits,  re- 
enforced with  all  the  beastly  devices  of  the  heathen.  It 
is  a war  in  which  all  the  specific  traits  of  the  well-bred 
and  gently-minded  man  are  a handicap ; in  which  veracity, 
gallantry,  humanity,  liberality  are  conducive  to  nothing 
but  defeat  and  humiliation.  The  death-rate  among  the 
British  gentlemen-officers  in  the  early  months,  and  for 
many  months,  ran  extravagantly  high,  for  the  most  part 
because  they  were  gallant  gentlemen  as  well  as  officers 
imbued  with  the  good,  old  class  spirit  of  noblesse  oblige, 
that  has  made  half  the  tradition  and  more  than  half  the 
working  theory  of  the  British  officer  in  the  field, — good. 


246 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


but  old,  hopelessly  out  of  date.  That  generation  of  offi- 
cers died,  for  the  most  part;  being  unfit  to  survive  or 
to  serve  the  purpose  under  these  modern  conditions  of 
w’arfare,  to  which  their  enemy  on  the  other  hand  had 
adapted  themselves  with  easy  facility  from  beforehand. 
The  gentlemanly  qualifications,  and  the  material  apparatus 
of  gentility,  and,  it  will  perhaps  have  to  be  admitted,  the 
gentlemen,  have  fallen  into  the  background,  or  perhaps 
rather  have  measurably  fallen  into  abeyance,  among  the 
officers  of  the  line.  There  may  be  more  doubt  as  to  the 
state  of  things  in  respect  of  the  gentility  of  the  staff,  but 
the  best  that  can  confidently  be  said  is  that  it  is  a point 
in  doubt. 

It  is  hoped  that  one  may  say  without  offense  that  in  the 
course  of  time  the  personnel  has  apparently  worked  down 
to  the  level  of  vulgarity  defined  by  the  ways  and  means 
of  this  modern  warfare;  which  means  the  level  on  which 
runs  a familiar  acquaintance  with  large  and  complex 
mechanical  apparatus,  railway  and  highway  transport  and 
power,  reenforced  concrete,  excavations  and  mud,  more 
particularly  mud,  concealment  and  ambush,  and  unlimited 
deceit  and  ferocity.  It  is  not  precisely  that  persons  of 
pedigree  and  gentle  breeding  have  ceased  to  enter  or  seek 
entrance  to  employment  as  officers,  still  less  that  measures 
have  been  taken  to  restrain  their  doing  so  or  to  eliminate 
from  the  service  those  who  have  come  into  it — though 
there  may  present  itself  a doubt  on  this  point  as  touches 
the  more  responsible  discretionary  positions — but  only 
that  the  stock  of  suitable  gentlemen,  uncommonly  large 
as  it  is,  has  been  overdrawn ; that  those  who  have  lat- 
terly gone  into  service,  or  stayed  in,  have  perforce  divested 
themselves  of  their  gentility  in  some  appreciable  measure, 
particularly  as  regards  class  distinction,  and  have  fallen 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


247 


on  their  feet  in  the  more  commonplace  role  of  common 
men. 

Serviceability  in  this  modern  warfare  is  conditioned  on 
much  the  same  traits  of  temperament  and  training  that 
make  for  usefulness  in  the  modern  industrial  processes, 
where  large-scale  coordinations  of  movement  and  an 
effective  familiarity  with  precise  and  far-reaching  me- 
chanical processes  is  an  indispensable  requirement, — in- 
dispensable in  the  same  measure  as  the  efficient  conduct 
of  this  modern  machine  industry  is  indispensable.  But 
the  British  gentleman,  in  so  far  as  he  runs  true  to  type, 
is  of  no  use  to  modern  industry;  quite  the  contrary,  in 
fact.  Still,  the  British  gentleman  is,  in  point  of  heredity, 
the  same  thing  over  again  as  the  British  common  man ; 
so  that,  barring  the  misdirected  training  that  makes  him  a 
gentleman,  and  which  can  largely  be  undone  under  urgent 
need  and  pressure,  he  can  be  made  serviceable  for  such 
uses  as  the  modern  warfare  requires.  Meantime  the 
very  large  demand  for  officers,  and  the  insatiable  demand 
for  capable  officers,  has  brought  the  experienced  and  ca- 
pable common  man  into  the  case  and  is  in  a fair  way  to 
discredit  gentility  as  a necessary  qualification  of  field 
officers. 

But  the  same  process  of  discredit  and  elimination  is 
also  extending  to  the  responsible  officials  who  have  the 
administration  of  things  in  hand.  Indeed,  the  course  of 
vulgarisation  among  the  responsible  officials  has  now  been 
under  way  for  some  appreciable  time  and  with  very  per- 
ceptible effect,  and  the  rate  of  displacement  appears  to 
be  gathering  velocity  with  every  month  that  passes.  Here, 
as  in  the  field  operations,  it  also  appears  that  gentlemanly 
methods,  standards,  preconceptions,  and  knowledge  of 
men  and  things,  is  no  longer  to  the  purpose.  Here,  too. 


248 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


it  is  increasingly  evident  that  this  is  not  a gentlemen’s 
war.  And  the  traditional  qualifications  that  have  sufficed 
in  the  past,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  enabling  the  British 
management  to  “muddle  through,”  as  they  are  proudly 
in  the  habit  of  saying, — these  qualifications  are  of  slight 
account  in  this  technological  conjuncture  of  the  nation’s 
fortunes.  It  would  perhaps  be  an  under-statement  to 
say  that  these  gentlemanly  qualifications  are  no  longer 
of  any  account,  for  the  purpose  immediately  in  hand,  and 
it  would  doubtless  not  do  to  say  that  they  are  wholly  and 
unreservedly  disserviceable  as  things  run  today ; but 
captious  critics  might  find  at  least  a precarious  footing  of 
argument  on  such  a proposition. 

Through  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
British  government  had  progressively  been  taking  on  the 
complexion  of  a “gentlemen’s  agreement;”  a government 
by  gentlemen,  for  gentlemen,  and  of  gentlemen,  too,  be- 
yond what  could  well  be  alleged  in  any  other  known  in- 
stance, though  never  wholly  so.  No  government  could  be 
a government  of  gentlemen  exclusively,  since  there  is  no 
pecuniary  profit  in  gentlemen  as  such,  and  therefore  no 
object  in  governing  them;  more  particularly  could  there 
never  be  any  incentive  in  it  for  gentlemen,  whose  liveli- 
hood is,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  drawn  from  some  one 
else.  A gentlemen’s  government  can  escape  death  by 
inanition  only  in  so  far  as  it  serves  the  material  interest 
of  its  class,  as  contrasted  with  the  underlying  population 
from  which  the  class  draws  its  livelihood.  This  British 
arrangement  of  a government  by  prudent  and  humane  gen- 
tlemen with  a view  to  the  conservation  of  that  state  of 
things  that  best  conduced  to  the  material  well-being  of 
their  own  class,  has  on  the  whole  had  the  loyal  support 
of  the  underlying  populace,  with  an  occasional  floundering 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


249 


protest.  But  the  protest  has  never  taken  the  shape  of 
an  expressed  distrust  of  gentlemen,  considered  as  the 
staple  ways  and  means  of  government ; nor  has  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  ever  descended  into  the  hands  of  any  other 
or  lower  class  or  condition  of  men. 

On  the  whole,  this  British  arrangement  for  the  control 
of  national  affairs  by  a body  of  interested  gentlemen- 
investors  has  been,  and  perhaps  still  is,  just  as  well  at 
home  in  the  affectionate  preconceptions  of  the  nineteenth- 
century  British  as  the  corresponding  German  usufruct 
by  self-appointed  swaggering  aristocrats  has  been  among 
the  underlying  German  population,  or  as  the  American 
arrangement  of  national  control  by  business  men  for  busi- 
ness ends.  The  British  and  the  American  arrangements 
run  very  much  to  the  same  substantial  effect,  of  course, 
inasmuch  as  the  British  gentlemen  represent,  as  a class, 
the  filial  generations  of  a business  community,  and  their 
aims  and  standards  of  conduct  continue  to  be  such  as  are 
enforced  by  the  pecuniary  interests  on  which  their  gen- 
tility is  conditioned.  They  continue  to  draw  the  ways 
and  means  of  a worthy  life  from  businesslike  arrange- 
ments of  a “vested”  character,  made  and  provided  with 
a view  to  their  nourishment  and  repose.  Their  resulting 
usufruct  of  the  community’s  productive  efforts  rests  on  a 
vested  interest  of  a pecuniary  sort,  sanctioned  by  the 
sacred  rights  of  property;  very  much  as  the  analogous 
German  dynastic  and  aristocratic  usufruct  rests  on  per- 
sonal prerogative,  sanctioned  by  the  sacred  rights  of  au- 
thentic prescription,  without  afterthought.  The  two,  it 
will  be  noted  are  very  much  alike,  in  effect,  “under  the 
skin.”  The  great  distinguishing  mark  being  that  the  Ger- 
man usufructuary  gentlemen  are,  in  theory  at  least,  gen- 
tlemen-adventurers  of  prowess  and  proud  words,  whose 


250 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


place  in  the  world’s  economy  it  is  to  glorify  God  and 
disturb  the  peace;  whereas  their  British  analogues  are 
gentlemen-investors,  of  blameless  propriety,  whose  place 
it  is  more  simply  to  glorify  God  and  enjoy  Him  forever. 

All  this  arrangement  of  a usufruct  with  a view  to  the 
reputable  consumption  of  the  community’s  superfluous 
production  has  had  the  cordial  support  of  British  senti- 
ment, perhaps  fully  as  cordial  as  the  German  popular 
subservience  in  the  corresponding  German  scheme;  both 
being  well  embedded  in  the  preconceptions  of  the  common 
man.  But  the  war  has  put  it  all  to  a rude  test,  and  has 
called  on  the  British  gentlemen’s  executive  committee  to 
take  over  duties  for  which  it  was  not  designed.  The  exi- 
gencies of  this  war  of  technological  exploits  have  been 
almost  wholly,  and  very  insistently,  of  a character  not 
contemplated  in  the  constitution  of  such  an  executive 
committee  of  gentlemen-investors  designed  to  safeguard 
class  interests  and  promote  their  pecuniary  class  ad- 
vantage by  a blamelessly  inconspicuous  and  indirect  man- 
agement of  national  affairs.  The  methods  are  of  the  class 
known  colloquially  among  the  vulgar-spoken  American 
politicians  as  “pussyfooting”  and  “log-rolling” ; but  al- 
ways with  such  circumstance  of  magnitude,  authenticity 
and  well-bred  deference  to  precedent,  as  to  give  the  re- 
sulting routine  of  subreption,  trover  and  conversion,  an 
air  not  only  of  benevolent  consideration  but  of  austere 
morality. 

But  the  most  austere  courtesy  and  the  most  authentical- 
ly dispassionate  division  of  benefits  will  not  meet  the 
underbred  exigencies  of  a war  conducted  on  the  mechan- 
istic lines  of  the  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts.  So 
the  blameless,  and  for  the  purpose  imbecile,  executive 
committee  of  gentlemen-investors  has  been  insensibly  los- 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


251 


mg  the  confidence  and  the  countenance  of  the  common 
man ; who,  when  all  is  said,  will  always  have  to  do  what 
is  to  be  done.  The  order  of  gentlemanly  parleying  and 
brokery  has,  therefore,  with  many  apprehensions  of  cal- 
amity, been  reluctantly  and  tardily  giving  ground  before 
something  that  is  of  a visibly  underbred  order.  Increas- 
ingly underbred,  and  thereby  insensibly  approaching  the 
character  of  this  war  situation,  but  accepted  with  visible 
reluctance  and  apprehension  both  by  the  ruling  class  and 
by  the  underlying  population.  The  urgent  necessity  of 
going  to  such  a basis,  and  of  working  out  the  matter  in 
hand  by  an  unblushing  recourse  to  that  matter-of-fact 
logic  of  mechanical  efficiency,  which  alone  can  touch  the 
difficulties  of  the  case,  but  which  has  no  respect  of  persons, 
— this  necessity  has  been  present  from  the  outset  and  has 
been  vaguely  apprehended  for  long  past,  but  it  is  only 
tardily  and  after  the  chastening  of  heavy  penalties  on  this 
gentlemanly  imbecility  that  a substantial  move  in  that 
direction  has  been  made.  It  has  required  much  British 
resolution  to  overcome  the  night-fear  of  going  out  into 
the  unhallowed  ground  of  matter-of-fact,  where  the  far- 
thest earlier  excursions  of  the  governmental  agencies  had 
taken  them  no  farther  than  such  financial  transactions  as 
are  incident  to  the  accomplishment  of  anything  whatever 
in  a commercial  nation.  And  then,  too,  there  is  a pe- 
cuniary interest  in  being  interested  in  financial  transac- 
tions. 

This  shifting  of  discretionary  control  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  gentlemen  into  those  of  the  underbred  common 
run,  who  know  how  to  do  what  is  necessary  to  be 
done  in  the  face  of  underbred  exigencies,  may  conceivably 
go  far  when  it  has  once  been  started,  and  it  may  go  for- 
ward at  an  accelerated  rate  if  the  pressure  of  necessity 
lasts  long  enough.  If  time  be  given  for  habituation  to 


252 


On  the  Nature  of  Pecu:e 


this  manner  of  directorate  in  national  affairs,  so  that  the 
common  man  comes  to  realise  how  it  is  feasible  to  get 
along  without  gentlemen-investors  holding  the  discretion, 
the  outcome  may  conceivably  be  very  grave.  It  is  a point 
in  doubt,  but  it  is  conceivable  that  in  such  a case  the 
gentlemanly  executive  committee  administering  affairs  in 
the  light  of  the  gentlemanly  pecuniary  interest,  will  not 
be  fully  reinstated  in  the  discretionary  control  of  the 
United  Kingdom  for  an  appreciable  number  of  years  after 
the  return  of  peace.  Possibly,  even,  the  regime  may  be 
permanently  deranged,  and  there  is  even  a shadowy  doubt 
possible  to  be  entertained  as  to  whether  the  vested  pecuni- 
ary rights,  on  which  the  class  of  gentlemen  rests,  may  not 
suffer  some  derangement,  in  case  the  control  should  pass 
into  the  hands  of  the  underbred  and  unpropertied  for  so 
long  a season  as  to  let  the  common  man  get  used  to  think- 
ing that  the  vested  interests  and  the  sacred  rights  of  gen- 
tility are  so  much  ado  about  nothing. 

Such  an  outcome  would  be  extreme,  but  as  a remote 
contingency  it  is  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  privileged 
classes  of  the  United  Kingdom  should  by  this  time  be  able 
to  see  the  danger  there  may  be  for  them  and  their  vested 
interests,  pecuniary  and  moral,  in  an  excessive  prolonga- 
tion of  the  war;  in  such  postponement  of  peace  as  would 
afford  time  for  a popular  realisation  of  their  incompetence 
and  disserviceability  as  touches  the  nation’s  material  well- 
being under  modern  conditions.  To  let  the  nation’s  war 
experience  work  to  such  an  outcome,  the  season  of  war 
would  have  to  be  prolonged  beyond  what  either  the  hopes 
or  the  fears  of  the  community  have  yet  contemplated; 
but  the  point  is  after  all  worth  noting,  as  being  within 
the  premises  of  the  case,  that  there  is  herein  a remote  con- 
tingency of  losing,  at  least  for  a time,  that  unformulated 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


253 


clause  in  the  British  constitution  which  has  hitherto  re- 
stricted the  holding  of  responsible  office  to  men  of  pedi- 
gree and  of  gentle  breeding,  or  at  least  of  very  grave 
pecuniary  weight;  so  grave  as  to  make  the  incumbents 
virtual  gentlemen,  with  a virtual  pedigree,  and  with  a 
virtual  gentleman’s  accentuated  sense  of  class  interest. 
Should  such  an  eventuality  overtake  British  popular  senti- 
ment and  belief  there  is  also  the  remote  contingency  that 
the  rights  of  ownership  and  investment  would  lose  a de- 
gree of  sanctity. 

It  seems  necessary  to  note  a further,  and  in  a sense 
more  improbable,  line  of  disintegration  among  modern 
fixed  ideas.  Among  the  best  entrenched  illusions  of  mod- 
em economic  preconceptions,  and  in  economic  as  well  as 
legal  theory,  has  been  the  indispensability  of  funds,  and 
the  hard  and  fast  limitation  of  industrial  operations  by  the 
supply  or  with-holding  of  funds.  The  war  experience  has 
hitherto  gone  tentatively  to  show  that  funds  and  financial 
transactions,  of  credit,  bargain,  sale  and  solvency,  may  be 
dispensed  with  under  pressure  of  necessity ; and  apparent- 
ly without  seriously  hindering  that  run  of  mechanical 
fact,  on  which  interest  in  the  present  case  necessarily  cen- 
ters, and  which  must  be  counted  on  to  give  the  outcome. 
Latterly  the  case  is  clearing  up  a little  further,  on 
further  experience  and  under  further  pressure  of  techno- 
logical exigencies,  to  the  effect  that  financial  arrangements 
are  indispensable  in  this  connection  only  because  and  in 
so  far  as  it  has  been  arranged  to  consider  them  indis- 
pensable ; as  in  international  trade.  They  are  an  indis- 
pensable means  of  intermediation  only  in  so  far  as  pe- 
cuniary interests  are  to  be  furthered  or  safeguarded  in 
the  intermediation.  When,  as  has  happened  with  the  bel- 
ligerents in  the  present  instance,  the  national  establishment 


254 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


becomes  substantially  insolvent,  it  is  beginning  to  appear 
that  its  affairs  can  be  taken  care  of  with  less  difficulty  and 
with  better  effect  without  the  use  of  financial  expedients. 
Of  course,  it  takes  time  to  get  used  to  doing  things  by  the 
more  direct  method  and  without  the  accustomed  circum- 
locution of  accountancy,  or  the  accustomed  allowance  for 
profits  to  go  to  interested  parties  who,  under  the  financial 
regime,  hold  a power  of  discretionary  permission  in  all 
matters  that  touch  the  use  of  the  industrial  arts.  Under 
these  urgent  material  exigencies,  investment  comes  to  have 
much  of  the  appearance  of  a gratuitous  drag  and  drain 
on  the  processes  of  industry. 

Here,  again,  is  a sinister  contingency;  sinister,  that  is, 
for  those  vested  rights  of  ownership  by  force  of  which  the 
owners  of  “capital”  are  enabled  to  permit  or  withhold  the 
use  of  the  industrial  arts  by  the  community  at  large,  on 
pain  of  privation  in  case  the  accustomed  toll  to  the  owners 
of  capital  is  not  paid.  It  is,  of  course,  not  intended  to  find 
fault  with  this  arrangement;  which  has  the  sanction  of 
“time  immemorial”  and  of  a settled  persuasion  that  it  lies 
at  the  root  of  all  civilised  life  and  intercourse.  It  is 
only  that  in  case  of  extreme  need  this  presumed  indis- 
pensable expedient  of  industrial  control  has  broken  down, 
and  that  experience  is  proving  it  to  be,  in  these  premises, 
an  item  of  borrowed  trouble.  Should  experience  continue 
to  run  on  the  same  lines  for  an  appreciable  period  and  at 
a high  tension,  it  is  at  least  conceivable  that  the  vested 
right  of  owners  to  employ  unlimited  sabotage  in  the  quest 
of  profits  might  fall  so  far  into  disrepute  as  to  leave  them 
under  a qualified  doubt  on  the  return  of  “normal”  con- 
ditions. The  common  man,  in  other  words,  who  gathers 
nothing  but  privation  and  anxiety  from  the  owners’  dis- 
cretionary sabotage,  may  conceivably  stand  to  lose  his 


Eliminafipn  of  the  Unfit 


255 


preconception  that  the  vested  rights  of  ownership  are  the 
cornerstone  of  his  life,  liberty  and  pursuit  of  happiness. 

The  considerations  recited  in  this  lengthy  excursion  on 
the  war  situation  and  its  probable  effects  on  popular  hab- 
its of  thought  in  the  United  Kingdom  go  to  say  that  when 
peace  comes  to  be  negotiated,  with  the  United  Kingdom 
as  the  chief  constituent  and  weightiest  spokesman  of  the 
allied  nations  and  of  the  league  of  pacific  neutrals,  the  rep- 
resentatives of  British  aims  and  opinions  are  likely  to 
speak  in  a different,  chastened,  and  disillusioned  fashion, 
as  contrasted  with  what  the  British  attitude  was  at  the 
beginning  of  hostilities.  The  gentlemanly  British  animus 
of  arrogant  self-sufficiency  will  have  been  somewhat 
sobered,  perhaps  somewhat  subdued.  Concession  to  the 
claims  and  pretensions  of  the  other  pacific  nations  is  likely 
to  go  farther  than  might  once  have  been  expected,  par- 
ticularly in  the  way  of  concession  to  any  demand  for 
greater  international  comity  and  less  international  discrim- 
ination ; essentially  concession  looking  to  a reduction  of 
national  pretensions  and  an  incipient  neutralisation  of  na- 
tional interests.  Coupled  with  this  will  presumably  be 
a less  conciliator}'  attitude  toward  the  members  of  the 
dynastic  coalition  against  whom  the  war  has  been  fought, 
owing  to  a more  mature  realisation  of  the  impossibility  of 
a lasting  peace  negotiated  with  a Power  whose  substantial 
core  is  a warlike  and  irresponsible  dynastic  establishment. 
The  peace  negotiations  are  likely  to  run  on  a lower  level 
of  diplomatic  deference  to  constituted  authorities,  and 
with  more  of  a view  to  the  interests  and  sentiments  of  the 
underlying  population,  than  was  evident  in  the  futile  nego- 
tiations had  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  gentle  art 
of  diplomacy,  that  engages  the  talents  of  exalted  person- 


256 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


ages  and  well-bred  statesmen,  has  been  somewhat  dis- 
credited ; and  if  it  turns  out  that  the  vulgarisation  of  the 
directorate  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  its  associated  allies 
and  neutrals  will  have  time  to  go  on  to  something  like 
dominance  and  authenticity,  then  the  deference  which  the 
spokesmen  of  these  nations  are  likely  to  show  for  the  pre- 
scriptive rights  of  dynasty,  nobility,  bureaucracy,  or  even 
of  pecuniary  aristocracy,  in  the  countries  that  make  up 
the  party  of  the  second  part,  may  be  expected  to  have 
shrunk  appreciably,  conceivably  even  to  such  precarious 
dimensions  as  to  involve  the  virtual  neglect  or  possible 
downright  abrogation  of  them,  in  sum  and  substance. 

Indeed,  the  chances  of  a successful  pacific  league  of 
neutrals  to  come  out  of  the  current  situation  appear  to 
be  largely  bound  up  with  the  degree  of  vulgarisation  due 
to  overtalce  the  several  directorates  of  the  belligerent 
nations  as  well  as  the  popular  habits  of  thought  in  these 
and  in  the  neutral  countries,  during  the  further  course  of 
the  war.  It  is  too  broad  a generalisation,  perhaps,  to  say 
that  the  longer  the  war  lasts  the  better  are  the  chances  of 
such  a neutral  temper  in  the  interested  nations  as  will 
make  a pacific  league  practicable,  but  the  contrar}’  would 
appear  a much  less  defensible  proposition.  It  is,  of  course, 
the  common  man  that  has  the  least  interest  in  warlike  en- 
terprise, if  any,  and  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  common  man 
that  bears  the  burden  of  such  enterprise  and  has  also  the 
most  immediate  interest  in  keeping  the  peace.  If,  slowly 
and  pervasively,  in  the  course  of  hard  experience,  he 
learns  to  distrust  the  conduct  of  affairs  by  his  betters,  and 
learns  at  the  same  move  to  trust  to  his  own  class  to  do 
what  is  necessary  and  to  leave  undone  what  is  not,  his 
deference  to  his  betters  is  likely  to  suffer  a decline,  such 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit  257 

as  should  show  itself  in  a somewhat  unguarded  recourse 
to  democratic  ways  and  means. 

In  short,  there  is  in  this  progressive  vulgarisation  of 
effectual  use  and  wont  and  of  sentiment,  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  elsewhere,  some  slight  ground  for  the  hope, 
or  the  apprehension,  that  no  peace  will  be  made  with  the 
dynastic  Powers  of  the  second  part  until  they  cease  to 
be  dynastic  Powers  and  take  on  the  semblance  of  demo- 
cratic commonwealths,  with  dynasties,  royalties  and  privi- 
leged classes  thrown  in  the  discard. 

This  would  probably  mean  some  prolongation  of  hos- 
tilities, until  the  dynasties  and  privileged  classes  had  com- 
pletely exhausted  their  available  resources ; and,  by  the 
same  token,  until  the  privileged  classes  in  the  more  modem 
nations  among  the  belligerents  had  also  been  displaced 
from  direction  and  discretion  by  those  underbred  classes 
on  whom  it  is  incumbent  to  do  what  is  to  be  done;  or 
until  a juncture  were  reached  that  comes  passably  near 
to  such  a situation.  On  the  contingency  of  such  a course 
of  events  and  some  such  outcome  appears  also  to  hang 
the  chance  of  a workable  pacific  league.  Without  further 
experience  of  the  futility  of  upperclass  and  pecuniary  con- 
trol, to  discredit  precedent  and  constituted  authority,  it 
is  scarcely  conceivable,  e.  g.,  that  the  victorious  allies 
would  go  the  length  of  coercively  discarding  the  German 
Imperial  dynasty  and  the  kept  classes  that  with  it  con- 
stitute the  Imperial  State,  and  of  replacing  it  with  a 
democratic  organisation  of  the  people  in  the  shape  of  a 
modern  commonwealth;  and  without  a change  of  that 
nature,  affecting  that  nation  and  such  of  its  allies  as  would 
remain  on  the  map,  no  league  of  pacific  neutrals  would 
be  able  to  manage  its  affairs,  even  for  a time,  except  on 
a war-footing  that  would  involve  a competitive  armament 

17 


258 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


against  future  dynastic  enterprises  from  the  same  quarter. 
Which  comes  to  saying  that  a lasting  peace  is  possible  on 
no  other  terms  than  the  disestablishment  of  the  Imperial 
dynasty  and  the  abrogation  of  all  feudalistic  remnants  of 
privilege  in  the  Fatherland  and  its  allies,  together  with  the 
reduction  of  those  countries  to  the  status  of  common- 
wealths made  up  of  ungraded  men. 

It  is  easy  to  speculate  on  what  the  conditions  precedent 
to  such  a pacific  league  of  neutrals  must  of  necessity  be ; 
but  it  is  not  therefore  less  difficult  to  make  a shrewd  guess 
as  to  the  chances  of  these  conditions  being  met.  Of  these 
conditions  precedent,  the  chief  and  foremost,  without 
which  any  other  favorable  circumstances  are  compara- 
tively idle,  is  a considerable  degree  of  neutralisation,  ex- 
tending to  virtually  all  national  interests  and  pretensions, 
but  more  particularly  to  all  material  and  commercial  in- 
terests of  the  federated  peoples ; and,  indispensably  and 
especially,  such  neutralisation  would  have  to  extend  to  the 
nations  from  whom  aggression  is  now  apprehended,  as, 
e.  g.,  the  German  people.  But  such  neutralisation  could 
not  conceivably  reach  the  Fatherland  unless  that  nation 
were  made  over  in  the  image  of  democracy,  since  the 
Imperial  State  is,  by  force  of  the  terms,  a warlike  and  un- 
neutral power.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  ostensibly  con- 
cealed meaning  of  the  allied  governments  in  proclaiming 
that  their  aim  is  to  break  German  militarism  without  doing 
harm  to  the  German  people. 

As  touches  the  neutralisation  of  the  democratically  re- 
habilitated Fatherland,  or  in  default  of  that,  as  touches 
the  peace  terms  to  be  offered  the  Imperial  government,  the 
prime  article  among  the  stipulations  would  seem  to  be 
abolition  of  all  trade  discrimination  against  Germany  or 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


259 


by  Germany  against  any  other  nationality.  Such  stipula- 
tion would,  of  course,  cover  all  manner  of  trade  discrim- 
ination,— e.  g.,  import,  export  and  excise  tariff,  harbor  and 
registry  dues,  subsidy,  patent  right,  copyright,  trade  mark, 
tax  exemption  whether  partial  or  exclusive,  investment 
preferences  at  home  and  abroad, — in  short  it  would 
have  to  establish  a thorough-going  neutralisation  of  trade 
relations  in  the  widest  acceptation  of  the  term,  and  to  ap- 
ply in  perpetuity.  The  like  applies,  of  course,  to  all  that 
fringe  of  subsidiary  and  outlying  peoples  on  whom  Im- 
perial Germany  relies  for  much  of  its  resources  in  any 
warlike  enterprise.  Such  a move  also  disposes  of  the 
colonial  question  in  a parenthesis,  so  far  as  regards  any 
special  bond  of  affiliation  between  the  Empire,  or  the 
Fatherland,  and  any  colonial  possessions  that  are  now 
thought  desirable  to  be  claimed.  Under  neutralisation, 
colonies  would  cease  to  be  “colonial  possessions,”  being 
necessarily  included  under  the  general  abrogation  of  com- 
mercial discriminations,  and  also  necessarily  exempt  from 
special  taxation  or  specially  favorable  tax  rates. 

Colonies  there  still  would  be,  though  it  is  not  easy  to 
imagine  what  would  be  the  meaning  of  a “German  Colony” 
in  such  a case.  Colonies  would  be  free  communities, 
after  the  fashion  of  New  Zealand  or  Australia,  but  with 
the  further  sterilisation  of  the  bond  between  colony  and 
mother  country  involved  in  the  abolition  of  all  appointive 
offices  and  all  responsibility  to  the  crown  or  the  im- 
perial government.  Now,  there  are  no  German  colonies 
in  this  simpler  British  sense  of  the  term,  which  implies 
nothing  more  than  community  of  blood,  institutions  and 
language,  together  with  that  sense  of  solidarity  between 
the  colony  and  the  mother  country  which  this  community 
of  pedigree  and  institutions  will  necessarily  bring;  but 


260 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


while  there  are  today  no  German  colonies,  in  the  sense 
of  the  term  so  given,  there  is  no  reason  to  presume  that 
no  such  German  colonies  would  come  into  bearing  under 
the  conditions  of  this  prospective  regime  of  neutrality  in- 
stalled by  such  a pacific  league,  when  backed  by  the 
league’s  guarantee  that  no  colony  from  the  Fatherland 
will  be  exposed  to  the  eventual  risk  of  coming  under  the 
discretionary  tutelage  of  the  German  Imperial  establish- 
ment and  so  falling  into  a relation  of  step-childhood  to 
the  Imperial  dynasty. 

As  is  well  known,  and  as  has  by  way  of  superflous  com- 
monplace been  set  forth  by  a sometime  Colonial  Secretary 
of  the  Empire,  the  decisive  reason  for  there  being  no 
German  colonies  in  existence  is  the  consistently  impos- 
sible colonial  policy  of  the  German  government,  looking 
to  the  usufruct  of  the  colonies  by  the  government,  and 
the  fear  of  further  arbitrary  control  and  nepotic  dis- 
crimination at  the  pleasure  of  the  self-seeking  dynastic 
establishment.  It  is  only  under  Imperial  rule  that  no 
German  colony,  in  this  modern  sense  of  the  term,  is  pos- 
sible; and  only  because  Imperial  rule  does  not  admit  of 
a free  community  being  formed  by  colonists  from  the 
Fatherland ; or  of  an  ostensibly  free  community  of  that 
kind  ever  feeling  secure  from  unsolicited  interference  with 
its  affairs. 

The  nearest  approach  to  a German  Colony,  as  con- 
trasted with  a “Colonial  Possession,”  hitherto  have  been 
the,  very  considerable,  number  of  escaped  German  sub- 
jects who  have  settled  in  English-speaking  or  Latin-speak- 
ing countries,  particularly  in  North  and  South  America. 
And  considering  that  the  chief  common  trait  among  them 
is  their  successful  evasion  of  the  Imperial  government’s 
heavy  hand,  they  show  an  admirable  filial  piety  toward  the 


Eliminafipn  of  the  Unfit 


261 


Imperial  establishment ; though  troubled  with  no  slightest 
regret  at  having  escaped  from  the  Imperial  surveillance 
and  no  slightest  inclination  to  return  to  the  shelter  of  the 
Imperial  tutelage.  A colloquialism — “hyphenate” — has 
latterly  grown  up  to  meet  the  need  of  a term  to  designate 
these  evasive  and  yet  patriotic  colonists.  It  is  scarcely 
misleading  to  say  that  the  German-American  hyphenate, 
e.  g.,  in  so  far  as  he  runs  true  to  form,  is  still  a German 
subject  with  his  heart,  but  he  is  an  American  citizen  with 
his  head.  All  of  which  goes  to  argue  that  if  the  Father- 
land  were  to  fall  into  such  a state  of  democratic  tolerance 
that  no  recidivist  need  carry  a defensive  hyphen  to  shield 
him  from  the  importunate  attentions  of  the  Imperial 
government,  German  colonies  would  also  come  into  bear- 
ing; although,  it  is  true,  they  would  have  no  value  to  the 
German  government. 

In  the  Imperial  colonial  policy  colonies  are  conceived 
to  stand  to  their  Imperial  guardian  or  master  in  a relation 
between  that  of  a step-child  and  that  of  an  indentured 
servant ; to  be  dealt  with  summarily  and  at  discretion  and 
to  be  made  use  of  without  scruple.  The  like  attitude  to- 
ward colonies  was  once  familiar  matter-of-course  with 
the  British  and  Spanish  statesmen.  The  British  found 
the  plan  unprofitable,  and  also  unworkable,  and  have  given 
it  up.  The  Spanish,  having  no  political  outlook  but  the 
dynastic  one,  could  of  course  not  see  their  way  to  re- 
linquish the  only  purpose  of  their  colonial  enterprise,  ex- 
cept in  relinquishing  their  colonial  possessions.  The  Ger- 
man (Imperial)  colonial  policy  is  and  will  be  necessarily 
after  the  Spanish  pattern,  and  necessarily,  too,  with  the 
Spanish  results. 

Under  the  projected  neutral  scheme  there  would  be  no 
colonial  policy,  and  of  course,  no  inducement  to  the  ac- 


262 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


quisition  of  colonies,  since  there  would  be  no  profit  to  be 
derived,  or  to  be  fancied,  in  the  case.  But  while  no 
country,  as  a commonwealth,  has  any  material  interest  in 
the  acquisition  or  maintenance  of  colonies,  it  is  other- 
wise as  regards  the  dynastic  interests  of  an  Imperial 
government ; and  it  is  also  otherwise,  at  least  in  the  belief 
of  the  interested  parties,  as  regards  special  businessmen 
or  business  concerns  who  are  in  a position  to  gain  some- 
thing by  help  of  national  discrimination  in  their  favor. 
As  regards  the  pecuniary  interests  of  favored  business- 
men or  business  concerns,  and  of  investors  favored  by 
national  discrimination  in  colonial  relations,  the  case  falls 
under  the  general  caption  of  trade  discrimination,  and 
does  not  differ  at  all  materially  from  such  expedients  as 
a protective  tariff,  a ship  subsidy,  or  a bounty  on  exports. 
But  as  regards  the  warlike,  that  is  to  say  dynastic,  interest 
of  an  Imperial  government  the  case  stands  somewhat  dif- 
ferent. 

Colonial  Possessions  in  such  a case  yield  no  material 
benefit  to  the  country  at  large,  but  their  possession  is 
a serviceable  plea  for  warlike  preparations  with  which  to 
retain  possession  of  the  colonies  in  the  face  of  eventual- 
ities, and  it  is  also  a serviceable  means  of  stirring  the 
national  pride  and  keeping  alive  a suitable  spirit  of  patri- 
otic animosity.  The  material  service  actually  to  be  de- 
rived from  such  possessions  in  the  event  of  war  is  a point 
in  doubt,  with  the  probabilities  apparently  running  against 
their  being  of  any  eventual  net  use.  But  there  need  be 
no  question  that  such  possessions,  under  the  hand  of  any 
national  establishment  infected  with  imperial  ambitions, 
are  a fruitful  source  of  diplomatic  complications,  excuses 
for  armament,  international  grievances,  and  eventual  ag- 
gression. A pacific  league  of  neutrals  can  evidently  not 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


263 


tolerate  the  retention  of  colonial  possessions  by  any  dynas- 
tic State  that  may  be  drawn  into  the  league  or  under  its 
jurisdiction,  as,  e.  g.,  the  German  Empire  in  case  it 
should  be  left  on  an  Imperial  footing.  Whereas,  in  case 
the  German  peoples  are  thrown  back  on  a democratic 
status,  as  neutralised  commonwealths  without  a crown  or 
a military  establishment,  the  question  of  their  colonial  pos- 
sessions evidently  falls  vacant. 

As  to  the  neutralisation  of  trade  relations  apart  from 
the  question  of  colonies,  and  as  bears  on  the  case  of 
Germany  under  the  projected  jurisdiction  of  a pacific 
league  of  neutrals,  the  considerations  to  be  taken  account 
of  are  of  much  the  same  nature.  As  it  would  have  to  take 
effect,  e.  g.,  in  the  abolition  of  commercial  and  industrial 
discriminations  between  Germany  and  the  pacific  nations, 
such  neutralisation  would  doubtless  confer  a lasting  ma- 
terial benefit  on  the  German  people  at  large;  and  it  is 
not  easy  to  detect  any  loss  or  detriment  to  be  derived 
from  such  a move  so  long  as  peace  prevails.  Protective, 
that  is  to  say  discriminating,  export,  import,  or  excise 
duties,  harbor  and  registry  dues,  subsidies,  tax  exemptions 
and  trade  preferences,  and  all  the  like  devices  of  interfer- 
ence with  trade  and  industry,  are  unavoidably  a hin- 
drance to  the  material  interests  of  any  people  on  whom 
they  are  imposed  or  who  impose  these  disabilities  on  them- 
selves. So  that  exemption  from  these  things  by  a com- 
prehensive neutralisation  of  trade  relations  would  im- 
mediately benefit  all  the  nations  concerned,  in  respect  of 
their  material  well-being  in  times  of  peace.  There  is  no 
exception  and  no  abatement  to  be  taken  account  of  under 
this  general  statement,  as  is  well  known  to  all  men  who  are 
conversant  with  these  matters. 


264 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


But  it  is  otherwise  as  regards  the  dynastic  interest  in 
the  case,  and  as  regards  any  national  interest  in  warlike 
enterprise.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  all  restraint  of  trade 
between  nations,  and  between  classes  or  localities  within 
the  national  frontiers,  unavoidably  acts  to  weaken  and  im- 
poverish the  people  on  whose  economic  activities  this  re- 
straint is  laid ; and  to  the  extent  to  which  this  effect  is 
had  it  will  also  be  true  that  the  country  which  so  is 
hindered  in  its  work  will  have  a less  aggregate  of  re- 
sources to  place  at  the  disposal  of  its  enterprising  states- 
men for  imperialist  ends.  But  these  restraints  may  yet  be 
useful  for  dynastic,  that  is  to  say  warlike,  ends  by  mak- 
ing the  country  more  nearly  a “self-contained  economic 
whole.”  A country  becomes  a “self-contained  economic 
whole”  by  mutilation,  in  cutting  itself  off  from  the  in- 
dustrial system  in  which  industrially  it  belongs,  but  in 
which  it  is  unwilling  nationally  to  hold  its  place.  National 
frontiers  are  industrial  barriers.  But  as  a result  of  such 
mutilation  of  its  industrial  life  such  a country  is  better 
able — it  has  been  believed — to  bear  the  shock  of  severing 
its  international  trade  relations  entirely,  as  is  likely  to 
happen  in  case  of  war. 

In  a large  country,  such  as  America  or  Russia,  which 
comprises  within  its  national  boundaries  very  extensive 
and  very  varied  resources  and  a widely  distributed  and 
diversified  population,  the  mischief  suffered  from  re- 
straints of  trade  that  hinder  industrial  relations  with  the 
world  at  large  will  of  course  be  proportionately  lessened. 
Such  a country  comes  nearer  being  a miniature  industrial 
world ; although  none  of  the  civilised  nations,  large  or 
small,  can  carry  on  its  ordinary  industrial  activities  and  its 
ordinary  manner  of  life  without  drawing  on  foreign  parts 
to  some  appreciable  extent.  But  a country  of  small  terri- 


Elimimtipn  of  the  Unfit 


265 


torial  extent  and  of  somewhat  narrowly  restricted  natural 
resources,  as,  e.  g.,  Germany  or  France,  can  even  by  the 
most  drastic  measures  of  restaint  and  mutilation  achieve 
only  a very  mediocre  degree  of  industrial  isolation  and 
“self-sufficiency,” — as  has,  e.  g.,  appeared  in  the  present 
war.  But  in  all  cases,  though  in  varying  measure,  the 
mitigated  isolation  so  enforced  by  these  restraints  on  trade 
will  in  their  degree  impair  the  country’s  industrial  efficien- 
cy and  lower  the  people’s  material  well-being;  yet,  if  the 
restrictions  are  shrewdly  applied  this  partial  isolation  and 
partial  “self-sufficiency”  will  go  some  way  toward  prepar- 
ing the  nation  for  the  more  thorough  isolation  that  fol- 
lows on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

The  present  plight  of  the  German  people  under  war  con- 
ditions may  serve  to  show  how  nearly  that  end  may  be 
attained,  and  yet  how  inadequate  even  the  most  unreserved 
measures  of  industrial  isolation  must  be  in  face  of  the 
fact  that  the  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts  necessarily 
draws  on  the  collective  resources  of  the  world  at  large. 
It  may  well  be  doubted,  on  an  impartial  view,  if  the  muti- 
lation of  the  country’s  industrial  system  by  such  measures 
of  isolation  does  not  after  all  rather  weaken  the  nation 
even  for  warlike  ends  ; but  then,  the  discretionary  authori- 
ties in  the  dynastic  States  are  always,  and  it  may  be  pre- 
sumed necessarily,  hampered  with  obsolete  theories  hand- 
ed down  from  that  cameralistic  age,  when  the  little  princes 
of  the  Fatherland  were  making  dynastic  history.  So,  e. 
g.,  the  current,  nineteenth  and  twentieth  century,  economic 
policy  of  the  Prussian-Imperial  statesmen  is  still  drawn 
on  lines  within  which  Frederick  II,  called  the  Great,  would 
have  felt  well  at  home. 

Like  other  preparation  for  hostilities  this  reduction  of 
the  country  to  the  status  of  a self-contained  economic  or- 


266 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


ganisation  is  costly,  but  like  other  preparation  for  hostili- 
ties it  also  puts  the  nation  in  a position  of  greater  readiness 
to  break  off  friendly  relations  with  its  neighbors.  It  is  a 
war  measure,  commonly  spoken  for  by  its  advocates  as  a 
measure  of  self-defense ; but  whatever  the  merits  of  the 
self-defenders’  contention,  this  measure  is  a war  measure. 
As  such  it  can  reasonably  claim  no  hearing  in  the  coun- 
sels of  a pacific  league  of  neutrals,  whose  purpose  it  is  to 
make  war  impracticable.  Particularly  can  there  be  no 
reasonable  question  of  admitting  a policy  of  trade  discrim- 
ination and  isolation  on  the  part  of  a nation  which  has,  for 
purposes  of  warlike  aggression,  pursued  such  a policy  in 
the  past,  and  which  it  is  the  immediate  purpose  of  the 
league  to  bind  over  to  keep  the  peace. 

There  has  been  a volume  of  loose  talk  spent  on  the 
justice  and  expediency  of  boycotting  the  trade  of  the 
peoples  of  the  Empire  after  the  return  of  peace,  as  a pen- 
alty and  as  a preventive  measure  designed  to  retard  their 
recovery  of  strength  with  which  to  enter  on  a further  war- 
like enterprise.  Such  a measure  would  necessarily  be 
somewhat  futile ; since  “Business  is  business,’’  after  all, 
and  the  practical  limitations  imposed  on  an  unprofitable 
boycott  by  the  moral  necessity  to  buy  cheap  and  sell  dear 
that  rests  on  all  businessmen  would  surreptitiously 
mitigate  it  to  the  point  of  negligibility.  It  is  inconceivable 
-or  it  would  be  inconceivable  in  the  absence  of  imbecile 
politicians  and  self-seeking  businessmen — that  measures 
looking  to  the  trade  isolation  of  any  one  of  these  countries 
could  be  entertained  as  a point  of  policy  to  be  pursued 
by  a league  of  neutrals.  And  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  patri- 
otic jealousy  and  vindictive' sentiments  are  allowed  to  dis- 
place the  aspiration  for  peace  and  security,  that  such 
measures  can  claim  consideration.  Considered  as  a pen- 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


267 


alty  to  be  imposed  on  the  erring  nations  who  set  this  war- 
like adventure  afoot,  it  should  be  sufficiently  plain  that 
such  a measure  as  a trade  boycott  could  not  touch  the 
chief  offenders,  or  even  their  responsible  abettors.  It 
would,  rather,  play  into  the  hands  of  the  militarist  in- 
terests by  keeping  alive  the  spirit  of  national  jeal'^us’  ■ 
international  hatred,  out  of  which  wars  arise  and  without 
which  warlike  enterprise  might  hopefully  be  expected  to 
disappear  out  of  the  scheme  of  human  intercourse.  The 
punishment  would  fall,  as  all  economic  burdens  and  dis- 
abilities must  always  fall,  on  the  common  man,  the  under- 
lying  population. 

The  chief  relation  of  this  common  run,  this  underlying 
population  of  German  subjects,  to  the  inception  and 
pursuit  of  this  Imperial  warlike  enterprise,  is  comprised 
in  the  fact  that  they  are  an  underlying  population  of  sub- 
jects, held  in  usufruct  by  the  Imperial  establishment  and 
employed  at  will.  It  is  true,  they  have  lent  themselves 
unreservedly  to  the  uses  for  which  the  dynasty  has  use 
for  them,  and  they  have  entered  enthusiastically  into  the 
warlike  adventure  set  afoot  by  the  dynastic  statesmen ; 
but  that  they  have  done  so  is  their  misfortune  rather  than 
their  fault.  By  use  and  wont  and  indoctrination  they  have 
for  long  been  unremittingly,  and  helplessly,  disciplined 
into  a spirit  of  dynastic  loyalty,  national  animosity  and 
servile  abnegation ; until  it  would  be  nothing  better  than  a 
pathetic  inversion  of  all  the  equities  of  the  case  to  visit 
the  transgressions  of  their  masters  upon  the  common  run ; 
whose  fault  lies,  after  all,  in  their  being  an  underlying 
population  of  subjects,  who  have  not  had  a chance  to 
reach  that  spiritual  level  on  which  they  could  properly 
be  held  accountable  for  the  uses  to  which  they  are  turned. 
It  is  true,  men  are  ordinarily  punished  for  their  misfor- 


268 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


tunes ; but  the  warlike  enterprise  of  the  Imperial  dynasty 
has  already  brought  what  might  fairly  be  rated  as  a good 
measure  of  punishment  on  this  underlying  populace, 
whose  chief  fault  and  chief  misfortune  lies  in  an  habitual 
servile  abnegation  of  those  traits  of  initiative  and  discre- 
tion in  man  that  constitute  him  an  agent  susceptible  of  re- 
sponsibility or  retribution. 

It  would  be  all  the  more  of  a pathetic  mockery  to  visit 
the  transgressions  of  their  masters  on  these  victims  of 
circumstance  and  dynastic  mendacity,  since  the  conven- 
tionalities of  international  equity  will  scarcely  permit  the 
high  responsible  parties  in  the  case  to  be  chastised  with 
any  penalty  harsher  than  a well-mannered  figure  of  speech. 
To  serve  as  a deterrent,  the  penalty  must  strike  the  point 
where  vests  the  discretion;  but  servile  use  and  wont  is 
still  too  well  intact  in  these  premises  to  let  any  penalty 
touch  the  guilty  core  of  a profligate  dynasty.  Under  the 
wear  and  tear  of  continued  war  and  its  incident  continued 
vulgarisation  of  the  directorate  and  responsible  staff 
among  the  pacific  allies,  the  conventional  respect  of  per- 
sons is  likely  to  suffer  appreciable  dilapidation;  but  there 
need  be  no  apprehension  of  such  a loss  of  decent  respect 
for  personages  as  would  compromise  the  creature  com- 
forts of  that  high  syndicate  of  personages  on  whose  initia- 
tive the  Fatherland  entered  upon  this  enterprise  in  domin- 
ion. 

Bygone  shortcomings  and  transgressions  can  have  no 
reasonable  place  in  the  arrangements  by  which  a pacific 
league  of  neutrals  designs  to  keep  the  peace.  Neither 
can  bygone  prerogatives  and  precedents  of  magnificence 
and  of  mastery,  except  in  so  far  as  they  unavoidably  must 
come  into  play  through  the  inability  of  men  to  divest  them- 
selves of  their  ingrained  preconceptions,  by  virtue  of  which 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


269 


a Hohenzollern  or  a Hapsburger  is  something  more  for- 
midable and  more  to  be  considered  than  a recruiting  ser- 
geant or  a purveyor  of  light  literature.  The  league  can 
do  its  work  of  pacification  only  by  elaborately  forgetting 
differences  and  discrepancies  of  the  kind  that  give  rise 
to  international  grievances.  Which  is  the  same  as  saying 
that  the  neutralisation  of  national  discriminations  and 
pretensions  will  have  to  go  all  the  way,  if  it  is  to  serve. 
But  this  implies,  as  broadly  as  need  be,  that  the  pacific 
nations  who  make  the  league  and  provisionally  administer 
its  articles  of  agreement  and  jurisdiction,  can  not  exempt 
themselves  from  any  of  the  leveling  measures  of  neutral- 
isation to  which  the  dynastic  suspects  among  them  are  to 
be  subject.  It  would  mean  a relinquishment  of  all  those 
undemocratic  institutional  survivals  out  of  which  inter- 
national grievances  are  wont  to  arise.  As  a certain  Danish 
adage  would  have  it,  the  neutrals  of  the  league  must  all 
be  shorn  over  the  same  comb. 

What  is  to  be  shorn  over  this  one  comb  of  neutralisation 
and  democracy  is  all  those  who  go  into  the  pacific  league 
of  neutrals  and  all  who  come  under  its  jurisdiction, 
whether  of  their  own  choice  or  by  the  necessities  of  the 
case.  It  is  of  the  substance  of  the  case  that  those  peoples 
who  have  been  employed  in  the  campaigns  of  the  German- 
Imperial  coalition  are  to  come  in  on  terms  of  impartial 
equality  with  those  who  have  held  the  ground  against 
them;  to  come  under  the  jurisdiction,  and  prospectively 
into  the  copartnery,  of  the  league  of  neutrals — all  on  the 
presumption  that  the  Imperial  coalition  will  be  brought  to 
make  peace  on  terms  of  unconditional  surrender. 

Let  it  not  seem  presumptuous  to  venture  on  a recital  of 
summary  specifications  intended  to  indicate  the  nature  of 


270 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


those  concrete  measures  which  would  logically  be  com- 
prised in  a scheme  of  pacification  carried  out  with  such 
a view  to  impartial  equality  among  the  peoples  who  are 
to  make  up  the  projected  league.  There  is  a significant 
turn  of  expression  that  recurs  habitually  in  the  formula- 
tion of  terms  put  forth  by  the  spokesmen  of  the  Entente 
belligerents,  where  it  is  insisted  that  hostilities  are  carried 
on  not  against  the  German  people  or  the  other  peoples 
associated  with  them,  but  only  against  the  Imperial  estab- 
lishments and  their  culpable  aids  and  abettors  in  the  enter- 
prise. So  it  is  further  insisted  that  there  is  no  intention 
to  bring  pains  and  penalties  on  these  peoples,  who  so  have 
been  made  use  of  by  their  masters,  but  only  on  the  culp- 
able master  class  whose  tools  these  peoples  have  been. 
And  later,  just  now  (January  1917),  and  from  a respon- 
sible and  disinterested  spokesman  for  the  pacific  league, 
there  comes  the  declaration  that  a lasting  peace  at  the 
hands  of  such  a league  can  be  grounded  only  in  a present 
“peace  without  victory.” 

The  mutual  congruity  of  these  two  declarations  need 
not  imply  collusion,  but  they  are  none  the  less  comple- 
mentary propositions  and  they  are  none  the  less  indica- 
tive of  a common  trend  of  convictions  among  the  men 
who  are  best  able  to  speak  for  those  pacific  nations  that 
are  looked  to  as  the  mainstay  of  the  prospective  league. 
They  both  converge  to  the  point  that  the  objective  to  be 
achieved  is  not  victory  for  the  Entente  belligerents  but 
defeat  for  the  German-Imperial  coalition ; that  the  peo- 
ples underlying  the  defeated  governments  are  not  to  be 
dealt  with  as  vanquished  enemies  but  as  fellows  in  un- 
deserved misfortune  brought  on  by  their  culpable  masters ; 
and  that  no  advantage  is  designed  to  be  taken  of  these 
peoples,  and  no  gratuitous  hardship  to  be  imposed  on  them. 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


271 


Their  masters  are  evidently  to  be  put  away,  not  as  defeated 
antagonists  but  as  a public  nuisance  to  be  provided  against 
as  may  seem  expedient  for  the  peace  and  security  of  those 
nations  whom  they  have  been  molesting. 

Taking  this  position  as  outlined,  it  should  not  be  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  forecast  the  general  line  of  procedure 
which  it  would  logically  demand, — barring  irrelevant  re- 
gard for  precedents  and  overheated  resentment,  and  pro- 
vided that  the  makers  of  these  peace  terms  have  a free 
hand  and  go  to  their  work  with  an  eye  single  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  enduring  peace.  The  case  of  Germany 
would  be  typical  of  all  the  rest;  and  the  main  items  of 
the  bill  in  this  case  would  seem  logically  to  run  somewhat 
as  follows : 

(1)  The  definitive  elimination  of  the  Imperial  establish- 
ment, together  with  the  monarchical  establishments  of  the 
several  states  of  the  Empire  and  the  privileged  classes ; 

(2)  Removal  or  destruction  of  all  warlike  equipment, 
military  and  naval,  defensive  and  offensive ; 

(3)  Cancelment  of  the  public  debt,  of  the  Empire  and 
of  its  members — creditors  of  the  Empire  being  accounted 
accessory  to  the  culpable  enterprise  of  the  Imperial  gov- 
ernment ; 

(4)  Confiscation  of  such  industrial  equipment  and  re-- 
sources  as  have  contributed  to  the  carrying  on  of  the  war, 
as  being  also  accessory; 

(5)  Assumption  by  the  league  at  large  of  all  debts  in- 
curred, by  the  Entente  belligerents  or  by  neutrals,  for 
the  prosecution  or  by  reason  of  the  war,  and  distribution 
of  the  obligation  so  assumed,  impartially  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  league,  including  the  peoples  of  the  defeated 
nations; 


272 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


(6)  Indemnification  for  all  injury  done  to  civilians  in 
the  invaded  territories ; the  means  for  such  indemnifi- 
cation to  be  procured  by  confiscation  of  all  estates  in  the 
defeated  countries  exceeding  a certain  very  modest  maxi- 
mum, calculated  on  the  average  of  property  owned,  say, 
by  the  poorer  three-fourths  of  the  population, — the  kept 
classes  being  properly  accounted  accessory  to  the  Empire’s 
culpable  enterprise. 

The  proposition  to  let  the  war  debt  be  shared  by  all 
members  of  the  league  on  a footing  of  impartial  equality 
may  seem  novel,  and  perhaps  extravagant.  But  all  pro- 
jects put  forth  for  safeguarding  the  world’s  peace  by  a 
compact  among  the  pacific  nations  run  on  the  patent, 
though  often  tacit,  avowal  that  the  Entente  belligerents 
are  spending  their  substance  and  pledging  their  credit  for 
the  common  cause.  Among  the  Americans,  the  chief  of 
the  neutral  nations,  this  is  coming  to  be  recognised  more 
and  more  overtly.  So  that,  in  this  instance  at  least,  no 
insurmountable  reluctance  to  take  over  their  due  share  of 
the  common  burden  should  fairly  be  looked  for,  particu- 
larly when  it  appears  that  the  projected  league,  if  it  is 
organised  on  a footing  of  neutrality,  will  relieve  the  re- 
public of  virtually  all  outlay  for  their  own  defense. 

Of  course,  there  is,  in  all  this,  no  temerarious  intention 
to  offer  advice  as  to  what  should  be  done  by  those  who 
have  it  to  do,  or  even  to  sketch  the  necessary  course  which 
events  are  bound  to  take.  As  has  been  remarked  in  an- 
other passage,  that  would  have  to  be  a work  of  prophesy 
or  of  effrontery,  both  of  which,  it  is  hoped,  lie  equally 
beyond  the  horizon  of  this  inquiry;  which  is  occupied 
with  the  question  of  what  conditions  will  logically  have 
to  be  met  in  order  to  an  enduring  peace,  not  what  will 
be  the  nature  and  outcome  of  negotiations  entered  into 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit  273 

by  astute  delegates  pursuing  the  special  advantage,  each 
of  his  own  nation.  And  yet  the  peremptory  need  of  reach- 
ing some  practicable  arrangement  whereby  the  peace  may 
be  kept,  goes  to  say  that  even  the  most  astute  negotiations 
will  in  some  degree  be  controlled  by  that  need,  and  may 
reasonably  be  expected  to  make  some  approach  to  the 
simple  and  obvious  requirements  of  the  situation. 

Therefore  the  argument  returns  to  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  probable  limit  of  tolerance  of  that  people,  in  re- 
spect of  what  they  are  likely  to  insist  on  as  a necessary 
measure  of  democratisation  in  the  nations  of  the  second 
part,  and  what  measure  of  national  abnegation  they  are 
likely  to  accomodate  themselves  to.  The  United  King- 
dom is  indispensable  to  the  formation  of  a pacific  league 
of  neutrals.  And  the  British  terms  of  adhesion,  or  rather 
of  initiation  of  such  a league,  therefore,  will  have  to  con- 
stitute the  core  of  the  structure,  on  which  details  may  be 
adjusted  and  to  which  concessive  adjustments  will  have  to 
be  made  by  all  the  rest.  This  is  not  saying  that  the  pro- 
jected league  must  or  will  be  dominated  by  the  United 
Kingdom  or  administered  in  the  British  interest.  Indeed, 
it  can  not  well  be  made  to  serve  British  particular  inter- 
ests in  any  appreciable  degree,  except  at  the  cost  of  defeat 
to  its  main  purpose ; since  the  purposes  of  an  enduring 
peace  can  be  served  only  by  an  effectual  neutralisation  of 
national  claims  and  interests.  But  it  would  mean  that  the 
neutralisation  of  national  interests  and  discriminations  to 
be  effected  would  have  to  be  drawn  on  lines  acceptable  to 
British  taste  in  these  matters,  and  would  have  to  go  ap- 
proximately so  far  as  would  be  dictated  by  the  British 
notions  of  what  is  expedient,  and  not  much  farther.  The 
pacific  league  of  neutrals  would  have  much  of  a British 

i8 


274  On  the  Nature  of  Peace 

air,  but  “British”  in  this  connection  is  to  be  taken  as 
connoting  the  English-speaking  countries  rather  than  as 
applying  to  the  United  Kingdom  alone ; since  the  entrance 
of  the  British  into  the  league  would  involve  the  entrance 
of  the  British  colonies,  and,  indeed,  of  the  American  re- 
public as  well. 

The  temper  and  outlook  of  this  British  community, 
therefore,  becomes  a matter  of  paramount  importance  in 
any  attempted  analysis  of  the  situation  resulting  after  the 
war,  or  of  any  prospective  course  of  conduct  to  be 
entered  on  by  the  pacific  nations.  And  the  question 
touches  not  so  much  the  temper  and  preconceptions  of  the 
British  community  as  known  in  recent  history,  but  rather 
as  it  is  likely  to  be  modified  by  the  war  experience.  So 
that  the  practicability  of  a neutral  league  comes  to  turn, 
in  great  measure,  on  the  effect  which  this  war  experience 
is  having  on  the  habits  of  thought  of  the  British  people,  or 
on  that  section  of  the  British  population  which  will  make 
up  the  effectual  majority  when  the  war  closes.  The 
grave  interest  that  attaches  to  this  question  must  serv'e  as 
justification  for  pursuing  it  farther,  even  though  there  can 
be  no  promise  of  a definite  or  confident  answer  to  be 
found  beforehand. 

Certain  general  assertions  may  be  made  with  some  con- 
fidence. The  experiences  of  the  war,  particularly  among 
the  immediate  participants  and  among  their  immediate 
domestic  connections — a large  and  increasing  proportion 
of  the  people  at  large — are  plainly  impressing  on  them  the 
uselessness  and  hardship  of  such  a war.  There  can  be  no 
question  but  they  are  reaching  a conviction  that  a war  of 
this  modern  kind  and  scale  is  a thing  to  be  avoided  if 
possible.  They  are,  no  doubt,  willing  to  go  to  ver}’  con- 
siderable lengths  to  make  a repetition  of  it  impossible,  and 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


275 


they  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  go  farther  along  that 
line  before  peace  returns.  But  the  lengths  to  which  they 
are  ready  to  go  may  be  in  the  way  of  concessions,  or  in 
the  way  of  contest  and  compulsion.  There  need  be  no 
doubt  but  a profound  and  vindictive  resentment  runs 
through  the  British  community,  and  there  is  no  reason  to 
apprehend  that  this  will  be  dissipated  in  the  course  of 
further  hostilities ; although  it  should  fairly  be  expected 
to  lose  something  of  its  earlier  exuberant  malevolence  and 
indiscrimination,  more  particularly  if  hostilities  continue 
for  some  time.  It  is  not  too  much  to  expect,  that  this 
popular  temper  of  resentment  will  demand  something  very 
tangible  in  the  way  of  summary  vengeance  on  those  who 
have  brought  the  hardships  of  war  upon  the  nation. 

The  manner  of  retribution  which  would  meet  the  pop- 
ular demand  for  “justice”  to  be  done  on  the  enemy  is 
likely  to  be  affected  by  the  fortunes  of  war,  as  also  the  in- 
cidence of  it.  Should  the  governmental  establishment  and 
the  discretion  still  vest  in  the  gentlemanly  classes  at  the 
close  of  hostilities,  the  retribution  is  likely  to  take  the 
accustomed  gentlemanly  shape  of  pecuniary  burdens  imr- 
posed  on  the  people  of  the  defeated  country,  together  with 
diplomatically  specified  surrender  of  territorial  and  colon- 
ial possessions,  and  the  like ; such  as  to  leave  the  de  facto 
enemy  courteously  on  one  side,  and  to  yield  something  in 
the  way  of  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  gentlemen-investors  in 
charge,  and  something  more  in  the  way  of  new  emolu- 
ments of  office  to  the  office-holding  class  included  in  the 
same  order  of  gentlemen.  The  retribution  in  the  case 
would  manifestly  fall  on  the  underlying  population  in  the 
defeated  country,  without  seriously  touching  the  responsi- 
ble parties,  and  would  leave  the  defeated  nation  with  a 
new  grievance  to  nourish  its  patriotic  animosity  and  with 


276 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


a new  incentive  to  a policy  of  watchful  waiting  for  a 
chance  of  retaliation. 

But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  under  the  stress  of  the  war 
there  is  going  forward  in  the  British  community  a pro- 
,gressive  displacement  of  gentlemanly  standards  and  official 
procedure  by  standards  and  procedure  of  a visibly  under- 
bred character,  a weakening  of  the  hold  of  the  gentleman- 
ly classes  on  the  control  of  affairs  and  a weakening  of 
the  hold  which  the  sacred  rights  of  property,  investment 
and  privilege  have  long  had  over  the  imagination  of  the 
British  people.  Should  hostilities  continue,  and  should 
the  exigencies  of  the  war  situation  continue  to  keep  the 
futility  of  these  sacred  rights,  as  well  as  the  fatuity  of  their 
possessors,  in  the  public  eye,  after  the  same  fashion  as 
hitherto,  it  would  not  be  altogether  unreasonable  to  ex- 
pect that  the  discretion  would  pass  into  the  hands  of  the 
underbred,  or  into  the  hands  of  men  immediately  and  ur- 
gently accountable  to  the  underbred.  In  such  a case,  and 
with  a constantly  growing  popular  realisation  tha.t  the 
directorate  and  responsible  enemy  in  the  war  is  the  Im- 
perial dynasty  and  its  pedigreed  aids  and  abettors,  it  is 
conceivable  that  the  popular  resentment  would  converge  so 
effectually  on  these  responsible  instigators  and  directors 
of  misfortune  as  to  bring  the  incidence  of  the  required 
retribution  effectually  to  bear  on  them.  The  outcome 
might,  not  inconceivably,  be  the  virtual  erasure  of  the 
Imperial  dynasty,  together  with  the  pedigreed-class  rule 
on  which  it  rests  and  the  apparatus  of  irresponsible  coer- 
cion through  which  it  works,  in  the  Fatherland  and  in  its 
subsidiaries  and  dependencies. 

With  a sufficiently  urgent  realisation  of  their  need  of 
peace  and  security,  and  with  a realisation  also  that  the 
way  to  avoid  war  is  to  avoid  the  ways  and  means  of  in- 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


277 


ternational  jealousy  and  of  the  national  discriminations 
out  of  which  international  jealousy  grows,  it  is  conceiv- 
able that  a government  which  should  reflect  the  British 
temper  and  the  British  hopes  might  go  so  far  in  insisting 
on  a neutralisation  of  the  peoples  of  the  Fatherland  as 
would  leave  them  without  the  dynastic  apparatus  with 
which  warlike  enterprise  is  set  afoot,  and  so  leave  them 
also  perforce  in  a pacific  frame  of  mind.  In  time,  in  the 
absence  of  their  dearly  beloved  leavings  of  feudalism,  an 
enforced  reliance  on  their  own  discretion  and  initiative, 
and  an  enforced  respite  from  the  rant  and  prance  of  war- 
like swagger,  would  reasonably  be  expected  to  grow  into  a 
popular  habit.  The  German  people  are  by  no  means  less 
capable  of  tolerance  and  neighbourly  decorum  than  their 
British  or  Scandinavian  neighbours  of  the  same  blood, — 
if  they  can  only  be  left  to  their  own  devices,  untroubled 
by  the  maggoty  conceit  of  national  domination. 

There  is  no  intention  herewith  to  express  an  expectation 
that  this  out-and-out  neutralisation  of  the  Fatherland’s 
international  relations  and  of  its  dynastic  government  will 
come  to  pass  on  the  return  of  peace,  or  that  the  German 
people  will,  as  a precaution  against  recurrent  Imperial 
rabies,  be  organised  on  a democratic  pattern  by  constraint 
of  the  pacific  nations  of  the  league.  The  point  is  only  that 
this  measure  of  neutralisation  appears  to  be  the  necessary 
condition,  in  the  absence  of  which  no  such  neutral  league^ 
can  succeed,  and  that  so  long  as  the  war  goes  on  there  is 
something  of  a chance  that  the  British  community  may 
in  time  reach  a frame  of  mind  combining  such  settled  de- 
termination to  safeguard  the  peace  at  all  costs,  with  such  a 
degree  of  disregard  for  outworn  conventions,  that  their 
spokesmen  in  the  negotiations  may  push  the  neutralisa- 
tion of  these  peoples  to  that  length. 


278 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


The  achievement  of  such  an  outcome  would  evidently 
take  time  as  well  as  harsh  experience,  more  time  and 
harsher  experience,  perhaps,  than  one  likes  to  contem- 
plate. 

Most  men,  therefore,  would  scarcely  rate  the  chance  of 
such  an  outcome  at  all  high.  And  yet  it  is  to  be  called  to 
mind  that  the  war  has  lasted  long  and  the  effect  of  its 
demands  and  its  experience  has  already  gone  far,  and 
that  the  longer  it  lasts  the  greater  are  the  chances  of  its 
prolongation  and  of  its  continued  hardships,  at  least  to 
the  extent  that  with  every  month  of  war  that  passes  the 
prospect  of  the  allied  nations  making  peace  on  any  terms 
short  of  unconditional  surrender  grows  less.  And  un- 
conditional surrender  is  the  first  step  in  the  direction  of 
an  unconditional  dispossession  of  the  Imperial  establish- 
ment and  its  war  prophets, — depending  primarily  on  the 
State  of  mind  of  the  British  people  at  the  time.  And 
however  unlikely,  it  is  also  always  possible,  as  some  con- 
tend, that  in  the  course  of  further  war  experience  the 
common  man  in  the  Fatherland  may  come  to  reflect  on  the 
use  and  value  of  the  Imperial  establishment,  with  the  re- 
sult of  discarding  and  disowning  it  and  all  its  works. 
Such  an  expectation  would  doubtless  underrate  the  force 
of  ancient  habit,  and  would  also  involve  a misapprehension 
of  the  psychological  incidence  of  a warlike  experience. 
The  German  people  have  substantially  none  of  those  pre- 
conceptions of  independence  and  self-direction  to  go  on, 
in  the  absence  of  which  an  effectual  revulsion  against 
dynastic  rule  can  not  come  to  pass. 

Embedded  in  the  common  sense  of  the  British  popula- 
tion at  large  is  a certain  large  and  somewhat  sullen  sense 
of  fair  dealing.  In  this  they  are  not  greatly  different  from 
their  neighbours,  if  at  all,  except  that  the  body  of  common 


Eliminafipn  of  the  Unfit 


279 


sense  in  which  this  British  sense  of  fair  dealing  lies  em- 
bedded is  a maturer  fashion  of  common  sense  than  that 
which  serves  to  guide  the  workday  life  of  many  of  their 
neighbours.  And  the  maturity  in  question  appears  to  be 
chiefly  a matter  of  their  having  unlearned,  divested  them- 
selves of,  or  been  by  force  of  disuse  divested  of,  an  ex- 
ceptionally large  proportion  of  that  burden  of  untoward 
conceits  which  western  Europe,  and  more  particularly 
middle  Europe,  at  large  has  carried  over  from  the  Middle 
Ages.  They  have  had  time  and  occasion  to  forget  more 
of  what  the  exigencies  of  modern  life  make  it  expedient 
to  have  forgotten.  And  yet  they  are  reputed  slow,  con- 
servative. But  they  have  been  well  placed  for  losing 
much  of  what  would  be  well  lost. 

Among  other  things,  their  preconception  of  national 
animosity  is  not  secure,  in  the  absence  of  provocation. 
They  are  now  again  in  a position  to  learn  to  do  without 
some  of  the  useless  legacy  out  of  the  past, — ^useless, 
that  is,  for  life  as  it  runs  today,  however  it  may  be  rated 
in  the  setting  in  which  it  was  all  placed  in  that  past  out 
of  which  it  has  come.  And  the  question  is  whether  now, 
under  the  pressure  of  exigencies  that  make  for  a dis- 
establishment of  much  cumbersome  inherited  apparatus 
for  doing  what  need  not  be  done,  they  will  be  ruled  by 
their  sense  of  expediency  and  of  fair  dealing  to  the  ex- 
tent of  cancelling  out  of  their  own  scheme  of  life  so 
much  of  this  legacy  of  conventional  preconceptions  as  has 
now  come  visibly  to  hinder  their  own  material  well-being, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  defeat  that  peace  and  security  for 
which  they  have  shown  themselves  willing  to  fight.  It  is, 
of  course,  a simpler  matter  to  fight  than  it  is  to  put  away 
a preconceived,  even  if  it  is  a bootless,  'superstition;  as, 
e.  g.,  the  prestige  of  hereditary  wealth,  hereditary  gentil- 


280 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


ity,  national  vainglory,  and  perhaps  especially  national 
hatred.  But  if  the  school  is  hard  enough  and  the  dis- 
cipline protracted  enough  there  is  no  reason  in  the  nature 
of  things  why  the  common  run  of  the  British  people  should 
not  unlearn  these  futilities  that  once  were  the  substance 
of  things  under  an  older  and  outworn  order.  They  have 
already  shown  their  capacity  for  divesting  themselves  of 
outworn  institutional  bonds,  in  discarding  the  main  sub- 
stance of  dynastic  rule ; and  when  they  now  come  to  face 
the  exigencies  of  this  new  situation  it  should  cause  no 
great  surprise  if  they  are  able  to  see  their  way  to  do  what 
further  is  necessary  to  meet  these  exigencies. 

At  the  hands  of  this  British  commonwealth  the  new 
situation  requires  the  putting  away  of  the  German  Imper- 
ial establishment  and  the  military  caste ; the  reduction  of 
the  German  peoples  to  a footing  of  unreserved  democracy 
with  sufficient  guarantees  against  national  trade  discrimi- 
nations; surrender  of  all  British  tutelage  over  outlying 
possessions,  except  what  may  go  to  guarantee  their  local 
autonomy;  cancelment  of  all  extra-territorial  pretensions 
of  the  several  nations  entering  into  the  league;  neutral- 
isation of  the  several  national  establishments,  to  comprise 
’virtual  disarmament,  as  well  as  cancelment  of  all  restric- 
tions on  trade  and  of  all  national  defense  of  extra-terri- 
torial pecuniary  claims  and  interests  on  the  part  of  in- 
dividual citizens.  The  naval  control  of  the  seas  will  best 
be  left  in  British  hands.  No  people  has  a graver  or  more 
immediate  interest  in  the  freedom  an-d  security  of  the 
sea-borne  trade ; and  the  United  Kingdom  has  shown 
that  it  is  to  be  trusted  in  that  matter.  And  then  it  may 
well  be  that  neither  the  national  pride  nor  the  apprehen- 
sions of  the  British  people  would  allow  them  to  surren- 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


281 


der  it;  whereas,  if  the  league  is  to  be  formed  it  will  have 
to  be  on  terms  to  which  the  British  people  are  willing  to 
adhere.  A certain  provision  of  armed  force  will  also  be 
needed  to  keep  the  governments  of  unneutral  nations  in 
check, — and  for  the  purpose  in  hand  all  effectively  mon- 
archical countries  are  to  be  counted  as  congenitally  un- 
neutral, whatever  their  formal  professions  and  whether 
they  are  members  of  the  league  or  not.  Here  again  it 
will  probably  appear  that  the  people  of  the  United  King- 
dom, and  of  the  English-speaking  countries  at  large,  will 
not  consent  to  this  armed  force  and  its  discretionary  use 
passing  out  of  British  hands,  or  rather  out  of  French- 
British  hands ; and  here  again  the  practical  decision  will 
have  to  wait  on  the  choice  of  the  British  people,  all  the 
more  because  the  British  community  has  no  longer  an 
interest,  real  or  fancied,  in  the  coercive  use  of  this  force 
for  their  own  particular  ends.  No  other  power  is  to  be 
trusted,  except  France,  and  France  is  less  well  placed 
for  the  purpose  and  would  assuredly  also  not  covet  so 
invidious  an  honour  and  so  thankless  an  office. 

The  theory,  i.  e.  the  logical  necessities,  of  such  a pa- 
cific league  of  neutral  nations  is  simple  enough,  in  its 
elements.  War  is  to  be  avoided  by  a policy  of  avoidance. 
Which  signifies  that  the  means  and  the  motives  to  war- 
like enterprise  and  warlike  provocation  are  to  be 
put  away,  so  far  as  may  be.  If  what  may  be,  in  this 
respect,  does  not  come  up  to  the  requirements  of  the 
case,  the  experiment,  of  course,  will  fail.  The  prelim- 
inary requirement, — elimination  of  the  one  formidable 
dynastic  State  in  Europe, — has  been  spoken  of.  Its  coun- 
terpart in  the  Far  East  will  cease  to  be  formidable  on 
the  decease  of  its  natural  ally  in  Central  Europe,  in  so 


282 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


far  as  touches  the  case  of  such  a projected  league.  The 
ever  increasingly  dubious  empire  of  the  Czar  would  ap- 
pear to  fall  in  the  same  category.  So  that  the  pacific 
league’s  fortunes  would  seem  to  turn  on  what  may  be 
called  its  domestic  or  internal  arrangements. 

Now,  the  means  of  warlike  enterprise,  as  well  as  of 
unadvised  embroilment,  is  always  in  the  last  analysis  the 
patriotic  spirit  of  the  nation.  Given  this  patriotic  spirit 
in  sufficient  measure,  both  the  material  equipment  and  the 
provocation  to  hostilities  will  easily  be  found.  It  should 
accordingly  appear  to  be  the  first  care  of  such  a pacific 
league  to  reduce  the  sources  of  patriotic  incitement  to  the 
practicable  minimum.  This  can  be  done,  in  such  measure 
as  it  can  be  done  at  all,  by  neutralisation  of  national  pre- 
tensions. The  finished  outcome  in  this  respect,  such  as 
would  assure  perpetual  peace  among  the  peoples  con- 
cerned, would  of  course  be  an  unconditional  neutralisation 
of  citizenship,  as  has  already  been  indicated  before.  The 
question  which,  in  effect,  the  spokesmen  for  a pacific 
league  have  to  face  is  as  to  how  nearly  that  outcome  can 
be  brought  to  pass.  The  rest  of  what  they  may  under- 
take, or  may  come  to  by  way  of  compromise  and  stipula- 
tion, is  relatively  immaterial  and  of  relatively  transient 
consequence. 

A neutralisation  of  citizenship  has  of  course  been  afloat 
in  a somewhat  loose  way  in  the  projects  of  socialistic  and 
other  “undesirable”  agitators,  but  nothing  much  has  come 
of  it.  Nor  have  specific  projects  for  its  realisation  been 
set  afoot.  That  anything  conclusive  along  that  line  could 
now  be  reached  would  seem  extremely  doubtful,  in  view 
of  the  ardent  patriotic  temper  of  all  these  peoples,  height- 
ened just  now  by  the  experience  of  war.  Still,  an  unde- 
signed and  unguided  drift  in  that  direction  has  been  visible 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


283 


in  all  those  nations  that  are  accounted  the  vanguard  among 
modern  civilised  peoples,  ever  since  the  dynastic  rule 
among  them  began  to  be  displaced  by  a growth  of  “free” 
institutions,  that  is  to  say  institutions  resting  on  an  ac 
cepted  ground  of  insubordination  and  free  initiative. 

The  patriotism  of  these  peoples,  or  their  national  spirit, 
is  after  all  and  at  the  best  an  attenuated  and  imperson- 
alised  remnant  of  dynastic  loyalty,  and  it  amounts  after 
all,  in  effect,  to  nothing  much  else  than  a residual  cur- 
tailment or  partial  atrophy  of  that  democratic  habit  of 
mind  that  embodies  itself  in  the  formula:  Live  and  let 
live.  It  is,  no  doubt,  both  an  ancient  and  a very  meri- 
torious habit.  It  is  easily  acquired  and  hard  to  put  away. 
The  patriotic  spirit  and  the  national  life  (prestige)  on 
which  it  centers  are  the  subject  of  untiring  eulogy;  but 
hitherto  its  encomiasts  have  shown  no  cause  and  put  for- 
ward no  claim  to  believe  that  it  all  is  of  any  slightest  use 
for  any  purpose  that  does  not  take  it  and  its  paramount 
merit  for  granted.  It  is  doubtless  a very  meritorious 
habit;  at  least  so  they  all  say.  But  under  the  circum- 
stances of  modern  civilised  life  it  is  fruitful  of  no  other 
net  material  result  than  damage  and  discomfort.  Still  it 
is  virtually  ubiquitous  among  civilised  men,  and  in  an 
admirable  state  of  repair;  and  for  the  calculable  future 
it  is  doubtless  to  be  counted  in  as  an  enduring  obstacle 
to  a conclusive  peace,  a constant  source  of  anxiety  and 
unremitting  care. 

The  motives  that  work  out  through  this  national  spirit, 
by  use  of  this  patriotic  ardor,  fall  under  two  heads : dy- 
nastic ambition,  and  business  enterprise.  The  two  cate- 
gories have  the  common  trait  that  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other  comprises  anything  that  is  of  the  slightest  ma- 
terial benefit  to  the  community  at  large;  but  both  have 


284 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


at  the  same  time  a high  prestige  value  in  the  conventional 
esteem  of  modern  men.  The  relation  of  dynastic  ambition 
to  warlike  enterprise,  and  the  uses  of  that  usufruct  of 
the  nation’s  resources  and  man-power  which  the  nation’s 
patriotism  places  at  the  disposal  of  the  dynastic  estab- 
lishment, have  already  been  spoken  of  at  length  above, 
perhaps  at  excessive  length,  in  the  recurrent  discussion  of 
the  dynastic  State  and  its  quest  of  dominion  for  domin- 
ion’s sake.  What  measures  are  necessary  to  be  taken  as 
regards  the  formidable  dynastic  States  that  threaten  the 
peace,  have  also  been  outlined,  perhaps  with  excessive 
freedom. 

But  it  remains  to  call  attention  to  that  mitigated  form 
of  dynastic  rule  called  a constitutional  monarchy.  In- 
stances of  such  a constitutional  monarchy,  designed  to 
conserve  the  well-beloved  abuses  of  dynastic  rule  unde:’ 
a cover  of  democratic  formalities,  or  to  bring  in  effectual 
democratic  insubordination  under  cover  of  the  ancient 
dignities  of  an  outworn  monarchical  system, — the  char- 
acterisation may  run  either  way  according  to  the  fancy 
of  the  speaker,  and  to  much  the  same  practical  effect  in 
either  case, — instances  illustrative  of  this  compromise 
monarchy  at  work  today  are  to  be  had,  as  felicitously  as 
anywhere,  in  the  Balkan  states ; perhaps  the  case  of 
Greece  will  be  especially  instructive.  At  the  other,  and 
far,  end  of  the  line  will  be  found  such  other  typical  in- 
stances as  the  British,  the  Dutch,  or,  in  pathetic  and  droll 
miniature,  the  Norwegian. 

There  is,  of  course,  a wide  interval  between  the  gro- 
tesque effrontery  that  wears  the  Hellenic  crown  and  the 
undeviatingly  decorous  self-effacement  of  the  Dutch  sov- 
ereign ; and  yet  there  is  something  of  a common  com- 
plexion runs  through  the  whole  range  of  establishments, 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


285 


all  the  way  from  the  quasi-dynastic  to  the  pseudo-dynastic. 
For  reasons  unavoidable  and  persistent,  though  not  in- 
scribed in  the  constituent  law,  the  governmental  establish- 
ment associated  with  such  a royal  concern  will  be  made 
up  of  persons  drawn  from  the  kept  classes,  the  nobility 
or  lesser  gentlefolk,  and  will  be  imbued  with  the  spirit 
of  these  “better”  classes  rather  than  that  of  the  common 
run. 

With  what  may  be  uncanny  shrewdness,  or  perhaps 
mere  tropismatic  response  to  the  unreasoned  stimulus 
of  a “consciousness  of  kind,”  the  British  government — 
habitually  a syndicate  of  gentlefolk — has  uniformly  in- 
sisted on  the  installation  of  a constitutional  monarchy  at 
the  formation  of  every  new  national  organisation  in  which 
that  government  has  had  a discretionary  voice.  And  the 
many  and  various  constitutional  governments  so  estab- 
lished, commonly  under  British  auspices  in  some  degree, 
have  invariably  run  true  to  form,  in  some  appreciable 
degree.  They  may  be  quasi-dynastic  or  pseudo-dynastic, 
but  at  this  nearest  approach  to  democracy  they  always, 
and  unavoidably,  include  at  least  a circumlocution  office 
of  gentlefolk,  in  the  way  of  a ministry  and  court  estab- 
lishment, whose  place  in  the  economy  of  the  nation’s 
affairs  it  is  to  adapt  the  run  of  these  affairs  to  the  needs 
of  the  kept  classes. 

There  need  be  no  imputation  of  sinister  designs  to  these 
gentlefolk,  who  so  are  elected  by  force  of  circumstances 
to  guard  and  guide  the  nation’s  interests.  As  things  go, 
it  will  doubtless  commonly  be  found  that  they  are  as  well- 
intentioned  as  need  be.  But  a well-meaning  gentleman 
of  good  antecedents  means  well  in  a gentlemanly  way 
and  in  the  light  of  good  antecedents.  Which  comes  un- 
avoidably to  an  effectual  bias  in  favor  of  those  interests 


286 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


which  honorable  gentlemen  of  good  antecedents  have  at 
heart.  And  among  these  interests  are  the  interests  of 
the  kept  classes,  as  contrasted  with  that  common  run  of 
the  population  from  which  their  keep  is  drawn. 

Under  the  auspices,  even  if  they  are  only  the  histrionic 
and  decorative  auspices,  of  so  decorous  an  article  of  in- 
stitutional furniture  as  royalty,  it  follows  of  logical  neces- 
sity that  the  personnel  of  the  effectual  government  must 
also  be  drawn  from  the  better  classes,  whose  place  and 
station  and  high  repute  will  make  their  association  with 
the  First  Gentleman  of  the  Realm  not  too  insufferably 
incongruous.  And  then,  the  popular  habit  of  looking  up 
to  this  First  Gentleman  with  that  deference  that  royalty 
commands,  also  conduces  materially  to  the  attendant 
habitual  attitude  of  deference  to  gentility  more  at  large. 

Even  in  so  democratic  a country,  and  with  so  exani- 
mate a crown  as  is  to  be  found  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  royal  establishment  visibly,  and  doubtless  very'  mate- 
rially, conduces  to  the  continued  tenure  of  the  effectual 
government  by  representatives  of  the  kept  classes ; and 
it  therefore  counts  with  large  effect  toward  the  retardation 
of  the  country’s  further  move  in  the  direction  of  demo- 
cratic insubordination  and  direct  participation  in  the  di- 
rection of  affairs  by  the  underbred,  who  finally  pay  the 
cost.  And  on  the  other  hand,  even  so  moderately'  royal 
an  establishment  as  the  Norwegian  has  apparently  a sen- 
sible effect  in  the  way  of  gathering  the  reins  somewhat 
into  the  hands  of  the  better  classes,  under  circumstances 
of  such  meagerness  as  might  be  expected  to  preclude 
anything  like  a “better”  class,  in  the  conventional  accepta- 
tion of  that  term.  It  would  appear  that  even  the  extreme 
of  pseudo-dynastic  royalty,  sterilised  to  the  last  degree, 
is  something  of  an  effectual  hindrance  to  democratic  rule, 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


287 


and  in  so  far  also  a hindrance  to  the  further  continued 
neutralisation  of  nationalist  pretensions,  as  also  an  ef- 
fectual furtherance  of  upper-class  rule  for  upper-class 
ends. 

Now,  a government  by  well-meaning  gentlemen-invest- 
ors  will,  at  the  nearest,  come  no  nearer  representing  the 
material  needs  and  interests  of  the  common  run  than  a 
parable  comes  to  representing  the  concrete  facts  which 
it  hopes  to  illuminate.  And  as  bears  immediately  on 
the  point  in  hand,  these  gentlemanly  administrators  of  the 
nation’s  atfairs  who  so  cluster  about  the  throne,  vacant 
though  it  may  be  of  all  but  the  bodily  presence  of  ma- 
jesty, are  after  all  gentlemen,  with  a gentlemanly  sense 
of  punctilio  touching  the  large  proprieties  and  courtesies 
of  political  life.  The  national  honor  is  a matter  of  punc- 
tilio, always;  and  out  of  the  formal  exigencies  of  the 
national  honor  arise  grievances  to  be  redressed ; and  it  is 
grievances  of  this  character  that  commonly  afford  the 
formal  ground  of  a breach  of  the  peace.  An  appeal  on 
patriotic  grounds  of  wounded  national  pride,  to  the  com- 
mon run  who  have  no  trained  sense  of  punctilio,  by  the 
gentlemanly  responsible  class  who  have  such  a sense, 
backed  by  assurances  that  the  national  prestige  or  the 
national  interests  are  at  stake,  will  commonly  bring  a 
suitable  response.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  that  the  com- 
mon run  should  know  just  what  the  stir  is  about,  so  long 
as  they  are  informed  by  their  trusted  betters  that  there 
is  a grievance  to  redress.  In  effect,  it  results  that  the 
democratic  nation’s  affairs  are  administered  by  a syndi- 
cate composed  of  the  least  democratic  class  in  the  popu- 
lation. 

Excepting  what  is  to  be  excepted,  it  will  commonly 
hold  true  today  that  these  gentlemanly  governments  are 


288 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


conducted  in  a commendably  clean  and  upright  fashion, 
with  a conscious  rectitude  and  a benevolent  intention. 
But  they  are  after  all,  in  effect,  class  governments,  and 
they  unavoidably  carry  the  bias  of  their  class.  The  gentle- 
manly officials  and  law-givers  come,  in  the  main,  from  the 
kept  classes,  whose  living  comes  to  them  in  the  way  of 
income  from  investments,  at  home  or  in  foreign  parts,  or 
from  an  equivalent  source  of  accumulated  wealth  or  offi- 
cial emolument.  The  bias  resulting  from  this  state  of  the 
case  need  not  be  of  an  intolerant  character  in  order  to 
bring  its  modicum  of  mischief  into  the  national  policy, 
as  regards  amicable  relations  with  other  nationalities.  A 
slight  bias  running  on  a ground  of  conscious  right  and 
unbroken  usage  may  go  far.  So,  e.  g.,  anyone  of  these 
gentlemanly  governments  is  within  its  legitimate  rights, 
or  rather  within  its  imperative  duty,  in  defending  the  for- 
eign investments  of  its  citizens  and  enforcing  due  payment 
of  its  citizens’  claims  to  income  or  principal  of  such  prop- 
erty as  they  may  hold  in  foreign  parts ; and  it  is  within 
its  ordinary  lines  of  duty  in  making  use  of  the  nation’s 
resources — that  is  to  say  of  the  common  man  and  his 
means  of  livelihood — in  enforcing  such  claims  held  by 
the  investing  classes.  The  community  at  large  has  no 
interest  in  the  enforcement  of  such  claims ; it  is  evidently 
a class  interest,  and  as  evidently  protected  by  a code  of 
rights,  duties  and  procedure  that  has  grown  out  of  a class 
bias,  at  the  cost  of  the  community  at  large. 

This  bias  favoring  the  interests  of  invested  wealth  may 
also,  and  indeed  it  commonly  does,  take  the  aggressive 
form  of  aggressively  forwarding  enterprise  in  invest- 
ment abroad,  particularly  in  commercially  backward  coun- 
tries abroad,  by  extension  of  the  national  jurisdiction 
and  the  active  countenancing  of  concessions  in  foreign 


Eliminafion  of  the  Unfit 


289 


parts,  by  subventions,  or  by  creation  of  offices  to  bring 
suitable  emoluments  to  the  younger  sons  of  deserving 
families.  The  protective  tariffs  to  which  recourse  is 
sometimes  had,  are  of  the  same  general  nature  and  pur- 
pose. Of  course,  it  is  in  this  latter,  aggressive  or  excur- 
sive, issue  of  the  well-to-do  bias  in  favor  of  investment 
and  invested  wealth  that  its  most  pernicious  effect  on 
international  relations  is  traceable. 

Free  income,  that  is  to  say  income  not  dependent  on 
personal  merit  or  exertion  of  any  kind,  is  the  breath  of 
life  to  the  kept  classes;  and  as  a corollary  of  the  “First 
Law  of  Nature,”  therefore,  the  invested  wealth  which 
gives  a legally  equitable  claim  to  such  income  has  in  their 
eyes  all  the  sanctity  that  can  be  given  by  Natural  Right. 
Investment — often  spoken  of  euphemistically  as  “savings” 
■ — is  consequently  a meritorious  act,  conceived  to  be  very 
serviceable  to  the  community  at  large,  and  properly  to  be 
furthered  by  all  available  means.  Invested  wealth  is  so 
much  added  to  the  aggregate  means  at  the  community’s 
disposal,  it  is  believed.  Of  course,  in  point  of  fact,  in- 
come from  investment  in  the  hands  of  these  gentlefolk 
is  a means  of  tracelessly  consuming  that  much  of  the 
community’s  yearly  product ; but  to  the  kept  classes,  who 
see  the  matter  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  recipient, 
the  matter  does  not  present  itself  in  that  light.  To  them 
it  is  the  breath  of  life.  Like  other  honorable  men  they 
are  faithful  to  their  bread ; and  by  authentic  tradition  the 
common  man,  in  whose  disciplined  preconceptions  the  kept 
classes  are  his  indispensable  betters,  is  also  imbued  with 
the  uncritical  faith  that  the  invested  wealth  which  enables 
these  betters  tracelessly  to  consume  a due  share  of  the 
yearly  product  is  an  addition  to  the  aggregate  means 
in  hand. 

IQ 


290 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


The  advancement  of  commercial  and  other  business 
enterprise  beyond  the  national  frontiers  is  consequently 
one  of  the  duties  not  to  be  neglected,  and  with  which  no 
trifling  can  be  tolerated.  It  is  so  bound  up  with  national 
ideals,  under  any  gentlemanly  government,  that  any  in- 
vasion or  evasion  of  the  rights  of  investors  in  foreign 
parts,  or  of  other  business  involved  in  dealings  with  for- 
eign parts,  immediately  involves  not  only  the  material 
interest  of  the  nation  but  the  national  honour  as  well. 
Hence  international  jealousies  and  eventual  embroilment. 

The  constitutional  monarchy  that  commonly  covers  a 
modern  democratic  community  is  accordingly  a menace 
to  the  common  peace,  and  any  pacific  league  of  neutrals 
will  be  laying  up  trouble  and  prospective  defeat  for  itself 
in  allowing  such  an  institution  to  stand  over  in  any  in- 
stance. Acting  with  a free  hand,  if  such  a thing  were 
possible,  the  projected  league  should  logically  eliminate 
all  monarchical  establishments,  constitutional  or  other- 
wise, from  among  its  federated  nations.  It  is  doubtless 
not  within  reason  to  look  for  such  a move  in  the  nego- 
tiations that  are  to  initiate  the  projected  league  of  neu- 
trals ; but  the  point  is  called  to  mind  here  chiefly  as  indi- 
cating one  of  the  difficult  passages  which  are  to  be  faced 
in  any  attempted  formation  of  such  a league,  as  well  as 
one  of  the  abiding  sources  of  international  irritation  with 
which  the  league’s  jurisdiction  will  be  burdened  so  long 
as  a decisive  measure  of  the  kind  is  not  taken. 

The  logic  of  the  whole  matter  is  simple  enough,  and 
the  necessary  measures  to  be  taken  to  remedy  it  are  no 
less  simple — barring  sentimental  objections  which  will 
probably  prove  insuperable.  A monarchy,  even  a suffi- 
ciently inane  monarchy,  carries  the  burden  of  a gentle- 
manly governmental  establishment — a government  by  and 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


291 


for  the  kept  classes ; such  a government  will  unavoidably 
direct  the  affairs  of  state  with  a view  to  income  on  in- 
vested wealth,  and  will  see  the  material  interests  of  the 
country  only  in  so  far  as  they  present  themselves  under 
the  form  of  investment  and  business  enterprise  designed 
to  eventuate  in  investment;  these  are  the  only  forms  of 
material  interest  that  give  rise  to  international  jealousies, 
discriminations  and  misunderstanding,  at  the  same  time 
that  they  are  interests  of  individuals  only  and  have  no 
material  use  or  value  to  the  community  at  large.  Given 
a monarchical  establishment  and  the  concomitant  gentle- 
manly governmental  corps,  there  is  no  avoiding  this  sin- 
ister prime  mover  of  international  rivalry,  so  long  as  the 
rights  of  invested  wealth  continue  in  popular  apprehen- 
sion to  be  held  inviolable. 

Quite  obviously  there  is  a certain  tu  quoque  ready  to 
the  hand  of  these  “gentlemen  of  the  old  school”  who  see 
in  the  constitutional  monarchy  a God-given  shelter  from 
the  unreserved  vulgarisation  of  life  at  the  hands  of  the 
unblest  and  unbalanced  underbred  and  underfed.  The 
formally  democratic  nations,  that  have  not  retained  even 
a pseudo-dynastic  royalty,  are  not  much  more  fortunately 
placed  in  respect  of  national  discrimination  in  trade  and 
investment.  The  American  republic  will  obviously  come 
into  the  comparison  as  the  type-form  of  economic  policy 
in  a democratic  commonwealth.  There  is  little  to  choose 
between  the  economic  policy  pursued  by  such  republics 
as  France  or  America  on  the  one  side  and  their  nearest 
counterparts  among  the  constitutional  monarchies  on  the 
other.  It  is  even  to  be  admitted  out  of  hand  that  the 
comparison  does  no  credit  to  democratic  institutions  as 
seen  at  work  in  these  republics.  They  are,  in  fact,  some- 
what the  crudest  and  most  singularly  foolish  in  their 


292 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


economic  policy  of  any  peoples  in  Christendom.  And  in 
view  of  the  amazing  facility  with  which  these  democratic 
commonwealths  are  always  ready  to  delude  themselves 
in  everything  that  touches  their  national  trade  policies,  it 
is  obvious  that  any  league  of  neutrals  whose  fortunes  are 
in  any  degree  contingent  on  their  reasonable  compliance 
with  a call  to  neutralise  their  trade  regulations  for  the 
sake  of  peace,  will  have  need  of  all  the  persuasive  power 
it  can  bring  to  bear. 

However,  the  powers  of  darkness  have  one  less  line  of 
defense  to  shelter  them  and  their  work  of  malversation 
in  these  commonwealths  than  in  the  constitutional  mon- 
archies. The  American  national  establishment,  e.  g., 
which  may  be  taken  as  a fairly  characteristic  type-form 
in  this  bearing,  is  a government  of  businessmen  for 
business  ends ; and  there  is  no  tabu  of  axiomatic  gen- 
tility or  of  certified  pedigree  to  hedge  about  this  working 
syndicate  of  business  interests.  So  that  it  is  all  nearer 
by  one  remove  to  the  disintegrating  touch  of  the  common 
man  and  his  commonplace  circumstances.  The  business- 
like r6gime  of  these  democratic  politicians  is  as  unde- 
viating in  its  advocacy  and  aid  of  enterprise  in  pursuit 
of  private  gain  under  shelter  of  national  discrimination  as 
the  circumstances  will  permit;  and  the  circumstances 
will  permit  them  to  do  much  and  far;  for  the  limits 
of  popular  gullibility  in  all  things  that  touch  the  admirable 
feats  of  business  enterprise  are  very  wide  in  these  coun- 
tries. There  is  a sentimental  popular  belief  running  to 
the  curious  effect  that  because  the  citizens  of  such  a com- 
monwealth are  ungraded  equals  before  the  law,  therefore 
somehow  they  can  all  and  several  become  wealthy  by 
trading  at  the  expense  of  their  neighbours. 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


293 


Yet,  the  fact  remains  that  there  is  only  the  one  Kne  of 
defense  in  these  countries  where  the  business  interests 
have  not  the  countenance  of  a time-honored  order  of  gen- 
tlefolk, with  the  sanction  of  royalty  in  the  background. 
And  this  fact  is  further  enhanced  by  one  of  its  immediate 
consequences.  Proceeding  upon  the  abounding  faith 
which  these  peoples  have  in  business  enterprise  as  a uni- 
versal solvent,  the  unreserved  venality  and  greed  of  their 
businessmen — unhampered  by  the  gentleman’s  noblesse 
oblige — have  pushed  the  conversion  of  public  law  to  pri- 
vate gain  farther  and  more  openly  here  than  elsewhere. 
The  outcome  has  been  divers  measures  in  restraint  of 
trade  or  in  furtherance  of  profitable  abuses,  of  such  a 
crass  and  flagrant  character  that  if  once  the  popular  ap- 
prehension is  touched  by  matter-of-fact  reflection  on  the 
actualities  of  this  businesslike  policy  the  whole  structure 
should  reasonably  be  expected  to  crumble.  If  the  present 
conjuncture  of  circumstances  should,  e.  g.,  present  to 
the  American  populace  a choice  between  exclusion  from 
the  neutral  league,  and  a consequent  probable  and  dubious 
war  of  self-defense,  on  the  one  hand ; as  against  entrance 
into  the  league,  and  security  at  the  cost  of  relinquishing 
their  national  tariff  in  restraint  of  trade,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  always  possible  that  the  people  might  be  brought 
to  look  their  protective  tariff  in  the  face  and  recognise  it 
for  a commonplace  conspiracy  in  restraint  of  trade,  and 
so  decide  to  shuffle  it  out  of  the  way  as  a good  riddance. 
And  the  rest  of  the  Republic’s  businesslike  policy  of 
special  favors  would  in  such  a case  stand  a chance  of 
going  in  the  discard  along  with  the  protective  tariff,  since 
the  rest  is  of  substantially  the  same  disingenuous  char- 
acter. 


294 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


Not  that  anyone  need  entertain  a confident  expectation 
of  such  an  exploit  of  common  sense  on  the  part  of  the 
American  voters.  There  is  little  encouragement  for  such 
a hope  in  their  past  career  of  gullibility  on  this  head. 
But  this  is  again  a point  of  difficulty  to  be  faced  in 
negotiations  looking  to  such  a pacific  league  of  neutrals. 
Without  a somewhat  comprehensive  neutralisation  of  na- 
tional trade  regulations,  the  outlook  for  lasting  peace 
would  be  reduced  by  that  much ; there  would  be  so  much 
material  for  international  jealousy  and  misunderstanding 
left  standing  over  and  requiring  continued  readjustment 
and  compromise,  always  with  the  contingency  of  a breach 
that  much  nearer.  The  infatuation  of  the  Americans  with 
their  protective  tariff  and  other  businesslike  discrimina- 
tions is  a sufficiently  serious  matter  in  this  connection, 
and  it  is  always  possible  that  their  inability  to  give  up 
this  superstition  might  lead  to  their  not  adhering  to  this 
projected  neutral  league.  Yet  it  is  at  least  to  be  said 
that  the  longer  the  time  that  passes  before  active  meas- 
ures are  taken  toward  the  organisation  of  such  a league 
— that  is  to  say,  in  effect,  the  longer  the  great  war  lasts — 
the  more  amenable  is  the  temper  of  the  Americans  likely 
to  be,  and  the  more  reluctantly  would  they  see  themselves 
excluded.  Should  the  war  be  protracted  to  some  such 
length  as  appears  to  be  promised  by  latterday  pronun- 
ciamentos  from  the  belligerents,  or  to  something  passably 
approaching  such  a duration ; and  should  the  Imperial 
designs  and  anomalous  diplomacy  of  Japan  continue  to 
force  themselves  on  the  popular  attention  at  the  present 
rate ; at  the  same  time  that  the  operations  in  Europe  con- 
tinue to  demonstrate  the  excessive  cost  of  defense  against 
a well  devised  and  resolute  offensive;  then  it  should  rea- 
sonably be  expected  that  the  Americans  might  come  to 


Elimination  of  the  Unfit 


295 


such  a realisation  of  their  own  case  as  to  let  no  minor 
considerations  of  trade  discrimination  stand  in  the  way 
of  their  making  common  cause  with  the  other  pacific 
nations. 

It  appears  already  to  be  realised  in  the  most  responsible 
quarter  that  America  needs  the  succor  of  the  other  pacific 
nations,  with  a need  that  is  not  to  be  put  away  or  put  off ; 
as  it  is  also  coming  to  be  realised  that  the  Imperial  Powers 
are  disturbers  of  the  peace,  by  force  of  their  Imperial 
character.  Of  course,  the  politicians  who  seek  their  own 
advantage  in  the  nation’s  embarrassment  are  commonly 
unable  to  see  the  matter  in  that  light.  But  it  is  also  ap- 
parent that  the  popular  sentiment  is  affected  with  the  same 
apprehension,  more  and  more  as  time  passes  and  the  aims 
and  methods  of  the  Imperial  Powers  become  more  patent. 

Hitherto  the  spokesmen  of  a pacific  federation  of  na- 
tions have  spoken  for  a league  of  such  an  (indeterminate) 
constitution  as  to  leave  all  the  federated  nations  undis- 
turbed in  all  their  conduct  of  their  own  affairs,  domestic 
or  international ; probably  for  want  of  second  thought  as 
to  the  complications  of  copartnership  between  them  in  so 
grave  and  unwonted  an  enterprise.  They  have  also  spoken 
of  America’s  share  in  the  project  as  being  that  of  an  in- 
terested outsider,  whose  interest  in  any  precautionary 
measures  of  this  kind  is  in  part  a regard  for  his  own 
tranquility  as  a disinterested  neighbour,  but  in  greater 
part  a humane  solicitude  for  the  well-being  of  civilised 
mankind  at  large.  In  this  view,  somewhat  self-complacent 
it  is  to  be  admitted,  America  is  conceived  to  come  into 
the  case  as  initiator  and  guide,  about  whom  the  pacific 
nations  are  to  cluster  as  some  sort  of  queen-bee. 

Now,  there  is  not  a little  verisimilitude  in  this  concep- 
tion of  America  as  a sort  of  central  office  and  a tower 


296 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  strength  in  the  projected  federation  of  neutral  nations, 
however  pharisaical  an  appearance  it  may  all  have  in 
the  self-complacent  utterances  of  patriotic  Americans. 
The  American  republic  is,  after  all,  the  greatest  of  the 
pacific  nations  of  Christendom,  in  resources,  population 
and  industrial  capacity ; and  it  is  also  not  to  be  denied 
that  the  temper  of  this  large  population  is,  on  the  whole, 
as  pacific  as  that  of  any  considerable  pveople — outside  of 
China.  The  adherence  of  the  American  republic  would,  in 
effect,  double  the  mass  and  powers  of  the  projected 
league,  and  would  so  place  it  beyond  all  hazard  of  defeat 
from  without,  or  even  of  serious  outside  opposition  to  its 
aims. 

Yet  it  will  not  hold  true  that  America  is  either  disin- 
terested or  indispensable.  The  unenviable  position  of  the 
indispensable  belongs  to  the  United  Kingdom,  and  car- 
ries with  it  the  customary  suspicion  of  interested  motives 
that  attaches  to  the  stronger  party  in  a bargain.  To 
America,  on  the  other  hand,  the  league  is  indispensable, 
as  a refuge  from  otherwise  inevitable  dangers  ahead;  and 
it  is  only  a question  of  a moderate  allowance  of  time  for 
the  American  voters  to  realise  that  without  an  adequate 
copartnership  with  the  other  pacific  nations  the  outlook 
of  the  Republic  is  altogether  precarious.  Single-handed, 
America  can  not  defend  itself,  except  at  a prohibitive 
cost ; whereas  in  copartnership  with  these  others  the 
national  defense  becomes  a virtually  negligible  matter. 
It  is  for  America  a choice  between  a policy  of  extravagant 
armament  and  aggressive  diplomacy,  with  a doubtful 
issue,  on  the  one  side,  and  such  abatement  of  national  pre- 
tensions as  would  obviate  bootless  contention,  on  the 
other  side. 


Eliminafipn  of  the  Unfit 


297 


Yet,  it  must  be  admitted,  the  patriotic  temper  of  the 
American  people  is  of  such  a susceptible  kind  as  to  leave 
the  issue  in  doubt.  Not  that  the  Americans  will  not  en- 
deavor to  initiate  some  form  of  compact  for  the  keeping 
of  the  peace,  when  hostilities  are  concluded ; barring  un- 
foreseen contingencies,  it  is  virtually  a foregone  conclu- 
sion that  the  attempt  will  be  made,  and  that  the  Americans 
will  take  an  active  part  in  its  promotion.  But  the  doubt 
is  as  to  their  taking  such  a course  as  will  lead  to  a com- 
pact of  the  kind  needed  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  the 
country.  The  business  interests  have  much  to  say  in  the 
counsels  of  the  Americans,  and  these  business  interests 
look  to  short-term  gains — American  business  interests 
particularly — ^to  be  derived  from  the  country’s  necessities. 
It  is  likely  to  appear  that  the  business  interests,  through 
representatives  in  Congress  and  elsewhere,  will  dis- 
approve of  any  peace  compact  that  does  not  involve  an 
increase  of  the  national  armament  and  a prospective  de- 
mand for  munitions  and  an  increased  expenditure  of  the 
national  funds. 

With  or  without  the  adherence  of  America,  the  pacific 
nations  of  Europe  will  doubtless  endeavour  to  form  a 
leagpie  or  alliance  designed  to  keep  the  peace.  If  America 
does  not  come  into  the  arrangement  it  may  well  come  to 
nothing  much  more  than  a further  continued  defensive 
alliance  of  the  belligerent  nations  now  opposed  to  the  Ger- 
man coalition.  In  any  case  it  is  still  a point  in  doubt 
whether  the  league  so  projected  is  to  be  merely  a compact 
of  defensive  armament  against  a common  enemy — in 
which  case  it  will  necessarily  be  transient,  perhaps  ephem- 
eral— or  a more  inclusive  coalition  of  a closer  character 
designed  to  avoid  any  breach  of  the  peace,  by  disarmament 
and  by  disallowance  and  disclaimer  of  such  national  pre- 


298 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


tensions  and  punctilio  as  the  patriotic  sentiment  of  the 
contracting  parties  will  consent  to  dispense  with.  The 
nature  of  the  resulting  peace,  therefore,  as  well  as  its 
chances  of  duration,  will  in  great  measure  be  conditioned 
on  the  fashion  of  peace-compact  on  which  it  is  to  rest; 
which  will  be  conditioned  in  good  part  on  the  degree  in 
which  the  warlike  coalition  under  German  Imperial  con- 
trol is  effectually  to  be  eliminated  from  the  situation  as  a 
prospective  disturber  of  the  peace;  which,  in  turn,  is  a 
question  somewhat  closely  bound  up  with  the  further 
duration  of  the  war,  as  has  already  been  indicated  in  an 
earlier  passage. 


CHAPTER  VII 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 

Evidently  the  conception  of  peace  on  which  its  various 
spokesmen  are  proceeding  is  by  no  means  the  same  for  all 
of  them.  In  the  current  German  conception,  e.  g.,  as  seen 
in  the  utterances  of  its  many  and  urgent  spokesmen,  peace 
appears  to  be  of  the  general  nature  of  a truce  between  na- 
tions, whose  God-given  destiny  it  is,  in  time,  to  adjust  a 
claim  to  precedence  by  wager  of  battle.  They  will  some- 
times speak  of  it,  euphemistically,  with  a view  to  concili- 
ation, as  “assurance  of  the  national  future,”  in  which  the 
national  future  is  taken  to  mean  an  opportunity  for  the 
extension  of  the  national  dominion  at  the  expense  of  some 
other  national  establishment.  In  the  same  connection  one 
may  recall  the  many  eloquent  passages  on  the  State  and  its 
paramount  place  and  value  in  the  human  economy.  The 
State  is  useful  for  disturbing  the  peace.  This  German 
notion  may  confidently  be  set  down  as  the  lowest  of  the 
current  conceptions  of  peace ; or  perhaps  rather  as  the 
notion  of  peace  reduced  to  the  lowest  terms  at  which  it 
continues  to  be  recognisable  as  such.  Next  beyond  in  that 
direction  lies  the  notion  of  armistice;  which  differs  from 
this  conception  of  peace  chiefly  in  connoting  specifically 
a definite  and  relatively  short  interval  between  warlike 
operations. 

The  conception  of  peace  as  being  a period  of  prepara- 
tion for  war  has  many  adherents  outside  the  Fatherland, 
---  299 


300 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  course.  Indeed,  it  has  probably  a wider  vogue  and  a 
readier  acceptance  among  men  who  interest  themselves  in 
questions  of  peace  and  war  than  any  other.  It  goes  hand 
in  hand  with  that  militant  nationalism  that  is  taken  for 
granted,  conventionally,  as  the  common  ground  of  those 
international  relations  that  play  a part  in  diplomatic  inter- 
course. It  is  the  diplomatist’s  metier  to  talk  war  in  para- 
bles of  peace.  This  conception  of  peace  as  a precarious 
interval  of  preparation  has  come  down  to  the  present  out 
of  the  feudal  age  and  is,  of  course,  best  at  home  where  the 
feudal  range  of  preconceptions  has  suffered  least  dilapida- 
tion; and  it  carries  the  feudalistic  presumption  that  all 
national  establishments  are  competitors  for  dominion,  aft- 
er the  scheme  of  Macchiavelli.  The  peace  which  is  had  on 
this  footing,  within  the  realm,  is  a peace  of  subjection, 
more  or  less  pronounced  according  as  the  given  national 
establishment  is  more  or  less  on  the  militant  order ; a war- 
like organisation  being  necessarily  of  a servile  character, 
in  the  same  measure  in  which  it  is  warlike. 

In  much  the  same  measure  and  with  much  the  same 
limitations  as  the  modern  democratic  nations  have  de- 
parted from  the  feudal  system  of  civil  relations  and  from 
the  peculiar  range  of  conceptions  which  characterise  that 
system,  they  have  also  come  in  for  a new  or  revised  con- 
ception of  peace.  Instead  of  its  being  valued  chiefly  as  a 
space  of  time  in  which  to  prepare  for  war,  offensive  or  de- 
fensive, among  these  democratic  and  provisionally  pacific 
nations  it  has  come  to  stand  in  the  common  estimation 
as  the  normal  and  stable  manner  of  life,  good  and  com- 
mendable in  its  own  right.  These  modern,  pacific,  com- 
monwealths stand  on  the  defensive,  habitually.  They  are 
still  pugnaciously  national,  but  they  have  unlearned  so 
much  of  the  feudal  preconceptions  as  to  leave  them  in 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


301 


a defensive  attitude,  under  the  watch-word;  Peace  with 
honour.  Their  quasi-feudalistic  national  prestige  is  not  to 
be  trifled  with,  though  it  has  lost  so  much  of  its  fascina- 
tion as  ordinarily  not  to  serve  the  purposes  of  an  ag- 
gressive enterprise,  at  least  not  without  some  shrewd 
sophistication  at  the  hands  of  militant  politicians  and  their 
diplomatic  agents.  Of  course,  an  exuberant  patriotism 
may  now  and  again  take  on  the  ancient  barbarian  vehe- 
mence and  lead  such  a provisionally  pacific  nation  into  an 
aggressive  raid  against  a helpless  neighbour ; but  it  re- 
mains characteristically  true,  after  all,  that  these  peoples 
look  on  the  country’s  peace  as  the  normal  and  ordinary 
course  of  things,  which  each  nation  is  to  take  care  of  for 
itself  and  by  its  own  force. 

The  ideal  of  the  nineteenth-century  statesmen  was  to 
keep  the  peace  by  a balance  of  power ; an  unstable  equi- 
librium of  rivalries,  in  which  it  was  recognised  that  eternal 
vigilance  was  the  price  of  peace  by  equilibration.  Since 
then,  by  force  of  the  object-lesson  of  the  twentieth-century 
wars,  it  has  become  evident  that  eternal  vigilance  will  no 
longer  keep  the  peace  by  equilibration,  and  the  balance  of 
power  has  become  obsolete.  At  the  same  time  things  have 
so  turned  that  an  effective  majority  of  the  civilised  nations 
now  see  their  advantage  in  peace,  without  further  op- 
portunity to  seek  further  dominion.  These  nations  have 
also  been  falling  into  the  shape  of  commonwealths,  and 
so  have  lost  something  of  their  national  spirit. 

With  much  reluctant  hesitation  and  many  misgivings, 
the  statesmen  of  these  pacific  nations  are  accordingly 
busying  themselves  with  schemes  for  keeping  the  peace  on 
the  unfamiliar  footing  of  a stable  equilibrium ; the  method 
preferred  on  the  whole  being  an  equilibration  of  make- 
believe,  in  imitation  of  the  obsolete  balance  of  power. 


302  On  th  e "Nature  of  Peace 

There  is  a meticulous  regard  for  national  jealousies  and 
discriminations,  which  it  is  thought  necessary  to  keep  in- 
tact. Of  course,  on  any  one  of  these  slightly  diversified 
plans  of  keeping  the  peace  on  a stable  footing  of  copart- 
nery among  the  pacific  nations,  national  jealousies  and 
national  integrity  no  longer  have  any  substantial  mean- 
ing. But  statesmen  think  and  plan  in  terms  of  precedent ; 
which  comes  to  thinking  and  planning  in  terms  of  make- 
believe,  when  altered  circumstances  have  made  the  pre- 
cedents obsolete.  So  one  comes  to  the  singular  proposal 
of  the  statesmen,  that  the  peace  is  to  be  kept  in  concert 
among  these  pacific  nations  by  a provision  of  force  with 
which  to  break  it  at  will.  The  peace  that  is  to  be  kept  on 
this  footing  of  national  discriminations  and  national  arm- 
aments will  necessarily  be  of  a precarious  kind ; being,  in 
effect,  a statesmanlike  imitation  of  the  peace  as  it  was  once 
kept  even  more  precariously  by  the  pacific  nations  in 
severalty. 

Hitherto  the  movement  toward  peace  has  not  gone  be- 
yond this  conception  of  it,  as  a collusive  safeguarding  of 
national  discrepancies  by  force  of  arms.  Such  a peace  is 
necessarily  precarious,  partly  because  armed  force  is  use- 
ful for  breaking  the  peace,  partly  because  the  national  dis- 
crepancies, by  which  these  current  peace-makers  set  such 
store,  are  a constant  source  of  embroilment.  What  the 
peace-makers  might  logically  be  expected  to  concern  them- 
selves about  would  be  the  elimination  of  these  discrep- 
ancies that  make  for  embroilment.  But  what  they  actu- 
ally seem  concerned  about  is  their  preservation.  A peace 
by  collusive  neglect  of  those  remnants  of  feudalistic  make- 
believe  that  still  serve  to  divide  the  pacific  nations  has 
hitherto  not  seriously  come  under  advisement. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


303 


Evidently,  hitherto,  and  for  the  calculable  future,  peace 
is  a relative  matter,  a matter  of  more  or  less,  whichever 
of  the  several  working  conceptions  spoken  of  above  may 
rule  the  case.  Evidently,  too,  a peace  designed  to  strength- 
en the  national  establishment  against  eventual  war,  will 
count  to  a different  effect  from  a collusive  peace  of  a 
defensive  kind  among  the  pacific  peoples,  designed  by  its 
projectors  to  conserve  those  national  discrepancies  on 
which  patriotic  statesmen  like  to  dwell.  Different  from 
both  would  be  the  value  of  a peace  by  neglect  of  such  use- 
less national  discriminations  as  now  make  for  embroilment. 
A protracted  season  of  peace  should  logically  have  a some- 
what different  cultural  value  according  to  the  character  of 
the  public  policy  to  be  pursued  under  its  cover.  So  that  a 
safe  and  sane  conservation  of  the  received  law  and  order 
should  presumably  best  be  effected  under  cover  of  a 
collusive  peace  of  the  defensive  kind,  which  is  designed 
to  retain  those  national  discrepancies  intact  that  count  for 
so  much  in  the  national  life  of  today,  both  as  a focus  of 
patriotic  sentiment  and  as  an  outlet  for  national  expendi- 
tures. This  plan  would  involve  the  least  derangement  of 
the  received  order  among  the  democratic  peoples,  although 
the  plan  might  itself  undergo  some  change  in  the  course 
of  time. 

Among  the  singularities  of  the  latterday  situation,  in 
this  connection,  and  brought  out  by  the  experiences  of  the 
great  war,  is  a close  resemblance  between  latterday  war- 
like operations  and  the  ordinary  processes  of  industry. 
Modern  warfare  and  modern  industry  alike  are  carried  on 
by  technological  processes  subject  to  surveillance  and 
direction  by  mechanical  engineers,  or  perhaps  rather  ex- 
perts in  engineering  science  of  the  mechanistic  kind. 


304 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


War  is  not  now  a matter  of  the  stout  heart  and  strong 
arm.  Not  that  these  attributes  do  not  have  their  place 
and  value  in  modern  warfare ; but  they  are  no  longer  the 
chief  or  decisive  factors  in  the  case.  The  exploits  that 
count  in  this  warfare  are  technological  exploits ; exploits 
of  technological  science,  industrial  appliances,  and  techno- 
logical training.  As  has  been  remarked  before,  it  is  no 
longer  a gentlemen’s  war,  and  the  gentleman,  as  such,  is 
no  better  than  a marplot  in  the  game  as  it  is  played. 

Certain  consequences  follow  from  this  state  of  the  case. 
Technology  and  industrial  experience,  in  large  volume 
and  at  a high  proficiency,  are  indispensable  to  the  conduct 
of  war  on  the  modern  plan,  as  well  as  a large,  efficient 
and  up-to-date  industrial  community  and  industrial  plant 
to  supply  the  necessary  material  of  this  warfare.  At  the 
same  time  the  discipline  of  the  campaign,  as  it  impinges 
on  the  rank  and  file  as  well  as  on  the  very  numerous  body 
of  officers  and  technicians,  is  not  at  cross  purposes  with 
the  ordinary  industrial  employments  of  peace,  or  not  in 
the  same  degree  as  has  been  the  case  in  the  past,  even  in 
the  recent  past.  The  experience  of  the  campaign  does 
not  greatly  unfit  the  men  who  survive  for  industrial  uses ; 
nor  does  it  come  in  as  a sheer  interruption  of  their  in- 
dustrial training,  or  break  the  continuity  of  that  range 
of  habits  of  thought  which  modern  industry  of  the  techno- 
logical order  induces ; not  in  the  same  degree  as  was  the 
case  under  the  conditions  of  war  as  carried  on  in  the 
nineteenth  century.  The  cultural,  and  particularly  the 
technological,  incidence  of  this  modern  warfare  should 
evidently  be  appreciably  different  from  what  has  been  ex- 
perienced in  the  past,  and  from  what  this  past  experience 
has  induced  students  of  these  matters  to  look  for  among 
the  psychological  effects  of  warlike  experience. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


305 


It  remains  true  that  the  discipline  of  the  campaign,  how- 
ever impersonal  it  may  tend  to  become,  still  inculcates  per- 
sonal subordination  and  unquestioning  obedience;  and 
yet  the  modern  tactics  and  methods  of  fighting  bear  som.e- 
what  more  on  the  individual’s  initiative,  discretion,  sagac- 
ity and  self-possession  than  once  would  have  been  true. 
Doubtless  the  men  who  come  out  of  this  great  war,  the 
common  men,  will  bring  home  an  accentuated  and 
acrimonious  patriotism,  a venomous  hatred  of  the  enemies 
whom  they  have  missed  killing;  but  it  may  reasonably  be 
doubted  if  they  come  away  with  a correspondingly  height- 
ened admiration  and  affection  for  their  betters  who  have 
failed  to  make  good  as  foremen  in  charge  of  this  team- 
work in  killing.  The  years  of  the  war  have  been  trying 
to  the  reputation  of  officials  and  officers,  who  have  had  to 
meet  uncharted  exigencies  with  not  much  better  chance  of 
guessing  the  way  through  than  their  subalterns  have  had. 

By  and  large,  it  is  perhaps  not  lo  be  doubted  that  the 
populace  now  under  arms  will  return  from  the  experience 
of  the  war  with  some  net  gain  in  loyalty  to  the  nation’s 
honour  and  in  allegiance  to  their  masters  ; particularly  the 
German  subjects, — the  like  is  scarcely  true  for  the  Brit- 
ish ; but  a doubt  will  present  itself  as  to  the  magnitude  of 
this  net  gain  in  subordination,  or  this  net  loss  in  self- 
possession.  A doubt  may  be  permitted  as  to  whether  the 
common  man  in  the  countries  of  the  Imperial  coalition,  e. 
g.,  will,  as  the  net  outcome  of  this  war  experience,  be  in  a 
perceptibly  more  pliable  frame  of  mind  as  touches  his 
obligations  toward  his  betters  and  subservience  to  the  ir- 
responsible authority  exercised  by  the  various  govern- 
mental agencies,  than  he  was  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
At  that  time,  there  is  reason  to  believe,  there  was  an 
ominous,  though  scarcely  threatening,  murmur  of  dis- 
20 


306 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


content  beginning  to  be  heard  among  the  working  classes 
of  the  industrial  towns.  It  is  fair  to  presume,  however, 
that  the  servile  discipline  of  the  service  and  the  vindictive 
patriotism  bred  of  the  fight  should  combine  to  render  the 
populace  of  the  Fatherland  more  amenable  to  the  ir- 
responsible rule  of  the  Imperial  dynasty  and  its  sub- 
altern royal  establishments,  in  spite  of  any  slight  effect 
of  a contrary  character  exercised  by  the  training  in  tech- 
nological methods  and  in  self-reliance,  with  which  this 
discipline  of  the  service  has  been  accompanied.  As  to 
the  case  of  the  British  population,  under  arms  or  under 
compulsion  of  necessity  at  home,  something  has  already 
been  said  in  an  earlier  passage ; and  much  will  apparently 
depend,  in  their  case,  on  the  further  duration  of  the  war. 
The  case  of  the  other  nationalities  involved,  both  neutrals 
and  belligerents,  is  even  more  obscure  in  this  bearing, 
but  it  is  also  of  less  immediate  consequence  for  the  present 
argument. 

The  essentially  feudal  virtues  of  loyalty  and  bellicose 
patriotism  would  appear  to  have  gained  their  great  as- 
cendency over  all  men’s  spirit  within  the  Western  civili- 
sation by  force  of  the  peculiarly  consistent  character  of 
the  discipline  of  life  under  feudal  conditions,  whether  in 
war  or  peace ; and  to  the  same  uniformity  of  these  forces 
that  shaped  the  workday  habits  of  thought  among  the 
feudal  nations  is  apparently  due  that  profound  institu- 
tionalisation of  the  preconceptions  of  patriotism  and  loyal- 
ty, by  force  of  which  these  preconceptions  still  hold  the 
modern  peoples  in  an  unbreakable  web  of  prejudice,  after 
the  conditions  favoring  their  acquirement  have  in  great 
part  ceased  to  operate.  These  preconceptions  of  national 
solidarity  and  international  enmity  have  come  down  from 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


307 


the  past  as  an  integral  part  of  the  unwritten  constitution 
underlying  all  these  modern  nations,  even  those  which 
have  departed  most  widely  from  the  manner  of  life  to 
which  the  peoples  owe  these  ancient  preconceptions. 
Hitherto,  or  rather  until  recent  times,  the  workday  ex- 
perience of  these  peoples  has  not  seriously  worked  at 
cross  purposes  with  the  patriotic  spirit  and  its  bias  of  na- 
tional animosity;  and  what  discrepancy  there  has  effec- 
tively been  between  the  discipline  of  workday  life  and  the 
received  institutional  preconceptions  on  this  head,  has 
hitherto  been  overborne  by  the  unremitting  inculcation  of 
these  virtues  by  interested  politicians,  priests  and  pub- 
licists, who  speak  habitually  for  the  received  order  of 
things. 

That  order  of  things  which  is  known  on  its  political  and 
civil  side  as  the  feudal  system,  together  with  that  era  of 
the  dynastic  States  which  succeeds  the  feudal  age  techni- 
cally so  called,  was,  on  its  industrial  or  technological  side, 
a system  of  trained  man-power  organised  on  a plan  of 
subordination  of  man  to  man.  On  the  whole,  the  scheme 
and  logic  of  that  life,  whether  in  its  political  (warlike)  or 
its  industrial  doings,  whether  in  war  or  peace,  runs  on 
terms  of  personal  capacity,  proficiency  and  relations.  The 
organisation  of  the  forces  engaged  and  the  constraining 
rules  according  to  which  this  organisation  worked,  were 
of  the  nature  of  personal  relations,  and  the  impersonal 
factors  in  the  case  were  taken  for  granted.  Politics  and 
war  were  a field  for  personal  valor,  force  and  cunning,  in 
practical  effect  a field  for  personal  force  and  fraud.  In- 
dustry was  a field  in  which  the  routine  of  life,  and  its 
outcome,  turned  on  “the  skill,  dexterity  and  judgment  of 
the  individual  workman,”  in  the  words  of  Adam  Smith. 


308 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 

The  feudal  age  passed,  being  done  to  death  by  handi- 
craft industry,  commercial  traffic,  gunpowder,  and  the 
state-making  politicians.  But  the  political  States  of  the 
statemakers,  the  dynastic  States  as  they  may  well  be  called, 
continued  the  conduct  of  political  life  on  the  i>ersonal 
plane  of  rivalry  and  jealousy  between  dynasties  and  be- 
tween their  States ; and  in  spite  of  gunpowder  and  the 
new  military  engineering,  warfare  continued  also  to  be, 
in  the  main  and  characteristically,  a field  in  which  man- 
power and  personal  qualities  decided  the  outcome,  by  vir- 
tue of  personal  “skill,  dexterity  and  judgment.”  Mean- 
time industry  and  its  technology  by  insensible  degrees 
underwent  a change  in  the  direction  of  impersonalisation, 
particularly  in  those  countries  in  which  statemaking  and 
its  warlike  enterprise  had  ceased,  or  were  ceasing,  to  be 
the  chief  interests  and  the  controlling  preconception  of 
the  people. 

The  logic  of  the  new,  mechanical  industry  which  has 
supplanted  handicraft  in  these  countries,  is  a mechanistic 
logic,  which  proceeds  in  terms  of  matter-of-fact  strains, 
masses,  velocities,  and  the  like,  instead  of  the  “skill,  dex- 
terity and  judgment”  of  personal  agents.  The  new  in- 
dustry does  not  dispense  with  the  personal  agencies,  nor 
can  it  even  be  said  to  minimise  the  need  of  skill,  dexterity 
and  judgment  in  the  personal  agents  employed,  but  it  does 
take  them  and  their  attributes  for  granted  as  in  some  sort 
a foregone  premise  to  its  main  argument.  The  logic  of  the 
handicraft  system  took  the  impersonal  agencies  for  grant- 
ed ; the  machine  industry  takes  the  skill,  dexterity  and 
judgment  of  the  workmen  for  granted.  The  processes  of 
thought,  and  therefore  the  consistent  habitual  discipline,  of 
the  former  ran  in  terms  of  the  personal  agents  engaged, 
and  of  the  personal  relations  of  discretion,  control  and 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


309 


subordination  necessary  to  the  work;  whereas  the  me- 
chanistic logic  of  the  modern  technology,  more  and  more 
consistently,  runs  in  terms  of  the  impersonal  forces  en- 
gaged, and  inculcates  an  habitual  predilection  for  matter- 
of-fact  statement,  and  an  habitual  preconception  that  the 
findings  of  material  science  alone  are  conclusive. 

In  those  nations  that  have  made  up  the  advance  guard 
of  Western  civilisation  in  its  movement  out  of  feudalism, 
the  disintegrating  effect  of  this  matter-of-fact  animus  in- 
culcated by  the  later  state  of  the  industrial  arts  has  ap- 
parently acted  effectively,  in  some  degree,  to  discredit 
those  preconceptions  of  personal  discrimination  on  which 
dynastic  rule  is  founded.  But  in  no  case  has  the  disci- 
pline of  this  mechanistic  technology  yet  wrought  its  per- 
fect work  or  come  to  a definitive  conclusion.  Mean- 
time war  and  politics  have  on  the  whole  continued  on 
the  ancient  plane ; it  may  perhaps  be  fair  to  say  that  politics 
has  so  continued  because  warlike  enterprise  has  continued 
still  to  be  a matter  of  such  personal  forces  as  skill,  dex- 
terity and  judgment,  valor  and  cunning,  personal  force 
and  fraud.  Latterly,  gradually,  but  increasingly,  the 
technology  of  war,  too,  has  been  shifting  to  the  mechan- 
istic plane;  until  in  the  latest  phases  of  it,  somewhere 
about  the  turn  of  the  century,  it  is  evident  that  the  logic 
of  warfare  too  has  come  to  be  the  same  mechanistic  logic 
that  makes  the  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts. 

What,  if  anything,  is  due  by  consequence  to  overtake 
the  political  strategy  and  the  political  preconceptions  of  the 
new  century,  is  a question  that  will  obtrude  itself,  though 
with  scant  hope  of  finding  a ready  answer.  It  may  even 
seem  a rash,  as  well  as  an  ungraceful,  undertaking  to  in- 
quire into  the  possible  manner  and  degree  of  prospective 
decay  to  which  the  received  political  ideals  and  virtues 


310 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


would  appear  to  be  exposed  by  consequence  of  this  de- 
rangement of  the  ancient  discipline  to  which  men  have 
been  subjected.  So  much,  however,  would  seem  evident, 
that  the  received  virtues  and  ideals  of  patriotic  animosity 
and  national  jealousy  can  best  be  guarded  against  untimely 
decay  by  resolutely  holding  to  the  formal  observance  of 
all  outworn  punctilios  of  national  integrity  and  dis- 
crimination, in  spite  of  their  increasing  disserviceability, 
—as  would  be  done,  e.  g.,  or  at  least  sought  to  be  done,  in 
the  installation  of  a league  of  neutral  nations  to  keep  the 
peace  and  at  the  same  time  to  safeguard  those  “national 
interests”  whose  only  use  is  to  divide  these  nations  and 
keep  them  in  a state  of  mutual  envy  and  distrust. 

Those  peoples  who  are  subject  to  the  constraining  gov- 
ernance of  this  modern  state  of  the  industrial  arts,  as 
all  modern  peoples  are  in  much  the  same  measure  in  which 
they  are  “modern,”  are,  therefore,  exposed  to  a workday 
discipline  running  at  cross  purposes  with  the  received  law 
and  order  as  it  takes  effect  in  national  affairs ; and  to  this 
is  to  be  added  that,  with  warlike  enterprise  also  shifted 
to  this  same  mechanistic-technological  ground,  war  can  no 
longer  be  counted  on  so  confidently  as  before  to  correct  all 
the  consequent  drift  away  from  the  ancient  landmarks 
of  dynastic,  pseudo-dynastic,  and  national  enterprise  in 
dominion. 

As  has  been  noted  above,  modern  warfare  not  only 
makes  use  of,  and  indeed  depends  on,  the  modern  indus- 
trial technology  at  every  turn  of  the  operations  in  the 
field,  but  it  draws  on  the  ordinary  industrial  resources  of 
the  countries  at  war  in  a degree  and  with  an  urgency 
never  equalled.  No  nation  can  hope  to  make  a stand  in 
modern  warfare,  much  less  to  make  headway  in  warlike 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


311 


enterprise,  without  the  most  thoroughgoing  exploitation 
of  the  modern  industrial  arts.  Which  signifies  for  the 
purpose  in  hand  that  any  Power  that  harbors  an  imperial 
ambition  must  take  measures  to  let  its  underlying  popula- 
tion acquire  the  ways  and  means  of  the  modern  machine 
industry,  without  reservation ; which  in  turn  signifies  that 
popular  education  must  be  taken  care  of  to  such  an  extent 
as  may  be  serviceable  in  this  manner  of  industry  and  in 
the  manner  of  life  which  this  industrial  system  necessarily 
imposes ; which  signifies,  of  course,  that  only  the  thor- 
oughly trained  and  thoroughly  educated  nations  have  a 
chance  of  holding  their  place  as  formidable  Powers  in 
this  latterday  phase  of  civilisation.  What  is  needed  is  the 
training  and  education  that  go  to  make  proficiency  in  the 
modern  fashion  of  technology  and  in  those  material 
sciences  that  conduce  to  technological  proficiency  of  this 
modern  order.  It  is  a matter  of  course  that  in  these 
premises  any  appreciable  illiteracy  is  an  intolerable  handi- 
cap. So  is  also  any  training  which  discourages  habitual 
self-reliance  and  initiative,  or  which  acts  as  a check  on 
skepticism ; for  the  skeptical  frame  of  mind  is  a neces- 
sary part  of  the  intellectual  equipment  that  makes  for  ad- 
vance, invention  and  understanding  in  the  field  of  tech- 
nological proficienc;^. 

But  these  requirements,  imperatively  necessary  as  a con- 
dition of  warlike  success,  are  at  cross  purposes  with  that 
unquestioning  respect  of  persons  and  that  spirit  of  abnega- 
tion that  alone  can  hold  a people  to  the  political  institutions 
of  the  old  order  and  make  them  a willing  instrument  in  the 
hands  of  the  dynastic  statesmen.  The  dynastic  State  is 
apparently  caught  in  a dilemma.  The  necessary  prepara- 
tion for  warlike  enterprise  on  the  modern  plan  can  ap- 
parently be  counted  on,  in  the  long  run,  to  disintegrate  the 


312 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


foundations  of  the  dynastic  State.  But  it  is  only  in  the 
long  run  that  this  effect  can  be  counted  on;  and  it  is 
perhaps  not  securely  to  be  counted  on  even  in  a moder- 
ately long  run  of  things  as  they  have  run  hitherto,  if  due 
precautions  are  taken  by  the  interested  statesmen, — as 
would  seem  to  be  indicated  by  the  successful  conservation 
of  archaic  traits  in  the  German  peoples  during  the  past 
half  century  under  the  archaising  rule  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lern.  It  is  a matter  of  habituation,  which  takes  time,  and 
which  can  at  the  same  time  be  neutralised  in  some  degree 
by  indoctrination. 

Still,  when  all  is  told,  it  will  probably  have  to  be 
conceded  that,  e.  g.,  such  a nation  as  Russia  will  fall 
under  this  rule  of  inherent  disability  imposed  by  the 
necessary  use  of  the  modern  industrial  arts.  Without  a 
fairly  full  and  free  command  of  these  modem  industrial 
methods  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  people,  together  with 
the  virtual  disappearance  of  illiteracy,  and  with  the  facile 
and  far-reaching  system  of  communication  which  it  all 
involves,  the  Russian  Imperial  establishment  would  not 
be  a formidable  power  or  a serious  menace  to  the  pacific 
nations ; and  it  is  not  easy  to  imagine  how  the  Imperial 
establishment  could  retain  its  hold  and  its  character  under 
the  conditions  indicated. 

The  case  of  Japan,  taken  by  itself,  rests  on  somewhat 
similar  lines  as  these  others.  In  time,  and  in  this  case 
the  time-allowance  should  presumably  not  be  anything 
very  large,  the  Japanese  people  are  likely  to  get  an  ade- 
quate command  of  the  modern  technology;  which  would, 
here  as  elsewhere,  involve  the  virtual  disappearance  of  the 
present  high  illiteracy,  and  the  loss,  in  some  passable 
measure,  of  the  current  superstitiously  crass  nationalism 
of  that  people.  There  are  indications  that  something  of 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


313 


that  kind,  and  of  quite  disquieting  dimensions,  is  already 
under  way;  though  with  no  indication  that  cuiy  conse- 
quent disintegrating  habits  of  thought  have  yet  invaded 
the  sacred  close  of  Japanese  patriotic  devotion. 

Again,  it  is  a question  of  time  and  habituation.  With 
time  and  habituation  the  emperor  may  insensibly  cease  to 
be  of  divine  pedigree,  and  the  syndicate  of  statesmen  who 
are  doing  business  under  his  signature  may  consequently 
find  their  measures  of  Imperial  expansion  questioned  by 
the  people  who  pay  the  bills.  But  so  long  as  the  Imperial 
syndicate  enjoy  their  present  immunity  from  outside  ob- 
struction, and  can  accordingly  carry  on  an  uninterrupted 
campaign  of  cumulative  predation  in  Korea,  China  and 
Manchuria,  the  patriotic  infatuation  is  less  likely  to  fall 
off,  and  by  so  much  the  decay  of  Japanese  loyalty  will  be 
retarded.  Yet,  even  if  allowed  anything  that  may  seem  at 
all  probable  in  the  way  of  a free  hand  for  aggression 
against  their  hapless  neighbours,  the  skepticism  and  insub- 
ordination to  personal  rule  that  seems  inseparable  in  the 
long  run  from  addiction  to  the  modern  industrial  arts 
should  be  expected  presently  to  overtake  the  Japanese 
spirit  of  loyal  servitude.  And  the  opportunity  of  Imperial 
Japan  lies  in  the  interval.  So  also  does  the  menace  of  Im- 
perial Japan  as  a presumptive  disturber  of  the  peace  at 
large. 

At  the  cost  of  some  unavoidable  tedium,  the  argument 
as  regards  these  and  similar  instances  may  be  summarised. 
It  appears,  in  the  (possibly  doubtful)  light  of  the  history 
of  democratic  institutions  and  of  modern  technology  hith- 
erto, as  also  from  the  logical  character  of  this  technology 
and  its  underlying  material  sciences,  that  consistent  ad- 
diction to  the  peculiar  habits  of  thought  involved  in  its 


314 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


carrying  on  will  presently  induce  a decay  of  those  pre- 
conceptions in  which  dynastic  government  and  national 
ambitions  have  their  ground.  Continued  addiction  to  this 
modern  scheme  of  industrial  life  should  in  time  eventuate 
in  a decay  of  militant  nationalism,  with  a consequent  lapse 
of  warlike  enterprise.  At  the  same  time,  popular  pro- 
ficiency in  the  modern  industrial  arts,  with  all  that  that 
implies  in  the  way  of  intelligence  and  information,  is  indis- 
pensable as  a means  to  any  successful  warlike  enterprise 
on  the  modern  plan.  The  menace  of  warlike  aggression 
from  such  dynastic  States,  e.  g.,  as  Imperial  Germany  and 
Imperial  Japan  is  due  to  their  having  acquired  a competent 
use  of  this  modern  technology,  while  they  have  not  yet 
had  time  to  lose  that  spirit  of  dynastic  loyalty  which  they 
have  carried  over  from  an  archaic  order  of  things,  out  of 
which  they  have  emerged  at  a very  appreciably  later  period 
(last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century)  than  those  democrat- 
ic peoples  whose  peace  they  now  menace.  As  has  been 
said,  they  have  taken  over  this  modem  state  of  the  indus- 
trial arts  without  having  yet  come  in  for  the  defects  of 
its  qualities.  This  modern  technolog}',  with  its  underly- 
ing material  sciences,  is  a novel  factor  in  the  history 
of  human  culture,  in  that  addiction  to  its  use  conduces  to 
the  decay  of  militant  patriotism,  at  the  same  time  that  its 
employment  so  greatly  enhances  the  warlike  efficiency  of 
even  a pacific  people,  at  need,  that  they  can  not  be  serious- 
ly molested  by  any  other  peoples,  however  valorous  and 
numerous,  who  have  not  a competent  use  of  this  technol- 
ogy. A peace  at  large  among  the  civilised  nations,  by 
loss  of  the  militant  temper  through  addiction  to  this  man- 
ner of  arts  of  peace,  therefore,  carries  no  risk  of  interrup- 
tion by  an  inroad  of  warlike  barbarians, — always  pro- 
vided that  those  existing  archaic  peoples  who  might  pass 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


31S 


muster  as  barbarians  are  brought  into  line  with  the  pacific 
nations  on  a footing  of  peace  and  equality.  The  disparity 
in  point  of  outlook  as  between  the  resulting  peace  at  large 
by  neglect  of  bootless  animosities,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
those  historic  instances  of  a peaceable  civilisation  that 
have  been  overwhelmed  by  warlike  barbarian  invasions,  on 
the  other  hand,  should  be  evident. 

It  is  always  possible,  indeed  it  would  scarcely  be  surpris- 
ing to  find,  that  the  projected  league  of  neutrals  or  of 
nations  bent  on  peace  can  not  be  brought  to  realisation  at 
this  juncture;  perhaps  not  for  a long  time  yet.  But  it 
should  at  the  same  time  seem  reasonable  to  expect  that  the 
drift  toward  a peaceable  settlement  of  national  discrep- 
ancies such  as  has  been  visible  in  history  for  some 
appreciable  time  past  will,  in  the  absence  of  unforeseen 
hindrances,  work  out  to  some  such  effect  in  the  course  of 
further  exi>erience  under  modern  conditions.  And 
whether  the  projected  peace  compact  at  its  inception  takes 
one  form  or  another,  provided  it  succeeds  in  its  main  pur- 
pose, the  long-term  drift  of  things  under  its  rule  should 
logically  set  toward  some  ulterior  settlement  of  the  gen- 
eral character  of  what  has  here  been  spoken  of  as  a 
peace  by  neglect  or  by  neutralisation  of  discrepancies. 

It  should  do  so,  in  the  absence  of  unforeseen  contin- 
gencies ; more  particularly  if  there  were  no  effectual  factor 
of  dissension  included  in  the  fabric  of  institutions  within 
the  nation.  But  there  should  also,  e.  g.,  be  no  difficulty 
in  assenting  to  the  forecast  that  when  and  if  national  peace 
and  security  are  achieved  and  settled  beyond  recall,  the 
discrepancy  in  fact  between  those  who  own  the  country’s 
wealth  and  those  who  do  not  is  presently  due  to  come  to 
an  issue.  Any  attempt  to  forecast  the  form  which  this 


316 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


issue  is  to  take,  or  the  manner,  incidents,  adjuncts  an-d 
sequelae  of  its  determination,  would  be  a bolder  and  a 
more  ambiguous,  undertaking.  Hitherto  attempts  to  bring 
this  question  to  an  issue  have  run  aground  on  the  real  or 
fancied  jeopardy  to  paramount  national  interests.  How, 
if  at  all,  this  issue  might  affect  national  interests  and  in- 
ternational relations,  would  obviously  depend  in  the  first 
instance  on  the  state  of  the  given  national  establishment 
and  the  character  of  the  international  engagements  entered 
into  in  the  formation  of  this  projected  pacific  league.  It 
is  always  conceivable  that  the  transactions  involving  so 
ubiquitous  an  issue  might  come  to  take  on  an  international 
character  and  that  they  might  touch  the  actual  or  fanci- 
ful interests  of  these  diverse  nations  with  such  divergent 
effect  as  to  bring  on  a rupture  of  the  common  understand- 
ing between  them  and  of  the  peace-compact  in  which  the 
common  understanding  is  embodied. 

In  the  beginning,  that  is  to  say  in  the  beginnings  out  of 
which  this  modern  era  of  the  Western  civilisation  has 
arisen,  with  its  scheme  of  law  and  custom,  there  grew 
into  the  scheme  of  law  and  custom,  by  settled  usage,  a 
right  of  ownership  and  of  contract  in  disposal  of  owner- 
ship,— which  may  or  may  not  have  been  a salutary  institu- 
tional arrangement  on  the  whole,  under  the  circumstances 
of  the  early  days.  With  the  later  growth  of  handicraft 
and  the  petty  trade  in  Western  Europe  this  right  of  own- 
ership and  contract  came  to  be  insisted  on,  standardised 
under  legal  specifications,  and  secured  against  molestation 
by  the  governmental  interests ; more  particularly  and 
scrupulously  among  those  peoples  that  have  taken  the 
lead  in  working  out  that  system  of  free  or  popular  insti- 
tutions that  marks  the  modern  civilised  nations.  So  it 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


317 


has  come  to  be  embodied  in  the  common  law  of  the  modern 
world  as  an  inviolable  natural  right.  It  has  all  the  pre- 
scriptive force  of  legally  authenticated  immemorial  cus- 
tom. 

Under  the  system  of  handicraft  and  petty  trade  this 
right  of  property  and  free  contract  served  the  interest 
of  the  common  man,  at  least  in  much  of  its  incidence,  and 
acted  in  its  degree  to  shelter  industrious  and  economical 
persons  from  hardship  and  indignity  at  the  hands  of  their 
betters.  There  seems  reason  to  believe,  as  is  commonly 
believed,  that  so  long  as  that  relatively  direct  and  simple 
scheme  of  industry  and  trade  lasted,  the  right  of  owner- 
ship and  contract  was  a salutary  custom,  in  its  bearing  on 
the  fortunes  of  the  common  man.  It  appears  also,  on  the 
whole,  to  have  been  favorable  to  the  fuller  development  of 
the  handicraft  technology,  as  well  as  to  its  eventual  out- 
growth into  the  new  line  of  technological  expedients  and 
contrivancies  that  presently  gave  rise  to  the  machine  in- 
dustry and  the  large-scale  business  enterprise. 

The  standard  theories  of  economic  science  have  as- 
sumed the  rights  of  property  and  contract  as  axiomatic 
premises  and  ultimate  terms  of  analysis ; and  their  theories 
are  commonly  drawn  in  such  a form  as  would  fit  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  handicraft  industry  and  the  petty  trade, 
and  such  as  can  be  extended  to  any  other  economic  situa- 
tion by  shrewd  interpretation.  These  theories,  as  they 
run  from  Adam  Smith  down  through  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury and  later,  appear  tenable,  on  the  whole,  when  taken 
to  apply  to  the  economic  situation  of  that  earlier  time,  in 
virtually  all  that  they  have  to  say  on  questions  of  wages, 
capital,  savings,  and  the  economy  and  efficiency  of  man- 
agement and  production  by  the  methods  of  private  enter- 
prise resting  on  these  rights  of  ownership  and  contract  and 


318 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


governed  by  the  pursuit  of  private  gain.  It  is  when  these 
standard  theories  are  sought  to  be  applied  to  the  later 
situation,  which  has  outgrown  the  conditions  of  handi- 
craft, that  they  appear  nugatory  or  meretricious.  The 
“competitive  system”  which  these  standard  theories  as- 
sume as  a necessary  condition  of  their  own  validity,  and 
about  which  they  are  designed  to  form  a defensive  hedge, 
would,  under  those  earlier  conditions  of  small-scale  enter- 
prise and  personal  contact,  appear  to  have  been  both  a 
passably  valid  assumption  as  a premise  and  a passably 
expedient  scheme  of  economic  relations  and  traffic.  At 
that  period  of  its  life-history  it  can  not  be  said  consis- 
tently to  have  worked  hardship  to  the  common  man ; rather 
the  reverse.  And  the  common  man  in  that  time  appears 
to  have  had  no  misgivings  about  the  excellence  of  the 
scheme  or  of  that  article  of  Natural  Rights  that  under- 
lies it. 

This  complexion  of  things,  as  touches  the  effectual 
bearing  of  the  institution  of  property  and  the  ancient 
customary  rights  of  ownership,  has  changed  substantially 
since  the  time  of  Adam  Smith.  The  “competitive  sys.- 
tem,”  which  he  looked  to  as  the  economic  working-out  of 
that  “simple  and  obvious  system  of  natural  liberty”  that 
always  engaged  his  best  affections,  has  in  great  measure 
ceased  to  operate  as  a routine  of  natural  libertv',  in  fact; 
particularly  in  so  far  as  touches  the  fortunes  of  the  com- 
mon man,  the  impecunious  mass  of  the  people.  De  jure, 
of  course,  the  competitive  system  and  its  inviolable  rights 
of  ownership  are  a citadel  of  Natural  Liberty;  but  de 
facto  the  common  man  is  now,  and  has  for  some  time  been, 
feeling  the  pinch  of  it.  It  is  law,  and  doubtless  it  is  good 
law,  grounded  in  immemorial  usage  and  authenticated  with 
statute  and  precedent.  But  circumstances  have  so  chang- 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


319 


ed  that  this  good  old  plan  has  in  a degree  become  archaic, 
perhaps  unprofitable,  or  even  mischievous,  on  the  whole, 
and  especially  as  touches  the  conditions  of  life  for  the 
common  man.  At  least,  so  the  common  man  in  these  mod- 
ern democratic  and  commercial  countries  is  beginning  to 
apprehend  the  matter. 

Some  slight  and  summary  characterisation  of  these 
changing  circumstances  that  have  affected  the  incidence 
of  the  rights  of  property  during  modern  times  may,  there- 
fore, not  be  out  of  place ; with  a view  to  seeing  how  far 
and  why  these  rights  may  be  due  to  come  under  ad- 
visement and  possible  revision,  in  case  a state  of  settled 
peace  should  leave  men’s  attention  free  to  turn  to  these 
internal,  as  contrasted  with  national  interests. 

Under  that  order  of  handicraft  and  petty  trade  that 
led  to  the  standardisation  of  these  rights  of  ownership 
in  the  accentuated  form  which  belongs  to  them  in  modern 
law  and  custom,  the  common  man  had  a practicable  chance 
of  free  initiative  and  self-direction  in  his  choice  and  pur- 
suit of  an  occupation  and  a livelihood,  in  so  far  as  rights 
of  ownership  bore  on  his  case.  At  that  period  the  work- 
man was  the  main  factor  in  industry  and,  in  the  main 
and  characteristically,  the  question  of  his  employment 
was  a question  of  what  he  would  do.  The  material 
equipment  of  industry — the  “plant,”  as  it  has  come  to  be 
called — was  subject  of  ownership,  then  as  now ; but  it  was 
then  a secondary  factor  and,  notoriously,  subsidiary  to  the 
immaterial  equipment  of  skill,  dexterity  and  judgment  em- 
bodied in  the  person  of  the  craftsman.  The  body  of  in- 
formation, or  general  knowledge,  requisite  to  a work- 
manlike proficiency  as  handicraftsman  was  sufficiently 
slight  and  simple  to  fall  within  the  ordinary  reach  of  the 
working  class,  without  special  schooling ; and  the  material 


320 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


equipment  necessary  to  the  work,  in  the  way  of  tools  and 
appliances,  was  also  slight  enough,  ordinarily,  to  bring  it 
within  the  reach  of  the  common  man.  The  stress  fell  on 
the  acquirement  of  that  special  personal  skill,  dexterity 
and  judgment  that  would  constitute  the  workman  a 
master  of  his  craft.  Given  a reasonable  measure  of  per- 
tinacity, the  common  man  would  be  able  to  compass  the 
material  equipment  needful  to  the  pursuit  of  his  craft,  and 
so  could  make  his  way  to  a livelihood ; and  the  inviolable 
right  of  ownership  would  then  serve  to  secure  him  the 
product  of  his  own  industry,  in  provision  for  his  own 
old-age  and  for  a fair  start  in  behalf  of  his  children.  At 
least  in  the  popular  conception,  and  presumably  in  some 
degree  also  in  fact,  the  right  of  property  so  served  as  a 
guarantee  of  personal  liberty  and  a basis  of  equality. 
And  so  its  apologists  still  look  on  the  institution. 

In  a very  appreciable  degree  this  complexion  of  things 
and  of  popular  conceptions  has  changed  since  then ; al- 
though, as  would  be  expected,  the  change  in  popular  con- 
ceptions has  not  kept  pace  with  the  changing  circum- 
stances. In  all  the  characteristic  and  controlling  lines  of 
industry  the  modern  machine  technology  calls  for  a 
very  considerable  material  equipment;  so  large  an  equip- 
^ment,  indeed,  that  this  plant,  as  it  is  called,  always  rep- 
resents a formidable  amount  of  invested  wealth ; and  also 
so  large  that  it  will,  typically,  employ  a considerable  num- 
ber of  workmen  per  unit  of  plant.  On  the  transition  to 
the  machine  technology  the  plant  became  the  unit  of  opera- 
tion, instead  of  the  workman,  as  had  previously  been  the 
case;  and  with  the  further  development  of  this  modern 
technology,  during  the  past  hundred  and  fifty  years  or  so, 
the  unit  of  operation  and  control  has  increasingly  come  to 
be  not  the  individual  or  isolated  plant  but  rather  an  artic- 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


321 


ulated  group  of  such  plants  working  together  as  a balanced 
system  and  keeping  pace  in  common,  under  a collective 
business  management ; and  coincidently  the  individual 
workman  has  been  falling  into  the  position  of  an  auxil- 
iary factor,  nearly  into  that  of  an  article  of  supply,  to 
be  charged  up  as  an  item  of  operating  expenses.  Under 
this  later  and  current  system,  discretion  and  initiative* 
vest  not  in  the  workman  but  in  the  owners  of  the  plant, 
if  anywhere.  So  that  at  this  point  the  right  of  owner- 
ship has  ceased  to  be,  in  fact,  a guarantee  of  personal 
liberty  to  the  common  man,  and  has  come  to  be,  or  is 
coming  to  be,  a guarantee  of  dependence.  All  of  which 
engenders  a feeling  of  unrest  and  insecurity,  such  as  to 
instill  a doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  common  man  as  to  the 
continued  expediency  of  this  arrangement  and  of  the 
prescriptive  rights  of  property  on  which  the  arrangement 
rests. 

There  is  also  an  insidious  suggestion,  carrying  a sinister 
note  of  discredit,  that  comes  in  from  ethnological  science 
at  this  point ; which  is  adapted  still  further  to  derange  the 
common  man’s  faith  in  this  received  institution  of  owner- 
ship and  its  control  of  the  material  equipment  of  industry. 
To  students  interested  in  human  culture  it  is  a matter  of 
course  that  this  material  equipment  is  a means  of  utilis- 
ing the  state  of  the  industrial  arts;  that  it  is  useful  in 
industry  and  profitable  to  its  owners  only  because  and 
in  so  far  as  it  is  a creation  of  the  current  technological 
knowledge  and  enables  its  owner  to  appropriate  the 
usufruct  of  the  current  industrial  arts.  It  is  likewise  a 
matter  of  course  that  this  technological  knowledge,  that 
so  enables  the  material  equipment  to  serve  the  purposes 
of  production  and  of  private  gain,  is  a free  gift  of  the 
community  at  large  to  the  owners  of  industrial  plant; 

21 


322 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


and,  under  latterday  conditions,  to  them  exclusively. 
The  state  of  the  industrial  arts  is  a joint  heritage  of  the 
community  at  large,  but  where,  as  in  the  modern  coun- 
tries, the  work  to  be  done  by  this  technology  requires 
a large  material  equipment,  the  usufruct  of  this  joint  herit- 
age passes,  in  effect,  into  the  hands  of  the  owners  of 
this  large  material  equipment. 

These  owners  have,  ordinarily,  contributed  nothing  to 
the  technology,  the  state  of  the  industrial  arts,  from  which 
their  control  of  the  material  equipment  of  industry  enables 
them  to  derive  a gain.  Indeed,  no  class  or  condition  of 
men  in  the  modern  community — with  the  possible  excep- 
tion of  politicians  and  the  clergy — can  conceivably  con- 
tribute less  to  the  community’s  store  of  technological 
knowledge  than  the  large  owners  of  invested  wealth.  By 
one  of  those  singular  inversions  due  to  production  being 
managed  for  private  gain,  it  happens  that  these  investors 
are  not  only  not  given  to  the  increase  and  diffusion  of 
technological  knowledge,  but  they  have  a well-advised 
interest  in  retarding  or  defeating  improvements  in  the 
industrial  arts  in  detail.  Improvements,  innovations  that 
heighten  productive  efficiency  in  the  general  line  of  pro- 
duction in  which  a given  investment  is  placed,  are  com- 
monly to  be  counted  on  to  bring  “obsolescence  by  super- 
session’’  to  the  plant  already  engaged  in  that  line;  and 
therefore  to  bring  a decline  in  its  income-yielding  capacity, 
and  so  in  its  capital  or  investment  value. 

Invested  capital  yields  income  because  it  enjoys  the 
usufruct  of  the  community’s  technological  knowledge;  it 
has  an  effectual  monopoly  of  this  usufruct  because  this 
machine  technology  requires  large  material  appliances  with 
which  to  do  its  work ; the  interest  of  the  owners  of  estab- 
lished industrial  plant  will  not  tolerate  innovations  de- 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


323 


signed  to  supersede  these  appliances.  The  bearing  of 
ownership  on  industry  and  on  the  fortunes  of  the  com- 
mon man  is  accordingly,  in  the  main,  the  bearing  which 
it  has  by  virtue  of  its  monopoly  control  of  the  industrial 
arts,  and  its  consequent  control  of  the  conditions  of  em- 
ployment and  of  the  supply  of  vendible  products.  It  takes 
effect  chiefly  by  inhibition  and  privation ; stoppage  of  pro- 
duction in  case  it  brings  no  suitable  profit  to  the  investor, 
refusal  of  employment  and  of  a livelihood  to  the  workmen 
in  case  their  product  does  not  command  a profitable  price 
in  the  market. 

The  expediency  of  so  having  the  nation’s  industry  man- 
aged on  a footing  of  private  ownership  in  the  pursuit  of 
private  gain,  by  persons  who  can  show  no  equitable  per- 
sonal claim  to  even  the  most  modest  livelihood,  and  whose 
habitual  method  of  controlling  industry  is  sabotage — re- 
fusal to  let  production  go  on  except  it  affords  them  an  un- 
earned income — the  expediency  of  all  this  is  coming  to  be 
doubted  by  those  who  have  to  pay  the  cost  of  it.  And 
it  does  not  go  far  to  lessen  their  doubts  to  find  that  the 
cost  which  they  pay  is  commonly  turned  to  no  more  urgent 
or  useful  purpose  than  a conspicuously  wasteful  con- 
sumption of  superfluities  by  the  captains  of  sabotage  and 
their  domestic  establishments. 

This  may  not  seem  a veracious  and  adequate  account  of 
these  matters ; it  may,  in  effect,  fall  short  of  the  formula- 
tion : The  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth ; nor  does  the  question  here  turn  on  its  adequacy  as 
a statement  of  fact.  Without  prejudice  to  the  question  of 
its  veracity  and  adequacy,  it  is  believed  to  be  such  an  ac- 
count of  these  matters  as  will  increasingly  come  easy  and 
seem  convincing  to  the  common  man  who,  in  an  ever  in- 
creasing degree,  finds  himself  pinched  with  privation  and 


324 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


insecurity  by  a run  of  facts  Which  will  consistently  bear 
this  construction,  and  who  perforce  sees  these  facts  from 
the  prejudiced  standpoint  of  a loser.  To  such  a one,  there 
is  reason  to  believe,  the  view  so  outlined  will  seem  all  the 
more  convincing  the  more  attentively  the  pertinent  facts 
and  their  bearing  on  his  fortunes  are  considered.  How 
far  the  contrary  prejudice  of  those  whose  interest  or 
training  inclines  them  the  other  way  may  lead  them  to  a 
different  contruction  of  these  pertinent  facts,  does  not 
concern  the  present  argument;  which  has  to  do  with  this 
run  of  facts  only  as  they  bear  on  the  prospective  frame  of 
mind  of  that  unblest  mass  of  the  population  who  will 
have  opportunity  to  present  their  proposals  when  peace  at 
large  shall  have  put  national  interests  out  of  their  pre- 
ferential place  in  men’s  regard. 

At  the  risk  of  what  may  seem  an  excessively  wide 
digression,  there  is  something  further  to  be  said  of  the 
capitalistic  sabotage  spoken  of  above.  The  word  has 
by  usage  come  to  have  an  altogether  ungraceful  air  of  dis- 
approval. Yet  it  signifies  nothing  more  vicious  than  a 
deliberate  obstruction  or  retardation  of  industry,  usually 
by  legitimate  means,  for  the  sake  of  some  personal  or 
partisan  advantage.  This  morally  colorless  meaning  is  all 
that  is  intended  in  its  use  here.  It  is  extremely  common  in 
all  industry  that  is  designed  to  supply  merchantable  goods 
for  the  market.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  most  ordinary  and 
ubiquitous  of  all  expedients  in  business  enterprise  that 
has  to  do  with  supplying  the  market,  being  always  present 
in  the  businessman’s  necessary  calculations ; being  not  only 
a usual  and  convenient  recourse  but  quite  indispensable  as 
an  habitual  measure  of  business  sagacity.  So  that  no  per- 
sonal blame  can  attach  to  its  employment  by  any  given  bus- 
inessman or  business  concern.  It  is  only  when  measures 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


325 


of  this  nature  are  resorted  to  by  employees,  to  gain  some 
end  of  their  own,  that  such  conduct  becomes  (techni- 
cally) reprehensible. 

Any  businesslike  management  of  industry  is  carried  on 
for  gain,  which  is  to  be  got  only  on  condition  of  meeting 
the  terms  of  the  market.  The  price  system  under  which 
industrial  business  is  carried  on  will  not  tolerate  pro- 
duction in  excess  of  the  market  demand,  or  without  due 
regard  to  the  expenses  of  production  as  determined  by 
the  market  on  the  side  of  the  supplies  required.  Hence 
any  business  concern  must  adjust  its  operations,  by  due 
acceleration,  retardation  or  stoppage,  to  the  market  con- 
ditions, with  a view  to  what  the  traffic  will  bear ; that  is  to 
say,  with  a view  to  what  will  yield  the  largest  obtainable 
net  gain.  So  long  as  the  price  system  rules,  that  is  to 
say  so  long  as  industry  is  managed  on  investment  for  a 
profit,  there  is  no  escaping  this  necessity  of  adjusting  the 
processes  of  industry  to  the  requirements  of  a remuner- 
ative price;  and  this  adjustment  can  be  taken  care  of  only 
by  well-advised  acceleration  or  curtailment  of  the  proces- 
ses of  industry;  which  answers  to  the  definition  of  sa- 
botage. Wise  business  management,  and  more  particularly 
what  is  spoken  of  as  safe  and  sane  business  management, 
therefore,  reduces  itself  in  the  main  to  a sagacious  use  of 
sabotage ; that  is  to  say  a sagacious  limitation  of  pro- 
ductive processes  to  something  less  than  the  productive 
capacity  of  the  means  in  hand. 

To  anyone  who  is  inclined  to  see  these  matters  of  usage 
in  the  light  of  their  history  and  to  appraise  them  as  phe- 
nomena of  habituation,  adaptation  and  supersession  in  the 
sequence  of  cultural  proliferation,  there  should  be  no  dif- 
ficulty in  appreciating  that  this  institution  of  ownership 


326 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  makes  the  core  of  the  modern  institutional  structure 
is  a precipitate  of  custom,  like  any  other  item  of  use  and 
wont ; and  that,  like  any  other  article  of  institutional  fur- 
niture, it  is  subject  to  the  contingencies  of  supersession 
and  obsolescence.  If  prevalent  habits  of  thought,  en- 
forced by  the  prevalent  exigencies  of  life  and  livelihood, 
come  to  change  in  such  a way  as  to  make  life  under  the 
rule  imposed  by  this  institution  seem  irksome,  or  intoler- 
able, to  the  mass  of  the  population;  and  if  at  the  same 
time  things  turn  in  such  a way  as  to  leave  no  other  and 
more  urgent  interest  or  exigency  to  take  precedence  of  this 
one  and  hinder  its  being  pushed  to  an  issue ; then  it  should 
reasonably  follow  that  contention  is  due  to  arise  between 
the  unblest  mass  on  whose  life  it  is  a burden  and  the 
classes  who  live  by  it.  But  it  is,  of  course,  impossible 
to  state  beforehand  what  will  be  the  precise  line  of 
cleavage  or  what  form  the  division  between  the  two  parties 
in  interest  will  take.  Yet  it  is  contained  in  the  premises 
that,  barring  unforeseen  contingencies  of  a formidable 
magnitude,  such  a cleavage  is  due  to  follow  as  a logical 
sequel  of  an  enduring  peace  at  large.  And  it  is  also  well 
within  the  possibilities  of  the  case  that  this  issue  may 
work  into  an  interruption  or  disruption  of  the  peace  be- 
tween the  nations. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  called  to  mind  that  the 
existing  governmental  establishments  in  these  pacific 
nations  are,  in  all  cases,  in  the  hands  of  the  beneficiary,  or 
kept  classes, — beneficiaries  in  the  sense  in  which  a dis- 
tinction to  that  effect  comes  into  the  premises  of  the 
case  at  this  point.  The  responsible  officials  and  their  chief 
administrative  officers, — so  much  as  may  at  all  reasonably 
be  called  the  “Government”  or  the  “Administration,” — are 
quite  invariably  and  characteristically  drawn  from  tliese 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


327 


beneficiary  classes ; nobles,  gentlemen,  or  business  men, 
which  all  comes  to  the  same  thing  for  the  purpose  in  hand ; 
the  point  of  it  all  being  that  the  common  man  does  not 
come  within  these  precincts  and  does  not  share  in  these 
counsels  that  assume  to  guide  the  destiny  of  the  nations. 

Of  course,  sporadically  and  ephemerally,  a man  out  of 
the  impecunious  and  undistinguished  mass  may  now  and 
again  find  his  way  within  the  gates ; and  more  frequently 
will  a professed  “Man  of  the  People”  sit  in  council.  But 
that  the  rule  holds  unbroken  and  inviolable  is  sufficiently 
evident  in  the  fact  that  no  community  will  let  the  emolu- 
ments of  office  for  any  of  its  responsible  officials,  even  for 
those  of  a very  scant  responsibility,  fall  to  the  level  of  the 
habitual  livelihood  of  the  undistinguished  populace,  or  in- 
deed to  fall  below  what  is  esteemed  to  be  a seemly  in- 
come for  a gentleman.  Should  such  an  impecunious  one 
be  thrown  up  into  a place  of  discretion  in  the  government, 
he  will  forthwith  cease  to  be  a common  man  and  will  be 
inducted  into  the  rank  of  gentleman,— so  far  as  that  feat 
can  be  achieved  by  taking  thought  or  by  assigning  him  an 
income  adequate  to  a reputably  expensive  manner  of 
life.  So  obvious  is  the  antagonism  between  a vulgar 
station  in  life  and  a position  of  official  trust,  that  many  a 
“selfmade  man”  has  advisedly  taken  recourse  to  govern- 
mental position,  often  at  some  appreciable  cost,  from  no 
apparent  motive  other  than  its  known  efficacy  as  a Levit- 
ical  corrective  for  a humble  origin.  And  in  point  of  fact, 
neither  here  nor  there  have  the  underbred  majority  hither- 
to learned  to  trust  one  of  their  own  kind  with  governmen- 
tal discretion ; which  has  never  yet,  in  the  popular  convic- 
tion, ceased  to  be  a perquisite  of  the  gently-bred  and  the 
well-to-do. 


328 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


Let  it  be  presumed  that  this  state  of  things  will  con- 
tinue without  substantial  alteration,  so  far  as  regards  the 
complexion  of  the  governmental  establishments  of  these 
pacific  nations,  and  with  such  allowance  for  overstatement 
in  the  above  characterisation  as  may  seem  called  for. 
These  governmental  establishments  are,  by  official  position 
and  by  the  character  of  their  personnel,  committed  more  or 
less  consistently  to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  law 
and  order.  And  should  no  substantial  change  overtake 
them  as  an  effect  of  the  war  experience,  the  pacific  league 
under  discussion  would  be  entered  into  by  and  between 
governments  of  this  complexion.  Should  difficulties  then 
arise  between  those  who  own  and  those  who  do  not,  in 
any  one  of  these  countries,  it  would  become  a nice  ques- 
tion whether  the  compact  to  maintain  the  peace  and  nat- 
ional integrity  of  the  several  nations  comprised  in  the 
league  should  be  held  to  cover  the  case  of  internal  dissen- 
sions and  possible  disorders  partaking  of  the  character  of 
revolt  against  the  established  authorities  or  against  the 
established  provisions  of  law.  A strike  of  the  scope  and 
character  of  the  one  recently  threatened,  and  narrowly 
averted,  on  the  American  railroads,  e.  g.,  might  easily 
give  rise  to  disturbances  sufficiently  formidable  to  raise  a 
question  of  the  peace  league’s  jurisdiction;  particularly  if 
such  a disturbance  should  arise  in  a less  orderly  and  less 
isolated  country  than  the  American  republic;  so  as  un- 
avoidably to  carry  the  effects  of  the  disturbance  across 
the  national  frontiers  along  the  lines  of  industrial  and 
commercial  intercourse  and  correlation.  It  is  always  con- 
ceivable that  a national  government  standing  on  a some- 
what conservative  maintenance  of  the  received  law  and 
order  might  feel  itself  bound  by  its  conception  of  the 
peace  to  make  common  cause  with  the  keepers  of  estab- 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


329 


lished  rights  in  neighboring  states,  particularly  if  the 
similar  interests  of  their  own  nation  were  thought  to  be 
placed  in  jeopardy  by  the  course  of  events. 

Antecedently  it  seems  highly  probable  that  the  received 
rights  of  ownership  and  disposal  of  property,  particularly 
of  investment,  will  come  up  for  advisement  and  re- 
vision so  soon  as  a settled  state  of  peace  is  achieved.  And 
there  should  seem  to  be  little  doubt  but  this  revision  would 
go  toward,  or  at  least  aim  at  the  curtailment  or  abro- 
gation of  these  rights ; very  much  after  the  fashion  in 
which  the  analogous  vested  rights  of  feudalism  and  the 
dynastic  monarchy  have  been  revised  and  in  great  part 
curtailed  or  abrogated  in  the  advanced  democratic  coun- 
tries. Not  much  can  confidently  be  said  as  to  the  details 
of  such  a prospective  revision  of  legal  rights,  but  the  an- 
alogy of  that  procedure  by  which  these  other  vested  rights 
have  been  reduced  to  a manageable  disability,  suggests  that 
the  method  in  the  present  case  also  would  be  by  way  of 
curtailment,  abrogation  and  elimination.  Here  again,  as 
in  analogous  movements  of  disuse  and  disestablishment, 
there  would  doubtless  be  much  conservative  apprehension 
as  to  the  procuring  of  a competent  substitute  for  the  sup- 
planted methods  of  doing  what  is  no  longer  desirable  to 
be  done;  but  here  as  elsewhere,  in  a like  conjuncture,  the 
practicable  way  out  would  presumably  be  found  to  lie 
along  the  line  of  simple  disuse  and  disallowance  of  class 
prerogative.  Taken  at  its  face  value,  without  unavoid- 
able prejudice  out  of  the  past,  this  question  of  a substi- 
tute to  replace  the  current  exploitation  of  the  industrial 
arts  for  private  gain  by  capitalistic  sabotage  is  not  alto- 
gether above  a suspicion  of  drollery. 

Yet  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that  private  enterprise 
on  the  basis  of  private  ownership  is  the  familiar  and  ac- 


330 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


cepted  method  of  conducting  industrial  affairs,  and  that 
it  has  the  sanction  of  immemorial  usage,  in  the  eyes  of 
the  common  man,  and  that  it  is  reenforced  with  the  ur- 
gency of  life  and  death  in  the  apprehension  of  the  kept 
classes.  It  should  accordingly  be  a possible  outcome  of 
such  a peace  as  would  put  away  international  dissension, 
that  the  division  of  classes  would  come  on  in  a new  form, 
between  those  who  stand  on  their  ancient  rights  of  ex- 
ploitation and  mastery,  and  those  who  are  unwilling  longer 
to  submit.  And  it  is  quite  within  the  possibilities  of  the 
case  that  the  division  of  opinion  on  these  matters  might 
presently  shift  back  to  the  old  familiar  ground  of  inter- 
national hostilities ; undertaken  partly  to  put  down  civil 
disturbances  in  given  countries,  partly  by  the  more  ar- 
chaic, or  conservative,  peoples  to  safeguard  the  institutions 
of  the  received  law  and  order  against  inroads  from  the 
side  of  the  iconoclastic  ones. 

In  the  apprehension  of  those  who  are  speaking  for 
peace  between  the  nations  and  planning  for  its  realisation, 
the  outlook  is  that  of  a return  to,  or  a continuance  of, 
the  state  of  things  before  the  great  war  came  on,  with 
peace  and  national  security  added,  or  with  the  danger  of 
war  eliminated.  Nothing  appreciable  in  the  way  of  con- 
sequent innovation,  certainly  nothing  of  a serious  char- 
acter, is  contemplated  as  being  among  the  necessary  con- 
sequences of  such  a move  into  peace  and  security.  Na- 
tional integrity  and  autonomy  are  to  be  preserv'ed  on  the 
received  lines,  and  international  division  and  discrimina- 
tion is  to  be  managed  as  before,  and  with  the  accustomed 
incidents  of  punctilio  and  pecuniary  equilibration.  Inter- 
nationally speaking,  there  is  to  dawn  an  era  of  diplomacy 
without  after-thought,  whatever  that  might  conceivably 
mean. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


331 


There  is  much  in  the  present  situation  that  speaks  for 
such  an  arrangement,  particularly  as  an  initial  phase  of 
the  perpetual  peace  that  is  aimed  at,  whatever  excursive 
variations  might  befall  presently,  in  the  course  of  years. 
The  war  experience  in  the  belligerent  countries  and  the 
alarm  that  has  disturbed  the  neutral  nations  have  visibly 
raised  the  pitch  of  patriotic  solidarity  in  all  these  coun- 
tries ; and  patriotism  greatly  favors  the  conservation  of 
established  use  and  wont;  more  particularly  is  it  favor- 
able to  the  established  powers  and  policies  of  the  national 
government.  The  patriotic  spirit  is  not  a spirit  of  inno- 
vation. The  chances  of  survival,  and  indeed  of  stabilisa- 
tion, for  the  accepted  use  and  wont  and  for  the  tradi- 
tional distinctions  of  class  and  prescriptive  rights,  should 
therefore  seem  favorable,  at  any  rate  in  the  first  instance. 

Presuming,  therefore,  as  the  spokesmen  of  such  a peace- 
compact  are  singularly  ready  to  presume,  that  the  era  of 
peace  and  good-will  which  they  have  in  view  is  to  be  of 
a piece  with  the  most  tranquil  decades  of  the  recent  past, 
only  more  of  the  same  kind,  it  becomes  a question  of  im- 
mediate interest  to  the  common  man,  as  well  as  to  all 
students  of  human  culture,  how  the  common  man  is  to 
fare  under  this  regime  of  law  and  order, — the  mass  of 
the  population  whose  place  it  is  to  do  what  is  to  be  done, 
and  thereby  to  carry  forward  the  civilisation  of  these  pa- 
cific nations.  It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  recall,  by 
way  of  parenthesis,  that  it  is  here  taken  for  granted  as 
a matter  of  course  that  all  governmental  establishments 
are  necessarily  conservative  in  all  their  dealings  with  this 
heritage  of  culture,  except  so  far  as  they  may  be  reac- 
tionary. Their  office  is  the  stabilisation  of  archaic  insti- 
tutions, the  measure  of  archaism  varying  from  one  to 
another.  , 


332 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


With  due  stabilisation  and  with  a sagacious  adminis- 
tration of  the  established  scheme  of  law  and  order,  the 
common  man  should  find  himself  working  under  condi- 
tions and  to  results  of  the  familiar  kind;  but  with  the 
difference  that,  while  legal  usage  and  legal  precedent  re- 
main unchanged,  the  state  of  the  industrial  arts  can  con- 
fidently be  expected  to  continue  its  advance  in  the  same 
general  direction  as  before,  while  the  population  increases 
after  the  familiar  fashion,  and  the  investing  business  com- 
munity pursues  its  accustomed  quest  of  competitive  gain 
and  competitive  spending  in  the  familiar  spirit  and  with 
cumulatively  augmented  means.  Stabilisation  of  the  re- 
ceived law  and  order  will  not  touch  these  matters ; and 
for  the  present  it  is  assumed  that  these  matters  will  not 
derange  the  received  law  and  order.  The  assumption  may 
seem  a violent  one  to  the  students  of  human  culture,  but 
it  is  a simple  matter  of  course  to  the  statesmen. 

To  this  piping  time  of  peace  the  nearest  analogues  in 
history  would  seem  to  be  the  Roman  peace,  say,  of  the 
days  of  the  Antonines,  and  passably  the  British  peace  of 
the  Victorian  era.  Changes  in  the  scheme  of  law  and 
order  supervened  in  both  of  these  instances,  but  the 
changes  were,  after  all,  neither  unconscionably  large  nor 
were  they  of  a subversive  nature.  The  scheme  of  law 
and  order,  indeed,  appears  in  neither  instance  to  have 
changed  so  far  as  the  altered  circumstances  would  seem 
to  have  called  for.  To  the  common  man  the  Roman  peace 
appears  to  have  been  a peace  by  submission,  not  widely 
different  from  what  the  case  of  China  has  latterly  brought 
to  the  appreciation  of  students.  The  Victorian  peace, 
which  can  be  appreciated  more  in  detail,  was  of  a more 
genial  character,  as  regards  the  fortunes  of  the  common 
man.  It  started  from  a reasonably  low  level  of  hardship 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


333 


and  de  facto  iniquity,  and  was  occupied  with  many  prudent 
endeavours  to  improve  the  lot  of  the  unblest  majority; 
but  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  these  prudent  endeavours 
never  caught  up  with  the  march  of  circumstances.  Not 
that  these  prudent  measures  of  amelioration  were  nuga- 
tory, but  it  is  clear  that  they  were  not  an  altogether  ef- 
fectual corrective  of  the  changes  going  on;  they  were, 
in  effect,  systematically  so  far  in  arrears  as  always  to 
leave  an  uncovered  margin  of  discontent  with  current 
conditions.  It  is  a fact  of  history  that  very  appreciable 
sections  of  the  populace  were  approaching  an  attitude  of 
revolt  against  what  they  considered  to  be  intolerable 
conditions  when  that  era  closed.  Much  of  what  kept  them 
within  bounds,  that  is  to  say  within  legal  bounds,  was 
their  continued  loyalty  to  the  nation ; which  was  greatly, 
and  for  the  purpose  needfully,  reenforced  by  a lively  fear 
of  warlike  aggression  from  without.  Now,  under  the 
projected  pax  orbis  terrarum  all  fear  of  invasion,  it  is 
hopefully  believed,  will  be  removed ; and  with  the  dis- 
appearance of  this  fear  should  also  disappear  the  drag  of 
national  loyalty  on  the  counsels  of  the  underbred. 

If  this  British  peace  of  the  nineteenth  century  is  to  be 
taken  as  a significant  indication  of  what  may  be  looked 
for  under  a regime  of  peace  at  large,  with  due  allowance 
for  what  is  obviously  necessary  to  be  allowed  for,  then 
what  is  held  in  promise  would  appear  to  be  an  era  of  un- 
exampled commercial  prosperity,  of  investment  and  busi- 
ness enterprise  on  a scale  hitherto  not  experienced.  These 
developments  will  bring  their  necessary  consequences  af- 
fecting the  life  of  the  community,  and  some  of  the  conse- 
quences it  should  be  possible  to  foresee.  The  circum- 
stances conditioning  this  prospective  era  of  peace  and 
prosperity  will  necessarily  differ  from  the  corresponding 


334 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


circumstances  that  conditioned  the  Victorian  peace,  and 
many  of  these  points  of  difference  it  is  also  possible  to 
forecast  in  outline  with  a fair  degree  of  confidence.  It  is 
in  the  main  these  economic  factors  going  to  condition  the 
civilisation  of  the  promised  future  that  will  have  to  be 
depended  on  to  give  the  cue  to  any  student  interested  in 
the  prospective  unfolding  of  events. 

The  scheme  of  law  and  order  governing  all  modern 
nations,  both  in  the  conduct  of  their  domestic  affairs  and 
in  their  national  policies,  is  in  its  controlling  elements  the 
scheme  worked  out  through  British  (and  French)  expe- 
rience in  the  eighteenth  century  and  earlier,  as  revised  and 
further  accommodated  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Other 
peoples,  particularly  the  Dutch,  have  of  course  had  their 
part  in  the  derivation  and  development  of  this  modern 
scheme  of  institutional  principles,  but  it  has  after  all  been 
a minor  part ; so  that  the  scheme  at  large  would  not  differ 
very  materially,  if  indeed  it  should  differ  sensibly,  from 
what  it  is,  even  if  the  contribution  of  these  others  had  net 
been  had.  The  backward  nations,  as  e.  g.,  Germany, 
Russia,  Spain,  etc.,  have  of  course  contributed  substan- 
tially nothing  but  retardation  and  maladjustment  to  this 
modern  scheme  of  civil  life;  w'hatever  may  be  due  to 
^students  resident  in  those  countries,  in  the  way  of  schol- 
arly formulation.  This  nineteenth  century  scheme  it  is 
proposed  to  carry  over  into  the  new  era;  and  the  re- 
sponsible spokesmen  of  the  projected  new  order  appear  to 
contemplate  no  provision  touching  this  scheme  of  law  and 
order,  beyond  the  keeping  of  it  intact  in  aU  suDstantial 
respects. 

When  and  in  so  far  as  the  projected  peace  at  large  takes 
effect,  international  interests  will  necessarily  fall  some- 
what into  the  background,  as  being  no  longer  a matter  of 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


335 


precarious  equilibration,  with  heavy  penalties  in  the  bal- 
ance ; and  diplomacy  will  consequently  become  even  more 
of  a make-believe  than  today — something  after  the  fashion 
of  a game  of  bluff  played  with  irredeemable  “chips.” 
Commercial,  that  is  to  say  business,  enterprise  will  conse- 
quently come  in  for  a more  undivided  attention  and  be  car- 
ried on  under  conditions  of  greater  security  and  of  more 
comprehensive  trade  relations.  The  population  of  the 
pacified  world  may  be  expected  to  go  on  increasing  some- 
what as  in  the  recent  past ; in  which  connection  it  is  to  be 
remarked  that  not  more  than  one-half,  presumably  some- 
thing less  than  one-half,  of  the  available  agricultural  re- 
sources have  been  turned  to  account  for  the  civilised  world 
hitherto.  The  state  of  the  industrial  arts,  including  means 
of  transport  and  communication,  may  be  expected  to  de- 
velop farther  in  the  same  general  direction  as  before,  as- 
suming always  that  peace  conditions  continue  to  hold. 
Popular  intelligence,  as  it  is  called,— more  properly  pop- 
ular education, — may  be  expected  to  suffer  a further  ad- 
vance ; necessarily  so,  since  it  is  a necessary  condition  of 
any  effectual  advance  in  the  industrial  arts, — every  appre- 
ciable technological  advance  presumes,  as  a requisite  to  its 
working-out  in  industry,  an  augmented  state  of  informa- 
tion and  of  logical  facility  in  the  workmen  under  whose 
hands  it  is  to  take  effect. 

Of  the  prescriptive  rights  carried  over  into  the  new  era,, 
under  the  received  law  and  order,  the  rights  of  owner- 
ship alone  may  be  expected  to  have  any  material  signifi- 
cance for  the  routine  of  workday  life;  the  other  personal 
fights  that  once  seemed  urgent  will  for  everyday  pur- 
poses have  passed  into  a state  of  half-forgotten  matter-of- 
course.  As  now,  but  in  an  accentuated  degree,  the  rights 
of  ownership  will,  in  effect,  coincide  and  coalesce  with  the 


336 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


rights  of  investment  and  business  management.  The  mar- 
ket— that  is  to  say  the  rule  of  the  price-system  in  all  mat- 
ters of  production  and  livelihood — may  be  expected  tc 
gain  in  volume  and  inclusiveness ; so  that  virtually  all 
matters  of  industry  and  livelihood  will  turn  on  questions 
of  market  price,  even  beyond  the  degree  in  which  that 
proposition  holds  today.  The  progressive  extension  and 
consolidation  of  investments,  corporate  solidarity,  and 
business  management  may  be  expected  to  go  forward  on 
the  accustomed  lines,  as  illustrated  by  the  course  of  things 
during  the  past  few  decades.  Market  conditions  should 
accordingly,  in  a progressively  increased  degree,  fall  under 
the  legitimate  discretionary  control  of  businessmen,  or 
syndicates  of  businessmen,  who  have  the  disposal  of  large 
blocks  of  invested  wealth, — “big  business,”  as  it  is  called, 
should  reasonably  be  expected  to  grow  bigger  and  to  exer- 
cise an  increasingly  more  unhampered  control  of  market 
conditions,  including  the  money  market  and  the  labor 
market. 

With  such  improvements  in  the  industrial  arts  as  may 
fairly  be  expected  to  come  forward,  and  with  the  possible 
enhancement  of  industrial  efficiency  which  should  follow 
from  a larger  scale  of  organisation,  a wider  reach  of  trans- 
port and  communication,  and  an  increased  population, — 
with  these  increasing  advantages  on  the  side  of  productive 
industry,  the  per-capita  product  as  well  as  the  total  prod- 
duct  should  be  increased  in  a notable  degree,  and  the 
conditions  of  life  should  possibly  become  notably  easier 
and  more  attractive,  or  at  least  more  conducive  to  effi- 
ciency and  personal  comfort,  for  all  concerned.  Such 
would  be  the  first  and  unguarded  inference  to  be  drawn 
from  the  premises  of  the  case  as  they  offer  themselves  in 
the  large ; and  something  of  that  kind  is  apparently  what 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


337 


floats  before  the  prophetic  vision  of  the  advocates  of  a 
league  of  nations  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  at  large. 
These  premises,  and  the  inferences  so  drawn  from  them., 
may  be  further  fortified  and  amplified  in  the  same  sense 
on  considering  that  certain  very  material  economies  also 
become  practicable,  and  should  take  effect  “in  the  absence 
of  disturbing  causes,”  on  the  establishment  of  such  a peace 
at  large.  It  will  of  course  occur  to  all  thoughtful  persons 
that  armaments  must  be  reduced,  perhaps  to  a minimum, 
and  that  the  cost  of  these  things,  in  point  of  expenditures 
as  well  as  of  man-power  spent  in  the  service,  would  con- 
sequently fall  off  in  a corresponding  measure.  So  also, 
as  slight  further  reflection  will  show,  would  the  cost  of 
the  civil  service  presumably  fall  off  very  appreciably ; 
more  particularly  the  cost  of  this  service  per  unit  of  serv- 
ice rendered.  Some  such  climax  of  felicities  might  be 
looked  for  by  hopeful  persons,  in  the  absence  of  disturb- 
ing causes. 

Under  the  new  dispensation  the  standard  of  living,  that 
is  to  say  the  standard  of  expenditure,  would  reasonably 
be  expected  to  advance  in  a very  appreciable  degree,  at 
least  among  the  wealthy  and  well-to-do ; and  by  pressure 
of  imitative  necessity  a like  effect  would  doubtless  also 
be  had  among  the  undistinguished  mass.  It  is  not  a ques- 
tion of  the  standard  of  living  considered  as  a matter  of 
the  subsistence  minimum,  or  even  a standard  of  habitually 
prevalent  creature  comfort,  particularly  not  among  the 
wealthy  and  well-to-do.  These  latter  classes  have  long 
since  left  all  question  of  material  comfort  behind  in  their 
accepted  standards  of  living  and  in  the  continued  advance 
of  these  standards.  For  these  classes  who  are  often 
spoken  of  euphemistically  as  being  “in  easy  circum- 
stances,” it  is  altogether  a question  of  a standard  of  re- 
22 


338 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


putable  expenditure,  to  be  observed  on  pain  of  lost  self- 
respect  and  of  lost  reputation  at  large.  As  has  been  re- 
marked in  an  earlier  passage,  wants  of  this  kind  are  in- 
definitely extensible.  So  that  some  doubt  may  well  be 
, entertained  as  to  whether  the  higher  productive  efficiency 
spoken  of  will  necessarily  make  the  way  of  life  easier, 
in  view  of  this  need  of  a higher  standard  of  expenditure, 
even  when  due  account  is  taken  of  the  many  economies 
which  the  new  dispensation  is  expected  to  make  prac- 
ticable. 

One  of  the  effects  to  be  looked  for  would  apparentlv 
be  an  increased  pressure  on  the  part  of  aspiring  men  ro 
get  into  some  line  of  business  enterprise ; since  it  is  only 
in  business,  as  contrasted  with  the  industrial  occupations, 
that  anyone  can  hope  to  find  the  relatively  large  income 
required  for  such  an  expensive  manner  of  life  as  will 
bring  any  degree  of  content  to  aspirants  for  pecuniary 
good  repute.  So  it  should  follow  that  the  number  of 
businessmen  and  business  concerns  would  increase  up  to 
the  limit  of  what  the  traffic  could  support,  and  that  the 
competition  between  these  rival,  and  in  a sense  over- 
numerous,  concerns  would  push  the  costs  of  competition 
to  the  like  limit.  In  this  respect  the  situation  would  be 
of  much  the  same  character  as  what  it  now  is,  with  the 
difference  that  the  limit  of  competitive  expenditures 
would  be  rather  higher  than  at  present,  to  answer  to  the 
greater  available  m.argin  of  product  that  could  be  devoted 
to  this  use ; and  that  the  competing  concerns  would  be 
somewhat  more  numerous,  or  at  least  that  the  aggregate 
expenditure  on  competitive  enterprise  would  be  some- 
what larger;  as,  e.  g.,  costs  of  advertising,  salesmanship, 
strategic  litigation,  procuration  of  legislative  and  munici- 
pal grants  and  connivance,  and  the  like. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


339 


It  is  always  conceivable,  though  it  may  scarcely  seem 
probable,  that  these  incidents  of  increased  pressure  of 
competition  in  business  traffic  might  eventually  take  up 
all  the  slack,  and  leave  no  net  margin  of  product  over 
what  is  available  under  the  less  favorable  conditions  of 
industry  that  prevail  today;  more  particularly  when  this 
increased  competition  for  business  gains  is  backed  by  an 
increased  pressure  of  competitive  spending  for  purposes 
of  a reputable  appearance.  All  this  applies  in  retail  trade 
and  in  such  lines  of  industry  and  public  service  as  par- 
takes of  the  nature  of  retail  trade,  in  the  respect  that 
salesmanship  and  the  costs  of  salesmanship  enter  into 
their  case  in  an  appreciable  measure ; this  is  an  extensive 
field,  it  is  true,  and  incontinently  growing  more  extensive 
with  the  later  changes  in  the  customary  methods  of  mar- 
keting products;  but  it  is  by  no  means  anything  like  the 
whole  domain  of  industrial  business,  and  by  no  means  a 
field  in  which  business  is  carried  on  without  interference 
of  a higher  control  from  outside  its  own  immediate  lim- 
its. 

All  this  generously  large  and  highly  expensive  and 
profitable  field  of  trade  and  of  trade-like  industry,  in 
which  the  businessmen  in  charge  deal  somewhat  directly 
with  a large  body  of  customers,  is  always  subject  to 
limitations  imposed  by  the  condition  of  the  market;  and 
the  condition  of  the  market  is  in  part  not  under  the  con- 
trol of  these  businessmen,  but  is  also  in  part  controlled 
by  large  concerns  in  the  background;  which  in  their 
turn  are  after  all  also  not  precisely  free  agents;  in  fact 
not  much  more  so  than  their  cousins  in  the  retail  trade,  be- 
ing confined  in  all  their  motions  by  the  constraint  of  the 
price-system  that  dominates  the  whole  and  gathers  them 
all  in  its  impersonal  and  inexorable  net 


340 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


There  is  a colloquial  saying  among  businessmen,  that 
they  are  not  doing  business  for  their  health ; which  being 
interpreted  means  that  they  are  doing  business  for  a 
price.  It  is  out  of  a discrepancy  in  price,  between  pur- 
chase and  sale,  or  between  transactions  which  come  to 
the  same  result  as  purchase  and  sale,  that  the  gains  of 
business  are  drawn ; and  it  is  in  terms  of  price  that 
these  gains  are  rated,  amassed  and  funded.  It  is  neces- 
sary, for  a business  concern  to  achieve  a favorable  bal- 
ance in  terms  of  price;  and  the  larger  the  balance  in 
terms  of  price  the  more  successful  the  enterprise.  Such 
a balance  can  not  be  achieved  except  by  due  regard  to 
the  conditions  of  the  market,  to  the  effect  that  dealings 
must  not  go  on  beyond  what  will  yield  a favorable  bal- 
ance in  terms  of  price  between  income  and  outgo.  As  has 
already  been  remarked  above,  the  prescriptive  and  indis- 
pensable recourse  in  all  this  conduct  of  business  is  sabo- 
tage, limitation  of  supply  to  bring  a remunerative  price 
result. 

The  new  dispensation  offers  two  new  factors  bearing 
on  this  businesslike  need  of  a sagacious  sabotage,  or 
rather  it  brings  a change  of  coefficients  in  two  factors 
already  familiar  in  business  management : a greater  need, 
for  gainful  business,  of  resorting  to  such  limitation  of 
traffic;  and  a greater  facility  of  ways  and  means  for 
enforcing  the  needed  restriction.  So,  it  is  confidently  to 
be  expected  that  in  the  prospective  piping  time  of  peace 
the  advance  in  the  industrial  arts  will  continue  at  an 
accelerated  rate;  which  may  confidently  be  expected  to 
affect  the  practicable  increased  production  of  merchant- 
able goods ; from  which  it  follows  that  it  will  act  to  de- 
press the  prices  of  these  goods ; from  which  it  follows 
that  if  a profitable  business  is  to  be  done  in  the  conduct 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


341 


of  productive  industry  a greater  degree  of  continence  than 
before  will  have  to  be  exercised  in  order  not  to  let  prices 
fall  to  an  unprofitable  figure ; that  is  to  say,  the  per- 
missible output  must  be  held  short  of  the  productive 
capacity  of  such  industry  by  a wider  margin  than  before. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  well  known  out  of  the  experience 
of  the  past  few  decades  that  a larger  coalition  of  in- 
vested capital,  controlling  a larger  proportion  of  the  out- 
put, can  more  effectually  limit  the  supply  to  a salutary 
maximum,  such  as  will  afford  reasonable  profits.  And 
with  the  new  dispensation  affording  a freer  scope  for 
business  enterprise  on  conditions  of  greater  security, 
larger  coalitions  than  before  are  due  to  come  into  bearing. 
So  that  the  means  will  be  at  hand  competently  to  meet 
this  more  urgent  need  of  a stricter  limitation  of  the  out- 
put, in  spite  of  any  increased  productive  capacity  con- 
ferred on  the  industrial  community  by  any  conceivable 
advance  in  the  industrial  arts.  The  outcome  to  be  looked 
for  should  apparently  be  such  an  effectual  recourse  to 
capitalistic  sabotage  as  will  neutralise  any  added  advan- 
tage that  might  otherwise  accrue  to  the  community  from 
its  continued  improvements  in  technology. 

In  spite  of  this  singularly  untoward  conjuncture  of  cir- 
cum'stances  to  be  looked  for,  there  need  be  no  serious  ap- 
prehension that  capitalistic  sabotage,  with  a view  to  main- 
taining prices  and  the  rate  of  profits,  will  go  all  the  way, 
to  the  result  indicated,  at  least  not  on  the  grounds  so 
indicated  alone.  There  is  in  the  modern  development  of 
technology,  and  confidently  to  be  counted  on,  a contin- 
ued flow  of  new  contrivances  and  expedients  designed 
to  supersede  the  old ; and  these  are  in  fact  successful, 
in  greater  or  less  measure,  in  finding  their  way  into  prof- 
itable use,  on  such  terms  as  to  displace  older  appliances. 


342 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


underbid  them  in  the  market,  and  render  them  obsolete 
or  subject  to  recapitalisation  on  a lowered  earning-ca- 
pacity. So  far  as  this  unremitting  flow  of  innovations  has 
its  effect,  that  is  to  say  so  far  as  it  can  not  be  hindered 
from  having  an  eifect,  it  acts  to  lower  the  effectual  cost 
of  products  to  the  consumer.  This  effect  is  but  a partial 
and  somewhat  uncertain  one,  but  it  is  always  to  be  counted 
in  as  a persistent  factor,  of  uncertain  magnitude,  that 
will  alfect  the  results  in  the  long  run. 

As  has  just  been  spoken  of  above,  large  coalitions  of 
invested  wealth  are  more  competent  to  maintain,  or  if 
need  be  to  advance,  prices  than  smaller  coalitions  acting 
in  severalty,  or  even  when  acting  in  collusion.  This  state 
of  the  case  has  been  well  illustrated  by  the  very  successful 
conduct  of  such  large  business  organisations  during  the 
past  few  decades;  successful,  that  is,  in  earning  large 
returns  on  the  investments  engaged.  Under  the  new  dis- 
pensation, as  has  already  been  remarked,  coalitions  should 
reasonably  be  expected  to  grow  to  a larger  size  and 
achieve  a greater  efiflciency  for  the  same  purpose. 

The  large  gains  of  the  large  corporate  coalitions  are 
commonly  ascribed  by  their  promoters,  and  by  sjTnpa- 
thetic  theoreticians  of  the  ancient  line,  to  economies  of 
production  made  practicable  by  a larger  scale  of  produc- 
tion ; an  explanation  which  is  disingenuous  only  so  far  as 
it  needs  be.  What  is  more  visibly  true  on  looking  into 
the  workings  of  these  coalitions  in  detail  is  that  they  are 
enabled  to  maintain  prices  at  a profitable,  indeed  at  a 
strikingly  profitable,  level  by  such  a control  of  the  output 
as  would  be  called  sabotage  if  it  were  put  in  practice  by 
interested  workmen  with  a view  to  maintain  wages.  The 
effects  of  this  sagacious  sabotage  become  visible  in  the 
large  earnings  of  these  investments  and  the  large  gains 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


343 


which,  now  and  again,  accrue  to  their  managers.  Large 
fortunes  commonly  are  of  this  derivation. 

In  cases  where  no  recapitalisation  has  been  effected  for 
a considerable  series  of  years  the  yearly  earnings  of  such 
businesslike  coalitions  have  been  known  to  approach  fifty 
percent  on  the  capitalised  value.  Commonly,  however, 
when  earnings  rise  to  a striking  figure,  the  business  will 
be  recapitalised  on  the  basis  of  its  earning-capacity,  by 
issue  of  a stock  dividend,  by  reincorporation  in  a new 
combination  with  an  increased  capitalisation,  and  the  like. 
Such  augmentation  of  capital  not  unusually  has  been 
spoken  of  by  theoretical  writers  and  publicists  as  an  in- 
crease of  the  community’s  wealth,  due  to  savings ; an 
analysis  of  any  given  case  is  likely  to  show  that  its  in- 
creased capital  value  represents  an  increasingly  profitable 
procedure  for  securing  a high  price  above  cost,  by  stop- 
ping the  available  output  short  of  the  productive  capacity 
of  the  industries  involved.  Loosely  speaking,  and  within 
the  limits  of  what  the  traffic  will  bear,  the  gains  in  such  a 
case  are  proportioned  to  the  deficiency  by  which  the  pro- 
duction or  supply  under  control  falls  short  of  productive 
capacity.  So  that  the  capitalisation  in  the  case  comes  to 
bear  a rough  proportion  to  the  material  loss  which  this 
organisation  of  sabotage  is  enabled  to  inflict  on  the  com- 
munity at  large ; and  instead  of  its  being  a capitalisation 
of  serviceable  means  of  production  it  may,  now  and 
again,  come  to  little  else  than  a capitalisation  of  chartered 
sabotage. 

Under  the  new  dispensation  of  peace  and  security  at 
large  this  manner  of  capitalisation  and  business  enterprise 
might  reasonably  be  expected  to  gain  something  in  scope 
and  security  of  operation.  Indeed,  there  are  few  things 
within  the  range  of  human  interest  on  which  an  opinion 


344 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


may  more  confidently  be  formed  beforehand.  If  the 
rights  of  property,  in  their  extent  and  amplitude,  are 
maintained  intact  as  they  are  before  the  law  today,  the 
hold  which  business  enterprise  on  the  large  scale  now  has 
on  the  affairs  and  fortunes  of  the  community  at  large  is 
bound  to  grow  firmer  and  to  be  used  more  unreservedly 
for  private  advantage  under  the  new  conditions  contem- 
plated. 

The  logical  result  should  be  an  accelerated  rate  of  ac- 
cumulation of  the  country’s  wealth  in  the  hands  of  .a 
relatively  very  small  class  of  wealthy  owners,  with  a rela- 
tively inconsiderable  semi-dependent  middle  class  of  the 
well-to-do,  and  with  the  mass  of  the  population  even  more 
nearly  destitute  than  they  are  today.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  scarcely  to  be  avoided  that  this  wholly  dependent  and 
impecunious  mass  of  the  population  must  be  given  an 
appreciably  better  education  than  they  have  today.  The 
argument  will  return  to  the  difficulties  that  are  liable  to 
arise  out  of  this  conjuncture  of  facts,  in  the  way  of  dis- 
content and  possible  disturbance. 

Meantime,  looking  to  the  promise  of  the  pacific  future 
in  the  light  of  the  pacific  past,  certain  further  conse- 
quences, particularly  consequences  of  the  economic  order, 
that  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  follow  will  also  merit 
attention.  The  experience  of  the  Victorian  peace  is 
almost  as  pointed  in  its  suggestion  on  this  head  as  if  it  had 
been  an  experiment  made  ad  hoc;  but  with  the  reserva- 
tion that  the  scale  of  economic  life,  after  all,  was  small 
in  the  Victorian  era,  and  its  pace  was  slack,  compared 
with  what  the  twentieth  century  should  have  to  offer 
under  suitable  conditions  of  peace  and  pecuniary  secu- 
rity. In  the  light  of  this  most  instructive  modern  instance. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


345 


there  should  appear  to  be  in  prospect  a growth  of  well- 
bred  families  resting  on  invested  wealth  and  so  living 
on  unearned  incomes ; larger  incomes  and  consequently  a 
more  imposingly  well-bred  body  of  gentlefolk,  sustained 
and  vouched  for  by  a more  munificent  expenditure  on  su- 
perfluities, than  the  modern  world  has  witnessed  hith- 
erto. Doubtless  the  resulting  growth  of  gentlemen  and 
gentlewomen  would  be  as  perfect  after  their  kind  as 
these  unexampled  opportunities  of  gentle  breeding  might 
be  expected  to  engender;  so  that  even  their  British  pre- 
cursors on  the  trail  of  respectability  would  fall  somewhat 
into  insignificance  by  comparison,  whether  in  respect  of 
gentlemanly  qualities  or  in  point  of  cost  per  unit. 

The  moral,  and  even  more  particularly  the  aesthetic, 
value  of  such  a line  of  gentlefolk,  and  of  the  culture 
which  they  may  be  expected  to  place  on  view, — this  cul- 
tural side  of  the  case,  of  course,  is  what  one  would  prefer 
to  dwell  on,  and  on  the  spiritual  gains  that  might  be 
expected  to  accrue  to  humanity  at  large  from  the  steady 
contemplation  of  this  meritorious  respectability  so  dis- 
played at  such  a cost. 

But  the  prosaic  necessity  of  the  argument  turns  back  to 
the  economic  and  civil  bearing  of  this  prospective  devel- 
opment, this  virtual  bifurcation  of  the  pacified  nation  into 
a small  number  of  gentlemen  who  own  the  community’s 
wealth  and  consume  its  net  product  in  the  pursuit  of 
gentility,  on  the  one  hand,  and  an  unblest  mass  of  the 
populace  who  do  the  community’s  work  on  a meager 
livelihood  tapering  down  toward  the  subsistence  mini- 
mum, on  the  other  hand.  Evidently,  this  prospective  pos- 
ture of  affairs  may  seem  “fraught  with  danger  to  the  com- 
mon weal,”  as  a public  spirited  citizen  might  phrase  it. 
Or,  as  it  would  be  expressed  in  less  eloquent  words,  it 


346 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


appears  to  comprise  elements  that  should  make  for  a 
change.  At  the  same  time  it  should  be  recalled,  and  the 
statement  will  command  assent  on  slight  reflection,  that 
there  is  no  avoiding  substantially  such  a posture  of  af- 
fairs under  the  promised  regime  of  peace  and  security, 
provided  only  that  the  price-system  stands  over  intact, 
and  the  current  rights  of  property  continue  to  be  held  in- 
violate. If  the  known  principles  of  competitive  gain  and 
competitive  spending  should  need  enforcement  to  that 
effect  by  an  illustrative  instance,  the  familiar  history 
of  the  Victorian  peace  is  sufficient  to  quiet  all  doubts. 

Of  course,  the  resulting  articulation  of  classes  in  the 
community  will  not  be  expected  to  fall  into  such  simple 
lines  of  sheer  contrast  as  this  scheme  would  indicate. 
The  class  of  gentlefolk,  the  legally  constituted  wasters,  as 
they  would  be  rated  from  the  economic  point  of  view, 
can  not  be  expected  personally  to  take  care  of  so  large 
a consumption  of  superfluities  as  this  posture  of  affairs 
requires  at  their  hands.  They  would,  as  the  Victorian 
peace  teaches,  necessarily  have  the  assistance  of  a trained 
corps  of  experts  in  unproductive  consumption,  the  first 
and  most  immediate  of  whom  would  be  those  whom  the 
genial  phrasing  of  Adam  Smith  designates  “menial  serv- 
ants.” Beyond  these  would  come  the  purveyors  of  super- 
fluities, properly  speaking,  and  the  large,  indeed  redun- 
dant, class  of  tradespeople  of  high  and  low  degree, — de- 
pendent in  fact  but  with  an  illusion  of  semi-dependence ; 
and  farther  out  again  the  legal  and  other  professional 
classes  of  the  order  of  stewards,  whose  duty  it  will  be 
to  administer  the  sources  of  income  and  receive,  appor- 
tion and  disburse  the  revenues  so  devoted  to  a traceless 
extinguishment. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


347 


There  would,  in  other  words,  be  something  of  a "sub- 
stantial middle  class,”  dependent  on  the  wealthy  and  on 
their  expenditure  of  wealth,  but  presumably  imbued  with 
the  Victorian  middle-class  illusion  that  they  are  of  some 
account  in  their  own  right.  Under  the  due  legal  forms 
and  sanctions  this,  somewhat  voluminous,  middle-class 
population  would  engage  in  the  traffic  which  is  their  per- 
quisite, and  would  continue  to  believe,  in  some  passable 
fashion,  that  they  touch  the  substance  of  things  at  some- 
thing nearer  than  the  second  remove.  They  would  in 
great  part  appear  to  be  people  of  “independent  means,” 
and  more  particularly  would  they  continue  in  the  hope  of 
so  appearing  and  of  some  time  making  good  the  appear- 
ance. Hence  their  fancied,  and  therefore  their  senti- 
mental, interest  would  fall  out  on  the  side  of  the  estab- 
lished law  and  order;  and  they  would  accordingly  be  an 
element  of  stability  in  the  commonwealth,  and  would 
throw  in  their  weight,  and  their  voice,  to  safeguard  that 
private  property  and  that  fabric  of  prices  and  credit 
through  which  the  “income  stream”  flows  to  the  owners 
of  preponderant  invested  wealth. 

Judged  on  the  state  of  the  situation  as  it  runs  in  our 
time,  and  allowing  for  the  heightened  efficiency  of  large- 
scale  investment  and  consolidated  management  under  the 
prospective  conditions  of  added  pecuniary  security,  it  is 
to  be  expected  that  the  middle-class  population  with  “in- 
dependent means”  should  come  in  for  a somewhat  meager 
livelihood,  provided  that  they  work  faithfully  at  their 
business  of  managing  pecuniary  traffic  to  the  advantage  of 
their  pecuniary  betters, — ^meager,  that  is  to  say,  when  al- 
lowance is  made  for  the  conventionally  large  expenditure 
on  reputable  appearances  which  is  necessarily  to  be  in- 
cluded in  their  standard  of  living.  It  lies  in  the  nature 


348 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  this  system  of  large-scale  investment  and  enterprise 
that  the  (pecuniarily)  minor  agencies  engaged  on  a foot- 
ing of  ostensible  independence  will  come  in  for  only  such 
a share  in  the  aggregate  gains  of  the  community  as  it  is 
.expedient  for  the  greater  business  interests  to  allow  them 
|as  an  incentive  to  go  on  with  their  work  as  purveyors  of 
traffic  to  these  greater  business  interests. 

The  current,  and  still  more  this  prospective,  case  of 
the  quasi-self-directing  middle  class  may  fairly  be  illus- 
trated by  the  case  of  the  American  farmers,  of  the  past 
and  present.  The  American  farmer  rejoices  to  be  called 
“The  Independent  Farmer.”  He  once  was  independent, 
in  a meager  and  toil-worn  fashion,  in  the  days  before  the 
price-system  had  brought  him  and  all  his  woiks  into  the 
compass  of  the  market;  but  that  was  some  time  ago. 
He  now  works  for  the  market,  ordinarily  at  something 
like  what  is  called  a “living  wage,”  provided  he  has  “in- 
dependent means”  enough  to  enable  him  by  steady  appli- 
cation to  earn  a living  wage;  and  of  course,  the  market 
being  controlled  by  the  paramount  investment  interests 
in  the  background,  his  work,  in  effect,  inures  to  their  bene- 
fit ; except  so  much  as  it  may  seem  necessary  to  allow  him 
as  incentive  to  go  on.  Also  of  course,  these  paramount 
investment  interests  are  in  turn  controlled  in  all  their 
manoeuvres  by  the  impersonal  exigencies  of  the  price-sys- 
t..m,  which  permits  no  vagaries  in  violation  of  the  rule 
that  all  traffic  must  show  a balance  of  profit  in  terms  ot 
price. 

The  Independent  Farmer  still  continues  to  believe  that 
in  some  occult  sense  he  still  is  independent  in  what  he  will 
do  and  what  not ; or  perhaps  rather  that  he  can  by  shrewd 
management  retain  or  regain  a tolerable  measure  of  such 
independence,  after  the  fashion  of  what  is  held  to  hav# 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


349 


been  the  posture  of  affairs  in  the  days  before  the  coming 
of  corporation  finance;  or  at  least  he  believes  that  he 
ought  to  have,  or  to  regain  or  reclaim,  some  appreciable 
measure  of  such  independence ; which  ought  then,  by  help 
of  the  “independent  means”  which  he  still  treasures,  to 
procure  him  an  honest  and  assured  livelihood  in  return 
for  an  honest  year’s  work.  Latterly  he,  that  is  the  com- 
mon run  of  the  farmers,  has  been  taking  note  of  the  fact 
that  he  is,  as  he  apprehends  it,  at  a disadvantage  in  the 
market ; and  he  is  now  taking  recourse  to  concerted  action 
for  the  purpose  of  what  might  be  called  “rigging  the  mar- 
ket” to  his  own  advantage.  In  this  he  overlooks  the  im- 
pregnable position  which  the  party  of  the  second  part, 
the  great  investment  interests,  occupy ; in  fact,  he  is  count- 
ing without  his  host.  Hitherto  he  has  not  been  con- 
vinced of  his  own  helplessness.  And  with  a fine  fancy 
he  still  imagines  that  his  own  interest  is  on  the  side  of  the 
propertied  and  privileged  classes ; so  that  the  farmer  con- 
stituency is  the  chief  pillar  of  conservative  law  and  order, 
particularly  in  all  that  touches  the  inviolable  rights  of 
property  and  at  every  juncture  where  a division  comes 
on  between  those  who  live  by  investment  and  those  who 
live  by  work.  In  pecuniary  effect,  the  ordinary  American 
farmer,  who  legally  owns  a moderate  farm  of  the  com- 
mon sort,  belongs  among  those  who  work  for  a liveli- 
hood ; such  a livelihood  as  the  investment  interests  find  it 
worth  while  to  allow  him  under  the  rule  of  what  the  traf- 
fic will  bear ; but  in  point  of  sentiment  and  class  conscious- 
ness he  clings  to  a belated  stand  on  the  side  of  those  who 
draw  a profit  from  his  work. 

So  it  is  also  with  the  menial  servants  and  the  middle- 
class  people  of  “independent  means,”  who  are,  however, 
in  a position  to  see  more  clearly  their  dependence  on  the 


350 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


owners  of  predominant  wealth.  And  such,  with  a further 
accentuation  of  the  anomaly,  may  reasonably  be  expected 
to  be  the  further  run  of  these  relations  under  the  promised 
regime  of  peace  and  security.  The  class  of  well-kept 
gentlefolk  will  scarcely  be  called  on  to  stand  alone,  in 
case  of  a division  between  those  who  live  by  investment 
and  those  who  live  by  work ; inasmuch  as,  for  the  cal- 
culable future,  it  should  seem  a reasonable  expectation 
that  this  very  considerable  fringe  of  dependents  and 
pseudo-independents  will  abide  by  their  time-tried  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  honest  living,  through  good  days  and 
evil,  and  cast  in  their  lot  unreservedly  with  that  reputable 
body  to  whom  the  control  of  trade  and  industry  by  in- 
vestment assigns  the  usufruct  of  the  community’s  pro- 
ductive powers. 

Something  has  already  been  said  of  the  prospective 
breeding  of  pedigreed  gentlefolk  under  the  projected 
regime  of  peace.  Pedigree,  for  the  purpose  in  hand,  is  a 
pecuniary  attribute  and  is,  of  course,  a product  of  funded 
wealth,  more  or  less  ancient.  Virtually  ancient  pedigree 
can  be  procured  by  well-advised  expenditure  on  the  con- 
spicuous amenities ; that  is  to  say  pedigree  effectually 
competent  as  a background  of  current  gentility.  Gentle- 
folk of  such  syncopated  pedigree  may  have  to  walk  cir- 
cumspectly, of  course;  but  their  being  in  this  manner 
put  on  their  good  behavior  should  tend  to  heighten  their 
effectual  serviceability  as  gentlefolk,  by  inducing  a single- 
mindedness  of  gentility  beyond  what  can  fairly  be  ex- 
pected of  those  who  are  already  secure  in  their  tenure. 

Except  conventionally,  there  is  no  hereditary  differ- 
ence between  the  standard  gentlefolk  and,  say,  their 
“menial  servants,”  or  the  general  population  of  the  farms 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


351 


and  the  industrial  towns.  This  is  a well-established  com- 
monplace among  ethnological  students ; which  has,  of 
course,  nothing  to  say  with  respect  to  the  conventionally 
distinct  lines  of  descent  of  the  “Best  Families.”  These 
Best  Families  are  nowise  distinguishable  from  the  com- 
mon run  in  point  of  hereditary  traits ; the  dilference  that 
makes  the  gentleman  and  the  gentlewoman  being  wholly 
a matter  of  habituation  during  the  individual’s  lifetime. 
It  is  something  of  a distasteful  necessity  to  call  attention 
to  this  total  absence  of  native  difference  between  the  well- 
born and  the  common,  but  it  is  a necessity  of  the  argu- 
ment in  hand,  and  the  recalling  of  it  may,  therefore,  be 
overlooked  for  once  in  a way.  There  is  no  harm  and  no 
annoyance  intended.  The  point  of  it  all  is  that,  on  the 
premises  which  this  state  of  the  case  affords,  the  body 
of  gentlefolk  created  by  such  an  accumulation  of  invested 
wealth  will  have  no  less  of  an  effectual  cultural  value 
than  they  would  have  had  if  their  virtually  ancient  pedi- 
gree had  been  actual. 

At  this  point,  again,  the  experience  of  the  Victorian 
peace  and  the  functioning  of  its  gentlefolk  come  in  to 
indicate  what  may  fairly  be  hoped  for  in  this  way  under 
this  prospective  regime  of  peace  at  large.  But  with  the 
difference  that  the  scale  of  things  is  to  be  larger,  the 
pace  swifter,  and  the  volume  and  dispersion  of  this  pros- 
pective leisure  class  somewhat  wider.  The  work  of  this 
leisure  class — and  there  is  neither  paradox  nor  inconsis- 
tency in  the  phrase — should  be  patterned  on  the  lines 
worked  out  by  their  prototypes  of  the  Victorian  time,  but 
with  some  appreciable  accentuation  in  the  direction  of 
what  chiefly  characterised  the  leisure  class  of  that  era  of 
tranquility.  The  characteristic  feature  to  which  at- 
tention naturally  turns  at  this  suggestion  is  the  tranquility 


352 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


that  has  marked  that  body  of  gentlefolk  and  their  code 
of  clean  and  honest  living.  Another  word  than  “tranquil- 
ity” might  be  hit  upon  to  designate  this  characteristic 
animus,  but  any  other  word  that  should  at  all  adequately 
serve  the  turn  would  carry  a less  felicitous  suggestion  of 
those  upper-class  virtues  that  have  constituted  the  sub- 
stantial worth  of  the  Victorian  gentleman.  The  conscious 
worth  of  these  gentlefolk  has  been  a beautifully  com- 
plete achievement.  It  has  been  an  achievement  of  “faith 
without  works,”  of  course ; but,  needless  to  say,  that  is 
as  it  should  be,  also  of  course.  The  place  of  gentlefolk 
in  the  economy  of  Nature  is  tracelessly  to  consume  the 
community’s  net  product,  and  in  doing  so  to  set  a standard 
of  decent  expenditure  for  the  others  emulatively  to  work 
up  to  as  near  as  may  be.  It  is  scarcely  conceivable  that 
this  could  have  been  done  in  a more  unobtrustively  ef- 
ficient manner,  or  with  a more  austerely  virtuous  convic- 
tion of  well-doing,  than  by  the  gentlefolk  bred  of  the 
Victorian  peace.  So  also,  in  turn,  it  is  not  to  be  believed 
that  the  prospective  breed  of  gentlefolk  derivable  from 
the  net  product  of  the  pacific  nations  under  the  promised 
regime  of  peace  at  large  will  prove  in  any  degree  less 
effective  for  the  like  ends.  More  will  be  required  of  them 
in  the  way  of  a traceless  consumption  of  superfluities 
and  an  unexampled  expensive  standard  of  living.  But 
this  situation  that  so  faces  them  may  be  construed  as 
a larger  opportunity,  quite  as  well  as  a more  difficult  task. 

A theoretical  exposition  of  the  place  and  cultural  value 
of  a leisure  class  in  modern  life  would  scarcely  be  in  place 
here ; and  it  has  also  been  set  out  in  some  detail  else- 
where.^ For  the  purpose  in  hand  it  may  be  sufficient  to 

iCf.  The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class,  especially  ck  v.— ix. 
and  xiv. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


353 


recall  that  the  canons  of  taste  and  the  standards  of  valu- 
ation ^vorked  out  and  inculcated  by  leisure-class  life  have 
in  all  ages  run,  with  unbroken  consistency,  to  pecuniary 
waste  and  personal  futility.  In  its  economic  bearing, 
and  particularly  in  its  immediate  bearing  on  the  material 
well-being  of  the  community  at  large,  the  leadership  of 
the  leisure  class  can.  scarcely  be  called  by  a less  deroga- 
tory epithet  than  “untoward.”  But  that  is  not  the  whole 
of  the  case,  and  the  other  side  should  be  heard.  The 
leisure-class  life  of  tranquility,  running  detached  as  it  does 
above  the  turmoil  out  of  which  the  material  of  their 
sustenance  is  derived,  enables  a growth  of  all  those  virtues 
that  mark,  or  make,  the  gentleman ; and  that  affect  the 
life  of  the  underlying  community  throughout,  pervasively, 
by  imitation ; leading  to  a standardisation  of  the  everyday 
proprieties  on  a,  presumably,  higher  level  of  urbanity  and 
integrity  than  might  be  expected  to  result  in  the  absence 
of  this  prescriptive  model. 

Integer  vitae  scelerisque  purus,  the  gentleman  of  as- 
sured station  turns  a placid  countenance  to  all  those  petty 
vexations  of  breadwinning  that  touch  him  not.  Serenely 
and  with  an  impassive  fortitude  he  faces  those  common 
vicissitudes  of  life  that  are  impotent  to  make  or  mar 
his  material  fortunes  and  that  can  neither  impair  his  crea- 
ture comforts  nor  put  a slur  on  his  good  repute.  So  that 
without  afterthought  he  deals  fairly  in  all  everyday  con- 
junctures of  give  and  take;  for  they  are  at  the  most 
inconsequential  episodes  to  him,  although  the  like  might 
spell  irremediable  disaster  to  his  impecunious  counterfoil 
among  the  common  men  who  have  the  community’s  work 
to  do.  In  short,  he  is  a gentleman,  in  the  best  acceptation 
of  the  word, — unavoidably,  by  force  of  circumstance.  As 
such  his  example  is  of  invaluable  consequence  to  the 
23 


354 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


underlying  community  of  common  folk,  in  that  it  keeps 
before  their  eyes  an  object-lesson  in  habitual  fortitude 
and  visible  integrity  such  as  could  scarcely  have  been  cre- 
ated except  under  such  shelter  from  those  disturbances 
that  would  go  to  mar  habitual  fortitude  and  integrity. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  but  the  high  example  of  the 
Victorian  gentlefolk  has  had  much  to  do  with  stabilising 
the  animus  of  the  British  common  man  on  lines  of  in- 
tegrity and  fair  play.  What  else  and  more  in  the  way  of 
habitual  preconceptions  he  may,  by  competitive  imitation, 
owe  to  the  same  high  source  is  not  immediately  in  ques- 
tion here. 

Recalling  once  more  that  the  canon  of  life  whereby  folk 
are  gentlefolk  sums  itself  up  in  the  requirements  of  pe- 
cuniary waste  and  personal  futility,  and  that  these  re- 
quirements are  indefinitely  extensible,  at  the  same  time 
that  the  management  of  the  community’s  industry  by  in- 
vestment for  a profit  enables  the  owners  of  invested 
wealth  to  divert  to  their  own  use  the  community’s  net 
product,  wherewith  to  meet  these  requirements,  it  follows 
that  the  community  at  large  which  provides  this  output  of 
product  will  be  allowed  so  much  as  is  required  by  their 
necessary  standard  of  living, — with  an  unstable  margin 
of  error  in  the  adjustment.  This  margin  of  error  should 
tend  continually  to  grow  narrower  as  the  businesslike 
management  of  industry  grows  more  efficient  with  ex- 
perience; but  it  will  also  continually  be  disturbed  in  the 
contrary  sense  by  innovations  of  a technological  nature 
that  require  continual  readjustment.  This  margin  is 
probably  not  to  be  got  rid  of,  though  it  may  be  expected 
to  become  less  considerable  under  more  settled  condi- 
tions. 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


355 


It  should  also  not  be  overlooked  that  the  standard  of 
living  here  spoken  of  as  necessarily  to  be  allowed  the 
working  population  by  no  means  coincides  with  the 
“physical  subsistence  minimum,”  from  which  in  fact  it 
always  departs  by  something  appreciable.  The  necessary 
standard  of  living  of  the  working  community  is  in  fact 
made  up  of  two  distinguishable  factors : the  subsistence 
minimum,  and  the  requirements  of  decorously  wasteful 
consumption — the  “decencies  of  life.”  These  decencies 
are  no  less  requisite  than  the  physical  necessaries,  in 
point  of  workday  urgency,  and  their  amount  is  a matter  of 
use  and  wont.  This  composite  standard  of  living  is  a 
practical  minimum,  below  which  consumption  will  not 
fall,  except  by  a fluctuating  margin  of  error;  the  effect 
being  the  same,  in  point  of  necessary  consumption,  as  if 
it  were  all  of  the  nature  of  a physical  subsistence  mini- 
mum. 

Loosely  speaking,  the  arrangement  should  leave  nothing 
appreciable  over,  after  the  requirements  of  genteel  waste 
and  of  the  workday  standard  of  consumption  have  been 
met.  From  which  in  turn  it  should  follow  that  the  rest 
of  what  is  comprised  under  the  general  caption  of  “cul- 
ture” will  find  a place  only  in  the  interstices  of  leisure- 
class  expenditure  and  only  at  the  hands  of  aberrant  mem- 
bers of  the  class  of  the  gently-bred.  The  working  popu- 
lation should  have  no  effectual  margin  of  time,  energy  or 
means  for  other  pursuits  than  the  day’s  work  in  the  service 
of  the  price-system;  so  that  aberrant  individuals  in  this 
class,  who  might  by  native  propensity  incline,  e.  g.,  to 
pursue  the  sciences  or  the  fine  arts,  should  have  (vir- 
tually) no  chance  to  make  good.  It  would  be  a virtual 
suppression  of  such  native  gifts  among  the  common  folk, 
not  a definitive  and  all-inclusive  suppression.  The  state  of 


356 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


the  case  under  the  Victorian  peace  may,  again,  be  taken 
in  illustration  of  the  point;  although  under  the  pre- 
sumably more  effectual  control  to  be  looked  for  in  the 
pacific  future  the  margin  might  reasonably  be  expected  to 
run  somewhat  narrower,  so  that  this  virtual  suppression  of 
cultural  talent  among  the  common  men  should  come  near- 
er a complete  suppression. 

The  working  of  that  free  initiative  that  makes  the  ad- 
vance of  civilisation,  and  also  the  greater  part  of  its 
conservation,  would  in  effect  be  allowed  only  in  the  er- 
ratic members  of  the  kept  classes ; where  at  the  same 
time  it  would  have  to  work  against  the  side-draught  of 
conventional  usage,  which  discountenances  any  pursuit 
that  is  not  visibly  futile  according  to  some  accepted  man- 
ner of  futility.  Now  under  the  prospective  perfect  work- 
ing of  the  price-system,  bearers  of  the  banners  of  civil- 
isation could  effectually  be  drawn  only  from  the  kept 
classes,  the  gentlefolk  who  alone  would  have  the  disposal 
of  such  free  income  as  is  required  for  work  that  has 
no  pecuniary  value.  And  numerically  the  gentlefolk  are 
an  inconsiderable  fraction  of  the  population.  The  supply 
of  competently  gifted  bearers  of  the  community’s  culture 
would  accordingly  be  limited  to  such  as  could  be  drawn 
by  self-selection  from  among  this  inconsiderable  propor- 
tion of  the  community  at  large. 

It  may  be  recalled  that  in  point  of  heredity,  and  there- 
fore in  point  of  native  fitness  for  the  maintenance  and 
advance  of  civilisation,  there  is  no  difference  between  the 
gentlefolk  and  the  populace  at  large;  or  at  least  there  is 
no  difference  of  such  a nature  as  to  count  in  abatement 
of  the  proposition  set  down  above.  Some  slight,  but  after 
all  inconsequential,  difference  there  may  be,  but  such 
difference  ^as  there  is,  if  any,  rather  counts  against  the 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


357 


gentlefolk  as  keepers  of  the  cultural  advance.  The  gen- 
tlefolk are  derived  from  business ; the  gentleman  repre- 
sents a filial  generation  of  the  businessman ; and  if  the 
class  typically  is  gifted  with  any  peculiar  hereditary  traits, 
therefore,  they  should  presumably  be  such  as  typically 
mark  the  successful  businessman — astute,  prehensile, 
unscrupulous.  For  a generation  or  two,  perhaps  to  the 
scriptural  third  and  fourth  generation,  it  is  possible  that 
a diluted  rapacity  and  cunning  may  continue  to  mark 
the  businessman’s  well-born  descendants ; but  these  are 
not  serviceable  traits  for  the  conservation  and  advance- 
ment of  the  community’s  cultural  heritage.  So  that  no 
consideration  of  special  hereditary  fitness  in  the  well- 
born need  be  entertained  in  this  connection. 

As  to  the  limitation  imposed  by  the  price-system  on  the 
supply  of  candidates  suited  by  native  gift  for  the  human 
work  of  civilisation ; it  would  no  doubt,  be  putting  the 
figure  extravagantly  high  to  say  that  the  gentlefolk,  prop- 
erly speaking,  comprise  as  much  as  ten  percent  of  the 
total  population ; perhaps  something  less  than  one-half 
of  that  percentage  would  still  seem  a gross  overstatement. 
But,  to  cover  loose  ends  and  vagrant  cases,  the  gentle- 
folk may  for  the  purpose  be  credited  with  so  high  a 
percentage  of  the  total  population.  If  ten  percent  be  al- 
lowed, as  an  outside  figure,  it  follows  that  the  community’s 
scientists,  artists,  scholars,  and  the  like  individuals  given 
over  to  the  workday  pursuits  of  the  human  spirit,  are 
by  conventional  restriction  to  be  drawn  from  one-tenth 
of  the  current  supply  of  persons  suited  by  native  gift  for 
these  pursuits.  Or  as  it  may  also  be  expressed,  in  so 
far  as  the  projected  scheme  takes  effect  it  should  result 
in  the  suppression  of  nine  (or  more)  out  of  every  ten 
persons  available  for  the  constructive  work  of  civilisa- 


358 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


tion.  The  cultural  consequences  to  be  looked  for,  there- 
fore, should  be  quite  markedly  of  the  conservative  order. 

Of  course,  in  actual  efifect,  the  retardation  or  repres- 
sion of  civilisation  by  this  means,  as  calculated  on  these 
premises,  should  reasonably  be  expected  to  count  up  to 
something  appreciably  more  than  nine-tenths  of  the  gains 
that  might  presumably  be  achieved  in  the  conceivable  ab- 
sence of  the  price-system  and  the  regime  of  investment. 
All  work  of  this  kind  has  much  of  the  character  of  team- 
work; so  that  the  efforts  of  isolated  individuals  count  for 
little,  and  a few  working  in  more  or  less  of  concert  and 
understanding  will  count  for  proportionally  much  less 
than  many  working  in  concert.  The  endeavours  of  the 
individuals  engaged  count  cumulatively,  to  such  effect  that 
doubling  their  forces  will  more  than  double  the  aggregate 
efficiency;  and  conversely,  reducing  the  number  will  re- 
duce the  effectiveness  of  their  work  by  something  more 
than  the  simple  numerical  proportion.  Indeed,  an  undue 
reduction  of  numbers  in  such  a case  may  lead  to  the  total 
defeat  of  the  few  that  are  left,  and  the  best  endeavours  of 
a dwindling  remnant  may  be  wholly  nugatory.  There  is 
needed  a sense  of  community  and  solidarity,  without 
which  the  assurance  necessary  to  the  work  is  bound  to 
‘ falter  and  dwindle  out ; and  there  is  also  needed  a degree 
of  popular  countenance,  not  to  be  had  by  isolated  individ- 
uals engaged  in  an  unconventional  pursuit  of  things  that 
are  neither  to  be  classed  as  spendthrift  decorum  nor  as 
merchantable  goods.  In  this  connection  an  isolated  one 
does  not  count  for  one,  and  more  than  the  critical  mini- 
mum will  count  for  several  per  capita.  It  is  a case  where 
the  “minimal  dose”  is  wholly  inoperative. 

There  is  not  a little  reason  to  believe  that  consequent 
upon  the  installation  of  the  projected  regime  of  peace 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


359 


at  large  and  secure  investment  the  critical  point  in  the 
repression  of  talent  will  very  shortly  be  reached  and 
passed,  so  that  the  principle  of  the  “minimal  dose”  will 
come  to  apply.  The  point  may  readily  be  illustrated  by 
the  case  of  many  British  and  American  towns  and  neigh- 
bourhoods during  the  past  few  decades  ; where  the  domi- 
nant price-system  and  its  commercial  standards  of  truth 
and  beauty  have  over-ruled  all  inclination  to  cultural 
sanity  and  put  it  definitively  in  abeyance.  The  cultural, 
or  perhaps  the  conventional,  residue  left  over  in  these 
cases  where  civilisation  has  gone  stale  through  inefficien- 
cy of  the  minimal  dose  is  not  properly  to  be  found  fault 
with ; it  is  of  a blameless  character,  conventionally ; nor  is 
there  any  intention  here  to  cast  aspersion  on  the  desolate. 
The  like  effects  of  the  like  causes  are  to  be  seen  in  the 
American  colleges  and  universities,  where  business  prin- 
ciples have  supplanted  the  pursuit  of  learning,  and  where 
the  commercialisation  of  aims,  ideals,  tastes,  occupations 
and  personnel  is  following  much  the  same  lines  that  have 
led  so  many  of  the  country  towns  effectually  outside  the 
cultural  pale.  The  American  university  or  college  is  com- 
ing to  be  an  outlier  of  the  price-system,  in  point  of  aims, 
standards  and  personnel ; hitherto  the  tradition  of  learn- 
ing as  a trait  of  civilisation,  as  distinct  from  business,  has 
not  been  fully  displaced,  although  it  is  now  coming  to 
face  the  passage  of  the  minimal  dose.  The  like,  in  a 
degree,  is  apparently  true  latterly  for  many  English, 
and  still  more  evidently  for  many  German  schools. 

In  these  various  instances  of  what  may  be  called  dry- 
rot  or  local  blight  on  the  civilised  world’s  culture  the 
decline  appears  to  be  due  not  to  a positive  infection  of 
a maligant  sort,  so  much  as  to  a failure  of  the  active 
cultural  ferment,  which  has  fallen  below  the  critical  point 


360 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


of  efficacy;  perhaps  through  an  unintended  refusal  of  a 
livelihood  to  persons  given  over  to  cultivating  the  ele- 
ments of  civilisation;  perhaps  through  the  conventional 
disallowance  of  the  pursuit  of  any  other  ends  than  com- 
petitive gain  and  competitive  spending.  Evidently  it  is 
something  much  more  comprehensive  in  this  nature  that 
is  reasonably  to  be  looked  for  under  the  prospective 
regime  of  peace,  in  case  the  price-system  gains  that  farther 
impetus  and  warrant  which  it  should  come  in  for  if  the 
rights  of  ownership  and  investment  stand  over  intact, 
and  so  come  to  enjoy  the  benefit  of  a further  improved 
state  of  the  industrial  arts  and  a further  enlarged  scale 
of  operation  and  enhanced  rate  of  turnover. 

To  turn  back  to  the  point  from 'which  this  excursion 
branched  off.  It  has  been  presumed  all  the  while  that 
the  technological  equipment,  or  the  state  of  the  industrial 
arts,  must  continue  to  advance  under  the  conditions  of- 
fered by  this  regime  of  peace  at  large.  But  the  last  few 
paragraphs  will  doubtless  suggest  that  such  a single- 
minded  addiction  to  competitive  gain  and  competitive 
spending  as  the  stabilised  and  amplified  price-system 
would  enjoin,  must  lead  to  an  effectual  retardation,  per- 
haps to  a decline,  of  those  material  sciences  on  which 
modern  technology  draws ; and  that  the  state  of  the  in- 
dustrial arts  should  therefore  cease  to  advance,  if  only 
the  scheme  of  investment  and  businesslike  sabotage  can 
be  made  sufficiently  secure.  That  such  may  be  the  out- 
come is  a contingency  which  the  argument  will  have  to 
meet  and  to  allow  for;  but  it  is  after  all  a contingency 
that  need  not  be  expected  to  derange  the  sequence  of 
events,  except  in  the  way  of  retardation.  Even  without 
further  advance  in  technological  expedients  or  in  the 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


361 


relevant  material  sciences,  there  will  still  necessarily 
ensue  an  effectual  advance  in  the  industrial  arts,  in  the 
sense  that  further  organisation  and  enlargement  of  the 
material  equipment  and  industrial  processes  on  lines  al- 
ready securely  known  and  not  to  be  forgotten  must 
bring  an  effectually  enhanced  efficiency  of  the  industrial 
process  as  a whole. 

In  illustration,  it  is  scarcely  to  be  asumed  even  as  a 
tentative  hypothesis  that  the  system  of  transport  and  com- 
munication will  not  undergo  extension  and  improvement 
on  the  lines  already  familiar,  even  in  the  absence  of  new 
technological  contrivances.  At  the  same  time  a continued 
increase  of  population  is  to  be  counted  on ; which  has,  for 
the  purpose  in  hand,  much  the  same  effect  as  an  advance 
in  the  industrial  arts.  Human  contact  and  mutual  under- 
standing will  necessarily  grow  wider  and  closer,  and  will 
have  its  effect  on  the  habits  of  thought  prevalent  in  the 
communities  that  are  to  live  under  the  promised  regime 
of  peace.  The  system  of  transport  and  communication 
having  to  handle  a more  voluminous  and  exacting  traffic, 
in  the  service  of  a larger  and  more  compact  population, 
will  have  to  be  organised  and  administered  on  mechani- 
cally drawn  schedules  of  time,  place,  volume,  velocity, 
and  price,  of  a still  more  exacting  accuracy  than  hither- 
to. The  like  will  necessarily  apply  throughout  the  in- 
dustrial occupations  that  employ  extensive  plant  or  pro- 
cesses, or  that  articulate  with  industrial  processes  of  that 
nature;  which  will  necessarily  comprise  a larger  pro- 
portion of  the  industrial  process  at  large  than  hitherto. 

As  has  already  been  remarked  more  than  once  in  the 
course  of  the  argument,  a population  that  lives  and  does 
its  work,  and  such  play  as  is  allowed  it,  in  and  by  an 
exactingly  articulate  mechanical  system  of  this  kind  will 


362 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


necessarily  be  an  “intelligent”  people,  in  the  colloquial 
sense  of  the  word;  that  is  to  say  it  will  necessarily  be  a 
people  that  uses  printed  matter  freely  and  that  has  some 
familiarity  with  the  elements  of  those  material  sciences 
that  underlie  this  mechanically  organised  system  of  ap- 
pliances and  processes.  Such  a population  lives  by  and 
within  the  framework  of  the  mechanistic  logic,  and  is  in 
a fair  way  to  lose  faith  in  any  proposition  that  can  not  be 
stated  convincingly  in  terms  of  this  mechanistic  logic. 
Superstitions  are  liable  to  lapse  by  neglect  or  disuse  in 
such  a community;  that  is  to  say  propositions  of  a non- 
mechanistic  complexion  are  liable  to  insensible  dises- 
tablishment in  such  a case ; “superstition”  in  these  prem- 
ises coming  to  signify  whatever  is  not  of  this  mechanistic, 
or  “materialistic”  character.  An  exception  to  this  broad 
characterisation  of  non-mechanistic  propositions  as  “sup- 
erstition” would  be  matters  that  are  of  the  nature  of  an 
immediate  deliverance  of  the  senses  or  of  the  aesthetic 
sensibilities. 

By  a simile  it  might  be  said  that  what  so  falls  under 
the  caption  of  “superstition”  in  such  a case  is  subject  to 
decay  by  inanition.  It  should  not  be  difficult  to  conceive 
the  general  course  of  such  a decay  of  superstitions  under 
this  unremitting  discipline  of  mechanistic  habits  of  life. 
The  recent  past  offers  an  illustration,  in  the  unemotional 
progress  of  decay  that  has  overtaken  religious  beliefs  in 
the  more  civilised  countries,  and  more  particularly  among 
the  intellectually  trained  workmen  of  the  mechanical  in- 
dustries. The  elimination  of  such  non-mechanistic  prop- 
ositions of  the  faith  has  been  visibly  going  on,  but  it 
has  not  worked  out  on  any  uniform  plan,  nor  has  it  over- 
taken any  large  or  compact  body  of  people  consistently 
or  abruptly,  being  of  the  nature  of  obsolescence  rather 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


363 


than  of  set  repudiation.  But  in  a slack  and  unreflecting 
fashion  the  divestment  has  gone  on  until  the  aggregate 
effect  is  unmistakable. 

A similar  divestment  of  superstitions  is  reasonably  to 
be  looked  for  also  in  that  domain  of  preconceptions  that 
lies  between  the  supernatural  and  the  mechanistic.  Chief 
among  these  time-warped  preconceptions — or  supersti- 
tions— that  so  stand  over  out  of  the  alien  past  among 
these  democratic  peoples  is  the  institution  of  property.  As 
is  true  of  preconceptions  touching  the  supernatural  veri- 
ties, so  here  too  the  article  of  use  and  wont  in  question 
will  not  bear  formulation  in  mechanistic  terms  and  is 
not  congruous  with  that  mechanistic  logic  that  is  inconti- 
nently bending  the  habits  of  thought  of  the  common  man 
more  and  more  consistently  to  its  own  bent.  There  is, 
of  course,  the  difference  that  while  no  class — apart  from 
the  servants  of  the  church — have  a material  interest  in 
the  continued  integrity  of  the  articles  of  the  supernatural 
faith,  there  is  a strong  and  stubborn  material  interest 
bound  up  with  the  maintenance  of  this  article  of  the 
pecuniary  faith;  and  the  class  in  whom  this  material 
interest  vests  are  also,  in  effect,  invested  with  the  coer- 
cive powers  of  the  law. 

The  law,  and  the  popular  preconceptions  that  give  the 
law  its  binding  force,  go  to  uphold  the  established  usage 
and  the  established  prerogatives  on  this  head ; and  the 
disestablishment  of  the  rights  of  property  and  investment 
therefore  is  not  a simple  matter  of  obsolescence  through 
neglect.  It  may  confidently  be  counted  on  that  all  the 
apparatus  of  the  law  and  all  the  coercive  agencies  of 
law  and  order,  will  be  brought  in  requisition  to  uphold 
the  ancient  rights  of  ownership,  whenever  any  move  is 
made  toward  their  disallowance  or  restriction.  But  then, 


364 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


on  the  other  hand,  the  movement  to  disallow  or  diminish 
the  prerogatives  of  ownership  is  also  not  to  take  the  in- 
nocuous shape  of  unstudied  neglect.  So  soon,  or  rather 
so  far,  as  the  common  man  comes  to  realise  that  these 
rights  of  ownership  and  investment  uniformly  work  to 
his  material  detriment,  at  the  same  time  that  he  has  lost 
the  “will  to  believe”  in  any  argument  that  does  not  run 
in  terms  of  the  mechanistic  logic,  it  is  reasonable  to 
expect  that  he  will  take  a stand  on  this  matter ; and  it  is 
more  than  likely  that  the  stand  taken  will  be  of  an  un- 
compromising kind, — presumably  something  in  the  nature 
of  the  stand  once  taken  by  recalcitrant  Englishmen  in  pro- 
test against  the  irresponsible  rule  of  the  Stuart  sovereign. 
It  is  also  not  likely  that  the  beneficiaries  under  these 
proprietary  rights  will  yield  their  ground  at  all  amicably ; 
all  the  more  since  they  are  patently  within  their  authentic 
rights  in  insisting  on  full  discretion  in  the  disposal  of  their 
own  possessions ; very  much  as  Charles  I or  James  II 
once  were  within  their  prescriptive  right, — which  had 
little  to  say  in  the  outcome. 

Even  apart  from  “time  immemorial”  and  the  patent 
authenticity  of  the  institution,  there  were  and  are  many 
cogent  arguments  to  be  alleged  in  favor  of  the  position  for 
which  the  Stuart  sovereigns  and  their  spokesmen  con- 
tended. So  there  are  and  will  be  many,  perhaps  more, 
cogent  reasons  to  be  alleged  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  established  law  and  order  in  respect  of  the  rights  of 
ownership  and  investment.  Not  least  urgent,  nor  least 
real,  among  these  arguments  is  the  puzzling  question  of 
what  to  put  in  the  place  of  these  rights  and  of  the 
methods  of  control  based  on  them,  ver>'  much  as  the 
analogous  question  puzzled  the  public-spirited  men  of  the 
Stuart  times.  All  of  which  goes  to  argue  that  there  may 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


365 


be  expected  to  arise  a conjuncture  of  perplexities  and 
complications,  as  well  as  a division  of  interests  and  claims. 
To  which  should  be  added  that  the  division  is  likely  to 
come  to  a head  so  soon  as  the  balance  of  forces  between 
the  two  parties  in  interest  becomes  doubtful,  so  that  either 
party  comes  to  surmise  that  the  success  of  its  own  aims 
may  depend  on  its  own  efforts.  And  as  happens  where 
two  antagonistic  parties  are  each  convinced  of  the  justice 
of  its  cause,  and  in  the  absence  of  an  umpire,  the  logical 
recourse  is  the  wager  of  battle. 

Granting  the  premises,  there  should  be  no  reasonable 
doubt  as  to  this  eventual  cleavage  between  those  who 
own  and  those  who  do  not;  and  of  the  premises  the  only 
item  that  is  not  already  an  accomplished  fact  is  the  in- 
stallation of  peace  at  large.  The  rest  of  what  goes  into 
the  argument  is  the  well-known  modern  state  of  the  in- 
dustrial arts,  and  the  equally  well-known  price-system ; 
which,  in  combination,  give  its  character  to  the  modern 
state  of  business  enterprise.  It  is  only  an  unusually 
broad  instance  of  an  institutional  arrangement  which  has 
in  the  course  of  time  and  changing  conditions  come  to 
work  at  cross  purposes  with  that  underlying  ground  of 
institutional  arrangements  that  takes  form  in  the  com- 
monplace aphorism.  Live  and  let  live.  With  change  set- 
ting in  the  direction  familiar  to  all  men  today,  it  is  only 
a question  of  limited  time  when  the  discrepancy  will 
reach  a critical  pass,  and  the  installation  of  peace  may 
be  counted  on  to  hasten  this  course  of  things. 

That  a decision  will  be  sought  by  recourse  to  forcible 
measures,  is  also  scarcely  open  to  question;  since  the  es- 
tablished law  and  order  provides  for  a resort  to  coercion 
in  the  enforcement  of  these  prescriptive  rights,  and  since 
both  parties  in  interest,  in  this  as  in  other  cases,  are 


366 


On  the  Nature  of  Peace 


persuaded  of  the  justice  of  their  claims.  A decision  either 
way  is  an  intolerable  iniquity  in  the  eyes  of  the  losing 
side.  History  teaches  that  in  such  a quarrel  the  recourse 
has  always  been  to  force. 

History  teaches  also,  but  with  an  inflection  of  doubt, 
that  the  outworn  institution  in  such  a conjuncture  faces 
disestablishment.  At  least,  so  men  like  to  believe.  What 
the  experience  of  history  does  not  leave  in  doubt  is  the 
grave  damage,  discomfort  and  shame  incident  to  the 
displacement  of  such  an  institutional  discrepancy  by  such 
recourse  to  force.  What  further  appears  to  be  clear  in 
the  premises,  at  least  to  the  point  of  a strong  presumption, 
is  that  in  the  present  case  the  decision,  or  the  choice,  lies 
between  two  alternatives : either  the  price-system  and 
its  attendant  business  enterprise  will  yield  and  pass  out; 
or  the  pacific  nations  will  conserve  their  pecuniary  scheme 
of  law  and  order  at  the  cost  of  returning  to  a war  footing 
and  letting  their  owners  preserve  the  rights  of  ownership 
by  force  of  arms. 

The  reflection  obviously  suggests  itself  that  this  pros- 
pect of  consequences  to  follow  from  the  installation  of 
peace  at  large  might  well  be  taken  into  account  beforehand 
by  those  who  are  aiming  to  work  out  an  enduring  peace. 
It  has  appeared  in  the  course  of  the  argument  that  the 
preservation  of  the  present  pecuniary  law  and  order,  with 
all  its  incidents  of  ownership  and  investment,  is  incompa- 
tible with  an  unwarlike  state  of  peace  and  security. 
This  current  scheme  of  investment,  business,  and  sabot- 
age, should  have  an  appreciably  better  chance  of  survival 
in  the  long  run  if  the  present  conditions  of  warlike  prep- 
aration and  national  insecurity  were  maintained,  or  if 
the  projected  peace  were  left  in  a somewhat  problemati- 
cal state,  sufficiently  precarious  to  keep  national  animosi- 


Peace  and  the  Price  System 


367 


ties  alert,  and  thereby  to  the  neglect  of  domestic  interests, 
particularly  of  such  interests  as  touch  the  popular  well- 
being. On  the  other  hand,  it  has  also  appeared  that  the 
cause  of  peace  and  its  perpetuation  might  be  materially 
advanced  if  precautions  were  taken  beforehand  to  put 
out  of  the  way  as  much  as  may  be  of  those  discrepancies 
of  interest  and  sentiment  between  nations  and  between 
classes  which  make  for  dissension  and  eventual  hostili- 
ties. 

So,  if  the  projectors  of  this  peace  at  large  are  in  any 
degree  inclined  to  seek  concessive  terms  on  which  the 
peace  might  hopefully  be  made  enduring,  it  should  evi- 
dently be  part  of  their  endeavours  from  the  outset  to  put 
events  in  train  for  the  present  abatement  and  eventual 
abrogation  of  the  rights  of  ownership  and  of  the  price- 
system  in  which  these  rights  take  effect.  A hopeful  be- 
ginning along  this  line  would  manifestly  be  the  neutral- 
isation of  all  pecuniary  rights  of  citizenship,  as  has  been 
indicated  in  an  earlier  passage.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
peace  is  not  desired  at  the  cost  of  relinquishing  the  scheme 
of  competitive  gain  and  competitive  spending,  the  pro- 
moters of  peace  should  logically  observe  due  precaution 
and  move  only  so  far  in  the  direction  of  a peaceable  set- 
tlement as  would  result  in  a sufficiently  unstable  equili- 
brium of  mutual  jealousies ; such  as  might  expeditiously 
be  upset  whenever  discontent  with  pecuniary  affairs 
should  come  to  threaten  this  established  scheme  of  pe- 
cuniary prerogatives. 


